[Cite as State v. Noble, 2026-Ohio-2128.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NOS. CA2025-10-091 Appellee, : CA2025-10-092
vs. : OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY JOHN MARTIN NOBLE, : 6/8/2026
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 24CR42027
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Johnna M. Shia, for appellant.
____________ OPINION
SIEBERT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, John Noble, appeals his convictions in the Warren County Court
of Common Pleas following his Alford pleas to multiple drug-related offenses. On appeal, Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
Noble challenges the validity of his Alford pleas, argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, and contends that his sentence is contrary to law. Finding no merit
to any of Noble's arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On April 8, 2024, law enforcement officers and emergency personnel
responded to Noble's residence after receiving a report of a medical emergency. Upon
arrival, first responders determined that Noble had suffered a stroke and had collapsed
inside the residence.
{¶ 3} While inside the home, deputies with the Warren County Sheriff's Office
observed suspected methamphetamine packaged in multiple individual baggies in the
kitchen, along with two methamphetamine pipes and three digital scales. Officers also
observed a Ruger .380 handgun in a bedroom.
{¶ 4} On September 23, 2024, Noble was indicted in Warren County Case No.
24CR42027 ("First Case") on four offenses, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The
indictment charged the following offenses:
First Case
Count Offense/Level Relevant Facts 1 Aggravated Trafficking (F2), R.C. Alford plea 2925.03(A)(2), with firearm and forfeiture specifications
2 Aggravated Possession (F2), R.C. Dismissed in exchange 2925.11(A), with forfeiture specification for plea
3 Having Weapons While Under Alford plea Disability (F3), R.C. 2923.13, with forfeiture specification
4 Possession of Criminal Tools (F5), Dismissed in exchange R.C. 2923.24 for plea
-2- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
{¶ 5} On September 26, 2024, deputies executed the arrest warrant arising from
the First Case. Noble answered the door and was taken into custody. Noble requested
permission to reenter the residence to retrieve his cell phone, and deputies accompanied
him inside. Noble consented to the deputies' entering the residence and informed them
that methamphetamine was sitting on the kitchen table. After receiving Miranda warnings,
Noble consented to a search of the residence, during which officers discovered additional
narcotics.
{¶ 6} On January 21, 2025, a Warren County Grand Jury returned a second
indictment against Noble in Warren County Case No. 25CR42359 ("Second Case"),
charging him with five additional offenses.
Second Case
Count Offense/Level Relevant Facts 1 Aggravated Trafficking (F2), R.C. Alford plea, 46.7 2925.03 grams, Schedule II
2 Aggravated possession (F2), Dismissed in R.C. 2925.11 exchange for plea
3 Aggravated trafficking in Alford plea, 18.65 amphetamine (F2), R.C. 2925.03 grams, Schedule II
4 Aggravated possession (F2), Dismissed in R.C. 2925.11 exchange for plea
5 Possession of Criminal Tools Dismissed in (F5), R.C. 2923.24 exchange for plea
{¶ 7} On July 15, 2025, the trial court conducted a change-of-plea hearing in both
cases. In the First Case, Noble entered Alford pleas to aggravated trafficking in drugs,
including the attached specifications, and to having weapons while under disability, along
with the related specifications. In the Second Case, Noble also entered Alford pleas to
-3- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs.
{¶ 8} At the outset of the hearing, the trial court addressed Noble regarding his
pleas, stating "[a]ll right. Mr. Noble, they're telling me that you're going to be entering an
Alford plea to the charges—certain charges from each of the indictments. Before I get to
that plea, I'm going to need to go over some things with you." The court then conducted
a plea colloquy during which it inquired into Noble's age, education, and whether anyone
had threatened him or promised him anything in exchange for the pleas. The court further
confirmed that Noble was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or medication that
would impair his understanding and that he was satisfied with counsel's representation.
{¶ 9} The trial court also advised Noble of the maximum penalties associated with
the offenses, explained the applicability of the Reagan Tokes Law, and informed him that
he would be subject to postrelease control upon his release from prison. In addition, the
court reviewed the constitutional rights Noble would waive by entering the pleas. Noble
indicated that he understood.
