319 Ga. 222 FINAL COPY
S24A0104. THE STATE v. LOPEZ-CARDONA et al.
WARREN, Justice.
Saturnino Andre Lopez-Cardona, Wilmer Mendez, and Gerson
Suruy were charged with crimes related to the stabbing death of
Lucas Andres Cruz-Guzman. They each filed pretrial motions to
suppress statements that they made during separate interviews
with the same police officer. The trial court issued orders granting
each of their respective motions, concluding that the defendants did
not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive their rights
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d
694) (1966), before they made the statements. The State now
appeals, contending that the trial court’s conclusion with respect to
Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s statements was incorrect and that
we should therefore reverse those orders. The State concedes,
however, that the trial court properly suppressed Suruy’s statement
and that we should thus affirm that order. As explained below, the trial court made express findings as to
disputed questions of material fact in this case, but because those
findings are not sufficiently detailed to permit us to meaningfully
review its rulings suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s
statements, we vacate the orders as to those two defendants and
remand the case to the trial court with the direction that the court
make further, specific findings. And as to Suruy, we defer to the
State’s discretion to not challenge the order suppressing his
statement, accept the State’s concession, and affirm that order.
1. For purposes of this appeal, we will recount the undisputed
evidence presented at the hearing on the motions to suppress and
also note the existence and nature of disputed evidence pertinent to
the trial court’s express findings regarding Lopez-Cardona and
Mendez and to the additional findings that may be required on
remand.1 In June 2021, Lopez-Cardona and Mendez were indicted
1 We may “take notice of the undisputed facts” in this case, “even if the
trial court did not.” Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 n.4 (770 SE2d 636) (2015). As to the material facts that are disputed, we note that appellate courts generally must “limit” their “consideration of the disputed facts to those
2 for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in
connection with Cruz-Guzman’s death. They each filed pretrial
motions to suppress statements that they separately made during
interviews with a Gwinnett County police officer while they were in
custody at police headquarters.
At a hearing on the motions, the officer testified that his
primary language is Spanish and that he interviewed Lopez-
Cardona and Mendez separately and conducted the interviews in
Spanish, their primary language. The prosecutor tendered into
evidence video recordings of the interviews, which he played for the
trial court, and transcripts (in Spanish and translated into English)
of the recordings.2 The video recordings and transcripts show that
expressly found by the trial court,” as discussed more below. Id. at 746. But because here, the trial court made limited findings that preclude meaningful appellate review, such that we must remand the case, we recount the disputed facts necessary to explain the basis for remand and to clarify the additional findings that the trial court must make. In addition, we note that because we accept the State’s decision to not challenge the trial court’s order suppressing Suruy’s statement, we need not recount the facts of Suruy’s case or examine whether the court erred by concluding that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights. 2 We note that there is some dispute about what the transcripts showed,
3 as to each defendant, the officer read in Spanish the rights under
Miranda,3 and the officer testified that he read from a “Spanish
Advisement of Rights” form that the Gwinnett County Police
Department typically used. The English translations of the
transcripts of the recordings show that the officer told Lopez-
Cardona and Mendez that they had the right to remain silent;
anything they said could “be used against [them] before a court of
law”; they had a right to an attorney during questioning; if they
“want[ed] an attorney but [could ]not afford one,” an attorney would
be appointed; and they could “exercise” those rights at any time.4
The video recordings of the interviews show that Lopez-Cardona
was mostly still while the officer read the rights, whereas Mendez
nodded after the officer recited each right. At the end of the reading,
as discussed further below.
3 See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
4 The phrases quoted above are what is shown in the English transcripts
of the defendants’ interviews. As we will explain below, however, a Spanish- speaking interpreter and translator testified that some of the Spanish words that the officer used in explaining the defendants’ rights were inaccurate, and thus translated into English differently than what is shown in the transcripts.
4 the officer asked each defendant if he understood, and each
defendant nodded. The officer then asked questions about the
crimes, and Lopez-Cardona and Mendez each answered his
questions.
The officer testified that Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s nods
when he asked if they understood, as well as their apparent
willingness to answer his questions, indicated to him that they did
in fact understand their rights under Miranda.5 The officer also
testified that he did not show Lopez-Cardona or Mendez the
advisement of rights form that was printed in Spanish; he did not
ask them to sign the form; and he did not read to them the last
paragraph just above the signature line on the form, which he
translated into English during his hearing testimony as follows: “I
have read this document of my rights, and I understand. I desire to
speak with you and answer your questions. I do not desire an
attorney at this time. I know and understand what I am doing. No
5 As explained more below, the defendants disputed this point, arguing
that they did not understand or waive their rights. 5 promises or threats or pressure or coercion have been used against
me.”
