HIGGINS, Judge.
George “Tiny” Mercer was convicted by a jury of capital murder, § 565.001, RSMo 1978; the jury fixed his punishment at death, §§ 565.008 and 565.012, RSMo 1978. Judgment was rendered accordingly. He charges errors to the excuse for cause of prospective jurors who voiced objections to consideration of the death penalty; the prosecuting attorney’s reference in opening statement and a stipulation concerning a prior accusation of rape of another victim by defendant; and the cross-examination of defendant with respect to previously excluded evidence. In addition to the review for error, the Court will review the sentence as mandated by § 565.014, RSMo 1978. Affirmed.
I.
The evidence supports defendant’s conviction for the murder of Karen Keeton, a 22-year-old white female, in the early morning hours of August 31, 1978. It established that defendant, a 34-year-old white male, was drinking with friends at the Blue Seven Lounge in Grandview, Missouri, the evening before. Karen was working there as a waitress. During the evening, defendant made the comment that he would like to take her to bed. Steven Gardner, a friend of defendant who was acquainted with Karen, went up to the bar to talk to her. He returned a short time later and said he and Karen were going to breakfast and would go to defendant’s house afterward. Defendant left with David Gee, another friend, and went to defendant’s home in Belton, Missouri, arriving there around 12:30 a. m. John Campbell was at the house babysitting with defendant’s ten-year-old daughter. A short time later Gardner and Karen Keeton arrived.
After visiting for some time defendant picked up a sawed-off double-barrelled shotgun, opened it to show the shells, walked over to Karen, tapped her on the head with the gun, and told her to “get her ass upstairs.” When she hesitated he grabbed her and pushed her to the stairway. She yelled for Gardner to help. He responded, “Happy Birthday, Tiny,” then turned to the others and said, “Seconds.” Karen’s dress was tossed downstairs with defendant telling Gardner to “put these clothes where they go, you know where they go.” Gardner put the clothes in a closet and pocketed the money from her purse.
Defendant later came downstairs; he was naked and had an erection. Gardner went upstairs. Defendant drank beer for awhile, [4]*4showered and returned to the table to dry himself at which time he remarked what “a good piece of ass” she was and that he was going to go back and “fuck her in the butt.” Several minutes later, Gardner yelled for David Gee to come upstairs. Gee, followed by defendant and John Campbell, complied. Upstairs, defendant told Karen, who was lying naked on the bed, to undress Gee and “start sucking David Gee’s dick.” She performed as directed. After Gee answered, “Pretty good”, to defendant’s question about her performance, defendant said, “You leaky cunt, you’d better do it better.” When asked how she was doing now, Gee answered, “Better now.” Defendant, Gardner and Campbell returned downstairs. At this time, Karen stopped what she was doing, and Gee put his clothes on. Karen asked what was going to happen to her; Gee attempted to reassure her. When Gee returned downstairs, defendant told Campbell to get upstairs so they would all be in it together. Campbell proceeded upstairs and found Karen unclothed. She cried, and Campbell talked with her, trying to console her. He too returned downstairs.
Defendant started upstairs again as Gardner was leaving. He asked Gardner what he wanted done with Karen and Gardner replied, “Kill the bitch.” Defendant said, “Okay, brother.” Gardner asked if he would need any help; defendant said no, he would get rid of the body where it would not be found. Gardner and Gee left, defendant went upstairs, and Campbell went to sleep downstairs.
Campbell was suddenly awakened by defendant calling his name from upstairs. He responded and found defendant straddling Karen’s body with his hands on her throat. Defendant screamed at Campbell to take her pulse. Campbell grabbed the arm of Karen’s seemingly lifeless body and found a faint pulse. At the time he told defendant this, he could smell human waste which was all over the bed. Defendant, “hollered”, struck the left side of Karen’s head, and said, “Die you bitch ... This is a leaky cunt. Die.” He continued strangling her, and again screamed at Campbell to take her pulse. Campbell found no pulse. When Campbell reported this, defendant got off the bed, grabbed Karen’s legs, and pulled her off the bed. Defendant took the sheets and blanket to the washing machine and told Campbell to wipe the waste off the floor. Defendant came back and told Campbell to get his truck and put the tailgate down so he could put Karen in it. After Campbell complied, defendant brought the body down and put it in the truck. Campbell and defendant climbed in the truck and Campbell started driving at defendant’s direction. Finally defendant had Campbell stop. Defendant got out and dumped the body over a fence into a field. When he returned he told Campbell, “Now, if I’d killed that leaky cunt 17-year-old like I did her ... I wouldn’t have been on any rape charges and things I’m on right now.” At that time, defendant had a rape charge pending against him filed by a 17-year-old girl. Defendant and Campbell returned to defendant’s house where defendant gave Campbell the shotgun to hide, and burned Karen’s purse.
