[Cite as State v. Lightner, 2010-Ohio-483.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HARDIN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 6-09-03
v.
STEVEN LIGHTNER, JR., OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 20082125 CRI
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: February 16, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Scott B. Johnson for Appellant
Bradford W. Bailey for Appellee Case No. 6-09-03
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Steven Lightner, Jr. (“Lightner”) appeals from
the February 9, 2009 Judgment Entry of the Court of Common Pleas of Hardin
County, Ohio sentencing him to seven years and ten months in prison for one
count of Burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a felony of the second
degree, three counts of Grand Theft of Checks, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1),
felonies of the fifth degree, three counts of Receiving Stolen Property, in violation
of R.C. 2913.51(A)(C), felonies of the fifth degree, and one count of Engaging in
a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), (B)(1), a felony
of the first degree.
{¶2} This matter stems from criminal conduct occurring on or about
January 23, 2008, at the residence of Steven and Deb Sons, located at 613 East
Pattison Street, Kenton, Ohio. The Sons were on vacation from the 16th or 17th of
January until January 26, 2008. Upon returning home from vacation, the Sons
discovered items missing from their home.
{¶3} The thefts were reported when Patrolman Robert Vogel was called
to the residence at 613 East Pattison on January 26, 2008. When Patrolman Vogel
arrived at 613 East Pattison, the Sons reported that multiple items had been stolen
from the home. The Sons reported that quite a few power tools were missing,
valued at over one thousand dollars, at least four checks, and a television were
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missing. The stolen checks belonged to two different accounts. Two checks were
from a Liberty Bank account and two checks were from a Home Savings and Loan
account.
{¶4} On January 27, 2008, the Sons filed a supplemental report with the
police when they found some jewelry to also be missing, including diamond
earrings. In total, over fifty-two hundred dollars worth of property was found
missing. The Sons also found that damage had been done to their vehicles. A
2006 Harley Davidson had been wrecked with damage totaling $3,628. Steven
Sons testified that no one ever had permission to drive the motorcycle.
{¶5} While the Sons were on vacation, Sadie Zachariah (“Zachariah”) and
the Sons’ adult children were supposed to be watching the residence at 613 East
Pattison. Steve Sons specifically testified at trial that no one else had permission
to be in the home while they were gone. Zachariah testified that while she was
watching the house, she had let some other people into the home. In fact,
Zachariah testified that not only did she have people over while she was watching
the house, but that they were there without her permission on at least one occasion.
One of the people Zachariah invited to her home was John Byers (“Byers”). Byers
testified that when he was in the Sons’ home, visiting Zachariah, Lightner, Jesse
Lightner, Josh Keim, and others were also present in the home. Byers also
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testified that he was at the Sons’ residence on both January 23 and January 24,
2008.
{¶6} Byers testified that Sadie was having a party at the house, with
people playing cards, using the Sons’ computer, and just hanging around.
Zachariah testified that she did not see anyone steal any property while she was at
the home, but that she was not always watching her guests. Additionally, at the
time she was house-sitting, Zachariah was still in high school. One day she came
back to the house and could tell that someone had been in the home because food
was out and things appeared to be missing. Zachariah testified that she could not
remember if she had locked the garage door on that day.
{¶7} Byers testified that Lightner also asked him if he knew anyone who
wanted to purchase a television, apparently referring to the Sons’ television.
According to Byers, he and Josh Keim got into an argument with Steve Lightner
concerning whether to “rob” the Sons’ home. Byers and Keim left after that
discussion because they did not want to “rob” the home and Lightner was
aggravated because they did not want to help Lightner move the items he wanted
to steal.
{¶8} On January 23, 2008, Lightner and Byers used checks stolen from
the Sons at the Shell gas station in Kenton, Ohio. The checks were identified as
belonging to the Sons based on the information on the check as well as the check
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number. One check was filled out and used by Lightner to purchase gas and
cigarettes. Byers used the second check, also to purchase gasoline and cigarettes.
{¶9} When questioned at trial, Byers testified that he got the check from
Lightner who said that he got them from Zachariah. Byers further testified that
Zachariah had told them that they could use the Sons’ vehicle to take Lightner to
court in Findlay, Ohio, which explains the fact that Byers, Lightner, and
Lightner’s brother, Jesse Lightner, put gas in one of their cars and an SUV
belonging to the Sons with the stolen checks. Zachariah testified that she did not
give Lightner the checks, and that he took the checks on his own. She also
testified that she did not give them permission to drive the vehicle.
