Opinion of the Court by
KIRIMITSU, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant-Appellant Malakai Maumalan-ga (Defendant) appeals the First Circuit Court’s June 28, 1996 Amended Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
[98]*98II. BACKGROUND
On June 8, 1996, Defendant had been working at EM Tours as a porter. Because an alleged anonymous phone call was received by the tour company that it would be robbed that evening, Defendant brought two guns to work with him that day. Apparently, no robbery occurred.
While at work on June 8, 1996, Defendant heard of a possible drive-by shooting at Ka-noa Park. Defendant then left work at about 10:00 p.m. to personally drive home two of his friends who were at the park during the drive-by shooting. After dropping off his friends, Defendant went to a gas station to put gas in his car. While at the gas station, Defendant coincidentally saw boys who he suspected were involved in the drive-by shooting.
Defendant alleged that one of the boys at the gas station pulled out a gun and aimed it at Defendant. Because Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to drive away, Defendant allegedly had no choice but to grab his gun and aim it at the boys. Defendant then shot off around four to five rounds from his gun.
Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with seven counts: Attempted Murder in the First Degree (Count I); Attempted Murder in the Second Degree (Counts II and III); Place to Keep Loaded Firearm (Count IV);2 and Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree (Counts V, VI and VII).
The trial court subsequently granted, in part, Defendant’s motion for directed verdict and thereby acquitted Defendant of Counts VI and VII.
At trial, Defendant specifically raised a choice of evils defense to the charge of Place to Keep Loaded Firearm,3 Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 134-6(c) and (e) (1993).4 Over Defendant’s objection, the court in[99]*99structed the jury on the choice of evils defense as follows:
It is a defense to the offense charged that the defendant’s conduct was legally justified. The law recognizes the “choice of evils” defense, also referred to as the “necessity” defense.
The “choice of evils” defense justifies the defendant’s conduct if the defendant reasonably believed that compliance with the law would have resulted in greater harm to himself or another than the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged.
In order for the “choice of evils” defense to apply, four conditions must be satisfied. First, the defendant must have reasonably believed that there was no legal alternative available to him. Second, the defendant must have reasonably believed that the harm sought to be prevented was imminent or immediate. Third, the defendant’s conduct must have been reasonably designed to actually prevent the threat of greater harm. Fourth, the harm sought to be avoided must have been greater than the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged.
Accordingly, if the prosecution has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was not legally justified by the “choice of evils” defense, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count IV: Place to Keep Loaded Firearm. If the prosecution has done so, then you must find that the “choice of evils” defense does not apply.5
(Patterned Hawai'i Jury Instruction 7.12) (emphasis added).
Subsequently, the jury acquitted Defendant of Counts I, II, III, and V. The jury found Defendant guilty of Count IV — Place to Keep Loaded Firearm.
An Amended Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence was entered on June 28, 1996.6 Defendant’s Notice of Appeal was untimely, having been filed on September 26, 1996.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Preliminarily, there is a question of jurisdiction in this case because Defendant filed his notice of appeal fifty-nine days late, or ninety days after the trial court entered its judgment. Pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(b), a criminal defendant must file a notice of appeal “within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” However, “[t]his court and the Hawaii Supreme Court have seen fit in criminal cases to relax the deadline for filing a notice of appeal where justice so warrants.” State v. Ahlo, 79 Hawai'i 385, 392, 903 P.2d 690, 697 (App.1995) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In light of the above holdings, and based on a review of the circumstances in [100]*100this case, the interests of justice require us to hold that Defendant’s failure to comply with HRAP Rule 4(b) does not preclude his right to appeal. See State v. Knight, 80 Hawai'i 318, 323, 909 P.2d 1133, 1139 (1996) (extending jurisdiction despite failure to comply with HRAP Rule 4(b)); Ahlo, 79 Hawai'i at 392, 903 P.2d at 697 (doing the same).
B. Jury Instructions
Defendant appeals only his conviction of Place to Keep Loaded Firearm. In that regard, Defendant only challenges the jury’s instruction regarding his choice of evils justification defense.
1. Standard of review.
“In reviewing jury instructions, the standard of review is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.” State v. Maelega, 80 Hawai'i 172, 176, 907 P.2d 758, 762 (1995) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
2. The current status of the choice of evils defense in Hawai‘i.
HRS § 703-302(l)(a) (1993) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Choice of evils. (1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid an imminent harm or evil to the actor or to another is justifiable provided that:
(a) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged[.]
HRS § 703-302(l)(a).7 HRS § 703-300 (1993) defines “believes” to mean “reasonably believes.”