Three to four weeks later Campbell and his attorney looked for and found the badly decomposed body of Karen Keeton. They reported this to the authorities. The body was identified by means of her teeth.
II.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the Court struck down Georgia’s death penalty provisions holding that the penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner; the Court did not hold that the infliction of the death per se violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).
Following the decision in Furman v. Georgia, supra, the Georgia legislature enacted a new death penalty scheme. In Gregg v. Georgia, supra, the Court held that this statutory system did not violate the Constitution. The Court stated:
[5]*5[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.
Id. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935. The Georgia statute was found to meet this test.
The Missouri death penalty scheme is patterned after the Georgia scheme approved in Gregg v. Georgia, supra. Section 565.-008, RSMo 1978, permits the death penalty for only those persons convicted of capital murder.1 In a capital murder case defendant’s guilt or innocence is determined in the first stage of a bifurcated trial. Section 565.006.1, RSMo Supp. 1980. Where the jury or judge returns a guilty verdict, a presentence hearing is held at which,
[T]he jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty, or pleas of nolo con-tendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and pleas. Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The jury or judge shall also hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney regarding the punishment to be imposed.
Section 565.006.2.
The judge is required to consider or to include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider any statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances supported by the evidence, any mitigating or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law, and,
Whether a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist to warrant the imposition of death or whether a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found to exist.
Section 565.012.1(4), RSMo Supp. 1980.
Unless one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in § 565.012.2 is found, the death penalty cannot be imposed. Section 565.012.5. If the verdict is a recommendation of death, the jury must designate the aggravating circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 565.012.4. The judge is required to impose the sentence fixed by the jury. Section 565.006.2.
If the death penalty is imposed, the sentence must be reviewed on the record by this Court. This Court is directed to consider the punishment as well as any errors raised on appeal, and to determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section 565.012; and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
Section 565.014.3, RSMo 1978.
The Court must also include in its decision a reference to similar cases taken into consideration. Section 565.014.5. Upon review, the death sentence may be affirmed or set aside and the case remanded for resentencing by the trial judge based on the record and argument of counsel. Id.
After the jury found Mercer guilty of capital murder, no additional evidence was presented at the presentence hearing; both the state and defendant did, however, make additional arguments regarding punishment. The court instructed on and the jury found two aggravating circumstances:
1. Whether the defendant, as an agent or employee of Stephen Gardner [6]*6and at his direction, murdered Karen Keeton. [Section 565.012.2(6)]
2.Whether the murder of Karen Kee-ton involved depravity of mind and that as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile and inhuman. [Section 565.012.2(7)]
The court also instructed the jury on the following mitigating circumstances:
1. Whether Karen Keeton was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.
2. Whether the defendant acted under extreme duress or substantial domination of another person.
3. The age of the defendant at the time of the offense.
4. ... [t]he absence of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant.
III.
A.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s excuse for cause of fifteen prospective jurors who expressed conscientious opposition to the imposition of the death penalty. He contends the excuse of five such venire persons violated the constitutional standards of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), because they were excused for voicing general objections to the death penalty. Appellant further contends the court’s failure to adhere strictly to the Witherspoon v. Illinois standard of qualifying the jury precluded the constitutional application of Missouri’s death penalty statutes to prevent the arbitrary and capricious use of jury discretion. In addition, he charges the excuse of the fifteen venire persons violated his constitutional rights to a trial by an impartial jury composed of a cross-section of the community.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, prospective jurors generally opposed to capital punishment had been excluded for cause from the jury that convicted defendant and sentenced him to death. The Court held that:
A sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.