{¶10} Derek Lowe, a clerk at the Shell gas station, testified that on
February 7th or 8th of 2008, Lightner came into the gas station with a friend, Josh
Morrisey, and attempted to purchase gas and cigarettes with a check. Lowe
testified that he could not take the check because Lightner did not have
identification that matched the information on the check. Although Lowe did not
remember the name on the check, he remembered that it was a woman’s name on
the check. Lowe also testified that Byers was not with Lightner on this occasion.
{¶11} Jesse Lightner also found the keys to Steven Sons’ motorcycle, took
it out for a drive, and subsequently wrecked it.
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{¶12} On July 8, 2008 Lightner was indicted on one count of Burglary, in
violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a felony of the second degree; two counts of
Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3),(B)(5),
felonies of the fourth degree; one count of Theft, in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(1),(B)(5), a felony of the fourth degree; eleven counts of Receiving
Stolen Property, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A),(C), felonies of the fifth degree;
one count of Receiving Stolen Property a Motor Vehicle, in violation of
R.C.2913.51(A),(C), a felony of the fourth degree; ten counts of Grand Theft of
Checks, in violation of 2913.02(A)(1), felonies of the fifth degree; and one count
of Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, in violation of R.C.
2923.32(A)(1),(B)(1), a felony of the first degree.
{¶13} Lightner was arraigned on July 17, 2008, and pled not guilty to all of
the charges contained in the indictment. On October 3, 2008, the State issued a
bill of particulars. On January 16, 2009, the State moved to dismiss seven counts
of Grand Theft of Checks and seven counts of Receiving Stolen Property. The
trial court dismissed those counts on January 21, 2009.
{¶14} A jury trial was held on February 3, 2009. The jury convicted
Lightner of one count of Burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a felony of
the second degree, three counts of Grand Theft of Checks, in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(1), felonies of the fifth degree, three counts of Receiving Stolen
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Property, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A),(C), felonies of the fifth degree, and one
count of Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, in violation of R.C.
2923.32(A)(1), (B)(1), a felony of the first degree.
{¶15} Lightner was sentenced on February 9, 2009. At sentencing, the trial
court determined that the counts of Grand Theft of Checks and Receiving Stolen
Property were allied offenses. The State elected to proceed to sentencing on the
counts of Grand Theft of Checks. The trial court sentenced Lightner to two years
in prison for one count of Burglary, ten months in prison for each count of Grand
Theft of Checks, and five years in prison for one count of Engaging in a Pattern of
Corrupt Activity. The trial court ordered the ten month sentences for Grand Theft
of Checks served concurrently to each other, but consecutive to the sentences for
Burglary and Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity for a total prison sentence
of seven years and ten months.
{¶16} Lightner now appeals, asserting four assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR ENGAGING IN A PATTERN OF CORRUPT ACTIVITY, BURGLARY, GRAND THEFT OF CHECKS(S), OR THE ALLIED OFFENCES [SIC] OF RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE CONVICTION ON THE RICO CHARGE WAS ERROREOUS [SIC] IN THAT IT VIOLATED THE
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APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE TRIAL JUDGED [SIC] IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT ON THE RICO COUNT TO A PRISON TERM CONSECUTIVE TO A PRISON TERM IMPOSED FOR A PREVIOUS RICO CONVICTION WHICH WAS BASED ON THE SAME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED AN ALLIED OFFENSE TO THE PRESENT CHARGE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT AFFORDED COMPETENT COUNSEL IN THAT THE COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL FAILED TO PROTECT THE DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
First Assignment of Error
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Lightner argues that the evidence
introduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, requires this Court to examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. In State v. Jenks (1991), 61
Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the sufficiency
of the evidence test as follows:
[A]n appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
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essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273.
{¶18} Lightner was convicted of Burglary, Grand Theft of Checks,
Receiving Stolen Property, and Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity.
Burglary is defined by R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), in pertinent part, as follows:
(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following:
(2) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the habitation any criminal offense;
{¶19} Although Lightner does not appear to contest the Burglary
conviction, we choose to address it nevertheless. Zachariah testified that Lightner
and his friends were in the house on approximately three separate occasions, and
while they may have had permission to be in the house on at least one occasion,
they never had permission to take anything from the house. Moreover, although
Zachariah did not see anyone remove any property from the home, she testified
that she was not always watching her guests and that on at least one occasion, they
came over uninvited.
