LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Ralph C. Feltrop, a Missouri inmate under sentence of death, appeals the judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Feltrop raises numerous issues, the most difficult being whether the Supreme Court of Missouri correctly applied Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), to cure the trial court’s sentencing-stage error in instructing the jury on a “depravity of mind” aggravating circumstance. We affirm.
I. Background
On March 16, 1987, shortly after a mutilated, dismembered female torso was found in St. Charles County, Missouri, Feltrop reported to the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department that his live-in girlfriend, Barbara Ann Roam, had been missing for a week. Suspecting that the body could be Ms. Roam, a Jefferson County deputy sheriff contacted Feltrop that evening and asked him to meet with St. Charles County investigators. Fel-trop drove to the Jefferson County Sheriffs office, arriving at approximately 9:00 p.m. He waited until officers of the St. Charles County Sheriffs Department arrived at about 11:30 p.m.
Two St. Charles officers began questioning Feltrop in the small watch commander’s office at 11:45 p.m., asking about his relationship with Roam and her disappearance. Fel-trop initially stated that he had last seen Roam two weeks earlier leaving their home with an unknown man. At approximately 1:10 a.m., an officer asked Feltrop whether he was a Christian and would tell the truth; Feltrop responded, “She clawed me and tried to take the knife.” The officers immediately warned Feltrop of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which he waived, and the questioning resumed. Feltrop then said that he had killed Roam in self-defense and later directed the officers to a partially submerged trash bag in a pond in Jefferson County which contained Roam’s head, hands, and lower legs.
In June 1988, Feltrop was tried in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County and convicted of murder in the first degree. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.020 (1986).1 Following the guilty verdict, the court conducted a penalty stage of the trial, as prescribed in Mo. Rev.Stat. § 565.030.4. Under this statute, if the jury concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists, it then considers whether the death penalty should be imposed, taking into account all evidence in aggravation and mitigation of punishment presented during the guilt and penalty stages of the trial. If the jury returns a verdict of death, it must set out in writing the aggravating eircumstance(s) it has found. See generally State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667, 675 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 239, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982); State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 683 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 770, 74 L.Ed.2d 983 (1983); Bolder v. Armontrout, 921 F.2d 1359, 1367 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 850, 112 S.Ct. 154, 116 L.Ed.2d 119 (1991). The trial court then has the power to reduce this punishment “if it finds that the punishment is excessive.” Rule 29.05 of the Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure.
At the conclusion of the penalty-stage evidence, the trial court submitted one statutory aggravating circumstance to the jury, whether “the murder of Barbara Ann Roam involved torture and or depravity of mind and [769]*769that as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman,” the factor enumerated in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.032.2(7). The jury’s verdict of death included a written finding that the murder “involved depravity of mind and that as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman.”
The trial court denied Feltrop’s Rule 29.05 motion for reduction of sentence, imposed the death sentence, and later denied Fel-trop’s motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction and sentence and the denial of post-conviction relief in a consolidated appeal. State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991). That Court subsequently denied Fel-trop’s petition for state habeas corpus and motion to recall the mandate. Feltrop then petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting seventeen grounds for relief. He now appeals the district court’s2 denial of that petition.
II. Sentencing Issues
A. The Aggravating Circumstance Instruction
In State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 10-11 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984), the Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged that applying the “depravity of mind” statutory aggravating circumstance “without proper tethers” might run afoul of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), which held that the words “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman,” standing alone, do not “impl[y] any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence.”3 Accordingly, the Court in Preston defined factors to be considered in determining whether depravity of mind may be found in a particular case:
mental state of defendant, infliction of physical or psychological torture upon the victim as when victim has a substantial period of time before death to anticipate and reflect upon it; brutality of defendant’s conduct; mutilation of the body after death; absence of any substantive motive; absence of defendant’s remorse and the nature of the crime.
673 S.W.2d at 11. In this ease, the trial court nonetheless charged the bare language of this statutory aggravating circumstance, the only one it submitted to the jury. Fel-trop therefore argued to the Missouri Supreme Court that his death sentence must be set aside because this instruction was unconstitutionally vague.
The Missouri Supreme Court agreed that its limiting definition of “depravity of mind” should have been given to the jury. However, relying on Walton, it denied Feltrop relief from his death sentence. The Court held that (i) Missouri law prescribes a “hybrid” sentencing procedure in which the sentencing judge acts as the final sentencer; (ii) the trial court in denying Feltrop’s motion for reduction of sentence must be presumed to have applied the limiting depravity-of-mind factors enunciated in Preston; and (iii) the evidence supports the finding that the murder involved depravity of mind as construed in Preston. 803 S.W.2d at 14-17.4 The district court held that this appellate review “was sufficient to cure the jury’s unchanneled discretion.”