The defendants presented testimony from Yvonne Machain, a
Spanish-speaking interpreter and translator, who stated that she
reviewed the video recordings and transcripts of the interviews and
that there were several “inaccuracies” in the officer’s recitation of
the rights under Miranda in Spanish to each defendant. First, as to
his recitation in Spanish of the phrase “[a]nything you say can be
used against you before a court of law,” the transcripts of the
recordings show that the word the officer used to represent the
English word “before” (as in “before a court of law”) was “antes,”
which, Machain testified, means “before” in the context of time (as
in “prior to”). Machain testified that the correct word to express
“before a court” (as in “in front of” the court) is “ante,” not “antes.”
Second, with regard to the officer’s recitation in Spanish of the
phrase “[i]f you want an attorney, but cannot afford one,” Machain
testified that the officer incorrectly used in each interview the word
“contrar,” which means “to oppose,” rather than the word
6 “contratar,” which means “to hire.”6 Finally, with respect to the
officer’s recitation in Spanish of the phrase, “[y]ou may exercise
these rights at any time,” the transcripts of the recordings show that
he used in each interview the word “ejercitar,” and Machain testified
that word means “physical exercise.”7 Machain also testified that the
officer “mumbled” and “sounded winded” when he recited the
Miranda warnings in Spanish to each defendant, and that “he
rushed through the reading.” On cross-examination, Machain
testified that depending on a listener’s educational background, the
listener would be able to decipher what the officer meant when he
used the words “antes” (instead of “ante”) and “contrar” (instead of
“contratar”), given the context.8
6 The transcripts of the interview recordings show that the officer used
the word “contrar” when reciting the rights under Miranda to Lopez-Cardona, but that he used “contratar” when speaking to Mendez. Machain testified, however, that each alleged inaccuracy she identified existed in each recording she reviewed, even if the transcripts did not necessarily reflect those inaccuracies.
7 Machain did not say, and was not asked, what word the officer should
have used in place of “ejercitar.” 8 Machain was not asked whether a listener would be able to decipher
what the officer meant when he used the word “ejercitar.” 7 At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted Lopez-
Cardona’s and Mendez’s motions to suppress. Noting that Machain
testified that the officer “was fast[-]speaking and possibly
mumbling” when he read the Miranda warnings, the trial court
found that the officer “was very fast[-]speaking . . . while he was
giving testimony.” The court then stated, without further
explanation, that there was “evidence there may have been some
mistakes in the translation.” The trial court also found that neither
Lopez-Cardona nor Mendez “answered audibly” when the officer
asked if they understood the Miranda warnings; that Lopez-
Cardona “slightly gave a nod after the one word understood”; and
that Mendez “nodded throughout the reading of the Miranda
[warnings], so his nod immediately after the word understood . . .
had no meaning.” The court then said that “neither one of these
[d]efendants w[as] asked if they waive[d] their rights. Neither one
of these [d]efendants w[as] asked if they want to talk to the police,
and therefore, I find that they did not knowingly and voluntarily
waive their Miranda rights and that they did not—there is not a
8 preponderance of the evidence that they understood.”
The trial court later issued separate, written orders granting
Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s motions to suppress. Each said:
“Having heard and considered the [d]efendant’s motion, evidence
and argument of counsel and all applicable law, the [c]ourt finds the
State failed to meet its burden of proving the defendant understood
his Miranda rights and knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently
waived those rights before giving a statement.” The State filed a
timely notice of appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), contending that
the trial court erred by suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s
statements.
2. (a) We begin with a review of the legal principles that apply
in this case. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and set forth the now well-established rule that a defendant who is
in custody and subject to interrogation “must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
9 to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires.” 384 U.S. at 479. To use a defendant’s custodial
statements in its case-in-chief, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was advised of
these rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived them. See, e.g., Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 400 (850 SE2d
41) (2020); Pena v. State, 297 Ga. 418, 422 (774 SE2d 652) (2015).
“The waiver inquiry has two distinct dimensions: waiver must
be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,
and made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-383 (130 SCt 2250, 176
LE2d 1098) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also, e.g.,
Hinkson, 310 Ga. at 400 (“‘Only if the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and
the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude
10 that the Miranda rights have been waived.’”) (citation omitted).
