[Cite as State v. Owens, 2026-Ohio-2376.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025-CA-00078
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Licking County Municipal Court, JESSICA OWENS Case No. 2025-TRC-03472
Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 22, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: J. Michael King for Plaintiff-Appellee; Chris Brigdon, for Defendant- Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Appellant Jessica Owens appeals the judgment of the Licking County
Municipal Court, arguing that she did not validly waive her right to counsel. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On April 23, 2025, at approximately midnight, a witness observed a vehicle
driving erratically, failing to maintain its lane, and repeatedly braking. The witness saw
the vehicle drive onto a curb and heard a “pop” that sounded like a tire blowing out. The
witness observed the driver, noted the vehicle’s license plate number, and later identified the driver at trial as Owens. Concerned that the driver was intoxicated, the witness called
911. The last location where she observed the vehicle was the Sheetz parking lot.
{¶3} At approximately 12:13 a.m., officers responded to the Sheetz gas station
after receiving the report of a possible drunk driver. Upon arrival, officers observed a
vehicle parked in the lot with the engine running and a blown tire. No one was inside the
vehicle. Officers observed an open container of alcohol in the center console and noted
that the front passenger-side tire was “torn to pieces.”
{¶4} Officers then observed Owens, the registered owner of the vehicle, walking
around the store while speaking on her cell phone. An officer testified that Owens had
slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a strong odor of alcohol, and appeared unsteady on her
feet. Officers administered several field sobriety tests, which Owens performed poorly.
Officers then placed Owens under arrest. Although she initially agreed to submit to a
breath test, she later refused after arriving at the police department.
{¶5} Owens did not testify at trial. However, in her opening statement and
closing argument, she asserted that her vehicle had experienced a mechanical issue and
that she was not operating the vehicle while impaired.
{¶6} Owens was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol
or drugs (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor, and
displaying expired license plates or tags in violation of R.C. 4503.21(A), a minor
misdemeanor.
{¶7} On April 23, 2025, Owens was arraigned, during which the trial judge
informed Owens, “you have a right to an attorney, if you can’t afford one, you can make
an application for a court-appointed attorney.” (Arraignment Transcript, p.2). Further,
“the maximum penalty for expired tags is a $150.00 fine, the maximum for the OVI offense is six months in jail, a $1075 fine, and a three-year license suspension. There’s a
mandatory minimum penalty of, uh, three days in jail or a three-day driver intervention
program and a, uh, $565.00 fine and one-year license suspension.” (Arraignment
Transcript, p.2). The court asked Owens if she had any questions regarding the charges
or penalties, and she responded that she did not.
{¶8} Owens pled guilty to the expired tags offense and not guilty to the OVI
charge. The trial court accepted her guilty plea on the minor misdemeanor and again
advised her, “if you need a court-appointed attorney, get that application filled out, ok?”
Owens responded, “yes, sir.” (Arraignment Transcript, p. 3).
{¶9} On April 24, 2025, Owens signed a form titled “Your Rights in Court” –
advising her that she was required to complete a written application to obtain court-
appointed counsel and outlining the penalties for a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶10} Beginning on April 25, 2025, Owens filed numerous motions and pleadings
in which she identified herself as proceeding “pro se” or as a “Pro Se Defendant.” These
filings include a motion to suppress evidence, discovery requests, supplemental
memoranda, motion to supplement the record, motion for limited driving privileges,
motion to continue, motion for sanctions, motion in limine, and a motion to compel
discovery. Owens also filed a jury demand, exhibit list, witness list, and issued subpoenas
on her own behalf.
{¶11} At a June pretrial hearing, the trial judge attempted to provide Owens with
an application for court-appointed counsel, but Owens stated that she already had one.
Owens represented herself during a suppression hearing held on July 23, 2025. At trial,
she conducted extensive cross-examinations, subpoenaed and called witnesses, and
presented opening statement and a closing argument. {¶12} Before trial began, Owens and the trial judge signed a written waiver of
counsel, which was filed with the clerk of courts. The waiver provided:
The Defendant appeared in open court this 13 day of October, 2025,
and was advised by the Court as follows: 1. Of the nature of the charges
pending against the Defendant. 2. That the Defendant has a right to an
attorney and a right to a reasonable continuance in the proceedings to
secure one, and pursuant to Ohio Criminal Rule 44, the right to have counsel
assigned without cost to the Defendant, if the Defendant is unable because
of a lack of funds to obtain one.
The Defendant was asked if he or she understood all these things,
and satisfied this Court that he or she did, and that the Defendant wishes to
waive the Defendant’s Right to Counsel. The Defendant’s signature below
is evidence of this Waiver of His or Her Right to Counsel.
Therefore, I affix my signature below to attest that the foregoing
procedure was observed, and the Defendant hereby waives his or her right
to a privately retained or court-appointed attorney. (Signature of the trial
judge).
I, the Defendant in this matter, do hereby declare by signing this
document that I now voluntarily acknowledge and state that I do not want
to be represented by an attorney in this case. (Signature of Owens).