On appeal, Feltrop argues that the district court erred in concluding that the Missouri Supreme Court cured the trial court’s failure to give the jury an instruction that narrowed the depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance. We note that there are two facets of [770]*770the Missouri Supreme Court’s “cure”: first, that the jury instruction error was cured by the trial judge in his role as “final sentencer,” and second, that the error was also cured by the appellate court’s conclusion, based on its independent review of the evidence, that the record supports the jury’s depravity-of-mind finding under the proper Preston standard. To prevail on this issue, Feltrop must establish that both of these grounds are constitutionally defective.
1. Feltrop argues that the Missouri Supreme Court’s first curative holding — that the trial judge cured the instructional error when it denied Feltrop’s motion for reduction of sentence — conflicts with the pronouncement in Walton that, “[w]hen a jury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process.” 497 U.S. at 653, 110 S.Ct. at 3057. But Walton went on to state:
But the logic of [Godfrey and Maynard] has no place in the context of sentencing by a trial judge_ If the Arizona Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of the “especially heinous, cruel or depraved” aggravating circumstance, we presume that Arizona trial judges are applying the narrower definition.
Id. at 653, 110 S.Ct. at 3057. The Missouri Supreme Court determined that the trial judge is the “final sentencer” when it acts upon a motion for reduction of sentence. We must accept that interpretation of state law, and the Constitution does not require that the jury impose the death sentence or make particular findings necessary to impose that sentence. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990) (“[Njeither the Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor any other constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to have a jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence.”); Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48, 110 S.Ct. at 3053-54.
Feltrop further contends that the trial judge did not cure the instructional error because the Walton presumption — that a trial judge applies the correct limiting construction in making an aggravating circumstance finding — is inappropriate when the trial judge has failed to give the Preston limiting instruction in charging the jury. However, neither Preston, nor Godfrey which prompted Preston, discussed whether a limiting instruction must be given to the sentencing jury. Rather, those cases concerned the reviewing appellate court’s function of determining whether a vague aggravating circumstance instruction had resulted in the “stan-dardless and unchanneled imposition” of the death penalty. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429, 100 S.Ct. at 1765; see Preston, 673 S.W.2d at 10-11. Here, the trial judge’s description of the murder and subsequent mutilation and dismembering of Barbara Roam undeniably satisfy the depravity-of-mind standard as narrowly construed in Preston.5 In these circumstances, the Missouri Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in invoking the Walton presumption.
2. The Missouri Supreme Court separately cured the trial court’s instructional error by making an independent depravity-of-mind finding under the narrow Preston standard. Walton expressly contemplated that a state appellate court may cure in this manner:
Moreover, even if a trial judge fails to apply the narrowing construction or applies an improper construction, the Constitution does not necessarily require that a state appellate court vacate a death sentence based on that factor. Rather ... a state appellate court may itself determine whether the evidence supports the existence of the aggravating circumstance as properly defined....
[771]*771497 U.S. at 653-54, 110 S.Ct. at 3057. Fel-trop argues that the Missouri Supreme Court’s finding did not cure the trial court’s constitutional error because the appellate court did not also reweigh the depravity-of-mind circumstance against the mitigating evidence, and did not conduct a harmless error analysis. He contends that these additional curative measures are required by recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Richmond v. Lewis, —— U.S. ——, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992), Sochor v. Florida, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), and Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). However, those eases dealt with the role of a reviewing appellate court in so-called “weighing” States, where the jury must weigh the statutory aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances in deciding whether to impose or recommend the death penalty. Missouri is not a weighing State. Under Missouri law, once the jury finds an aggravating circumstance, it is free to consider all the evidence in deciding whether to recommend the death penalty. See LaRette v. Delo, 44 F.3d 681, 687 n. 4 (8th Cir.1995). Under this type of capital sentencing procedure, “the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2741, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).6
As Zant makes clear, when the appellate court in a non-weighing State concludes that the jury was given an improperly vague aggravating circumstance instruction, it must determine (i) whether the jury’s findings “adequately differentiate this case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way” from other murder cases, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. at 2744, and (ii) whether the faulty instruction either permitted the jury to consider inadmissible evidence, or caused the jury to give inappropriate weight to particular evidence, 462 U.S. at 886-89, 103 S.Ct. at 2747-49. The Missouri Supreme Court performed that function when it reviewed the evidence and concluded that it supported the jury’s depravity-of-mind finding under the Preston standard. See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362-63, 108 S.Ct. at 1858-59; Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 449-50 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1609, 123 L.Ed.2d 170 (1993).7 Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court’s discussion of the evidence, particularly that quoted in note 5 supra, brings this case squarely within the purview of Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1562 (8th Cir.1994): “[e]ven if a jury does not make specific findings that the murder involved torture, a finding by the state court of evidence that the victim had a substantial period of time before death to anticipate and reflect on it is a proper limiting construction of the aggravating circumstance instruction.” The district court properly rejected this claim.