Id. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777. The Court noted, however, that its decision did not prevent the execution of a death sentence where veniremen excluded for cause made it “unmistakably clear ... that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them.” Id. at 522, n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 21. See also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 399 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 90 S.Ct. 1578, 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969).
The parties were in agreement and the court understood that a venire person could not be excluded unless that person was, “irrevocably committed to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the trial.” The state questioned each juror individually:
If, during the trial of the case the facts and circumstances that come forth as evidence are such that under the law the jury could consider the death penalty, would you, as a juror, consider the death penalty?
The state would follow any negative answer by questioning whether the venire person could assess the death sentence under any circumstance.
The trial court sustained fifteen of the state’s challenges for cause on the ground the venire persons were irrevocably committed against imposing the death penalty regardless of the circumstances. Appellant claims for the first time on appeal that five of these fifteen venire persons were equivocal in response to the state’s questions. The pertinent examination of the five venire [7]*7persons in question is contained in the appendix.
Review of the questions and answers indicates each of the five excused venire persons made it “unmistakably clear” that they would not impose the death penalty under any circumstances. Appellant presents the response of Harry Bumgarner as the most equivocal. His response, “I don’t think so,” is not equivocal in its context; it is common vernacular to express a negative. See State v. Pride, 567 S.W.2d 426, 433 (Mo.App.1978). In light of the trial court’ stated understanding of the limited excuse, its ability to observe the tenor of the questioning and the frequent reluctance of lay persons to communicate their deep-seated opinions in a cogent and emphatic manner, it can only be said that the requirements of Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, were met.
Appellant’s challenge to the excuse of all fifteen venire persons is actually two-fold. First, he argues that the excuse for cause violated his right under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Second, he argues the excuse for cause resulted in a jury that was not impartial on the issue of guilt; that it was prosecution-prone. Both of these arguments were rejected in State v. Mitchell, 611 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. banc 1981).
As in that case, there is no evidence to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement.2 If such a prima facie case could be established, the state has a significant interest in impaneling only those jurors who have stated that they can follow the law. The exclusion of those venire persons who have stated unambiguously that they cannot, under any circumstances, consider a certain punishment permissible under the law does not violate representative cross-section requirements of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Spenkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 597 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976, 99 S.Ct. 1548, 59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979). The right to a representative jury does not include the right to be tried by jurors who have explicitly indicated an inability to follow the law. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at 516, 88 S.Ct. at 1774, petitioners maintained that a jury selected in the manner present in that case, must necessarily be biased in favor of conviction citing two surveys in support. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra at 517, n. 10, 88 S.Ct. at 1774, n. 10. The Court found that the data presented was “too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt,” and declined to conclude that the “exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction.” Id. at 517-518, 88 S.Ct. at 1774-1775. . The Court refused to reverse the conviction. See also Bumpers v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).
Following Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, a number of studies were published on a theory that “death-qualified” jurors are not impartial on the issue of guilt.3 These stu[8]*8dies, however, are not conclusive, and this Court will not reverse defendant’s conviction on the basis of the studies presented.
Those chosen to be jurors in no way indicated that they were biased for the prosecution or against the defendant; they indicated only that they would consider the death penalty if the law and facts permitted it. As stated in Spenkellink v. Wainwright, supra at 594:
[T]he veniremen indicated only that they would be willing to perform their civic obligation as jurors and obey the law. Such persons cannot accurately be branded prosecution-prone.
“A juror wholly unable to ever consider the death penalty no matter what the facts of a given case, would clearly be unable to follow the law ... in assessing punishment.” Adams v. Texas, supra at 2526. The state has a legitimate interest in administering its death penalty statute which permits it to bar from jury service those whose belief about capital punishment would lead them to ignore the law. Adams v. Texas, supra. See also State v. Mitchell, supra.
B.
In the state’s opening statement the prosecuting attorney told the jury:
We are back at the location where Karen Keeton’s body was dumped, and Mercer says to Campbell: T wouldn’t be in the trouble I’m in today if I’d killed that other bitch on the rape.’
***** *
T was going to do it, but Bruce Miller talked me out of it.’
Deborah Middleton will come here and testify. Deborah Middleton will tell you that she first met George Mercer on July 26th, 1978, and that basically an occurrence happened in which she later brought charges against George Mercer and before August 31st of 1978. She’ll be here to testify.
