ELLETT, Justice:
The defendants appeal from a conviction of “conspiring to commit an act for the obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws, in that the defendants did conspire to obtain and procure a dismissal of the case of the State of Utah v. Vincent Guercio, by defendant, Jane Baxter, changing her statement of the facts of said case for money consideration passing from said Vincent Guercio to defendants, Harold Nielsen and Jane Baxter.”
The statute under which the defendants were charged is Section 76-12-1, U.C.A. 1953, and so far as material is as follows:
If two or more persons conspire:
(1) To commit a crime, or, * * * * * * * * * •
(5) To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws;— they are punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding $1,000.
The defendants say that subsection (5) is unconstitutional and claim that this court has heretofore so held in the case of State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193.
That case involved the part of the statute regarding public morals only. It was a case wherein a conspiracy to teach .and practice polygamy was charged. This court upheld the. statute at the first hearing (110 Utah 534), 175 P.2d 724, but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the particular section of. the staG ute under which the defendants were being prosecuted might be “so vague and indefinite that it fails adequately to define the offense or give reasonable standards for determining guilt.” Since this particular question was not raised by the defendants [68]*68in the Musser case but was suggested by the United States Supreme Court during argument, the case was remanded to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the following language: “We believe we should not pass upon the question raised here until the Supreme Court of Utah has had opportunity to deal with this ultimate issue of federal law and with state law questions relevant to it. The present judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah is vacated and cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.” State v. Musser, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S.Ct. 397, 92 L.Ed. 562 (1948).
When this court got the case back, it bowed to a superior commission if not to superior reasons and held the statute involved therein to be void for vagueness and uncertainty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The fact that a part of a statute is held to be unconstitutional does not necessarily mean that other parts are also void. The void part may be disregarded, and the valid part enforced. See Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907, 86 A.L.R. 907. See also 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 152. The general policy is clearly expressed at 82 C.J.S. Statutes, § 93, as follows:
A statute may be unconstitutional in part and yet he sustained with the offending part omitted, if the paramount intent or chief purpose will not be destroyed thereby, or the legislative purpose not substantially affected or impaired, if the statute is still capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, or if the remaining portions are sufficient to accomplish the legislative purpose deducible from the entire act, construed in the light of contemporary events.
If, when the invalid part is stricken, that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, or purpose, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained to that extent; and this rule is especially applicable where the statute provides for two distinct subjects. In other words, the invalidity of a part of a statute does not render the remainder invalid where enough remains, after discarding the valid part, to show the legislative intent and to furnish sufficient means to effectuate that intent. A statute can be saved by severability only if its entirety of thought is not destroyed.
The valid part of a statute will be sustained where the valid and invalid parts are so separate and distinct that it is clear, or may be presumed or concluded, that the legislature would have enacted the former without the latter, if it had known of the invalidity, or, as otherwise stated, if the valid or invalid parts are not so intimately connected or interdependent as to raise the presumption that the [69]*69legislature would not have enacted the one without the other, the act will he upheld so far as valid, as it will where it appears that the unconstitutional part did not constitute such an inducement to, or consideration or compensation for, the passage of the other parts that they would not have been passed without it.
The meaning of the various parts of the statute here involved will he made clearer if we set the statute out as follows:
(5) To commit any act
(a) injurious to the public health,
(b) injurious to public morals,
(c) injurious to trade or commerce,
(d) for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws; * * *.
It is difficult to see how there can be any interdependence between any of the provisions listed above. Each part can stand or fall without in any degree affecting the others. In the Musser case, supra, this court held part (b) above set out to be unconstitutional. It has not yet determined whether (a), (c), and (d) are valid or void.
The general rule of statutory construction is to hold an enactment of the legislature valid unless it clearly appears to violate some provision of the Constitution of this State or of the United States. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 99.
With this presumption in mind, let us consider the case now before us.
We are dealing only with part (d) as above set out and must decide whether it is “so vague and indefinite that it fails adequately to define the offense or give reasonable standards for determining guilt.”
The obstruction of justice was a crime known to the common law. See 4 Wendell’s Blackstone Commentaries, page 128. The law was well defined and consisted of a number of acts which had been held by the court to constitute the offense of interfering with the court and its officers in the due administration of the law.