Because the Hawai'i Penal Code (the Code) is derived from the Model Penal Code (MPC), Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 227, in 1971 House Journal, at 784, HRS § 703-302 is nearly identical to Section 3.02 of the MPC.8
[101]*101Prior to the enactment of HRS § 703-302(l)(a), the State of Hawai'i (the State) followed the common law defense of “necessity” or choice of evils. State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 471-72, 509 P.2d 1095, 1109 (1973).9 Under the common law approach, the choice of evils defense is not applicable in three situations (the Marley test):
(1) Where there is a third alternative available to defendants that does not involve violation of the law, defendants are not justified in violating the law....
(2) A closely related required element is that the harm to be prevented be imminent. ...
(3) Thirdly, and most importantly, even assuming arguendo that alternative courses of action were “unavailable” ... defendants remain unentitled to the defense of “necessity” because their actions were not reasonably designed to actually prevent the threatened greater harm.
Id. at 472, 509 P.2d at 1109 (citations omitted).
Following the enactment of HRS § 703-302, this court in State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw. App. 115, 826 P.2d 884 (1992) believed that “the Marley rationale [was] applicable in the construction of HRS § 703-302(1), (2).” Id. at 118, 826 P.2d at 886. Thus, we essentially adopted the three-part Marley test for purposes of construing HRS § 703-302(1), (2). Id.
Subsequently, in 1996, we reaffirmed our decision in Kealoha and surmised that, pursuant to HRS § 703-302(l)(a),
the necessity or choice of evils justification defense is not applicable when one or both of the following requirements is not satisfied: (1) the defendant reasonably believed that it was necessary to commit the crime to avoid an imminent harm or evil to himself or to others; or (2) the harm or evil sought to be avoided was greater than the harm or evil generated by the crime committed.
State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i 147, 153, 913 P.2d 558, 564 (App.1996) (Acoba, J., concurring).
We further reiterated our holding in Keal-oha that,
with respect to requirement (1) above, a person does not reasonably believe that it is necessary to commit a crime to avoid an imminent harm or evil to himself or others when one or more of the following is a fact:
(a) A third alternative that did not involve the commission of a crime was reasonably available to the person;
(b) The crime committed was not reasonably designed to actually avoid the harm or evil sought to be avoided; or
(c) The harm or evil sought to be avoided was not imminent when the person committed the crime.
Id. at 153-54, 913 P.2d at 564-65.
However, in DeCastro, Judge Acoba disagreed with the application of the three-part Marley test because in his opinion, “the common law requirements set forth in Kealoha [and Marley ] conflict with the express language of HRS § 703-302.” Id. at 155, 913 P.2d at 566. Instead, pursuant to the express language of HRS § 703-302(l)(a), Judge Acoba reasoned that
the justification defense is satisfied when the following factors are established: the defendant (1) reasonably believes (2) the conduct is necessary (3) to avoid harm or evil to the actor or another which is (4) imminent, and (5) the harm or evil sought to be avoided is greater than the violative conduct.
Id.
Defendant now asks us to revisit our holdings in Kealoha and DeCastro on the basis [102]*102that these cases improperly expand or add to the requirements set forth by the legislature in HRS § 703-302(l)(a).
3. We reaffirm our holdings in Kealoha and DeCastro with clarification.
Our decisions in Kealoha and DeCastro are consistent with the general principles of statutory construction as well as the Code’s rule of construction. Therefore, we reject any argument that Kealoha and DeCastro go beyond the scope of permissible construction.
a.
HRS § 701-102(2) (1993) provides that “[t]he provisions of this Code govern the construction of and punishment for any offense set forth herein committed after the effective date, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.”
HRS § 701-104 (1993) further provides as follows:
Principles of construction. The provisions of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, .in order to promote justice and effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of the words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, HRS § 701-104, “read in conjunction with § 701-103 [(purposes of this Code) ], is intended to assure that this Code will be construed by the courts in such a way as to effectuate the declared purposes of the law.” Commentary to HRS § 701-104.
We are also guided by the following principles of statutory construction:
The starting point in statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent from the language of the statute itself. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that ,no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute. Penal statutes are to be strictly construed. However, the strict construction rule does not permit the court to ignore legislative intent, nor require the court to reject that construction that best harmonizes with the design of the statute or the end sought to be achieved.
State v. Mitsuda, 86 Hawai'i 37, 40-41, 947 P.2d 349, 352-53 (1997) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
b.