{¶ 10} The State then recited the factual basis supporting the charges. With
respect to the First Case, the State explained that officers responded to Noble's residence
on April 8, 2024, in connection with a reported medical emergency. While inside the
residence, deputies observed suspected methamphetamine packaged in multiple
baggies on the kitchen counter. Officers subsequently obtained a search warrant and
recovered ten plastic bags containing suspected methamphetamine from the kitchen
table, multiple baggies commonly used for drug packaging, two methamphetamine pipes,
three digital scales, and a Ruger .380 handgun located in a bedroom. Laboratory testing
later confirmed the substance to be 35.76 grams of methamphetamine.
{¶ 11} As to the Second Case, the State explained that officers returned to the
-4- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
residence on September 26, 2024, to execute an arrest warrant related to the First Case.
Noble answered the door and was taken into custody. He then requested permission to
reenter the residence to retrieve his cell phone and was accompanied inside by officers.
While inside, Noble informed the officers that methamphetamine was present in the
residence. Officers observed methamphetamine in plain view on the kitchen table, and
Noble confirmed that the substances were methamphetamine. After being advised of his
Miranda rights, Noble gave verbal consent to search the residence. Officers recovered a
brown box containing additional baggies of suspected methamphetamine and
unidentified orange pills from the kitchen table. Subsequent laboratory testing confirmed
the substances to be 46.7 grams of methamphetamine and 18.65 grams of amphetamine.
{¶ 12} Following the State's recitation of the facts, defense counsel advised the
court that Noble "does not dispute the facts as stated," but was tendering an Alford plea.
In light of the plea, the trial court personally addressed Noble and explained the nature of
an Alford plea. Specifically, the court explained that by entering such a plea, Noble would
maintain his innocence while acknowledging that the State possessed sufficient evidence
for a judge or jury to find him guilty.
{¶ 13} The court further advised Noble that he retained the right to proceed to trial,
noting that the matter was scheduled for trial that day, that he was entitled to a jury trial,
and that he would not be penalized for exercising that constitutional right. Noble confirmed
that he understood. The court then asked whether he wished to proceed based upon
counsel's advice regarding an Alford plea, to which Noble responded, "[a]s an Alford plea,
correct." Noble thereafter entered his pleas, and the court accepted them as knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made.
{¶ 14} The trial court subsequently ordered a presentence investigation and
-5- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
conducted a sentencing hearing on September 4, 2025. During allocution, Noble asserted
that the drugs were not his, claimed he had been "set up," but also suggested that the
substances were intended for medical purposes. The trial court addressed those
statements, noting that drugs had been discovered on two separate occasions and
observing that methamphetamine "has no medical purpose."
{¶ 15} The court further stated that it had considered the record, the presentence-
investigative report, the purposes and principles of felony sentencing, and the relevant
seriousness and recidivism factors. In the First Case, the court imposed an aggregate
indefinite prison term of eight-to-eleven years. In the Second Case, the court imposed an
aggregate indefinite prison term of six-to-nine years. The court ordered the sentences in
the two cases to be served consecutively, resulting in an indefinite prison term of 14-to-
17 years. Noble now appeals, raising three assignments of error for review.
II. Appeal
A. Whether Noble's Plea Was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary
{¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, Noble argues that he did not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily enter into an Alford plea. Specifically, he claims that the trial
court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry before accepting the plea.
{¶ 17} The U.S. Supreme Court held that a trial court may accept a guilty plea
despite a defendant's claim of innocence "when . . . a defendant intelligently concludes
that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains
strong evidence of actual guilt." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). Because
an Alford plea permits a defendant to maintain factual innocence while pleading guilty, a
trial court has a heightened duty to ensure that the defendant's rights are protected and
that the plea constitutes a rational decision. State v. Satterwhite, 2021-Ohio-2878, ¶ 17
-6- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
(12th Dist.). Although a defendant may continue to assert innocence, an Alford plea
carries the same legal effect as a guilty plea. Id.