{¶20} Zachariah testified that she returned from attending school one day
and noticed that someone had been in the home. She noticed that food and
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beverage containers were present that were not there when she left for school that
day. Furthermore, Zachariah then noticed that the Sons’ SUV had been taken out
and now had a full gas tank.
{¶21} Steve Sons testified as to what property was missing from the home,
and Byers testified that Lightner had taken checks from the Sons. Therefore, we
find that there was sufficient evidence to convince the jury that on at least one
occasion Lightner trespassed, uninvited in the house with the purpose of
committing a theft offense therein, and therefore committed Burglary.
{¶22} Turning next to Lightner’s convictions for Grand Theft of Checks
and Receiving Stolen property, found to be allied offenses by the trial court.
Grand Theft of Checks is defined by R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), in pertinent part, as
follows:
(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following ways:
(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent
{¶23} Receiving Stolen Property is defined by R.C. 2913.51(A),(C), in
pertinent part, as follows:
No person shall receive, retain, or dispose of property of another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has been obtained through commission of a theft offense.
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{¶24} Byers testified that on two instances he and Lightner took checks
from the Sons to a gas station and purchased gas and cigarettes. Moreover, Byers
was able to identify the exact checks used, which matched the checks missing
from the Sons’ residence. Moreover, Detective Vogel testified that two other
checks were missing, and Lowe testified that Lightner attempted to use another
check that did not belong to him.
{¶25} It is settled law in Ohio that “circumstantial and direct evidence
inherently possess the same probative value.” Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574
N.E.2d 492. Therefore, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to believe
that Lightner took a third check from the Sons’ residence.
{¶26} Finally, Lightner argues that there was insufficient evidence
introduced at trial to prove his conviction for Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt
Activity. Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity is defined by R.C.
2923.32(A)(1), as follows:
(A)(1) No person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.
R.C. 2923.31(C) defines “enterprise” as the following:
* * * any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, corporation, trust, union, government agency, or other legal entity, or any organization, association, or group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity. ‘Enterprise’ includes illicit as well as licit enterprises.
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Finally, R.C. 2923.31(E) defines “pattern of corrupt activity” to mean:
two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.
{¶27} R.C. 2923.32 defines “corrupt activity” as “engaging in, attempting
to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidating
another person to engage in * * * conduct constituting” one of the predicate
offenses listed in R.C. 2923.31(I)(2). See, State v. Adkins, 136 Ohio App.3d 765,
737 N.E.2d 1021, 2000-Ohio-1656; State v. Schlosser (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 329,
335, 681 N.E.2d 911, 915-916.
{¶28} Although the predicate acts in R.C. 2923.31 need not be supported
by convictions, their occurrence must at least be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. See State v. Lightner, 3rd Dist. No. 6-08-11, 2009-Ohio-544; State v. Burkitt
(1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 214, 222-23, 624 N.E.2d 210. In addition, the State must
set forth the requisite predicate acts in the indictment that it intends on using as the
foundation for a R.C. 2923.32 offense. State v. Warden, 6th Dist. No. WD-03-065,
2004-Ohio-6306, ¶ 48. This Court has previously stated that “where a defendant is
required to defend himself against additional unindicted predicate offenses, he
should be notified of such by identification of those charges within the
indictment.” State v. Roberson, 3rd Dist. No. 5-02-45, 2003-Ohio-4627, ¶ 13,
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quoting State v. Siferd, 151 Ohio App.3d 103, 2002-Ohio-6801, 783 N.E.2d 591, ¶
23.
{¶29} Lightner contends that the State failed to establish two instances of
corrupt activity sufficient to support his conviction for Engaging in a Pattern of
Corrupt Activity. In the indictment, the State offered the following to establish the
pattern of corrupt activity:
STEVEN LIGHTNER JR., from on or about May 4, 2003 through on or about March 31, 2008, in Hardin County, Ohio, while employed by or associated with an enterprise did conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity to-wit: §2911.12(A)(2) Burglary [F2]; §2913.02(A)(1),(B)(5), Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle [F4]; §2913.02(A)(3),(B)(5), Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle[F4]; §2913.02(A)(1),(B)(5), Theft[F4]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.02(A)(1) Grand Theft of Check(s) [F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5]; §2913.51(A),(C), Receiving Stolen Property[F5], and Receiving Stolen Property. Theft offenses in municipal courts of Ohio; thefts of Motor Scooter on or about May 4, 2003 and Receiving Stolen Property namely, ATV’s on or about March 2, 2007 through and including
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March 31, 2007; when the total value of the thefts, property, contraband, etc. exceeds five hundred dollars ($500.00); in violation of Ohio Revised Code §2923.32(A)(1),(B)(1), Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity[F1], a felony of the first degree.