Lopez-Cardona and Mendez did not argue in their motions to
suppress or at the hearing on the motions that any waiver of their
rights was not voluntary. Rather, the issue presented here centers
on whether the officer who read the Miranda warnings adequately
advised Lopez-Cardona and Mendez of their rights, such that they
understood them, and whether they then knowingly and
intelligently waived those rights.
To that end, we have explained that a recitation of the Miranda
warnings must be “intelligible,” because a defendant must
understand his rights in order to knowingly and intelligently waive
them. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 826 (725 SE2d 260) (2012). And
although “no talismanic incantation [is] required” to satisfy the
strictures of Miranda, an officer’s recitation of the warnings must
convey to a defendant each of the rights required by that judicial
decision. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-361 (101 SCt 2806,
69 LE2d 696) (1981). See also Benton v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 574-575
(807 SE2d 450) (2017) (concluding that the trial court erred by
11 failing to suppress statements that a defendant made during
interrogation, because the totality of the circumstances showed that
the officer gave the defendant an incomplete explanation of the
Miranda warnings, which failed to include three of the four
warnings).
As to the form of the waiver itself, it is well settled that a
relinquishment of the rights pursuant to Miranda need not be
express. See, e.g., Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 (“The prosecution . . .
does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was
express.”); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (99 SCt 1755,
60 LE2d 286) (1979) (“An express written or oral statement of waiver
of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually
strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either
necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”). Instead, waiver may
be “implied from all the circumstances,” including from “‘the
defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and
a course of conduct indicating waiver.’” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384
(quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). See also Huffman v. State, 311 Ga.
12 891, 895 (860 SE2d 721) (2021).
In assessing whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his rights under Miranda, a trial court must
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. See, e.g., Hinkson, 310 Ga. at 400. And in reviewing a
trial court’s order on a motion to suppress, we have explained that
when the facts material to the motion are disputed—as some of them
are in this case—it generally is for the trial court, not this Court, to
resolve those disputes and determine the material facts. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (770 SE2d 636) (2015). A trial
court is not required to make express findings of fact in ruling on a
motion to suppress, see Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 609 (878 SE2d
505) (2022), but when it does make such findings, we generally
accept them unless they are clearly erroneous; we construe the
record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment; and
we generally limit our consideration of the disputed facts to those
13 expressly found by the trial court. See, e.g., Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746.9
“Although we owe substantial deference to the way in which
the trial court resolved disputed questions of material fact, we owe
no deference at all to the trial court with respect to questions of law,
and instead, we must apply the law ourselves to the material facts.”
Hughes, 296 Ga. at 750. However, “[i]f the trial court has made
express findings of fact, but not with sufficient detail to permit
meaningful appellate review, an appellate court may remand for
further findings.” Id. at 746 n.6.
(b) We now turn to the findings of fact that the trial court made
in suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s custodial statements.
9 Citing Licata v. State, 305 Ga. 498 (826 SE2d 94) (2019), the State
contends that we should review de novo the trial court’s factual determinations in this case because, the State says, “the controlling facts are not in dispute.” Id. at 500 n.2. But the parties vigorously dispute factual issues like the speed, clarity, and accuracy of the Miranda warnings that were given in Spanish to Lopez-Cardona and Mendez; there was conflicting evidence about these issues presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress; and that evidence is relevant to the ultimate legal question of whether Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s waivers were knowing and intelligent. To the extent a trial court makes factual and credibility findings about such disputed issues, those findings are reviewed for clear error. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 299 (812 SE2d 225) (2018); Clay, 290 Ga. at 825 n.1. Compare State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 39 n.1 (897 SE2d 432) (2024). 14 As we mentioned above, the trial court’s written orders granting the
motions said only that “the State failed to meet its burden of
proving” that the defendants “understood [their] Miranda rights
and knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently waived those rights
before giving a statement.” But when the trial court pronounced that
ruling at the end of the hearing on the motions, the court made
additional (though limited) factual findings as part of its analysis of
the totality of the circumstances—and the parties do not dispute
that the court’s orders were based on those findings.10 Accordingly,
we review those findings for clear error. See Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746.
See also Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335 n.4 (745 SE2d 630) (2013)
(construing the trial court’s written order together with its oral
pronouncement in determining that the court applied the proper
standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v.