Based on the aforementioned principles, we make the following observations. In light of our holdings in Kealoha and DeCastro, the law in Hawaii on a choice of evils justification defense is still governed by HRS § 703-302(l)(a): (1) the defendant must reasonably believe that it was necessary to commit the crime to avoid an imminent harm or evil to himself or others; and (2) the harm or evil sought to be avoided was greater than the harm or evil generated by the crime committed. HRS § 703-302(l)(a); see also DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i at 153, 913 P.2d at 564.
The language of HRS § 703-302 was intended to be general and objective in order for a jury or factfinder to be the ultimate decision-maker for determining whether a choice of evils defense is justified. The commentary to § 703-302 states, in relevant part:
The whole matter, with all of its ramifications is to be weighed by the court and the jury in the same manner as in any criminal proceeding. If the defendant’s conduct was not necessary, if one evil was not greater than the other, if the defendant exceeded the reasonable bounds of intelligence and morality, the defendant may be convicted for the defendant’s conduct notwithstanding the defendant’s attempts to justify the defendant’s actions.
Finally, many commentators have had difficulty with the concept of necessity because of the possibility of unforeseeable changes in the perilous situation. For instance, if a number of passengers are thrown overboard from a ship to save a much larger number of persons, there is really no way for the actors to foresee the [103]*103exact moment when a rescue ship may arrive. There is always the chance that help will arrive in time to make the emergency action unnecessary. Such objections, however, fail to take account of the fact that other defenses which are predicated on a threat to person or property can take account only of the probability of harm. One can never guarantee that the uplifted knife will be plunged into the victim. If necessity is not admitted where there is a high degree of probability of disastrous consequences if action is -not taken, then it can never be admitted. A person faced with such seeming necessity is and will remain in a personal moral quandary because of the person’s uncertainty. Our only point is that the threat of criminal punishment is unneeded here.
(Emphases added) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
Our holdings in Kealoha and DeCas-tro recognize the difficulty with the concept of when an actor reasonably believes his or her conduct to be “necessary to avoid an imminent harm or evil to the actor or to another.” Thus, our case law simply provides considerations for interpreting this first requirement of the statute; they do not create elements which add to the requirements of HRS § 703-302(l)(a). The considerations for the first requirement of the statute are as follows: (1) whether a third alternative, that did not involve the commission of a crime, was reasonably available to the defendant; (2) whether the crime committed was not reasonably designed to actually avoid the harm or evil sought to be avoided; and (3) whether the harm or evil sought to be avoided was imminent when the person committed the crime. DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i at 153-54, 913 P.2d at 564-65.
As to consideration (1), although the statute does not include language about a third legal alternative, it also does not add to the statute because it is another way of defining whether a defendant reasonably believed it was necessary to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to himself or others. A choice of evils defense is exactly what it says — a defendant must be in a position of choosing between two evils. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-10, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (“While the defense of duress covered the situation where the coercion had its source in the actions of other human beings, the defense of necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.”) A natural and common definition to the term “necessary,” in the context of a choice of evils defense, is that “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,” then there is no necessity. Id. at 410, 100 S.Ct. 624 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, by having a jury consider the presence of a third legal alternative does not add to the express language of the statute; instead it helps define and construe whether an action is necessary. See generally MPC § 3.02 at 10 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958) (“Questions of immediacy and of alternatives have bearing, of course, on the genuineness of a belief in necessity, as well as on the actor’s recklessness or negligence when either is material.”).
As to consideration (2), HRS § 703-302(l)(a) mentions nothing about the defendant’s actions being “reasonably designed” to actually avoid a harm or evil. Nevertheless, “reasonably designed” goes to the question of degree (i.e., the nature and degree of the crime committed by the defendant in relation to the nature and degree of the harm or evil sought to be prevented). This consideration does not add to the statute because an express requirement of § 703-302(l)(a) is that “[t]he harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged[.]” '
Finally, consideration (3) articulates the element of imminency and does not add anything to the requirements of HRS § 703-302(l)(a) because the statute specifically requires that the harm or evil perceived by the defendant be imminent.
Even the drafters of the MPC recognized these aforementioned considerations:
[T]he formulation makes the actor’s belief in the necessity sufficient (assuming a [104]*104valid choice of evils) unless the crime can be committed recklessly or negligently, in which case recklessness or negligence as to the necessity suffices. Questions of immediacy and of alternatives have bearing, of course, on the genuineness of a belief in necessity, as well as on the actor’s recklessness or negligence when either is material. Not even actual necessity suffices unless the actor acted on belief in its existence; under the formulation in the draft, one cannot act by accident from necessity.