Defendant objected and requested a mistrial which was denied. John Campbell later in the trial testified that after defendant had dumped the body:
He got in the truck, and he said, ‘Now, if I’d killed that leaky cunt 17-year-old like I did her,’ he says, T wouldnt’ve been on any rape charges and things I’m on right now.'
Defendant objected to the calling of Deborah Middleton to testify about the rape charge she brought against defendant. The trial court ruled that Middleton could testify that she had made an accusation of rape against defendant prior to August 31, 1978 (the day of Karen Keeton’s murder), provided the state did not go into the truth of the charge. Defendant then agreed to stipulate that:
On July 26, 1978, a 17-year-old female accused the defendant, George Mercer, of rape, and as a result of that accusation a criminal prosecution for rape was commenced against the defendant, George Mercer, prior to August 31, 1978.
Appellant now charges error to permitting the prosecutor to state in opening statement that Deborah Middleton would testify about her rape charge against the defendant, and argues he was forced to choose between having Deborah Middleton testify or entering into the stipulation. Appellant contends Deborah Middleton’s testimony was inadmissible and therefore the stipulation and reference in opening statement were improper because there was no evidence that the person defendant referred to in his statement to John Campbell was Deborah Middleton, because the stipulation defendant was forced into agreeing to constituted proof of a separate and distinct crime for which defendant was not on trial, and because it constituted an attack upon [9]*9defendant’s character which had not been placed in issue.
In view of John Campbell’s testimony concerning the defendant’s statement after dumping Karen Keeton’s body, Deborah Middleton’s testimony, limited to the bringing of a rape charge against defendant prior to August 31, 1978, would have been admissible. Therefore the trial court did not err in permitting the prosecuting attorney to refer to this in his opening statement or in permitting the stipulation in lieu of her testimony.
Defendant denied the killing and sought to portray John Campbell as a liar. It was necessary for the state to establish defendant’s motive, and to corroborate John Campbell’s testimony. Defendant’s statement to John Campbell was relevant as evidence of his motive in killing Karen Kee-ton; he killed her to avoid detection of the rape. Deborah Middleton’s testimony would have explained defendant’s statement and would have corroborated John Campbell’s testimony — the state sought to prove that there was in fact a 17-year-old girl who had brought rape charges against defendant prior to the murder of Karen Keeton. The stipulation did not go into the facts leading to the charges or the disposition of those charges.
The admissibility of the stipulation is not affected by the lack of direct evidence establishing that Deborah Middleton was the girl referred to by defendant in his statement to John Campbell. Evidence need only be relevant, not conclusive. It is relevant if it logically tends to prove a fact in issue or corroborates relevant evidence which bears on the principal issue. State v. Lee, 556 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. banc 1977), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 461, 99 S.Ct. 710, 58 L.Ed.2d 736 (1979). Nor is this otherwise relevant evidence on the issue of motive rendered inadmissible because it might also tend to constitute proof of another crime or discredit defendant’s character. See State v. Holt, 592 S.W.2d 759, 775 (Mo. banc 1980); State v. Richardson, 515 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo.1974).
C.
Prior to trial the court sustained defendant’s motion to suppress a mattress cover seized during a warrantless search of defendant’s residence. During cross-examination of defendant, the state asked:
You were aware that in the upstairs bedroom of that house that there was a mattress that was covered with human feces—
Defendant objected and requested a mistrial on the ground his motion to suppress the feces covered mattress had been sustained by the trial court. The court overruled the objection and motion for mistrial noting that there was evidence independent of any search and seizure that would authorize the question. Appellant now charges error to the trial court for overruling the objection and motion. He argues that this statement was “clearly calculated to inflame the passion of the jury against the defendant by mentioning matters of an inherently abhorrent nature.”
Evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure is not admissible against the defendant in a criminal case. If, however, the state gains the same knowledge or evidence from an independent source it may become admissible. State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S.W.2d 794, 798 (1942).
There is evidence independent of the suppressed mattress cover to support the cross-examination of the defendant on this matter. John Campbell had previously testified that at the time of the murder he could
smell the human waste. It was all over the sheets, and the sheets and her kind of came off of the bed the same time he pulled her ....