State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 (779 SE2d 94) (2015) (explaining that
10 We note, however, that if there had been any discrepancies between
the trial court’s oral pronouncement and its written ruling, such discrepancies would be resolved in favor of the written judgment. See, e.g., Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, 303 Ga. 764, 772 (815 SE2d 70) (2018). 15 the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying
the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally
announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on
the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings under
a clearly-erroneous standard was appropriate). However, as we
explain more below, even after examining the trial court’s limited
findings, we cannot determine whether the trial court erred by
granting the motions to suppress, because its factual findings are
incomplete.
(i) With respect to whether Lopez-Cardona and Mendez were
adequately apprised of their rights under Miranda, the trial court
first recounted Machain’s testimony that the officer who recited the
rights in Spanish “was fast[-]speaking and possibly mumbling”
when he read the rights, and the court then found that the officer
“was very fast[-]speaking” when he testified at the hearing on the
motions to suppress. However, the court made no express findings
about whether the officer’s recitation of the warnings was so fast
that it was unintelligible. Although the trial court did reference
16 Machain’s testimony about the officer’s “fast” and “mumbl[ed]”
reading of the rights, it did not expressly credit that testimony. And
although the trial court found that the officer spoke “very fast” when
he testified at the hearing, that observation does not necessarily
bear on how the officer spoke when he read the rights to the
defendants. In the same vein, the court did not determine whether
the officer’s pace in reading the rights was so fast or his “possibl[e]
mumbling” so inarticulate that the defendants did not understand
him. Compare Clay, 290 Ga. at 825-826 (holding that the trial court
did not err in concluding that the defendant did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his rights under Miranda, because the evidence
supported the court’s findings that an investigator read the rights
“in such a super-speed manner that the warnings likely could not
have been identified as anything more than gibberish” to the
defendant, who was experiencing the effects of a drug-induced coma)
(punctuation omitted) with Huffman, 311 Ga. at 894 (explaining
that a detective’s reading of the Miranda warnings “was not so
rushed as to be unintelligible absent familiarity with Miranda”).
17 Second, the trial court mentioned “evidence [that] there may
have been some mistakes in the translation.” Yet the court made no
findings about whether such mistakes were actually made, or
whether they were material such that they likely affected Lopez-
Cardona’s and Mendez’s understanding of their rights. Notably,
conflicting evidence on this point was presented at the hearing. On
one hand, Machain testified about three alleged “inaccuracies” in the
officer’s recitation of the rights: his use of the word “antes” (meaning
“prior to”) rather than “ante” (meaning “in front of”) to explain that
anything the defendants said during their interviews could be used
against them “before a court”; his use of the word “contrar” (meaning
“to oppose”) rather than “contratar” (meaning “to hire”) to explain
that if the defendants could not afford to hire an attorney, one would
be appointed; and his use of the word “ejercitar” (meaning “physical
exercise”) to explain that the defendants could exercise their legal
rights at any time. But the trial court did not expressly credit or
discredit Machain’s testimony about inaccuracies in the translation
or address whether any or all of the purported inaccuracies rendered
18 the officer’s reading of the rights unintelligible or incorrect, such
that the defendants were not adequately advised of their rights
under Miranda. On the other hand, Machain also testified that a
listener would likely be able to decipher the officer’s meaning as to
the first two phrases, when heard in context, and did not opine
further on the third phrase. The trial court did not expressly credit
or discredit that testimony, either.
As we discussed above, an officer is not required to give the
warnings set forth in Miranda in the exact form described in that
judicial decision, but must convey to the defendant the substance of
each of the four required warnings. See Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359-
361; Benton, 302 Ga. at 574-575. In this respect, we have held that
the State may carry its burden of proving that a defendant was
adequately advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda even where
there is evidence that there were minor errors in a translation of the
rights, so long as the rights were effectively conveyed. See Pena, 297
Ga. at 422 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the Spanish version
of the Miranda warnings he was given did not adequately inform
19 him of his rights, where the evidence at the hearing on the motion
to suppress showed that a detective informed the defendant of his
rights but mispronounced the Spanish word for “‘interrogation’” and
used a “‘made up word’” for “‘name’” in explaining that the defendant
could have an attorney “‘named’” for him, and an interpreter
testified at the hearing that she was able to interpret the detective’s
statements based on context); Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 394-
395 (627 SE2d 579) (2006) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the
Spanish version of the Miranda warnings given to her was
incomplete and upholding the trial court’s determination that she
knowingly waived her rights, noting that she pointed to no specific
error in the translation and that “[t]he Spanish translation of the
Miranda form . . . clearly expressed the required concepts; any
deviation was at most minor and inconsequential”). Evidence that
an officer’s translation of the required warnings rendered the
warnings incomplete or incorrect, however, could support a
conclusion that the defendant was not sufficiently informed of each
of his rights. Cf. Benton, 302 Ga. at 575.