B. The Imprisonment for Life Instruction
The jury was instructed that, as an alternative to the death penalty, Feltrop could be sentenced to “imprisonment for life by the Division of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole.” After an hour of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking:
Is there any legal situation under which a person can be released who has received life without parole; that is pardoned by the governor. Please distinguish between life in prison and natural life. Are these one in the same? What is the length of life, capital life.
[772]*772Feltrop’s attorney requested the response, “You’re not to infer anything other than the literal meaning of the instructions.”8 The trial judge told the jury, “You must be guided by the instructions that the court has given you,” a response consistent with state law. See 803 S.W.2d at 14. Feltrop now argues that the failure to provide the jury further explanation of “life without parole” unconstitutionally limited the jury’s consideration of a factor relevant in deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed. This contention is without merit.
In Simmons v. South Carolina, — U.S. -,-, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2196, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), the Supreme Court recently explained that California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), “stands for the broad proposition that we generally will defer to a State’s determination as to what a jury should and should not be told about sentencing.” Simmons held that, if the State urges the death penalty on the ground of a defendant’s future dangerousness, the jury should be told, by argument or instruction, that life imprisonment without possibility of parole is the alternative penalty. The instruction in this case complied with Simmons. The trial court’s response to the jury’s subsequent inquiry was consistent with the response requested by Feltrop’s counsel and with state law. The court’s initial instruction was sufficiently clear that its refusal to further explain the phrase, imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole, was not “a fundamental defect that resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or so infected the entire trial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Baker v. Leapley, 965 F.2d 657, 659 (8th Cir.1992) (quotation omitted).
III. Issues in Determining Guilt
A Admission of Incriminating Statements
Feltrop argues that his incriminating statements to police investigators were improperly admitted at trial because (1) the statements were involuntary, and (2) the first incriminating statement was elicited before he received Miranda warnings.
(1) For his incriminating statements to be involuntary, Feltrop must show that, at the time he made them, the statements were the product of coercive police activity and his “will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.” Sumpter v. Nix, 863 F.2d 563, 565 (8th Cir.1988), quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). We review the question of voluntariness de novo; state court findings “are entitled to a presumption of correctness.” Evans v. Dowd, 932 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944, 112 S.Ct. 385, 116 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991).
Feltrop argues that he was questioned late at night in a “claustrophobic” nine-foot-by-nine-foot office when he was nervous, tired, distraught, and cried periodically. He complains that certain statements by the questioning officers were inherently coercive— asking whether he was a Christian, telling him that Roam’s killer had “blood on his hands” that “would never wash off,” and asking where the remainder of Roam’s body was so that she could be given “a proper burial.” However, “there is nothing inherently wrong with efforts to create a favorable climate for confession.” Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 81, 126 L.Ed.2d 49 (1993) (quotation omitted).
After careful review of the record in light of the state court findings, see 803 S.W.2d at 13, we agree with the district court that Feltrop’s incriminating statements were not the product of unconstitutional coercion. The statements were not preceded by lengthy interrogation. The interview was interrupted by several breaks, during which Feltrop used the restroom and drank a soda. When he became upset, he was given time to calm down. There were no police threats or intimidation, and he was informed of his Miranda rights prior to confessing. “Any interview of one suspected of a crime ... will have coercive aspects to it.” Oregon v. Mat-[773]*773hiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Feltrop has failed to prove that his will was overborne by this questioning.
(2) After a suppression hearing, the Missouri courts rejected Feltrop’s Miranda claim on the ground that he was not in custody when he first made an incriminating statement. 803 S.W.2d at 13. This finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Krantz v. Briggs, 983 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir.1993); Purvis v. Dugger, 932 F.2d 1413, 1418-19 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 1485, 117 L.Ed.2d 627 (1992). Custody for Miranda purposes is an objective test that turns on whether there was “restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, — U.S.-,-, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (quotation omitted). Miranda warnings are not required “simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714.
