ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 1. The petitioner, State of Wisconsin, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision reversing a judgment convicting Robert Post of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, as a fifth offense.1 The State asserts that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Post's deviations within one lane of travel, with nothing more, failed to provide the police officer with the reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop of the vehicle. The State, in essence, asks for a bright-line rule that repeated weaving within a single lane provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop.
¶ 2. We determine that weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of [5]*5a vehicle. However, we also determine that under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer did have reasonable suspicion in this case, and that the stop did not violate Post's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
HH
¶ 3. In February 2004, Sauk Prairie police sergeant Josh Sherman, who had six years of experience as a police officer, was on routine patrol on Water Street in Sauk City. The northbound side of Water Street is approximately 22-24 feet wide from the yellow center line to the curb. It contains a traffic lane and parking lane. There is no line or marking delineating the traffic lane from the parking lane. The parking lane is bounded by the curb.
¶ 4. Sergeant Sherman testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m., he was traveling southbound on Water Street and observed two cars traveling northbound. The second vehicle, a Chevrolet Cavalier driven by Post, was "canted" such that it was driving at least partially in the unmarked parking lane.
¶ 5. After the two cars passed, Sherman turned around to follow them. He did not lose sight of the cars and caught up to them after six or seven blocks. While following the cars, Sherman observed Post's car traveling in a smooth "S-type" pattern. Sherman described the movement as "a smooth motion toward the right part of the parking lane and back toward the center line." He stated that Post's car moved approximately ten feet from right to left within the northbound lane, coming within 12 inches of the center line and to within six to eight feet of the curb. Post's car repeated the [6]*6S-pattern several times over two blocks. The movement was neither erratic nor jerky, and the car did not come close to hitting any other vehicles or to hitting the curb at the edge of the parking lane. Sherman testified that the manner of Post's driving was a "clue that he may be intoxicated."
¶ 6. After being followed by Sherman for two blocks, both cars signaled and made a left turn onto a cross street. The first car turned into the oncoming traffic lane. The second car, driven by Post, made a proper turn. Sherman activated his emergency lights and both cars pulled over.
¶ 7. Relying on this court's decision in State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996), the circuit court determined that Sherman's testimony of "unusual driving" and "drifting even within one's own lane" provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that slight deviations within a single travel lane do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated.
II
¶ 8. In this case we examine whether a traffic stop violated Post's constitutional rights because it was not based on reasonable suspicion. The question of whether a traffic stop is reasonable is a question of constitutional fact. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶ 19, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899. A question of constitutional fact is a mixed question of law and fact to which we apply a two-step standard of review. State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶ 16, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. We review the circuit court's findings of historical fact [7]*7under the clearly erroneous standard, and we review independently the application of those facts to constitutional principles. Id.; State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶ 16, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548.
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¶ 9. This court has never addressed the question of whether a vehicle's weaving within a single lane, without more, provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of that vehicle. We begin our analysis of this question by reviewing the principles underlying investigatory stops.
¶ 10. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons .. . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .. . ."2 In Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed that, [8]*8although investigative stops are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in some circumstances police officers may conduct such stops even where there is no probable cause to make an arrest. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Such a stop must be based on more than an officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Id. at 27. Rather, the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the intrusion of the stop. Id. at 21.
¶ 11. This court adopted the Terry standard for investigative stops in State v. Chambers. 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972). The Wisconsin legislature codified the standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (2005-06).3 In interpreting § 968.24 we apply Terry and cases following Terry. State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 399-400, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983).
¶ 12. Investigative traffic stops are subject to the constitutional reasonableness requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶ 14, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 [9]*9N.W.2d 516. The burden of establishing that an investigative stop is reasonable falls on the state. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 519, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
¶ 13. The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test. The crucial question is whether the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). This common sense approach balances the interests of the State in detecting, preventing, and investigating crime and the rights of individuals to he free from unreasonable intrusions. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 56; Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶ 15; State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).
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ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 1. The petitioner, State of Wisconsin, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision reversing a judgment convicting Robert Post of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, as a fifth offense.1 The State asserts that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Post's deviations within one lane of travel, with nothing more, failed to provide the police officer with the reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop of the vehicle. The State, in essence, asks for a bright-line rule that repeated weaving within a single lane provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop.