******
Q. Could you see anything on the bed?
A. You could see the human waste, yes.
The state’s question was not designed to inflame the jury. Defendant had taken the stand and denied strangling Karen Keeton. On cross-examination the state attempted [10]*10and was successful in getting defendant to admit that he had given an excuse to someone for the feces on the bed, thereby acknowledging its presence and corroborating John Campbell’s testimony. The court properly permitted the state’s question.
IV.
Section 565.014.1, requires this Court to review a sentence of death when imposed. Section 565.014.3 provides:
With regard to the sentence, the supreme court shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section 565.012; and
(3)Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
The record in this case demonstrates that George Mercer’s death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
The jury found as statutory aggravating circumstances that the “defendant, as an agent or employee of Stephen Gardner and at his direction, murdered Karen Keeton”, § 565.012.2(6), and that the murder of Karen Keeton involved depravity of mind and that as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile and inhuman, § 565.012.2(7).4 The evidence supports the jury’s findings.5
Defendant forced Karen Keeton, a total stranger, into a bedroom aided by a sawed-off shotgun. There is evidence to show that he had sex with Karen, and that he [11]*11stated his intention to return for more. He compelled her at gunpoint to perform oral sex on David Gee while others watched. She expressed fear for her well-being to David Gee and John Campbell. When Steve Gardner told defendant to “kill the bitch”, he agreed to do so. He grabbed her about the throat, choking her; he struck her with his fists; finally, after having a friend check her pulse, he succeeded in strangling her. After this he loaded the body in a truck, drove to the country, and dumped the body beneath a bridge.
In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), the Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to apply a constitutional construction of the phrase “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they] involved ... depravity of mind because the defendants crimes could not
be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more ‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder. His victims were killed instantaneously. They were members of his family who were causing him extreme emotional trauma. Shortly after the killings, he acknowledged his responsibility and the heinous nature of his crimes.
Id. 100 S.Ct. at 1767. This case is unlike Godfrey v. Georgia, supra. “Depravity of mind” is demonstrated in this case by the mode of killing preceded by extended sexual and psychological abuse of the victim. See Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 268 S.E.2d 339, 345 — 46 (1980), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 958, 67 L.Ed.2d 122 (1980).
The enumerated legal errors have been denied for the reasons stated, and the statement of evidence prepared from the record factually substantiates the verdict. Section 565.014.7. The evidence also supports the finding of the aggravating circumstances and the sentence of death by a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
This is the first capital murder case decided on appeal in which the death penalty was imposed under the law effective May 26, 1977. The records of all capital cases in which sentence was imposed after the effective date, accumulated pursuant to § 565.014.6, have been reviewed. Those cases in which both death and life imprisonment were submitted to the jury, and which have been affirmed on appeal are considered as similar cases, § 565.014.5: State v. Mitchell, 611 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Williams, 611 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Borden, 605 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. banc 1980); and State v. Downs, 593 S.W.2d 535 (Mo.1980). These cases support affirmance of the death penalty in this case; defendant’s sentence to death for the murder of Karen Keeton is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering the crime and the defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.
DONNELLY, RENDLEN, WELLIYER and MORGAN, JJ., concur.
BARDGETT, C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed.
SEILER, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.
Date of execution set for June 26, 1981.
APPENDIX
Harry Bumgarner:
“EXAMINATION BY MR. HAMILTON
(Prosecutor):
Q. Mr. Bumgarner, this is a charge of capital murder, which means that it does carry the possibility of capital punishment, or the death sentence. My inquiry is directed to find out what your attitude is toward capital punishment. If, during the trial of this case the facts and circumstances were developed that in fact the jury could consider capital punishment, would you, as a juror, consider capital punishment as a possible alternative?
A. I don’t think so.
Q. Are you morally and religiously opposed to capital punishment?
[12]*12A. Yes.
Q. And you feel you couldn’t bring back a sentence of — the death sentence under any circumstances?
A. I don’t think so.
Q. So regardless of how severe and aggravated the circumstances are, you don’t feel that you could bring back a death penalty?
A. I don’t believe I could.”
Rosalie M. Delange:
“EXAMINATION BY MR. HAMILTON
(Prosecutor):
Q. Mrs. Delange, this is a charge of capital murder, which carries with it the possibility of capital punishment, which is the death penalty.
