State v. B. Jay Craig

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: May 12, 2025
• Docket: A25A0391
• Status: Published

Opinion

SECOND DIVISION RICKMAN, P. J., GOBEIL and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 12, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0391. THE STATE v. CRAIG.

GOBEIL, Judge.

The State appeals from the Superior Court of Cherokee County’s grant of B.

Jay Craig’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop,

arguing that the court erred in granting the motion “despite the clear video evidence”

that Craig committed a traffic violation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We apply the following principles upon appellate review of a ruling on a motion

to suppress:

First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment. These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the State or the defendant.

Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 803 (3) (b) (2) (750 SE2d 148) (2013) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Nevertheless, “we owe no deference to the way in which the

court below resolved questions of law.” Ewumi v. State, 315 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) (727

SE2d 257) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted).

So viewed, the record shows that on February 11, 2023, Officer Tyler Berg with

the Cherokee County Sheriff’s Office was on routine traffic patrol. He initiated a

traffic stop after he observed a vehicle fail to come to a complete stop at a red light

before turning right. The driver of the vehicle, later identified as Craig, was

subsequently arrested and later charged by accusation with two counts of DUI (less

safe), DUI, driving with a suspended license, and disregarding a traffic control device.

Craig filed a motion to suppress all evidence discovered as a result of the traffic

stop, arguing that his detention was not based on reasonable articulable suspicion of

criminal conduct. At the hearing on Craig’s motion, the State played a sixty second

2 clip from the dash cam video in Officer Berg’s patrol car that showed Craig’s car at

the stop light and then turn right.1 The trial court took a short recess so that the judge

could view the video “straight on” in his chambers. After hearing argument from both

sides, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding that Craig’s detention

was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. More

specifically, “[u]pon close review of the footage,” the court determined that Craig’s

vehicle came to a complete stop and then proceeded cautiously when he turned right.2

Even though “[i]t wasn’t a very long stop,” the court found that it was a “legally

sufficient stop” and was not a violation of OCGA § 40-6-20. As a result, the court

1 As the State points out, Officer Berg’s credibility is “not at issue” in this case because his testimony was largely to lay a foundation for the admission of the video of the stop, as opposed to his observations about the alleged traffic violation. 2 Although the trial court’s specific finding — that Craig’s vehicle proceeded cautiously when he turned right — did not make its way into the written order, the court made such an express finding in the transcript of the evidentiary hearing on the matter. See Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335 (2) n.4 (745 SE2d 630) (2013) (construing the trial court’s written order together with its oral pronouncement in determining that the court applied the proper standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 (779 SE2d 94) (2015) (explaining that the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings under a clearly-erroneous standard was appropriate). 3 ordered the suppression of all evidence discovered incident to and as a result of the

traffic stop. The State now appeals.

“The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of an official

traffic-control device[.]” OCGA § 40-6-20 (a). OCGA § 40-6-21 (a) (3) in turn

provides in relevant part:

(A) Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line or, if there is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if there is no crosswalk, before entering the intersection, and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown, except as provided in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) of this paragraph;

(B) Vehicular traffic facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal may cautiously enter the intersection to make a right turn after stopping as provided in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.

In a single enumeration of error, the State argues that the trial court’s factual

findings are not supported by the video evidence, which shows that Craig did not bring

his vehicle to a complete stop, nor did he cautiously enter the intersection to make a

right turn.

4 In this case, we disagree with the State that the dash cam video conclusively

establishes that the trial court’s finding — that Craig’s car did come to a complete

stop at the traffic light before cautiously turning right — was clearly erroneous. We

have independently reviewed the recording and have no basis to disturb the trial

court’s finding that Craig came to a legally sufficient stop and then proceeded

cautiously when he turned right as outlined in OCGA §§ 40-6-20 (a), 40-6-21 (a) (3).

When, as here, it is not undisputably clear that Craig violated OCGA § 40-6-20 by

disregarding a traffic control device, “we must review this evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s findings and judgment.” State v. Dykes, 345 Ga. App. 721,

723 (1) (815 SE2d 106) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, we defer to

the trial court’s finding that Craig did not commit the traffic violation that was the

basis for the traffic stop. See Dougherty v. State, 341 Ga. App. 120, 123 n. 1 (799 SE2d

257) (2017) (“We conduct a de novo review of factual findings when the controlling

facts are clearly and completely discernible from a video recording. But where, as here,

some of the controlling facts are not fully captured in the recording, we defer to the

trial court’s findings regarding those facts.”) (citations and punctuation omitted;

emphasis supplied).