Though he initially went to the Jefferson County station voluntarily, Feltrop argues that he was in custody because he waited there a long time for the arrival of the St. Charles County interviewing officers and because, when the interview did occur, it was conducted by two officers in a very small room. The Missouri Supreme Court found that “[a]t all times prior to his making the incriminating statement, [Feltrop] was free to depart.” That Court also noted:
[E]ven after [Feltrop] confessed, he apparently assumed he was free to go; he asked to drive his own vehicle to the discovery site of the body parts so that he could later return home in time to go to work.
803 S.W.2d at 13. Applying the indicia of custody articulated in United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir.1990), we conclude that this is a close custody question but that Feltrop has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness. In addition, because Feltrop’s initial incriminating statement was voluntary, his later confession, given after Miranda warnings, was admissible. Thus, any Miranda error in admitting the initial ambiguous statement was harmless.
B. Exclusion of a Defense Witness as Incompetent
Feltrop argues that the state trial court violated his right to compulsory process and to due process when it excluded testimony by Barbara Roam’s six-year-old daughter that allegedly would have corroborated Feltrop’s claim of self-defense. In general, a state court evidentiary ruling may not be the basis for federal habeas corpus relief unless it “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72-73, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (internal quotation omitted).
Under Missouri law, a child under ten years of age is presumed incompetent to testify unless the child “appears to the trial judge to have the capacity both to receive just impressions and to relate them truthfully.” State v. Williams, 729 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 296, 98 L.Ed.2d 256 (1987); see Mo.Rev.Stat. 491.060(2). The determination of competence is left to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Robinson, 835 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Mo. banc 1992). Here, following a competency hearing at which the daughter testified, the trial court found that she was incompetent generally and that the testimony she would offer would be incompetent regarding the issues at trial. The record of the competency hearing more than fairly supports these findings, so they are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Nolan v. Armontrout, 973 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir.1992); cf. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117-18, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 2264, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (competency to stand trial). The district court properly rejected this claim.
C. Failure to Exclude Jurors for Bias
During voir dire, three prospective jurors admitted they had been influenced by pretrial publicity. After further questioning, the trial court denied Feltrop’s motion to strike them for cause, and he then struck them using peremptory challenges. Feltrop argues that this violated his constitutional right [774]*774to a fair and impartial jury. This claim is without merit because there is no showing that the trial jury was not fair and impartial. “[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court found that all three prospective jurors “demonstrated an ability to be fair and to follow the law and instructions of the court,” 803 S.W.2d at 8, a finding entitled to the presumption of correctness. See Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1089, 112 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1991).
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Issues
A. Feltrop’s main defense at trial was that he killed Roam in self defense after she attacked him with a knife. He argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to also present expert medical testimony that he suffered from “battered spouse syndrome,” both as a defense to first degree murder - and as a mitigating circumstance at the penalty stage.
Prior to trial, Feltrop pleaded the defense of insanity, and the State requested a pretrial psychological examination. Dr. Max Given examined Feltrop and reported that he had no mental defect that would excuse him from criminal responsibility. Feltrop’s counsel moved for a second examination. Dr. A.E. Daniel examined Feltrop and agreed that he did not suffer from a mental defect but opined that his “state of mind, particularly as it relates to constant battering by the victim should be given some consideration as a mitigating factor when the degree of the offense is considered and later at the penalty stage.” Feltrop then filed a notice of his intent to offer evidence of the battered spouse syndrome. However, he ultimately offered no medical evidence on this question at either the guilt or penalty stage.
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Daniel Cuneo testified that he had examined Feltrop and reviewed the pretrial medical reports. Dr. Cuneo testified that Feltrop has a passive-aggressive personality disorder that would make him a target for abuse from the victim and also prone to “go into a rage reaction.” He opined that the pretrial medical reports were consistent with his diagnosis and “could have been” presented during either stage of the trial. Feltrop’s counsel testified that he initially planned to introduce medical evidence of spousal-type abuse by Roam but concluded that testimony by the examining doctors would seriously undermine the core defense of self defense because Feltrop had told all the doctors that he did not commit the crime:
Q Did you ever intend, once you had planned your trial strategy, to put Dr. Daniel on?
A I had considered the possibility of putting him on, I think, up until about two weeks prior to trial but did not.
Q Why?