{¶13} After the written waiver was executed, the trial judge asked, “Ms. Owens, do
you understand you’re waiving your right to an attorney today? I know we went over this
but I want to, just for the record.” (Trial Transcript, p.29). Owens responded, “yes, your honor.” During her opening statement, Owens again confirmed that she was
“representing herself in this matter.” (Trial Transcript, p. 36).
{¶14} The jury found Owens guilty of OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).
The trial court sentenced her to thirty days in jail, with twenty-seven days suspended,
imposed a one-year driver’s license suspension, fines, court costs, and one year of
probation. The trial court entered judgment on October 13, 2025.
{¶15} Owens appeals the October 13, 2025, judgment entry of the Licking County
Municipal Court and assigns the following as error:
{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ACCEPTING AN INADEQUATE
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL RULE 44, THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10
OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
I.
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[Cite as State v. Owens, 2026-Ohio-2376.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025-CA-00078
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Licking County Municipal Court, JESSICA OWENS Case No. 2025-TRC-03472
Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 22, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: J. Michael King for Plaintiff-Appellee; Chris Brigdon, for Defendant- Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Appellant Jessica Owens appeals the judgment of the Licking County
Municipal Court, arguing that she did not validly waive her right to counsel. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On April 23, 2025, at approximately midnight, a witness observed a vehicle
driving erratically, failing to maintain its lane, and repeatedly braking. The witness saw
the vehicle drive onto a curb and heard a “pop” that sounded like a tire blowing out. The
witness observed the driver, noted the vehicle’s license plate number, and later identified the driver at trial as Owens. Concerned that the driver was intoxicated, the witness called
911. The last location where she observed the vehicle was the Sheetz parking lot.
{¶3} At approximately 12:13 a.m., officers responded to the Sheetz gas station
after receiving the report of a possible drunk driver. Upon arrival, officers observed a
vehicle parked in the lot with the engine running and a blown tire. No one was inside the
vehicle. Officers observed an open container of alcohol in the center console and noted
that the front passenger-side tire was “torn to pieces.”
{¶4} Officers then observed Owens, the registered owner of the vehicle, walking
around the store while speaking on her cell phone. An officer testified that Owens had
slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a strong odor of alcohol, and appeared unsteady on her
feet. Officers administered several field sobriety tests, which Owens performed poorly.
Officers then placed Owens under arrest. Although she initially agreed to submit to a
breath test, she later refused after arriving at the police department.
{¶5} Owens did not testify at trial. However, in her opening statement and
closing argument, she asserted that her vehicle had experienced a mechanical issue and
that she was not operating the vehicle while impaired.
{¶6} Owens was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol
or drugs (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor, and
displaying expired license plates or tags in violation of R.C. 4503.21(A), a minor
misdemeanor.
{¶7} On April 23, 2025, Owens was arraigned, during which the trial judge
informed Owens, “you have a right to an attorney, if you can’t afford one, you can make
an application for a court-appointed attorney.” (Arraignment Transcript, p.2). Further,
“the maximum penalty for expired tags is a $150.00 fine, the maximum for the OVI offense is six months in jail, a $1075 fine, and a three-year license suspension. There’s a
mandatory minimum penalty of, uh, three days in jail or a three-day driver intervention
program and a, uh, $565.00 fine and one-year license suspension.” (Arraignment
Transcript, p.2). The court asked Owens if she had any questions regarding the charges
or penalties, and she responded that she did not.
{¶8} Owens pled guilty to the expired tags offense and not guilty to the OVI
charge. The trial court accepted her guilty plea on the minor misdemeanor and again
advised her, “if you need a court-appointed attorney, get that application filled out, ok?”
Owens responded, “yes, sir.” (Arraignment Transcript, p. 3).
{¶9} On April 24, 2025, Owens signed a form titled “Your Rights in Court” –
advising her that she was required to complete a written application to obtain court-
appointed counsel and outlining the penalties for a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶10} Beginning on April 25, 2025, Owens filed numerous motions and pleadings
in which she identified herself as proceeding “pro se” or as a “Pro Se Defendant.” These
filings include a motion to suppress evidence, discovery requests, supplemental
memoranda, motion to supplement the record, motion for limited driving privileges,
motion to continue, motion for sanctions, motion in limine, and a motion to compel
discovery. Owens also filed a jury demand, exhibit list, witness list, and issued subpoenas
on her own behalf.
{¶11} At a June pretrial hearing, the trial judge attempted to provide Owens with
an application for court-appointed counsel, but Owens stated that she already had one.