20 Applying these principles to just one of the alleged inaccuracies
Machain testified about shows why factual and credibility findings
on such points are critical to the legal analysis Miranda requires:
Machain’s testimony that the officer’s translation informed the
defendants that anything they said during their interviews could be
used against them “prior to a court of law” could, for example,
authorize a finding that the defendants were not adequately advised
that anything they said could be used against them during court
proceedings. See Benton, 302 Ga. at 575 (explaining that “an
incomplete Miranda warning ‘is one instance in which halfway is
not close enough’”) (citation omitted). On the other hand, if the trial
court credited Machain’s testimony about an average Spanish-
speaker’s ability to understand the import of the officer’s statement
in context, such a finding could support a conclusion that the
defendants were sufficiently apprised that what they said during
their interviews could be used against them in court, and there
would be no violation of Miranda.
In sum, because the trial court cited evidence that the officer
21 “was fast[-]speaking and possibly mumbling” when he read the
Miranda warnings and evidence that there may have been mistakes
in his translation of the warnings, but made no specific findings
about whether the officer’s reading was so fast, mumbled, or
inaccurate that Lopez-Cardona and Mendez were not adequately
advised of their rights, we cannot determine whether the court’s
conclusion that the State had not shown that the defendants
understood their rights was correct.
(ii) We next turn to the trial court’s factual findings about the
nature of the defendants’ alleged waivers. Specifically, at the end of
the hearing on the motions to suppress, the court found that after
the officer read the Miranda warnings and asked Lopez-Cardona
and Mendez if they understood their rights, they did not “answer[ ]
audibly”; Lopez-Cardona “slightly gave a nod”; Mendez also nodded,
but his nod “had no meaning” because he “nodded throughout the
reading” of the warnings; and neither defendant was asked if he
waived his rights or wanted to talk to the officer.
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court made
22 clear in Berghuis v. Thompkins that the State is not required to
prove that a defendant’s waiver of his rights under Miranda was
express. See 560 U.S. at 384. In Berghuis, a police officer read the
defendant the Miranda warnings, but the defendant declined to sign
a form acknowledging that he understood the warnings, and there
was “conflicting evidence” about whether the defendant “verbally
confirmed that he understood the rights listed on the form.” Id. at
375. The officer questioned the defendant, who was “‘largely’ silent”
until, near the end of the interview, he made an incriminating
statement in response to one of the officer’s questions. Id. at 375-
376.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s
claim that he had not waived his right to remain silent, explaining
that “[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was
given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s
uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to
remain silent.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384. The Court held that the
evidence—which included evidence that the defendant was shown a
23 written copy of the warnings and was given time to read them, the
officer determined that the defendant could read, and the defendant
read one of the warnings aloud—showed that the defendant
understood his rights, and his answer to the officer’s question was a
“‘course of conduct indicating waiver,’” such that he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. Id. at 385-386 (quoting
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). The Court also rejected the defendant’s
argument that the officer was not allowed to question him without
first obtaining a waiver of the rights pursuant to Miranda, because
a rule requiring waiver at the outset of police questioning would be
inconsistent with the Court’s holding in North Carolina v. Butler
that “courts can infer a waiver of Miranda rights ‘from the actions
and words of the person interrogated.’” Id. at 387 (quoting Butler,
441 U.S. at 373).
In accordance with the holdings in Berghuis and Butler, this
Court has held that a waiver of the rights under Miranda was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent where the defendant was
adequately apprised of the rights, understood them, and then “freely
24 made his statements without invoking his right to remain silent and
without requesting an attorney.” Huffman, 311 Ga. at 895
(upholding the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress where the
defendant did not sign a waiver of his rights under Miranda, the
officer who read the rights did not ask for a verbal waiver of rights
or a verbal acknowledgment that the defendant understood the
rights, the evidence authorized the trial court to conclude that the
defendant understood his rights, and the defendant implicitly
waived his rights by responding to the officer’s questions). See also,
e.g., Kidd v. State, 304 Ga. 543, 546 (820 SE2d 46) (2018) (explaining
that “a written waiver is not necessary where a suspect is orally
advised of his or her rights and subsequently waives those rights
through his or her responses”); Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 282
(695 SE2d 604) (2010) (holding that the trial court did not err in
ruling that the defendant waived his rights pursuant to Miranda,
where a detective properly advised him of his rights, asked if he
understood the rights and if they were “still good to talk,” and the
defendant nodded affirmatively), disapproved on other grounds by
25 Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315 (830 SE2d 195) (2019).