5 And for a traffic stop to be valid, “an officer must identify specific and

articulable facts that provide a reasonable suspicion that the individual being stopped

is engaged in criminal activity.” Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 38 (2) (727 SE2d 456)

(2012). Thus, because the trial court’s conclusion that Craig did not commit a traffic

violation was not clearly erroneous, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop

Craig, and the court properly granted his motion to suppress. See id. (holding that an

officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop when there was no evidence

that the defendant violated a traffic law or drove in an unsafe manner); State v.

Mincher, 313 Ga. App. 875, 877-878 (723 SE2d 300) (2012) (affirming the trial court’s

grant of a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop because the

conduct that was alleged as the basis for the stop was not illegal and there was no

objective basis to suspect that the defendant was or was about to be engaged in any

criminal activity).

Judgment affirmed. Rickman, P. J., and Davis, J., concur fully and specially. In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0391. THE STATE v. CRAIG.

RICKMAN, Presiding Judge, concurring fully and specially.

I agree fully with the majority, that the trial court properly granted Craig’s

motion to suppress. I write separately, however because I see conflict, and the

potential for confusion, with regard to how we should treat statements made by the

trial court from the bench following evidentiary hearings, as compared to the factual

findings set forth in its written orders.

As noted by the majority, the standard for reviewing the trial court’s factual

findings following a motion to suppress is discussed at length in Hughes v. State, 296

Ga. 744, 746 (1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015). “When the facts material to a motion to

suppress are disputed, it generally is for the trial judge to resolve those disputes and

determine the material facts.” Id. “This principle is a settled one, and this Court has

identified three corollaries of the principle, which limit the scope of review in appeals

2 from a grant or denial of a motion to suppress in which the trial court has made

express findings of disputed facts.” Id. “First, an appellate court generally must

accept those findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. “Second, an appellate

court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual

findings and judgment of the trial court.” Id. “And third, an appellate court generally

must limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court.”

Id. (emphasis supplied). In connection with the third corollary, our Supreme Court

recognized that “we must focus on the facts found by the trial court in its order, as the

trial court sits as the trier of fact.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in

original). Id.

Additionally, there are many cases from our Supreme Court and this Court

which clearly hold that oral pronouncements are not binding and that the written

order controls. See Williams v. Williams, 295 Ga. 113, 114 (1) (757 SE2d 859) (2014)

(“ An oral pronouncement of this type is not binding. It may provide insight on the

intent of a later written judgment, but any discrepancy between the written judgment

and oral pronouncement is resolved in favor of the written judgment.”); See Onyeka

v. State, 374 Ga. App. 504, 508 (2) (913 SE2d 377) (2025) (“any discrepancy between

3 the oral pronouncement and the written ruling will be resolved in favor of the written

judgment”) (citation and punctuation omitted); In the Interest of J. J., 317 Ga. App.

462 (731 SE2d 766) (2012) (“Indeed, a trial court's oral pronouncements are not

binding because, while they may provide insight on the intent of the subsequent

written judgment, any discrepancy between the written judgment and oral

pronouncements is resolved in favor of the written judgment.”).

Accordingly, in light of Hughes and the broader body of case law holding that

a trial court’s oral pronouncement is not binding, it would seem that our review would

be confined to the findings expressly set forth in the trial court’s detailed written

order. But, as the majority points out, our Supreme Court has referred to a trial

court’s oral statements from the bench as oral findings and authorized construing

those oral findings with the written findings of fact. See State v. Lopez-Cardona, 319

Ga. 222, 228 (2) (b) (903 SE2d 18) (2024). Unlike in Lopez-Cardona, the written order

in this case contained detailed factual findings. That distinguishing attribute, however,

does not mean that we can look past our Supreme Court’s directive that we can, at

times, look to what the trial court pronounces orally when conducting meaningful

appellate review of a motion to suppress. It may be that such instances are restricted

4 to those cases when there is not a detailed written order, but our Supreme Court has

not explicitly said that nor have we.

Ultimately, the issue of whether it is proper to construe the trial court’s oral

statements from the bench together with the trial court’s written order, does not

impact the resolution of this case. Thus, any inconsistency between the order and the

oral pronouncement is of no consequence, but I do think that in the future this conflict

could become a problem in cases that do not have video evidence. When given the

right opportunity, our court and ultimately the Supreme Court, should weigh in on

this issue and clarify it.

I am authorized to state that Judge Davis joins this special concurrence.