The fact that the courts had decided that there were different ways of committing the crime of obstructing justice or the due administration of the laws does not make the law vague or indefinite. Burglary likewise at common law could be committed in different ways, all of which had been decided by the courts. It was committed by breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a felony. It also was committed by entering an open door or a dwelling without breaking any part of the building. It was committed by breaking and entering a church or a barn or stable and so forth with intent to commit a felony when said outbuildings are inside of a common fence with the dwelling.
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ELLETT, Justice:
The defendants appeal from a conviction of “conspiring to commit an act for the obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws, in that the defendants did conspire to obtain and procure a dismissal of the case of the State of Utah v. Vincent Guercio, by defendant, Jane Baxter, changing her statement of the facts of said case for money consideration passing from said Vincent Guercio to defendants, Harold Nielsen and Jane Baxter.”
The statute under which the defendants were charged is Section 76-12-1, U.C.A. 1953, and so far as material is as follows:
If two or more persons conspire:
(1) To commit a crime, or, * * * * * * * * * •
(5) To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws;— they are punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding $1,000.
The defendants say that subsection (5) is unconstitutional and claim that this court has heretofore so held in the case of State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193.
That case involved the part of the statute regarding public morals only. It was a case wherein a conspiracy to teach .and practice polygamy was charged. This court upheld the. statute at the first hearing (110 Utah 534), 175 P.2d 724, but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the particular section of. the staG ute under which the defendants were being prosecuted might be “so vague and indefinite that it fails adequately to define the offense or give reasonable standards for determining guilt.” Since this particular question was not raised by the defendants [68]*68in the Musser case but was suggested by the United States Supreme Court during argument, the case was remanded to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the following language: “We believe we should not pass upon the question raised here until the Supreme Court of Utah has had opportunity to deal with this ultimate issue of federal law and with state law questions relevant to it. The present judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah is vacated and cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.” State v. Musser, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S.Ct. 397, 92 L.Ed. 562 (1948).
When this court got the case back, it bowed to a superior commission if not to superior reasons and held the statute involved therein to be void for vagueness and uncertainty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The fact that a part of a statute is held to be unconstitutional does not necessarily mean that other parts are also void. The void part may be disregarded, and the valid part enforced. See Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907, 86 A.L.R. 907. See also 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 152. The general policy is clearly expressed at 82 C.J.S. Statutes, § 93, as follows:
A statute may be unconstitutional in part and yet he sustained with the offending part omitted, if the paramount intent or chief purpose will not be destroyed thereby, or the legislative purpose not substantially affected or impaired, if the statute is still capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, or if the remaining portions are sufficient to accomplish the legislative purpose deducible from the entire act, construed in the light of contemporary events.
If, when the invalid part is stricken, that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, or purpose, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained to that extent; and this rule is especially applicable where the statute provides for two distinct subjects. In other words, the invalidity of a part of a statute does not render the remainder invalid where enough remains, after discarding the valid part, to show the legislative intent and to furnish sufficient means to effectuate that intent. A statute can be saved by severability only if its entirety of thought is not destroyed.
The valid part of a statute will be sustained where the valid and invalid parts are so separate and distinct that it is clear, or may be presumed or concluded, that the legislature would have enacted the former without the latter, if it had known of the invalidity, or, as otherwise stated, if the valid or invalid parts are not so intimately connected or interdependent as to raise the presumption that the [69]*69legislature would not have enacted the one without the other, the act will he upheld so far as valid, as it will where it appears that the unconstitutional part did not constitute such an inducement to, or consideration or compensation for, the passage of the other parts that they would not have been passed without it.
The meaning of the various parts of the statute here involved will he made clearer if we set the statute out as follows:
(5) To commit any act
(a) injurious to the public health,
(b) injurious to public morals,
(c) injurious to trade or commerce,
(d) for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws; * * *.
It is difficult to see how there can be any interdependence between any of the provisions listed above. Each part can stand or fall without in any degree affecting the others. In the Musser case, supra, this court held part (b) above set out to be unconstitutional. It has not yet determined whether (a), (c), and (d) are valid or void.
The general rule of statutory construction is to hold an enactment of the legislature valid unless it clearly appears to violate some provision of the Constitution of this State or of the United States. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 99.
With this presumption in mind, let us consider the case now before us.
We are dealing only with part (d) as above set out and must decide whether it is “so vague and indefinite that it fails adequately to define the offense or give reasonable standards for determining guilt.”