{¶30} Therefore, the following acts could have been used to prove the
existence of two predicate acts of corrupt activity: Burglary, two instances of
Grant Theft of a Motor Vehicle, one instance of Theft, one instance of Receiving
Stolen Property; one instance of Receiving Stolen Property – a motor vehicle, ten
instances of Grand Theft of Checks, ten instances of Receiving Stolen Property –
checks, municipal court theft offenses, thefts of motor scooters in 2003, and thefts
of ATV’s in 2007.
{¶31} Prior to trial, the State dismissed seven of the counts of Receiving
Stolen Property – checks and Grand Theft of Checks. Additionally, at trial, the
State conceded that it had not proven the charges of Grand Theft of a Motor
Vehicle and Receiving Stolen Property – a motor vehicle. Moreover, the jury
found Lightner not guilty of the charges of Theft and Receiving Stolen Property
that did not concern the checks.
{¶32} However, viewing the evidence presented at trial, we find that the
State successfully proved multiple predicate offenses. As previously discussed,
sufficient evidence was introduced to prove the convictions for Burglary, Grand
Theft of Checks, and the Receiving Stolen Property charges. Additionally, we are
mindful that a single defendant need not commit the predicate offenses. Instead
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the State must prove that the enterprise engaged in corrupt activity, but it was not
required that the State prove Lightner directed, controlled, or directly participated
in the activity. The State need only prove that Lightner assisted the enterprise.
See State v. Siferd, 151 Ohio App.3d 103, 783 N.E.2d 591, 2002-Ohio-6801.
{¶33} Although the State conceded that Lightner had not committed the
Grand Theft of Motor Vehicles, Byers testified that Jesse Lightner drove and
wrecked Steve Sons’ motorcycle during the course of their visit in the home.
Byers also testified that Lightner used the Sons’ SUV without their permission.
{¶34} Testimony was given by Steve Sons as to the extent of belongings
stolen from their home while the Sons were on vacation. The theft extended
beyond the checks at issue in the present case. Jewelry, power tools, and a
television were also taken from the home, and Byers testified that Lightner
expressed interest in stealing the Sons’ television. Although the State was unable
to prove that Lightner himself took those items, this Court notes that evidence was
introduced at trial that would indicate those items were taken by Lightner, his
brother Jesse, or their associates.
{¶35} Therefore, the jury was free to consider the Burglary, the charges of
Grand Theft of Checks, the Receiving Stolen Property charges, the unlawful use
and damage to the motor vehicles, and the theft of the other items in the Sons’
home. Moreover, this Court is not convinced by Lightner’s argument that all of
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those occurrences were so closely related in time as to constitute a single incident.
Testimony indicates that the conduct at issue in the present case occurred over the
course of the Son’s vacation, lasting approximately a week. Reasonable minds
could conclude that these events were not so closely related that they constituted a
single incident, but instead were repeated incidents so related that they constituted
a pattern of corrupt activity. See State v. Gasser (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 544, 626
N.E.2d 127.
{¶36} Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence to prove
Lightner’s conviction for Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity based on the
acts occurring during the Sons’ vacation alone. Accordingly, Lightner’s first
assignment of error is overruled.
Second and Third Assignments of Error
{¶37} Lightner elected to brief his second and third assignments of error
together. Accordingly, we elect to treat them as a single assignment of error. In
his second and third assignments of error, Lightner argues that his conviction for
Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity was barred by double jeopardy. In
espousing this argument, Lightner assumes that the 2003 or 2007 incidents of theft
of motor scooters or ATVs, which were used as predicate offenses for a previous
conviction of Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, were necessary predicate
offenses for the Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity conviction in the present
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case. However, based on our disposition of Lightner’s previous assignment of
error, finding that the Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity charge could be
proven with predicate offenses based on conduct from only the January 2008
incident involving the Sons’ home, we find it unnecessary to address the double
jeopardy argument premised upon the predicate offenses from the prior conviction
of Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity. Accordingly, these two assignments
of error are overruled as moot.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶38} In his fourth assignment of error, Lightner argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. An ineffective assistance of counsel
claim requires proof that trial counsel’s performance fell below objective
standards of reasonable representation and that the defendant was prejudiced as a
result. State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two
of the syllabus. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel’s
deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome at trial would have been
different. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136,at paragraph three of the syllabus.
“Reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial. State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 433, 588 N.E.2d
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819 (superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as recognized by
State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 103, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997-Ohio-355).
{¶39} Furthermore, the defendant must overcome the presumption that
counsel provided competent representation and must show that counsel’s actions
were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment.
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. See
also, State v. Richardson, 3rd Dist. No. 13-06-21, 2007-Ohio-115, citing State v.
Hoffman (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 403, 407, 717 N.E.2d 1149. Tactical or
strategic decisions, even if unsuccessful, generally do not constitute ineffective
assistance. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965, 1995-Ohio-
104. Additionally, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances and not
isolated instances of an allegedly deficient performance. State v. Fritz, 3rd Dist.
No. 13-06-39, 2007-Ohio-3138, ¶35, citing State v. Malone (Dec. 13, 1989), 2nd
Dist. No. 10564, 1989 WL 150798.
{¶40} Given this Court’s findings in Lightner’s first, second, and third
assignments of error, we cannot find that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standards of reasonable representation. For example, even if we could
assume that some double jeopardy bar existed and counsel had failed to object, our
finding that Lightner’s conviction for Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt activity
was sustained by sufficient evidence from the facts of the present case, precludes a
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finding of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to object.
Accordingly, Lightner’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶41} Based on the foregoing, the February 9, 2009 Judgment Entry of the
Court of Common Pleas of Hardin County, Ohio is affirmed.
PRESTON, J., concurs.
/jlr
ROGERS, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
{¶42} I concur with the majority’s analysis and disposition of Lightner’s
fourth assignment of error; however, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
analysis and disposition of Lightner’s first assignment of error pertaining to his
conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and one of his convictions
for grand theft of a check. Additionally, as I would sustain Lightner’s first
assignment of error, I would find his second and third assignments of error to be
moot and would not address them.
{¶43} In his first assignment of error, Lightner argues, in part, that there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for engaging in a pattern of
corrupt activity. I agree that all of the offenses committed were so closely related
in time as to constitute a single incident. The testimony at trial was unclear as to
when the various offenses occurred over the course of the victims’ approximate
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one-week vacation, and the evidence does not preclude the possibility that all of
the offenses took place in one day. In fact, other than his conviction for engaging
in a pattern of corrupt activity, Lightner was only convicted of burglary and theft
of checks1, and the thefts apparently occurred during the burglary.
{¶44} Additionally, I would find that the majority impermissibly stacked
inference upon inference in finding sufficient evidence existed to convict Lightner
for theft of the third check. Here, evidence was heard that the Sons reported that
four checks were missing from their residence; that Lightner used one check stolen
from the Sons to purchase gasoline and cigarettes; that Lightner’s friend, Byers,
used a second check stolen from the Sons to purchase gasoline and cigarettes; and,
that Lightner attempted to use a third check several weeks later to purchase
gasoline and cigarettes, but that the clerk would not let him use the check because,
although he could not remember the name on the check, it was a woman’s name
and Lightner did not have identification that matched the information on the
check. As this Court recently stated, “a trier of fact is allowed to make reasonable
inference based on the evidence presented before him, [however] ‘[a] trier of fact
may not rely on an inference based entirely upon another inference, unsupported
by any additional fact or another inference from other facts.’” State v. Fields, 3d
1 We note that Lightner was also found guilty of three counts of receiving stolen property; however, the trial court found those to be allied offenses with the three counts of theft of checks and the State elected to proceed to sentencing on the theft of checks convictions.
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Dist. No. 16-09-05, 2009-Ohio-5909, ¶23, quoting State v. Taylor, 7th Dist. No.
98 JE 31, 2001-Ohio-3162. See, also, Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co.
(1955), 164 Ohio St. 329, 331-335. Here, I believe that the conclusion that
Lightner stole a third check is an impermissible inference upon an inference when
based solely upon evidence that four checks were missing from the Sons, that
Lightner and his friend used two of the Sons’ checks, and that Lightner attempted
to use another check several weeks later that was not identified as belonging to the
Sons.
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