[17]*17DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Defendant was convicted of escape in the second degree.1 ORS 162.155(1).2 The issue before us is whether defendant’s use of physical force occurred when he was “escaping from custody^’ as required to constitute escape in the second degree under the statute. The Court of Appeals concluded that the crime of escape, as defined in ORS 162.155(1), encompasses ongoing, continuous conduct that extends at least during the immediate pursuit of the escapee, and that the use of physical force at any time during a single continuous course of escaping was sufficient under the statute. State v. Lonergan, 210 Or App 155, 149 P3d 1215 (2006). We allowed defendant’s petition for review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
The underlying facts are undisputed. At 2:15 a.m. on January 12,2003, Springfield Police Officer Myers responded to a 9-1-1 call regarding a stolen truck. Myers located defendant driving the truck and activated his overhead lights and siren. In response, defendant leapt from the truck while it was still moving, jumped over a guardrail, and ran down a 20-foot embankment into a field of blackberry bushes. Myers eventually caught defendant, handcuffed him, and walked him back up the embankment to the patrol car. When Myers placed defendant against the trunk of his car and reached into the vehicle for his radio, defendant “took off running.” Defendant managed to reach a distance of 50 to 75 yards from the patrol car before Myers eventually overtook and tackled him. At that time Myers “deliver [ed] several focused blows to [defendant’s] head and shoulders,” while defendant continued to fight and kick Myers. Eventually, however, [18]*18defendant gave up, and Myers walked him back to the patrol car.
The state charged defendant with escape in the second degree in violation of ORS 162.155(l)(a), on the theory that he “us[ed] or threatened] to use physical force escaping from custody.” At trial, at the conclusion of the state’s case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the escape-in-the-second-degree charge. Defendant based his argument, in part, on State v. Metcalfe, 172 Or App 501, 505, 19 P3d 374 (2001), in which the Court of Appeals held that an escape is complete even if a defendant only “momentarily” leaves a peace officer’s control. Based on that holding, defendant argued that he did not use physical force escaping from custody but, instead, used physical force only as he was attempting to avoid recapture after his escape was completed. Therefore, according to defendant, he had committed only escape in the third degree.3 The state responded that defendant had not “gotten away,” because Myers was in close pursuit of defendant the entire time. Therefore, according to the state, the escape was still ongoing when defendant used physical force to resist Myers. The trial court agreed with the state, denied defendant’s motion, and found defendant guilty of escape in the second degree. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On appeal, defendant again argued that his escape was complete at the point that he left the vicinity of the patrol car, because he had “departed from the immediate presence of the officer and was no longer in the officer’s restraint or control.” According to defendant, his escape was complete before he used physical force in resisting Myers. The state responded that defendant’s escape was ongoing “[a]s long as defendant was out of the control of the officer and actively trying to escape.” According to the state, a person may have “escaped” in the sense of having successfully freed him or herself, at least momentarily, from an officer’s restraint and [19]*19control, but still be “escaping” in the sense of “making good” his or her escape.
In Metcalfe, the defendant, who was in a courtroom for a criminal hearing, jumped from his seat, “pushed off of’ the officer who had escorted him, and ran toward a door in the back of the courtroom, where he was subdued by other officers. 172 Or App at 503. The defendant was found guilty of second-degree escape. On appeal, the defendant argued that his actions constituted only attempted escape because, during the incident, he remained within the constructive restraint of the courtroom or the actual restraint of one or more deputies. Id. Applying the plain meanings of “departure,” “custody,” and “restraint,” the Court of Appeals concluded that
“[A] person ‘escaptes] from custody’ within the meaning of ORS 162.155(l)(a) when a person subject to actual or constructive restraint or control by a peace officer sets out on a course of action and that setting out results, even momentarily, in the person no longer being within the peace officer’s restraint or control.”
Id. at 505 (second brackets in original; emphasis added). The court also concluded that, based on the plain meaning of “constructive,” the scope of an officer’s actual or constructive custody of a defendant “consists of those boundaries within which the peace officer can and does exercise effective control over the [defendant].” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s escape conviction, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant “escapfed] from custody” at the time that he “pushed off of’ the officer who had escorted him, because, however momentarily, he was no longer within the officer’s effective restraint or control. The court also held that the fact that the defendant was inside a courtroom and that there were other deputies present was irrelevant to “the scope of the constructive custody to which defendant was subject.” Id. at 507.