The obstruction of justice was a crime known to the common law. See 4 Wendell’s Blackstone Commentaries, page 128. The law was well defined and consisted of a number of acts which had been held by the court to constitute the offense of interfering with the court and its officers in the due administration of the law.
The fact that the courts had decided that there were different ways of committing the crime of obstructing justice or the due administration of the laws does not make the law vague or indefinite. Burglary likewise at common law could be committed in different ways, all of which had been decided by the courts. It was committed by breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a felony. It also was committed by entering an open door or a dwelling without breaking any part of the building. It was committed by breaking and entering a church or a barn or stable and so forth with intent to commit a felony when said outbuildings are inside of a common fence with the dwelling.
There was nothing thought to be vague or indefinite about burglary so long as the [70]*70indictment set out the particulars which would amount to the crime.
It will be rioted that the statute involved herein does not attempt to punish for “obstructing justice” but only for “conspiring to commit an act for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws.”
■ These-defendants were charged with conspiring to do an act, to-wit, changing statements-of’facts in a named case for money 'paid to them. It was alleged that said act was' for the obstruction of justice or the 'due administration of the law. Nobody could fail to understand what the offense was, nor could anybody believe that such conduct was not, both at common law and now, an interference with the due administration of the laws. It is the conspiracy to do an evil act which has been defined for hundreds . c>f years that constitutes this crime. , . -
Whether there be common law crimes in Utah is immaterial. The gist of the matter is whether the defendants knew that what they conspired to do had been defined as one of the age-old things known as obstructing justice. It seéms clear' to us that the statute and dhargé made pursuant thereto are neither Vague nor indefinite but that they do .give reasonable'standards for determining guilt firstly by the defendants when they entered .into the conspiracy, and lastly by the jury .when they found the defendants guilty as charged.
We hold that the part of the statute under which the defendants were charged and convicted is not unconstitutional. In this we are fortified by the holding of the California Supreme Court. In Lorenson v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d 49, 216 P.2d 859, a statute practically identical with our own was attacked as being unconstitutional. At page 865 of the Pacific Reporter it is said.
Lorenson attacks the statute making criminal conspiracy an offense upon the ground that it is so vague and uncertain as to be violative of the constitutional requirements of due process. He also contends that the indictment is equally vague and indefinite.
Section 182 defines as criminal conspiracy acts committed with the purpose “ * * * to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws.” Generally speaking, conduct which constitutes an offense against public justice, or the administration of law includes both malfeasance and nonfeasance by an officer in connection with the administration of his public duties, and also anything done by a person in hindering or obstructing an officer in the performance of his official obligations. Such an offense was recognized at common law and generally punishable as a. misdemeanor. Now, quite generally, it has been made a statutory crime and, under some circumstances, a felony. Burdick, Law of [71]*71Crimes (1946), vol. 1, p. 382, et seq.; 20 Cal.Jur. 347-354.
In California, the statutes relating to “Crimes Against Public Justice” are found in Part I, Title VII, of the Penal Code. Bribery, escapes, rescues, perjury, falsifying evidence, and other acts which would have been considered offenses against the administration of justice at common law are made criminal by legislative enactment. Section 182, subdivision 5, is a more general section making punishable a conspiracy to commit any offense against public justice. The' meaning of the words “to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws” is easily ascertained by reference either to the common law or to the more specific crimes enumerated in Part I, Title VII. * * *
Although, higher standards .of certainty will be required of penal than of civil statutes, Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed. 595, a statute is sufficiently cértain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law meaning, “notwithstanding an element of .degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ.” * * *
Considering the well-settled meaning at common law of the words “to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws,” the other and more specific provisions in the Penal Code concerning “Crimes Against Public Justice,” and the relative certainty- of words employed in statutes which have been held valid, it cannot be said that subsec-, tion 5 of section 182 of the Penal Code is unconstitutional. * * *
The holding in the Lorenson case was-quoted with approval in the case of People v. Sullivan, District Court of Appeals, Fourth District of California, 113 Cal.App. 2d 510, 248 P.2d 520, which was a case decided after the Musser case, supra, was before the Supreme Court of the United States.
The judgment of the District' Court should be and it is hereby affirmed.
CROCKETT, C. J., and TUCljCETT, J., concur.