¶ 2. We determine that weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of [5]*5a vehicle. However, we also determine that under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer did have reasonable suspicion in this case, and that the stop did not violate Post's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
HH
¶ 3. In February 2004, Sauk Prairie police sergeant Josh Sherman, who had six years of experience as a police officer, was on routine patrol on Water Street in Sauk City. The northbound side of Water Street is approximately 22-24 feet wide from the yellow center line to the curb. It contains a traffic lane and parking lane. There is no line or marking delineating the traffic lane from the parking lane. The parking lane is bounded by the curb.
¶ 4. Sergeant Sherman testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m., he was traveling southbound on Water Street and observed two cars traveling northbound. The second vehicle, a Chevrolet Cavalier driven by Post, was "canted" such that it was driving at least partially in the unmarked parking lane.
¶ 5. After the two cars passed, Sherman turned around to follow them. He did not lose sight of the cars and caught up to them after six or seven blocks. While following the cars, Sherman observed Post's car traveling in a smooth "S-type" pattern. Sherman described the movement as "a smooth motion toward the right part of the parking lane and back toward the center line." He stated that Post's car moved approximately ten feet from right to left within the northbound lane, coming within 12 inches of the center line and to within six to eight feet of the curb. Post's car repeated the [6]*6S-pattern several times over two blocks. The movement was neither erratic nor jerky, and the car did not come close to hitting any other vehicles or to hitting the curb at the edge of the parking lane. Sherman testified that the manner of Post's driving was a "clue that he may be intoxicated."
¶ 6. After being followed by Sherman for two blocks, both cars signaled and made a left turn onto a cross street. The first car turned into the oncoming traffic lane. The second car, driven by Post, made a proper turn. Sherman activated his emergency lights and both cars pulled over.
¶ 7. Relying on this court's decision in State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996), the circuit court determined that Sherman's testimony of "unusual driving" and "drifting even within one's own lane" provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that slight deviations within a single travel lane do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated.
II
¶ 8. In this case we examine whether a traffic stop violated Post's constitutional rights because it was not based on reasonable suspicion. The question of whether a traffic stop is reasonable is a question of constitutional fact. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶ 19, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899. A question of constitutional fact is a mixed question of law and fact to which we apply a two-step standard of review. State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶ 16, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. We review the circuit court's findings of historical fact [7]*7under the clearly erroneous standard, and we review independently the application of those facts to constitutional principles. Id.; State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶ 16, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548.
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¶ 9. This court has never addressed the question of whether a vehicle's weaving within a single lane, without more, provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of that vehicle. We begin our analysis of this question by reviewing the principles underlying investigatory stops.
¶ 10. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons .. . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .. . ."2 In Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed that, [8]*8although investigative stops are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in some circumstances police officers may conduct such stops even where there is no probable cause to make an arrest. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Such a stop must be based on more than an officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Id. at 27. Rather, the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the intrusion of the stop. Id. at 21.
¶ 11. This court adopted the Terry standard for investigative stops in State v. Chambers. 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972). The Wisconsin legislature codified the standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (2005-06).3 In interpreting § 968.24 we apply Terry and cases following Terry. State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 399-400, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983).
¶ 12. Investigative traffic stops are subject to the constitutional reasonableness requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶ 14, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 [9]*9N.W.2d 516. The burden of establishing that an investigative stop is reasonable falls on the state. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 519, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
¶ 13. The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test. The crucial question is whether the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). This common sense approach balances the interests of the State in detecting, preventing, and investigating crime and the rights of individuals to he free from unreasonable intrusions. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 56; Rutzinski, 241 Wis. 2d 729, ¶ 15; State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987). The reasonableness of a stop is determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶ 22, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106; Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 679.
¶ 14. The State contends that Sergeant Sherman had reasonable suspicion to stop Post. It advocates the view that repeated weaving of a motor vehicle within a single lane (absent an obvious innocent explanation) provides the reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. While we agree that the facts of the case give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Post was driving while intoxicated and that the investigative stop was reasonable, we reject the bright-line rule that repeated weaving within a single lane alone gives rise to reasonable suspicion. Rather, our determination is based on the totality of the circumstances, in accord with Wisconsin jurisprudence.