In this case, the Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish Metcalfe. Applying the methodology from PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), to the pivotal phrase in ORS 162.155(l)(a), “uses * * * physical force escaping from custody,” the court first [20]*20determined that its decision in Metcalfe did not preclude the state’s construction of the statute, “given the statute’s syntax, viz., ‘escaping,’ which can reasonably be understood as connoting a process.” Lonergan, 210 Or App at 162. The court determined that both defendant’s and the state’s interpretations of the statute were plausible, given the statutory text and context. Finding nothing conclusive in the legislative history, the court therefore considered maxims of statutory construction, determining that the legislature’s purpose in creating a graded scheme for escape was to increase the penalties for escape when “additional risk producing elements” are present, including ongoing, continuous conduct that extends at least during the immediate pursuit of the escapee. Id. at 165.
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[17]*17DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Defendant was convicted of escape in the second degree.1 ORS 162.155(1).2 The issue before us is whether defendant’s use of physical force occurred when he was “escaping from custody^’ as required to constitute escape in the second degree under the statute. The Court of Appeals concluded that the crime of escape, as defined in ORS 162.155(1), encompasses ongoing, continuous conduct that extends at least during the immediate pursuit of the escapee, and that the use of physical force at any time during a single continuous course of escaping was sufficient under the statute. State v. Lonergan, 210 Or App 155, 149 P3d 1215 (2006). We allowed defendant’s petition for review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
The underlying facts are undisputed. At 2:15 a.m. on January 12,2003, Springfield Police Officer Myers responded to a 9-1-1 call regarding a stolen truck. Myers located defendant driving the truck and activated his overhead lights and siren. In response, defendant leapt from the truck while it was still moving, jumped over a guardrail, and ran down a 20-foot embankment into a field of blackberry bushes. Myers eventually caught defendant, handcuffed him, and walked him back up the embankment to the patrol car. When Myers placed defendant against the trunk of his car and reached into the vehicle for his radio, defendant “took off running.” Defendant managed to reach a distance of 50 to 75 yards from the patrol car before Myers eventually overtook and tackled him. At that time Myers “deliver [ed] several focused blows to [defendant’s] head and shoulders,” while defendant continued to fight and kick Myers. Eventually, however, [18]*18defendant gave up, and Myers walked him back to the patrol car.
The state charged defendant with escape in the second degree in violation of ORS 162.155(l)(a), on the theory that he “us[ed] or threatened] to use physical force escaping from custody.” At trial, at the conclusion of the state’s case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the escape-in-the-second-degree charge. Defendant based his argument, in part, on State v. Metcalfe, 172 Or App 501, 505, 19 P3d 374 (2001), in which the Court of Appeals held that an escape is complete even if a defendant only “momentarily” leaves a peace officer’s control. Based on that holding, defendant argued that he did not use physical force escaping from custody but, instead, used physical force only as he was attempting to avoid recapture after his escape was completed. Therefore, according to defendant, he had committed only escape in the third degree.3 The state responded that defendant had not “gotten away,” because Myers was in close pursuit of defendant the entire time. Therefore, according to the state, the escape was still ongoing when defendant used physical force to resist Myers. The trial court agreed with the state, denied defendant’s motion, and found defendant guilty of escape in the second degree. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On appeal, defendant again argued that his escape was complete at the point that he left the vicinity of the patrol car, because he had “departed from the immediate presence of the officer and was no longer in the officer’s restraint or control.” According to defendant, his escape was complete before he used physical force in resisting Myers. The state responded that defendant’s escape was ongoing “[a]s long as defendant was out of the control of the officer and actively trying to escape.” According to the state, a person may have “escaped” in the sense of having successfully freed him or herself, at least momentarily, from an officer’s restraint and [19]*19control, but still be “escaping” in the sense of “making good” his or her escape.
In Metcalfe, the defendant, who was in a courtroom for a criminal hearing, jumped from his seat, “pushed off of’ the officer who had escorted him, and ran toward a door in the back of the courtroom, where he was subdued by other officers. 172 Or App at 503. The defendant was found guilty of second-degree escape. On appeal, the defendant argued that his actions constituted only attempted escape because, during the incident, he remained within the constructive restraint of the courtroom or the actual restraint of one or more deputies. Id. Applying the plain meanings of “departure,” “custody,” and “restraint,” the Court of Appeals concluded that
“[A] person ‘escaptes] from custody’ within the meaning of ORS 162.155(l)(a) when a person subject to actual or constructive restraint or control by a peace officer sets out on a course of action and that setting out results, even momentarily, in the person no longer being within the peace officer’s restraint or control.”
Id. at 505 (second brackets in original; emphasis added). The court also concluded that, based on the plain meaning of “constructive,” the scope of an officer’s actual or constructive custody of a defendant “consists of those boundaries within which the peace officer can and does exercise effective control over the [defendant].” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s escape conviction, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant “escapfed] from custody” at the time that he “pushed off of’ the officer who had escorted him, because, however momentarily, he was no longer within the officer’s effective restraint or control. The court also held that the fact that the defendant was inside a courtroom and that there were other deputies present was irrelevant to “the scope of the constructive custody to which defendant was subject.” Id. at 507.
