[Cite as State v. Owens, 2024-Ohio-5555.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 3-24-11 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
TYLER OWENS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 18-CR-0253
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 25, 2024
APPEARANCES:
Christopher Bazeley for Appellant
Ryan M. Hoovler for Appellee Case No. 3-24-11
WILLAMOWKSI, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Tyler Owens (“Owens”) appeals the judgment of
the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the trial court erred in
revoking his judicial release; that the trial court erred by failing to order him to
complete an in-patient substance abuse program; and that he was denied his right to
the effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On October 10, 2018, Owens pled guilty to one count of burglary in
violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a second-degree felony, and one count of receiving
stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), a fourth-degree felony. The trial
court then imposed a prison term of four years and eleven months. On September
7, 2023, Owens filed a motion for judicial release that included a request that he be
ordered to complete a substance abuse treatment program.
{¶3} On October 25, 2023, the trial court issued a judgment entry that granted
Owens’s motion for judicial release but did not contain an order regarding in-patient
treatment. On January 17, 2024, a notice was filed with the trial court that alleged
Owens had violated a condition of his judicial release by testing positive for various
drugs of abuse. On March 25, 2024, the trial court revoked Owens’s judicial release
and reimposed the remainder of his original term of incarceration.
-2- Case No. 3-24-11
{¶4} Owens filed his notice of appeal on April 15, 2024. On appeal, he raises
the following three assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
The trial court’s decision to impose the balance of Owens’ sentence was an abuse of discretion.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Owens’ motion for in-patient substance abuse treatment
Third Assignment of Error
Owens’ defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue his request for in-patient substance abuse treatment as a condition of judicial release.
{¶5} Owens argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his
judicial release and reimposing the remainder of his original term of incarceration.
Standard of Review
{¶6} “A trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s judicial release based
on a violation of the conditions of his judicial release will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Stokley, 2022-Ohio-3647, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). An abuse
of discretion is not an error in judgment but is present where the trial court’s
determination was arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable. State v. Miller,
2023-Ohio-1330, ¶ 4 (3d Dist.). In applying this standard on review, an appellate
-3- Case No. 3-24-11
court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State v.
Rice, 2024-Ohio-3156, ¶ 4 (3d Dist.).
Legal Standard
{¶7} R.C. 2929.20 is the provision that governs judicial release and reads, in
its relevant part, as follows:
If the court grants a motion for judicial release under this section, the court shall order the release of the eligible offender, shall place the eligible offender under an appropriate community control sanction, under appropriate conditions, and under the supervision of the department of probation serving the court and shall reserve the right to reimpose the sentence that it reduced if the offender violates the sanction. If the court reimposes the reduced sentence, it may do so either concurrently with, or consecutive to, any new sentence imposed upon the eligible offender as a result of the violation that is a new offense.
R.C. 2929.20(K). Thus, if the defendant violates the conditions of his release, the
trial court may reimpose the remainder of the defendant’s original term of
incarceration. State v. Phipps, 2021-Ohio-258, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.
Mann, 2004-Ohio-4703, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).
{¶8} “A defendant under community control [including community control
imposed under R.C. 2929.20(K)] is entitled to both a preliminary and a final
revocation hearing.” (Brackets sic.) State v. Lammie, 2022-Ohio-419, ¶ 13 (3d
Dist.), quoting State v. Kiser, 2009-Ohio-1337, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.).
‘The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine if probable cause exists to believe the defendant has violated the terms of his probation or community control.’ State v. Knerr, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-14-03, 2014-Ohio-3988, ¶ 14 * * *. “The purpose of the final
-4- Case No. 3-24-11
revocation hearing is to give the defendant ‘an opportunity to be heard and to show’ that he either did not violate his conditions or that certain mitigating circumstances ‘suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.’” Id., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).
(Citation omitted.) Lammie at ¶ 13. “Importantly, ‘[w]hen the trial court is
reimposing the remainder of the defendant’s original sentence after revoking his
judicial release, the trial court need not make the statutory findings that are required
when a felony sentence is originally imposed.’” Stokley at ¶ 11, quoting State v.
Thompson, 2016-Ohio-8401, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶9} On February 14, 2024, the probation officer appeared at a hearing
before the trial court and reported that Owens admitted he had used drugs of abuse
after a urine test indicated marijuana, benzodiazepine, amphetamines, and
methamphetamines were present in his system. The trial court was later informed
that, several days before this drug test was administered, Owens was found
exhibiting the symptoms of a “methamphetamine-induced psychosis,” and law
enforcement intervened to address this situation. (Mar. 25 Tr. 8).