¶ 15. In Waldner, this court addressed the issue of investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion that a [10]*10person is driving while intoxicated. There, a police officer observed the defendant's car traveling at a slow speed. The car stopped at an intersection that had no stop sign or traffic light, turned onto a cross-street, and accelerated "at a high rate of speed" (though not exceeding the speed limit). 206 Wis. 2d at 53. The officer then observed the car pull into a legal parking space, where the defendant opened the car door and poured what appeared to be "a mixture of liquid and ice" from a plastic glass onto the roadway. Id. When the officer pulled near the defendant and identified himself, the defendant began to walk away, at which point the officer made an investigative stop of the defendant. Id. at 53-54.
¶ 16. The defendant in Waldner argued that the stop was unreasonable on the ground that it was based upon the officer's inchoate hunch, and not on a reasonable suspicion. This court determined that the search was based on a reasonable suspicion. It noted that the stop was based on a number of specific, articulable facts, including the car's varying speeds and stopping at an intersection without a stoplight or sign, and the driver's pouring out a cup of liquid and ice. The court recognized that each of these facts alone would be insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion. However, it explained that cumulatively they were sufficient to support an inference that the driver was intoxicated:
Any one of these facts, standing alone, might well be insufficient. But that is not the test we apply. We look to the totality of the facts taken together. The building blocks of fact accumulate. And as they accumulate, reasonable inferences about the cumulative effect can he drawn. In essence, a point is reached where the sum of the whole is greater than the sum of its individual parts. That is what we have here.
Id. at 58.
[11]*11¶ 17. Thus, the court's determination was based on the totality of circumstances rather than on any particular fact. Considered as a whole they constituted reasonable suspicion. Id. at 60-61.
¶ 18. The State's view that repeated weaving within a single lane alone gives an experienced police officer reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop therefore conflicts with the approach articulated in Waldner. The State asks for a bright-line rule, where this court has consistently maintained that the determination of reasonable suspicion is based upon the totality of the circumstances. State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶ 49, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449; Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶ 22; State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139-40, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990); Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 679; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (adopting a totality of circumstances test for determining reasonable suspicion based on anonymous tips).
¶ 19. Further, the State's proffered bright-line rule is problematic because movements that may be characterized as "repeated weaving within a single lane" may, under the totality of the circumstances, fail to give rise to reasonable suspicion. This may be the case, for example, where the "weaving" is minimal or happens very few times over a great distance.4 Courts in a number of other jurisdictions have concluded that weaving within a single lane can be insignificant [12]*12enough that it does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.5 In such cases, weaving within a single lane would not alone warrant a reasonable police officer to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime.
¶ 20. In addition, the rule that weaving within a single lane may alone give rise to reasonable suspicion fails to strike the appropriate balance between the State's interest in detecting, preventing, and investigating crime with the individual's interest in being free from unreasonable intrusions. "[R]epeated weaving within a single lane" is a malleable enough standard that it can be interpreted to cover much innocent conduct. In U.S. v. Lyons, a police officer made an investigatory stop after having seen the defendant's vehicle weave three to four times within a single lane. 7 F.3d 973, 974 (10th Cir. 1993). The court recognized "the universality of drivers' 'weaving' in their lanes." Id. at 976. It therefore cautioned that allowing weaving to justify a vehicle stop may subject many innocent people to an investigation. "Indeed, if failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway or keeping one's eyes on the road were sufficient reasons to suspect a person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be subject each day to an invasion of their privacy." Id.; United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 446 (9th Cir. 2002).
[13]*13¶ 21. Because the standard proffered by the State can be interpreted to cover conduct that many innocent drivers commit, it may subject a substantial portion of the public to invasions of their privacy. It is in effect no standard at all. Adopting it here would allow essentially unfettered discretion and permit the arbitrary invasions of privacy by government officials addressed by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979); State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶ 13, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277; Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 57; Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 672.6
[14]*14¶ 22. Like the State, Post offers a bright-line rule for determining reasonable suspicion. He argues that movements within a lane can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop only where the movements are erratic, unsafe, or illegal.7 We reject this bright-line rule as well.