In this case, the Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish Metcalfe. Applying the methodology from PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), to the pivotal phrase in ORS 162.155(l)(a), “uses * * * physical force escaping from custody,” the court first [20]*20determined that its decision in Metcalfe did not preclude the state’s construction of the statute, “given the statute’s syntax, viz., ‘escaping,’ which can reasonably be understood as connoting a process.” Lonergan, 210 Or App at 162. The court determined that both defendant’s and the state’s interpretations of the statute were plausible, given the statutory text and context. Finding nothing conclusive in the legislative history, the court therefore considered maxims of statutory construction, determining that the legislature’s purpose in creating a graded scheme for escape was to increase the penalties for escape when “additional risk producing elements” are present, including ongoing, continuous conduct that extends at least during the immediate pursuit of the escapee. Id. at 165. For that reason, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had correctly denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the second-degree escape charge. Id.
In this court, defendant reiterates his argument that, when a person has fled from custody and is no longer within a police officer’s restraint or control, the escape is complete. Therefore, defendant argues, when an escapee uses physical force in response to the officer’s attempt to reestablish custody, he has not “used physical force escaping from custody” as defined under ORS 162.155(l)(a). Defendant posits that his interpretation is faithful to the literal text of the statute and the intent of the legislature, which was “to adopt the traditional legal meaning of escape, i.e., an unlawful departure from custody, as opposed to the broader lay usage of the term that includes evading capture.” Defendant asserts that, “[n]owhere does the [statutory] definition of escape describe a continuing activity that encompasses pursuit and recapture.”
To decide the question presented in this case, we consider the statutory text in its context. The crime at issue here is escape. “Escape” is defined, in part, as “the unlawful departure of a person from custody * * ORS 162.135(5). There are three degrees of escape. See ORS 162.145 (defining escape in the third degree); ORS 162.155 (defining escape in the second degree); ORS 162.165 (defining escape in the first degree). “Custody” is defined, in part, as “the imposition of actual or constructive restraint by a peace officer pursuant to [21]*21an arrest * * ORS 162.135(4). Defendant was convicted of second-degree escape.
Here, defendant had been arrested and placed against the trunk of the patrol car. At that time, he was in custody, because he was under “actual or constructive restraint by a peace officer pursuant to an arrest.” ORS 162.135(4). When defendant stood up and ran, he was no longer under the officer’s actual or constructive restraint; he had unlawfully departed from custody. See Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 564 (3d ed 1982) (“[T]he limits within which a prisoner may be required by law to remain, at a certain time, may be * * * the immediate presence of his guard on the street * * *. Whatever the limits may be for him at the time [of] a departure therefrom is the physical part of an escape.” (footnotes omitted)). By unlawfully departing from custody, defendant had committed an escape, as that term is defined in ORS 162.135(5).4
In committing his escape — in escaping — defendant did not use physical force or its threat. By definition, then, defendant’s actions in running away could not constitute the crime of escape in the second degree: He did not “use[] or threaten [ ] to use[ ] physical force escaping from custody.” ORS 162.155(l)(a). It was only later, after the officer had tackled him, that defendant used physical force, kicking the officer. At that point, defendant may have been resisting arrest. See ORS 162.315 (defining that offense).5 However, defendant was not escaping; defendant had already escaped.
[22]*22The state argues and the dissent agrees that, when defendant kicked Myers, defendant was escaping, in the sense that he was trying to make good on his earlier escape. However, the state and the dissent cannot have it both ways; either defendant had departed from custody, or he had not. As we have explained, we agree with defendant that he had already departed from custody when he used physical force. Thus, defendant could not have been in the process of departing from custody — he could not have been “escaping,” as that term is used in ORS 162.155(l)(a) — when he used physical force.
The state argues that our construction of the statute could result, as the Court of Appeals noted, in a “Keystone Kops” situation, in which a defendant runs away from an officer, is caught and subdued after several yards, runs away and is caught again, and is then charged with multiple escapes. The possibility of such occurrences does not affect the clear meaning of the words of the statute. Should the scenario the state describes occur, an escapee who uses physical force in escaping each time well may be exposed to multiple charges of escape in the second degree, and multiple sentences on conviction of those offenses.
We hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of escape in the second degree and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that conviction. In the trial court, defendant argued that he was not guilty of escape in the second degree but was guilty of escape in the third degree. We agree. ORS 162.145 provides, in part:
“(1) A person commits the crime of escape in the third degree if the person escapes from custody.
“(3) Escape in the third degree is a Class A misdemeanor.”
Defendant’s flight from Myers fits that statutory description. Defendant escaped from custody as defined in that statute and the trial court should have accepted defendant’s argument in that regard and found him guilty of escape in the [23]*23third degree. The case must be remanded to the trial court for entry of such a judgment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.