{¶10} At a hearing on March 25, 2024, Owens stated that he had not used
any drugs of abuse for over a month after he had been placed on judicial release but
admitted to having used methamphetamines and opiates while he had been
imprisoned. After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court determined
that the circumstances surrounding the violation at issue indicated that Owens’s
-5- Case No. 3-24-11
drug use posed a “danger to himself and others” and decided to revoke his judicial
release. (Mar. 25 Tr. 18).
{¶11} Having examined the evidence in the record, we find no indication that
the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Owens’s judicial release and
reimposing the remainder of his original term of incarceration. The first assignment
of error is overruled.
{¶12} Owens argues that the trial court erred by failing to order him to
complete an in-patient treatment program as a condition of his judicial release.
{¶13} R.C. 2505.02 defines “what constitutes a final appealable order.”
Galloway v. Galloway, 1999 WL 356282, *1 (10th Dist. May 20, 1999). R.C.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Owens, 2024-Ohio-5555.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 3-24-11 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
TYLER OWENS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 18-CR-0253
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 25, 2024
APPEARANCES:
Christopher Bazeley for Appellant
Ryan M. Hoovler for Appellee Case No. 3-24-11
WILLAMOWKSI, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Tyler Owens (“Owens”) appeals the judgment of
the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the trial court erred in
revoking his judicial release; that the trial court erred by failing to order him to
complete an in-patient substance abuse program; and that he was denied his right to
the effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On October 10, 2018, Owens pled guilty to one count of burglary in
violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a second-degree felony, and one count of receiving
stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), a fourth-degree felony. The trial
court then imposed a prison term of four years and eleven months. On September
7, 2023, Owens filed a motion for judicial release that included a request that he be
ordered to complete a substance abuse treatment program.
{¶3} On October 25, 2023, the trial court issued a judgment entry that granted
Owens’s motion for judicial release but did not contain an order regarding in-patient
treatment. On January 17, 2024, a notice was filed with the trial court that alleged
Owens had violated a condition of his judicial release by testing positive for various
drugs of abuse. On March 25, 2024, the trial court revoked Owens’s judicial release
and reimposed the remainder of his original term of incarceration.
-2- Case No. 3-24-11
{¶4} Owens filed his notice of appeal on April 15, 2024. On appeal, he raises
the following three assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
The trial court’s decision to impose the balance of Owens’ sentence was an abuse of discretion.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Owens’ motion for in-patient substance abuse treatment
Third Assignment of Error
Owens’ defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue his request for in-patient substance abuse treatment as a condition of judicial release.
{¶5} Owens argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his
judicial release and reimposing the remainder of his original term of incarceration.
Standard of Review
{¶6} “A trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s judicial release based
on a violation of the conditions of his judicial release will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Stokley, 2022-Ohio-3647, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). An abuse
of discretion is not an error in judgment but is present where the trial court’s
determination was arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable. State v. Miller,
2023-Ohio-1330, ¶ 4 (3d Dist.). In applying this standard on review, an appellate
-3- Case No. 3-24-11
court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State v.
Rice, 2024-Ohio-3156, ¶ 4 (3d Dist.).
Legal Standard
{¶7} R.C. 2929.20 is the provision that governs judicial release and reads, in
its relevant part, as follows:
If the court grants a motion for judicial release under this section, the court shall order the release of the eligible offender, shall place the eligible offender under an appropriate community control sanction, under appropriate conditions, and under the supervision of the department of probation serving the court and shall reserve the right to reimpose the sentence that it reduced if the offender violates the sanction. If the court reimposes the reduced sentence, it may do so either concurrently with, or consecutive to, any new sentence imposed upon the eligible offender as a result of the violation that is a new offense.
R.C. 2929.20(K). Thus, if the defendant violates the conditions of his release, the
trial court may reimpose the remainder of the defendant’s original term of
incarceration. State v. Phipps, 2021-Ohio-258, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.
Mann, 2004-Ohio-4703, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).
{¶8} “A defendant under community control [including community control
imposed under R.C. 2929.20(K)] is entitled to both a preliminary and a final
revocation hearing.” (Brackets sic.) State v. Lammie, 2022-Ohio-419, ¶ 13 (3d
Dist.), quoting State v. Kiser, 2009-Ohio-1337, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.).
‘The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine if probable cause exists to believe the defendant has violated the terms of his probation or community control.’ State v. Knerr, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-14-03, 2014-Ohio-3988, ¶ 14 * * *. “The purpose of the final
-4- Case No. 3-24-11
revocation hearing is to give the defendant ‘an opportunity to be heard and to show’ that he either did not violate his conditions or that certain mitigating circumstances ‘suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.’” Id., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).
(Citation omitted.) Lammie at ¶ 13. “Importantly, ‘[w]hen the trial court is
reimposing the remainder of the defendant’s original sentence after revoking his
judicial release, the trial court need not make the statutory findings that are required
when a felony sentence is originally imposed.’” Stokley at ¶ 11, quoting State v.