Owens represented herself during a suppression hearing held on July 23, 2025. At trial,
she conducted extensive cross-examinations, subpoenaed and called witnesses, and
presented opening statement and a closing argument. {¶12} Before trial began, Owens and the trial judge signed a written waiver of
counsel, which was filed with the clerk of courts. The waiver provided:
The Defendant appeared in open court this 13 day of October, 2025,
and was advised by the Court as follows: 1. Of the nature of the charges
pending against the Defendant. 2. That the Defendant has a right to an
attorney and a right to a reasonable continuance in the proceedings to
secure one, and pursuant to Ohio Criminal Rule 44, the right to have counsel
assigned without cost to the Defendant, if the Defendant is unable because
of a lack of funds to obtain one.
The Defendant was asked if he or she understood all these things,
and satisfied this Court that he or she did, and that the Defendant wishes to
waive the Defendant’s Right to Counsel. The Defendant’s signature below
is evidence of this Waiver of His or Her Right to Counsel.
Therefore, I affix my signature below to attest that the foregoing
procedure was observed, and the Defendant hereby waives his or her right
to a privately retained or court-appointed attorney. (Signature of the trial
judge).
I, the Defendant in this matter, do hereby declare by signing this
document that I now voluntarily acknowledge and state that I do not want
to be represented by an attorney in this case. (Signature of Owens).
{¶13} After the written waiver was executed, the trial judge asked, “Ms. Owens, do
you understand you’re waiving your right to an attorney today? I know we went over this
but I want to, just for the record.” (Trial Transcript, p.29). Owens responded, “yes, your honor.” During her opening statement, Owens again confirmed that she was
“representing herself in this matter.” (Trial Transcript, p. 36).
{¶14} The jury found Owens guilty of OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).
The trial court sentenced her to thirty days in jail, with twenty-seven days suspended,
imposed a one-year driver’s license suspension, fines, court costs, and one year of
probation. The trial court entered judgment on October 13, 2025.
{¶15} Owens appeals the October 13, 2025, judgment entry of the Licking County
Municipal Court and assigns the following as error:
{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ACCEPTING AN INADEQUATE
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL RULE 44, THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10
OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
I.
{¶17} In her sole assignment of error, Owens argues that her waiver of counsel
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because the trial court failed to
provide a sufficiently detailed advisement regarding the waiver of counsel, the nature of
the charges, and the range of potential penalties and sanctions.
{¶18} The parties agreed that the charged OVI offense constitutes a petty offense
under Criminal Rule 2(D). Criminal Rule 44 governs the assignment and waiver of
counsel in such cases and provides that, “when a defendant charged with a petty offense
is unable to obtain counsel, no sentence of confinement may be imposed upon the
defendant, unless after being fully advised by the court, the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waives assignment of counsel.” Crim. R. 44(B). Further, “waiver of counsel shall be in open court and the advice and waiver shall be recorded as
provided in Rule 22.” Crim.R. 44(C). Rule 22 similarly states, “in petty offense cases all
waivers of counsel required by Rule 44(B) shall be recorded ...”
{¶19} We review the propriety of a defendant’s waiver of his or her right to counsel
de novo. State v. Grimes, 2024-Ohio-2609, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.). “Whether a defendant
voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his right to counsel is ‘determined by the
totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Hundley, 2020-Ohio-3775, ¶ 103, quoting State v.
Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 31 (1998). “In order to establish an effective waiver of right to
counsel, the trial court must make sufficient inquiry to determine whether [the]
defendant fully understands and intelligently relinquishes that right.” State v. Gibson, 45
Ohio St.2d 366, 366 (1976). An intelligent waiver includes a discussion on the
understanding of the nature of the charges and the range of allowable sentences or
sanctions. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948).
{¶20} The waiver of one’s right to counsel can be express or implied from the
circumstances of the case. Grimes at ¶ 34.
{¶21} Upon review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Owens
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to counsel. The record reflects
that the trial court advised Owens of her rights during arraignment, provided her with the
“Your Rights in Court” form, conducted a colloquy prior to the start of the trial, and
obtained a signed written waiver of counsel prior to trial. State v. Rodeheaver, 2023-
Ohio-3283, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.); State v. Goler, 2015-Ohio-2562, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.); City of
Lakewood v. Lane, 2017-Ohio-1039, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.); State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-4424, ¶
32 (6th Dist.). Although a written waiver was not required in this petty offense case, the
written waiver further supports the validity of Owens’ decision. {¶22} Further, Owens repeatedly filed motions and documents indicating that she
was proceeding pro se, and she participated pro se in a pretrial suppression hearing.
Owens clearly and consistently articulated and expressed her desire to proceed without
counsel.
{¶23} Additionally, despite the trial court’s repeated attempts to get Owens to fill
out the form required to obtain a court-appointed attorney, Owens refused to take
effective action to obtain counsel. Thus, she waived her right to counsel by her conduct.
State v. Dahlin, 2008-Ohio-4175, ¶ 42 (5th Dist.) (implied waiver of counsel by refusing
to contact the public defender); Grimes at ¶ 35-37.
{¶24} Based on the foregoing, Owens’ assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} The judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is affirmed.
{¶26} Costs to appellant Jessica Owens.
By: Popham, J.
Baldwin, P.J. and
Gormley, J., concur