MPC § 3.02 at 10 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958) (Tentative Draft No. 8 remained unchanged in its final draft) (cited in MPC part I Commentaries, Vol. 2, at 9 (Off. Draft and Rev. Comm.1962)).
To be sure, the “common law” considerations of Kealoha and DeCastro do not make it more difficult for a defendant to prevail on a choice of evils defense. The considerations are just that — considerations. They do not add additional elements to a choice of evils defense because they are merely interpreta-tional guidelines to assist a jury or court in determining the validity of a choice of evils defense.
c.
We also find it noteworthy that the express considerations set forth in Kealoha and DeCastro are in accord with at least five other jurisdictions. In Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 498 A.2d 806, 808 (1985), a Pennsylvania court was faced with an MPC-based justification statute that relieves a defendant of liability for criminal conduct if (1) the actor believed such conduct to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another, and (2) “the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged[.]” Crimes and Offenses Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 503 (1983).
However, the Pennsylvania court commented that:
The defense of necessity, however, does not arise from a “choice” of several courses of actions; instead it is based on a real emergency. It can be asserted only by an actor who is confronted with such a crisis as a personal danger (to oneself or others), a crisis which does not permit a selection from among several solutions, some of which do not involve criminal acts. Accordingly, the defense can be raised only in situations that deal with harms or evils that are readily apparent and recognizable to reasonable persons. The defense cannot be permitted to justify acts taken to foreclose speculative and uncertain dangers, and is therefore limited in application to acts directed at the avoidance of harm that is reasonably certain to occur.
Furthermore, the actor must reasonably believe that the conduct chosen was necessary to avoid the greater threatened harm or evil. Because the harm must be real, and not an imagined, speculative, or non-imminent harm, the actions taken to avoid the harm must support a reasonable belief or inference that the actions would be effective in avoiding or alleviating the impending harm.
Id. 498 A.2d at 808-09 (citations omitted).
Based on these aforementioned considerations, the court held that:
In order, then, to be entitled to an instruction on justification as a defense to a crime charged, the actor must first offer evidence that will show:
(1) that the actor was faced with a clear and imminent harm, not one which is debatable or speculative;
(2) that the actor could reasonably expect that the actor’s actions would be effective in avoiding this greater harm;
(3) that there is no legal alternative which will be effective in abating the harm; and
(4) that the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue.
Id. at 809.
The Pennsylvania court apparently felt that the express wording of its statute did not adequately cover some compelling considerations of a choice of evils defense. Thus, without adding elements to a statutory justification defense, it articulated considerations which, when present, would defeat a [105]*105justification defense. Accord Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky.1983) (expanding Kentucky’s MPC-based choice of evils statute to include common law elements that were not present in the Kentucky statute); State v. O’Brien, 132 N.H. 587, 567 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1989) (reasoning that New Hampshire’s MPC-based statute sets up a balancing test wherein “the desire or need to avoid the present harm must outweigh the harm sought to be prevented,” and therefore expanded the statute to include the common law element that there must be no lawful alternative); see also People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 677-79 (Colo.Ct.App.1990) (inquiring into common law elements not articulated in Colorado’s MPC-based statute for purposes of determining whether a jury instruction should be given); State v. Smith, 884 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (examining common law elements not expressed in the MPC-based statute to determine if a necessity or justification defense instruction should be submitted to the jury).10
Accordingly, we reaffirm our holdings in Kealoha and DeCastro.
4. The choice of evils instruction was erroneous; however, a vacatur of conviction is not required.
The jury instruction in this case, patterned after Hawaii Jury Instruction 7.12, stated as follows:
It is a defense to the offense charged that the defendant’s conduct was legally justified. The law recognizes the “choice of evils” defense, also referred to as the “necessity” defense.
The “choice of evils” defense justifies the defendant’s conduct if the defendant reasonably believed that compliance with the law would have resulted in greater harm to himself or another than the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged.
In order for the “choice of evils” defense to apply, four conditions must be satisfied. First, the defendant must have reasonably believed that there was no legal alternative available to him. Second, the defendant must have reasonably believed that the harm sought to be prevented was imminent or immediate. Third, the defendant’s conduct must have been reasonably designed to actually prevent the threat of greater harm. Fourth, the harm sought to be avoided must have been greater than the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged.
Accordingly, if the prosecution has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was not legally justified by the “choice of evils” defense, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count IV: Place to Keep Loaded Firearm. If the prosecution has done so, then you must find that the “choice of evils” defense does not apply.
(Emphasis added.)