Thompson, 2016-Ohio-8401, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶9} On February 14, 2024, the probation officer appeared at a hearing
before the trial court and reported that Owens admitted he had used drugs of abuse
after a urine test indicated marijuana, benzodiazepine, amphetamines, and
methamphetamines were present in his system. The trial court was later informed
that, several days before this drug test was administered, Owens was found
exhibiting the symptoms of a “methamphetamine-induced psychosis,” and law
enforcement intervened to address this situation. (Mar. 25 Tr. 8).
{¶10} At a hearing on March 25, 2024, Owens stated that he had not used
any drugs of abuse for over a month after he had been placed on judicial release but
admitted to having used methamphetamines and opiates while he had been
imprisoned. After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court determined
that the circumstances surrounding the violation at issue indicated that Owens’s
-5- Case No. 3-24-11
drug use posed a “danger to himself and others” and decided to revoke his judicial
release. (Mar. 25 Tr. 18).
{¶11} Having examined the evidence in the record, we find no indication that
the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Owens’s judicial release and
reimposing the remainder of his original term of incarceration. The first assignment
of error is overruled.
{¶12} Owens argues that the trial court erred by failing to order him to
complete an in-patient treatment program as a condition of his judicial release.
{¶13} R.C. 2505.02 defines “what constitutes a final appealable order.”
Galloway v. Galloway, 1999 WL 356282, *1 (10th Dist. May 20, 1999). R.C.
2505.02(B)(2) states that reviewable final orders include “an order that affects a
substantial right made in a special proceeding * * *.” A trial court’s determination
on a motion for judicial release falls within R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) because “[j]udicial
release is a purely statutory creation” and, therefore, qualifies as a special
proceeding. State v. Gondeau-Guttu, 2010-Ohio-3321, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting
State v. Burgess, 2002 WL 1042296, *1 (2d Dist. May 22, 2002). See R.C.
2505.02(A)(2). In turn, R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) defines a “substantial right” as “a right
that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common
law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”
-6- Case No. 3-24-11
{¶14} On appeal, Owens points out that his motion for judicial release
contained “a request for an order that he complete an in-patient substance abuse
treatment [program] as a condition of his judicial release.” (Appellant’s Brief, 1).
He argues the trial court erred by failing to include such an order in its judgment
entry granting judicial release. However, this argument addresses the order granting
judicial release that was issued on October 25, 2023 and that is not presently before
this Court. The instant appeal arises from the order revoking judicial release that
was issued on March 25, 2024.
{¶15} Even if the October 25, 2023 order granting judicial release was before
this Court, Owens still has not identified a substantial right in his argument that
would bring this order within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). Owens is
essentially arguing that the order granting judicial release was too lenient because it
did not mandate an additional restriction. In his brief, Owens has not identified any
legal authority that would suggest that the trial court was required to impose such a
condition. In the absence of such a showing, he has failed to demonstrate that he
had a substantial right to an additional condition for his judicial release that the trial
court chose not to impose.
{¶16} Further, at the revocation hearing, a probation officer informed the
trial court that Owens did not mention or request treatment for substance abuse until
the night that he was arrested. Owens then indicated that he recently signed up for
-7- Case No. 3-24-11
substance abuse program but that his appointments had not yet started. The trial
court then pointed out that, since he signed himself up for this program, he did not
need a court order to obtain treatment. Thus, even if the trial court had erred, Owens
has not identified any evidence in the record that would suggest that he was
prejudiced. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} Owens argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to make
arguments in support of his request for in-patient treatment.
{¶18} “Ohio law presumes that a licensed attorney’s representation was
competent.” State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-625, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “In order to prove
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry the burden of
establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that this
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay, 2018-Ohio-3618,
¶ 24 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
{¶19} To establish deficient performance, the appellant must demonstrate
that defense “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Howton,
2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland at 687. To establish prejudice,
“the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-
-8- Case No. 3-24-11
8396, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “If the appellant does not establish one of these two prongs,
the appellate court does not need to consider the facts of the case under the other
prong of the test.” State v. Gear, 2023-Ohio-1246, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.).
{¶20} In the second assignment of error, we concluded (1) that the order
granting judicial release was not before us; (2) that, even if the order granting
judicial release had been the basis of this appeal, Owens did not demonstrate that he
had a substantial right to have the identified condition imposed; and (3) that the
record indicates that Owens had access to treatment for substance abuse in the
absence of a trial court order for the same. For these same reasons, Owens cannot
demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient. For this reason, he
has failed to carry the burden of establishing an ineffective assistance counsel of
claim. The third assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas
is affirmed.
WALDICK and MILLER, J.J., concur.
/hls
-9-