* * * * * *
Q. Basically I am interested in your attitude as to the death penalty, and my question is: If the facts and circumstances which come out during the course of this trial are such that the jury, under the law, can consider as a possible alternative, capital punishment—
******
Q. —would you, as a member of that jury, give consideration to that as a possibility?
A. I am opposed to capital punishment.
Q. Okay, then are you basically morally and religiously against capital punishment as a punishment?
A. I would say that.
Q. Are you such that basically, regardless of what the circumstances are, you are against capital punishment?
A. I have always thought of myself as being against capital punishment. I don’t really know, when you put it that way, maybe circumstances could alter my decision, but I really think I would have to say I’m against it.
Q. Am I correct in saying that basically you wouldn’t vote for capital punishment regardless?
A. I think, right, I would have to say that.
Q. No matter how violent the crime might be, you would be against that as punishment, am I correct?
A. I just don’t believe in taking a life. I just don’t. I’m sorry.
******
Q. (By Mr. Lozano — Defense Counsel): —if—can you say that you would never consider capital punishment under any circumstances whatsoever?
A. I will say that.”
Elston Dalton:
“EXAMINATION BY MR. HAMILTON
(Prosecutor):
Q. Mr. Dalton, this is a charge of capital murder, which carries a possibility of capital punishment—
******
Q. —the death penalty. And my question is about your attitude as to the death penalty. If the facts and circumstances in this trial are such that under the law the jury can consider as an alternative the death penalty, would you, as a member of that jury, be willing to consider that as a possible alternative?
A. Well, I never did much like that subject.
Q. Let me ask you the, sir, are you telling us that basically you would be unwilling to return a death penalty verdict?
A. I believe I would sir.
Q. Would you be willing to, or be unwilling to, return such a verdict regardless of what the evidence is?
A. I didn’t understand you.
Q. Are you saying, sir, that you wouldn’t return a result of death, a death penalty result, regardless of what the evidence is?
A. Well, as I said, I don’t believe in the death penalty.
Q. Basically the opposition is such that you wouldn’t return it under any circumstances, is that correct?
A. Yeah, that’s the way I feel about it.”
[13]*13Juanita Bishop:
“EXAMINATION BY MR. HAMILTON
(Prosecutor):
Q. Mrs. Bishop, this is a charge of capital murder, and it carries with it the potential of the death penalty, the death sentence. Basically I am interested in your attitude as to capital punishment.
If the facts and circumstances brought out during the trial are such that they justify it, justify the death penalty, would you consider giving the death penalty?
A. (Pause) I don’t think so.
Q. Do you feel that your inclination is that morally and religiously you don’t feel you could bring back a sentence of death in any case?
A. Yes, I don’t feel like I’d be a judge of it.
Q. You don’t feel you could ever bring back the death penalty regardless of the situation, is that correct?
A. Yes.
******
Q. (By Mr. Lozano — Defense Counsel) Yes. Is your position that you could never vote for capital punishment in any case at any time no matter what the facts?
A. I’d say it is.”
Priscilla Choate:
“EXAMINATION BY MR. HAMILTON
(Prosecutor):
Q. Mrs. Choate, this is a charge of capital murder, and it carries with it the possibility of the death sentence, or of capital punishment.
♦ * * * * *
Q. Basically I am interested in inquiring of you as to what your attitude is toward capital punishment, and my question is: If, during the trial of the case the facts and circumstances that come forth as evidence are such that under the law the jury could consider the death penalty, would you, as a juror, consider the death penalty?
A. I don’t believe in capital punishment.
Q. Are you opposed to capital punishment?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Are you religiously and morally opposed to it?
A. Well, I don’t know, its just my opinion. It’s not really from religion or anything like that.
Q. But it’s such that you feel that you would not bring back the death penalty under any circumstances?
A. I don’t think I would.
Q. So, regardless of how severe or aggravated the situation is, it’s your feelings that you could not impose the death sentence?
A. I don’t think so.
******
THE COURT: Ma’am, you say you don’t think so. We need to be a little more precise.
MRS. CHOATE: Well, I couldn’t, no. That’s just my own personal feelings; I just couldn’t do it.
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Q. (Examination by Mr. Fiorella — Defense Counsel) .... Would you rule that out [death penalty] because of your feelings?
A. You mean corporal punishment?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah, I believe I would. I just can’t go along with it.