¶ 23. Post's claim that lateral movements must be erratic, unsafe, or illegal in order to generate reasonable suspicion is belied by our decision in Waldner. In that case, the defendant drove slowly, paused at an intersection without a stoplight or sign, accelerated quickly, and poured liquid and ice from a cup. 206 Wis. 2d at 53. The Waldner court based its conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion on the totality of the circumstances, not on an intermediate determination that the defendant's driving was erratic or unsafe. Moreover, even if one were to interpret the driving in Waldner as erratic or unsafe, there is no reason to conclude that those actions were any more erratic or unsafe than Post's weaving in the present case.
¶ 24. Further, it is clear that driving need not be illegal in order to give rise to reasonable suspicion. As the Waldner court observed, requiring reasonable suspicion to be based upon an observation of unlawful [15]*15conduct would allow investigatory stops only when there was probable cause to make an arrest. Id. at 59. Such a requirement would run counter to the law set forth in Terry, where an officer's investigative stop was based on activity that standing alone fell short of the probable cause necessary to make an arrest. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 59 (citing State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 835, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989)); sec Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23. We therefore determine that a driver's actions need not be erratic, unsafe, or illegal to give rise to reasonable suspicion.
¶ 25. Cases from other jurisdictions support our view that reasonable suspicion does not require erratic, unsafe, or illegal driving, as Post maintains. They also support our view that reasonable suspicion does not follow automatically from repeated weaving within a single lane, as the State advocates. Certainly courts in other jurisdictions have found reasonable suspicion where vehicles weave erratically.8 However, courts also point to other factors, such as pronounced or prolonged weaving9 or other suspicious aspects of [16]*16driving,10 as supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion.
¶ 26. Thus, we adopt neither the bright-line rule proffered by the State that weaving within a single lane may alone give rise to reasonable suspicion, nor the bright-line rule advocated by Post that weaving within a single lane must be erratic, unsafe, or illegal to give rise to reasonable suspicion. Rather, we maintain the well-established principle that reviewing courts must determine whether there was reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop based on the totality of the circumstances.
¶ 27. Having concluded that the determination of whether weaving within a single lane gives rise to reasonable suspicion requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances, we turn to the particular facts of this case. The question we must answer is whether the State has shown that there were "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the intrusion of the stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. While we acknowledge that this case presents a close call, we determine that the movements do warrant the stop.
¶ 28. As in Waldner, the police officer in the present case did not observe any actions that constituted traffic violations or which, considered in isolation, [17]*17provided reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. However, when considered in conjunction with all of the facts and circumstances of the case, Post's driving provided Sherman with reasonable suspicion to believe that Post was driving while intoxicated.
¶ 29. The court of appeals concluded that Post's movements amount to "slight deviations within one lane of travel" and therefore are not sufficient for reasonable suspicion. However, the court of appeals' account is not in accord with the circuit court's rendition. Although the circuit court did not detail the measurements upon which it relied, it does state that Post's vehicle appeared to be "moving between the roadway centerline and parking lane." Moving between the roadway centerline and parking lane is not slight deviation within one's own lane. The circuit court also incorporated by reference Sherman's testimony regarding Post's "drifting and unusual driving." Our read of Sherman's testimony does not support the view that Post's weaving constituted only slight deviation within one lane.
¶ 30. When Sergeant Sherman first observed the two vehicles, he described Post's vehicle as being "canted" into the parking lane. He explained that this meant that Post "[wjasn't traveling in the designated traveling lane." After this initial observation, Sherman turned around to follow the vehicles. He testified that this was when he observed Post's weaving.
Q: [W]ith respect to [Post's vehicle], what did you observe concerning the driving conduct?
A: The vehicle continued to travel northbound, traveling in an S type manner, from the parking lane to the yellow center line.
Q: You say an S type manner. What do you mean?
[18]*18A: The motion that the vehicle was making wasn't jerky. It was a smooth motion toward the right part of the parking lane and back towards the center line.