At the hearing on the motions to suppress in this case, the
prosecutor cited Berghuis and argued that Lopez-Cardona and
Mendez implicitly waived their rights under Miranda. The trial
court, in pronouncing its ruling, determined that Berghuis was “not
on point,” without explanation, and then emphasized evidence that
had been presented that would support a finding of no express
waiver—such as evidence showing that the defendants did not
verbally answer, and instead nodded in response, when the officer
asked if they understood the Miranda warnings, and evidence that
the officer did not expressly ask the defendants if they waived their
rights before he began questioning them. The trial court’s rejection
of Berghuis and emphasis on evidence in the record showing that the
defendants did not expressly waive their rights under Miranda
suggests that the court concluded that an officer must obtain an
express waiver of the Miranda warnings before questioning a
defendant. Any such ruling, however, constituted an error of law: an
officer is not required to obtain an express waiver of rights before
26 commencing questioning, and a defendant may implicitly waive his
rights “through ‘[his] silence, coupled with an understanding of his
rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.’” Berghuis, 560
U.S. at 384, 387-388 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373).
Because the trial court incorrectly determined that Berghuis
was “not on point,” the court made no findings about whether there
was evidence in the record showing whether the defendants
implicitly waived their rights—such as whether the defendants’
course of conduct indicated an implicit waiver, including whether
their silence or their understanding of their rights (or lack thereof)
affected the assessment of implicit waiver. See Berghuis, 560 U.S.
at 385-386 (explaining that “[t]here was more than enough evidence
in the record to conclude that [the defendant] understood his
Miranda rights” and that his course of conduct in “giv[ing] sporadic
answers to questions throughout the interrogation” and in making
an incriminating statement about three hours after receiving the
Miranda warnings (rather than saying nothing or unambiguously
invoking his rights) was “sufficient to show a course of conduct
27 indicating waiver”). As to whether the defendants understood their
rights, we explained above in Division 2 (b) (i) that the trial court
made no specific findings about whether the officer’s reading of the
Miranda warnings was so fast, mumbled, or inaccurate that Lopez-
Cardona and Mendez were not adequately advised of their rights,
such that they did not “kn[o]w what [they] gave up when [they]
spoke.” Id. at 385. And as to Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s course
of conduct during their interviews, the trial court noted only the
defendants’ failure to verbally answer when the officer asked if they
understood the Miranda warnings, Lopez-Cardona’s “slight[ ]” nod,
and Mendez’s nods “throughout the reading,” without assessing
whether this conduct and other conduct by Lopez-Cardona and
Mendez during the interviews—including, for example, their
subsequent answers to the officer’s questions—“was sufficient to
show a course of conduct indicating waiver.” Id. at 386. Because the
trial court rejected Berghuis and made incomplete findings about
the defendants’ understanding of their rights and course of conduct
during the interviews, we cannot meaningfully review the trial
28 court’s ruling about the form of the alleged waivers.
(iii) In all, under the circumstances of this case, the
determination of whether the officer sufficiently advised Lopez-
Cardona and Mendez of the Miranda warnings, such that they
understood their rights, and whether they then implicitly waived
those rights, necessarily rests on factual and credibility findings
that must be made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to
observe the live testimony from the officer and Machain, as well as
the video recordings and transcripts of the interviews. We therefore
vacate the trial court’s orders suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and
Mendez’s statements and remand the case to that court for it to
make appropriate factual findings consistent with the legal
framework set out in this opinion. See Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746 n.6.
See also Williams v. State, 301 Ga. 60, 62 (799 SE2d 779) (2017);
Welbon v. State, 301 Ga. 106, 110-111 (799 SE2d 793) (2017). As
discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s suppression order with
respect to Suruy.
29 Judgments affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
Decided June 11, 2024.
Murder, etc. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Adkins.
Patsy Austin-Gatson, District Attorney, Christopher M. DeNeve,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Clint C.
Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
David L. Whitman, Robert Greenwald; The Armond Firm,
Richard C. Armond; Lyle K. Porter, for appellees.