{¶ 18} Courts have recognized that guilty pleas accompanied by protestations of
innocence create an inherent concern that the defendant may not have knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered into the plea. Accordingly, an Alford plea should not
be accepted unless a factual basis exists for the plea and the trial court has attempted to
resolve the apparent conflict between the waiver of trial rights and the assertion of
innocence. State v. Heiser-Mullins, 2024-Ohio-5360, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 19} When accepting an Alford plea, the trial court must determine that the
defendant has made a rational calculation that entering the plea was in his best interest.
Satterwhite at ¶ 18. However, although such an inquiry may be considered a best
practice, the trial court is not required to directly question the defendant regarding whether
such a rational calculation was made. State v. Frazier, 2024-Ohio-2114, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.).
The court does not have an affirmative duty to inquire into the defendant's precise
motivations for accepting the plea because, "[i]n the absence of such an inquiry, there
may be sufficient information before the trial court to determine that the defendant's
decision to plead guilty notwithstanding an assertion of innocence was a rational
decision." Satterwhite at ¶ 19.
{¶ 20} Under Alford, the relevant inquiry is "'whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant.'" Id. at ¶ 20, quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31. The Ohio Supreme Court has
explained that this standard is satisfied where the record affirmatively demonstrates that:
(1) the plea was not the result of coercion, deception, or intimidation; (2) counsel was
present at the time of the plea; (3) counsel's advice was competent under the
-7- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
circumstances; (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charges; and (5) the plea
was motivated by a desire to obtain a lesser penalty, a fear of the consequences of a jury
trial, or both. Id., citing State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 96 (1971). In determining
whether a plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, a reviewing court must
consider all of the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Id., citing
State v. Carter, 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 38 (1979).
{¶ 21} In the present case, the record contains a sufficient factual basis to support
Noble's decision to enter Alford pleas. The record further demonstrates that Noble's
decision was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in light of the alternative
courses of action available to him. The record also establishes that the pleas were not
the product of coercion, deception, or intimidation; that counsel was present at the plea
hearing; and that counsel's recommendation to enter Alford pleas was competent. In
addition, the record affirmatively demonstrates that Noble understood the charges against
him, including the maximum penalties involved.
{¶ 22} Moreover, the record shows that Noble's decision to enter Alford pleas was
motivated by a desire to obtain a lesser penalty or avoid the potential consequences of a
jury trial in light of the substantial evidence against him. That evidence included the
substantial quantity of drugs and drug-trafficking materials discovered in plain view at his
residence and as a result of lawful searches. In exchange, the State dismissed several
charges, which decreased the length of Noble's potential prison sentence.
{¶ 23} Accordingly, the record does not support Noble's claim that his pleas were
not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Rather, the record fully supports the
trial court's determination that Noble made a rational decision to accept the State's plea
offer despite his protestations of innocence. Noble's first assignment is therefore
-8- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
overruled.
B. Whether Noble Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 24} In his second assignment of error, Noble argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with his Alford pleas. Specifically, he contends that
counsel's representation rendered his pleas less than knowing and voluntary.
{¶ 25} Noble first asserts that the plea agreement was not in his best interest
because several of the charges dismissed by the State either would have merged for
sentencing purposes or would have been ordered to run concurrently. He further argues
that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an agreed sentence as part of the plea
negotiations. Finally, Noble contends that counsel failed to object to the trial court's
alleged failure to permit him to proclaim his innocence, make an allocution statement, or
sufficiently inquire into the nature of his Alford pleas to ensure that they were voluntary
under the circumstances.
{¶ 26} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must satisfy the
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under
Strickland, the appellant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-
688, 694; State v. Arledge, 2019-Ohio-3147, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). Failure to establish either
prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Zielinski, 2011-Ohio-
6535, ¶ 50 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 27} In addition, "[a] plea of guilty waives the right to claim that one was
prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that such ineffective
assistance made the plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." State v.
-9- Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
McMahon, 2010-Ohio-2055, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.); State v. Rice, 2007-Ohio-6529, ¶ 17 (6th
Dist.) ("Due to appellant's Alford plea, we are limited to an examination of whether
appellant's counsel's performance caused his plea to be less than knowing and
voluntary.").