The jury instruction on the choice of evils justification defense complies with the language of HRS § 703-302(l)(a), as well as our holdings in Kealoha and DeCastro, to the extent that the first and third elements follow the case law of Kealoha and DeCastro (i.e., (1) no alternative available, and (3) the crime committed was not reasonably designed to actually avoid the harm or evil sought to be avoided), and the second and fourth elements track the express language of HRS § 703-302(l)(a) (i.e., (2) imminent harm, and (4) the harm or evil sought to be avoided is greater than that sought to be prevented).
Nevertheless, we find error with the instruction because it fails to articulate that the “common law” elements set forth in Kealoha and DeCastro are considerations for pur[106]*106poses of the first requirement of the statute. In other words, the instruction does not first expressly set forth the statutory requirements pursuant to HRS § 703-302. Instead, it attempts to incorporate both statutory requirements and case law considerations without distinguishing between the two. Such an incorporation misstates the law.11
An accurate reflection of the law would be to first acknowledge that, pursuant to HRS § 703-302(l)(a), conduct by the defendant is justifiable if (1) the defendant engages in conduct which he or she believes to be reasonably necessary to avoid an imminent harm or evil to the actor or to another, and (2) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged. HRS § 703-302(l)(a).
Thereafter, the instruction should advise the jury that
with respect to requirement (1) above, a person does not reasonably believe that it is necessary to commit a crime to avoid an imminent harm or evil to himself or others when one or more of the following is a fact:
(a) A third alternative that did not involve the commission of a crime was reasonably available to the person;
(b) The crime committed was not reasonably designed to actually avoid the harm of evil sought to be avoided; or
(c) The harm or evil sought to be avoided was not imminent when the person committed the crime.
DeCastro, 81 Hawai'i at 153-54, 913 P.2d at 564-65.
Erroneous instructions are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial. Error is not to be viewed in isolation and considered purely in the abstract. It must be examined in the light of the entire proceedings and given the effect which the whole record shows it to be entitled. In that context, the real question becomes whether there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to conviction. If there is such a reasonable possibility in a criminal case, then the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judgment of conviction on which it may have been based must be set aside.
State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335, 350, 926 P.2d 1258, 1273 (citation omitted), reconsideration denied, 83 Hawai'i 545, 928 P.2d 39 (1996).
Although the jury instruction in this case did not accurately reflect the law on choice of evils in Hawaii, such an error does not require a reversal of Defendant’s conviction.
■ In this case, Defendant presented one argument to the jury for a choice of evils defense: that his co-worker asked him to bring some “protection” to work because an anonymous telephone call indicated that the company would be robbed that day. See n.4.
However, the facts surrounding the Place to Keep Loaded Firearm charge arose out of Defendant’s possession of a loaded gun in his waistband while sitting in his car at a gas station. See n.3. Thus, even if we were to accept that Defendant’s only reason for carrying a loaded gun that day was because of an anonymous tip that his workplace would be robbed, it does not logically follow that he had no choice but to carry a loaded gun to a gas station which was located away from his work place. If Defendant’s reason for carrying a loaded gun were true, then he should have left his gun at the location that was supposed to have been robbed. In light of the factual basis for the charge, Defendant’s argument that he had no choice but to bring a loaded gun to work is too far removed. As such, we believe there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous jury instruction contributed to his conviction of Place to Keep Loaded Firearm.12
[107]*1075. The jury instruction did not improperly place the burden of proving the defense on Defendant.
Defendant also argues that the four conditions set forth in the jury instructions “improperly placed the burden of proving the defense on the defendant by implying that the burden was a ‘question of fact’ to be decided by the jury.” In other words, “[t]he result of [the jury instruction] is a ‘shifted burden.’ In essence, the jury was ‘given the opportunity to reject the defense as less than credible’ before the state was put to the test of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, it is a long-standing rule in Hawai'i that
[w]here the defense is justification, once evidence of a fact, or set of facts, which negatives penal liability has been introduced, the burden is on thq prosecution to disprove the facts that have been introduced or to prove facts negativing the justification defense and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Straub, 9 Haw.App. 435, 444, 843 P.2d 1389, 1393 (1993) (citations omitted).
Thus, the “result” complained of by Defendant is exactly what is mandated by law: that the defendant first has the burden to put into evidence a set of facts which negative penal liability and, once accomplished, the burden shifts to the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. As such, Defendant’s argument is without merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we reaffirm our holdings in Kealoha and DeCastro and, therefore, affirm the June 28, 1996 Amended Judgment, Conviction and Probation Sentence.