Q: Using the driver's side front door tire as your point of reference, how far did the vehicle go from right to left within that lane?
A: Approximately ten feet.
Q: How many times did it do that?
A: I don't have a specific number of times. Approximately two blocks worth.
¶ 31. Sergeant Sherman testified that driving in such an S-type manner contrasted with most driving behavior:
Q: Did that strike you as being unusual driving conduct?
A: Yes.
Q: Why was that?
A: Most vehicles travel straight down the road near the center line.
Q: Was the first car... also traveling in that same manner?
A: Not at that time, no.
¶ 32. Further, Sherman described Post's S-type driving as covering both the traveling lane and the parking lane:
Q: Do you know approximately how wide the lane is on Water Street?
A: I would say 22 to 24 feet.
[19]*19Q: How close did the vehicle come to the center line?
A: At times, within 12 inches.
Q: How close did the vehicle come to the curb on the right side?
A: Within approximately 6 to 8 feet.
¶ 33. After initially stating that he did not have an estimate of how many times Post's vehicle weaved, on cross-examination Sherman stated that Post's vehicle weaved "several" or "a few" times:
Q: [You] [d]on't have any estimate at all?
A: Several times within the two blocks.
Q: Could it be a few times?
A: I'm sorry?
Q: Could it be a few times?
A: Again, our words could be the same, a few and several.
¶ 34. Post contends that his car "didn't change its position very much at all." He bases this claim on a selective reading of Sergeant Sherman's testimony at the suppression hearing. Sherman testified that the northbound side of Water Street was "22 to 24" feet wide, that Post's vehicle came within one foot of the center line, and to within "approximately six to eight feet" of the curb, and that Post's vehicle was about eight feet wide. Post picks out only the favorable parts of Sherman's estimates. For example, he asserts that northbound Water Street is 22 feet wide (i.e., the low [20]*20end of Sherman's estimate) and that his vehicle "was never closer to the curb than eight feet" (i.e., the high end of Sherman's estimate). Thus, subtracting the width of the car (which Sherman testified he was estimating at "[p]robably eight feet" wide),11 the distance from the center line, and the distance from the curb, Post calculates that his car weaved only five feet from side-to-side.
¶ 35. However, Post's calculations fail to account for the whole of Sergeant Sherman's testimony. Sherman estimated northbound Water Street to be 22 to 24 feet wide and that Post's vehicle came to within six to eight feet of the curb. Thus, even taking his estimate that the vehicle was eight feet wide at face value, Sherman's testimony indicates that Post's weave was between five feet and nine feet, based on his individual estimates of distances. Sherman further testified that Post's vehicle moved laterally ten feet.
¶ 36. However, the width of Post's weaving is not the only specific, articulable fact in the case. It is noteworthy that the single lane here, described as between 22 and 24 feet, is approximately twice as wide as the standard single lane.12 Post's vehicle moved in a [21]*21discernible S-type pattern within that single lane, and it repeated that S-type pattern several (or "a few") times for two blocks. When Sherman first observed Post's vehicle, it was "canted into the parking lane" and "wasn't in the designated traffic lane." Finally, we note that the incident took place at 9:30 at night. While this is not as significant as when poor driving takes place at or around "bar time," it does lend some further credence to Sherman's suspicion that Post was driving while intoxicated.13
¶ 37. When viewed in isolation, the individual facts that Post was weaving across the travel and parking lanes, that the weaving created a discernible [22]*22S-type pattern, that Post's vehicle was canted into the parking lane, and that the incident took place at night may not be sufficient to warrant a reasonable officer to suspect that Post was driving while intoxicated. As this court stated in Waldner, "[a]ny one of these facts, standing alone, might well be insufficient." 206 Wis. 2d at 58. However, such facts accumulate, and "as they accumulate, reasonable inferences about the cumulative effect can be drawn." Id. We determine, under the totality of the circumstances, that Sherman presented specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop. Accordingly, the stop did not violate Post's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
IV
¶ 38. In sum, we determine that weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of a vehicle. However, we also determine that under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer did have reasonable suspicion in this case, and that the stop did not violate Post's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.