A Because I wanted to present a consistent defense all the way through and that defense was self-defense, and [Fel-trop] just told the doctor inconsistent facts with that. And so I thought that any good that would come from the doctor’s testimony would be undercut and open to scathing cross examination by the prosecution, that would indicate a lack of remorse on his part and easily be interpreted] that way. So whatever personality traits [Feltrop] had, I felt I could produce that through lay witnesses who had a good understanding of him, and I would not [incur] the problems that I would have with Dr. Daniel’s testimony.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, Feltrop “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2055, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Missouri Supreme Court found that counsel investigated whether to use medical evidence of battered spouse syndrome in defense of the first degree murder charge and in mitigation of penalty; the Court concluded that “[counsel’s] choice not to present expert testimony was based on reasonable trial strategy.” 803 S.W.2d at 22. After considering the question of ineffective assistance de novo, the district [775]*775court agreed with this analysis, and so do we. Feltrop has failed to “overcome a strong presumption that his counsel’s actions constituted reasonable trial strategy.” Sanders v. Trickey, 875 F.2d 205, 207 (8th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 898, 110 S.Ct. 252, 107 L.Ed.2d 201 (1989); see Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1389 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1944, 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989).
B. Feltrop further argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in declining the trial court’s offer to declare a mistrial when the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify, and in refusing to allow Feltrop to testify, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise numerous issues on appeal. After careful review of the entire record, we agree with the district court and the Missouri Supreme Court that the challenged decisions by Fel-trop’s trial and appellate counsel were based upon reasonable strategy. See 803 S.W.2d at 20-22. Accordingly, these claims were properly denied.
V. Prosecutor Misconduct Issues
Feltrop claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct at various points during the trial that deprived Feltrop of a fair trial. He first argues that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify during the penalty stage closing arguments by stating:
The Defendant is not entitled to receive from you what he so blatantly refused to give Barbara Roam, mercy and compassion. Dr. Case testified Barbara lived a minimum of fifteen minutes after the fatal wound, in that she was conscious. And that could have been as much as four hours. The defendant was unable to refute that.
(Emphasis added.) Indirect references to a defendant’s failure to testify are violative of a defendant’s constitutional rights only if they “(1) manifest the prosecutor’s intention to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, or (2) are such that the jury would naturally take them as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 853 (8th Cir.1987).
Here, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the prosecutor intended to refer to Fel-trop’s “failure to offer medical evidence to refute the state’s expert testimony,” not to his failure to testify. 803 S.W.2d at 13. The record supports that finding. Nor was the statement one that the jury would naturally take as a comment on Feltrop’s failure to testify; rather, the prosecutor’s focus was whether Barbara Roam had suffered prior to her death. This statement is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.
Feltrop also argues that the prosecutor made comments that “affected the jurors’ perception of their responsibility,” improperly elicited testimony of prior bad acts, “minimized the importance of the penalty phase” of the trial, and improperly personalized his closing argument to the jury. We have carefully considered the challenged comments in their various contexts. Like the district court, we conclude that the comments, if improper, did not “so prejudice [Feltrop] that he was unable to obtain a fair trial.” Carlson v. Minnesota, 945 F.2d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir.1991).
VI. A Procedural Bar Issue
In his federal habeas corpus petition, Feltrop raised a number of claims not raised in his consolidated appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court but subsequently raised to that Court in his petition for state habeas relief and in his motion to recall the mandate. Feltrop argues that the district court erred in concluding that these claims are procedurally barred. We disagree. The claims were proeedurally defaulted under Missouri law. See Kennedy v. Delo, 959 F.2d 112, 115-16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 168, 121 L.Ed.2d 116 (1992) (claims first raised in motion to recall the mandate); Byrd v. Delo, 942 F.2d 1226, 1231-32 (8th Cir.1991) (claims first raised in state habeas petition). Feltrop argues that the ineffective assistance of his counsel during the state post-conviction proceedings excuses these procedural defaults. We have previously rejected that claim. See Nolan, 973 F.2d at 616-17.
[776]*776VII. Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing
The district court denied Feltrop’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the ground that Feltrop had not shown either cause or prejudice for any failure to adequately develop relevant facts in the state court proceedings, as required by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). Feltrop argues that this ruling was error because the cause-and-prejudice standard of Tamayo-Reyes applies only to claims that are otherwise proeedurally barred. We disagree. The cause-and-prejudice requirement of Ta-mayo-Reyes plainly applies to non-barred claims previously raised in state court. See McCann v. Armontrout, 973 F.2d 655, 658 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1342, 122 L.Ed.2d 724 (1993). Because Feltrop made no showing of cause and prejudice, the district court properly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing.
VIII. Issues Raised Pro Se
In addition to the above claims raised by Feltrop’s counsel, Feltrop has raised a number of additional claims in pro se briefs to this court. Many of these claims were not raised in the state courts and are procedurally barred. We have carefully considered the remainder and conclude they are without merit.
The judgment of the district court denying Feltrop’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.