{¶ 28} Here, the trial court personally addressed Noble and conducted a sufficient
inquiry into his motivations for entering the pleas despite his assertions of innocence. The
record further reflects that Noble was not deprived of the opportunity to make an allocution
statement. To the contrary, Noble provided a lengthy statement at sentencing before the
trial court imposed the sentence.
{¶ 29} Nor does Noble's challenge to the terms of his plea agreement establish
ineffective assistance of counsel. The record contains no evidence regarding the scope
of the plea negotiations between defense counsel and the State or whether the State
would have agreed to more favorable terms than it already did. The agreement ultimately
secured by counsel was favorable to Noble. In exchange for Noble's Alford pleas to four
offenses, one firearm specification, and two forfeiture specifications, the State dismissed
five additional offenses and another forfeiture specification.
{¶ 30} Although Noble argues that some of the dismissed charges may have
merged or resulted in concurrent sentences, those assertions are entirely speculative.
Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court would have merged offenses or imposed
concurrent sentences after hearing the evidence at trial. Even assuming certain offenses
may have merged, other offenses were clearly committed separately and could have
been ordered to run consecutively, thereby exposing Noble to an even longer prison
sentence.
{¶ 31} Through the negotiated plea agreement, Noble substantially reduced his
- 10 - Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
potential sentencing exposure. Although the agreement did not include an agreed
sentence, it nevertheless reduced Noble's minimum potential prison term by nearly 13
years and allowed him to avoid what would have effectively amounted to a life sentence
given his age. In short, Noble received a substantial benefit from the plea agreement.
{¶ 32} Accordingly, Noble cannot rely upon speculative, hindsight criticisms of the
plea agreement to establish deficient performance by counsel. Furthermore, in light of the
substantial sentencing benefit obtained through the plea agreement, Noble cannot
credibly assert that he would have rejected the agreement and proceeded to trial, where
he faced a potential prison term of 27-to-31 years. Noble's second assignment of error is
C. Whether Noble's Sentence is Contrary to Law
{¶ 33} In his third assignment of error, Noble argues that his sentence is contrary
to law.
{¶ 34} A felony sentence is reviewed under the standard in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-68, ¶ 74 (12th Dist.). Pursuant to that provision, an appellate
court may modify or vacate a sentence if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the
sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. Gable, 2024-Ohio-293, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 35} A consecutive sentence is contrary to law where the trial court fails to make
the consecutive sentencing findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Wood,
2020-Ohio-422, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage
in a three-step analysis and make certain findings before imposing consecutive
sentences. Id. Specifically, the trial court must find that (1) the consecutive sentence is
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, (2) consecutive
- 11 - Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to
the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) one of the following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post- release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶ 36} "When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required
findings as part of the sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the offender
and to defense counsel." State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29, citing Crim.R. 32(A)(4).
However, "a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required," and
consecutive sentences should be upheld so long as the reviewing court can discern that
the trial court engaged in the proper analysis and the record supports the findings. Id.
{¶ 37} In the present case, Noble does not dispute that the trial court made the
necessary consecutive sentencing findings and incorporated those findings into the
sentencing entries. Rather, he argues that the findings are unsupported by the record. In
support of that argument, Noble characterizes the offenses as nonviolent, notes that the
First Case came to light only because of his medical emergency, and emphasizes his
cooperation with law enforcement. He also points to his alleged lack of criminal history,
prior military service, and mental-health conditions as factors warranting leniency.
- 12 - Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
{¶ 38} Upon review, we find Noble's arguments unpersuasive. The record reflects
that Noble previously served a lengthy prison sentence for drug-related offenses, yet that
experience failed to deter him from engaging in additional criminal conduct. Significantly,
Noble committed the offenses underlying the Second Case following his indictment in the
First Case. Moreover, although Noble attempts to minimize his conduct as nonviolent, the
record demonstrates that he possessed weapons in connection with the offenses. The
record further establishes that Noble possessed substantial quantities of drugs intended
for distribution, conduct that poses a serious danger to the community.
{¶ 39} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's decision to impose
consecutive sentences is supported by the record and is not contrary to law. Noble's third
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 40} Judgment affirmed.
BYRNE, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
- 13 - Warren CA2025-10-091 CA2025-10-092
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
- 14 -