[517]*517OPINION OP THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON, C.J.
Appellant was cited on May 15, 1968, for failing to wear a safety helmet as required by HRS § 286-81 (1) (A) : “No person shall: (1) Operate a motorcycle or motor scooter on any highway in the State unless he and any passenger he carries on the motorcycle or motor scooter wears (A) a safety helmet securely fastened with a chin strap . . . .” Appellant was convicted. He appeals from a judgment sustaining the constitutionality of the statute.
“The term ‘police power’ connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. . . . The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), is still valid today: ‘To justify the State in [thus] interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public [generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class] require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.’ ” Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
Appellant argues that the first precondition required by the due process clause of the U. S. Constitution to the exercise of the police power by the legislature enumerated above, namely, “it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference” has not been met. He contends that other members of the public at large are not affected in a deleterious manner, if indeed at all, by the conduct regulated by this statute; that the only realistic effect of the statute is to compel motorcyclists to take precautionary méasures so that they will not harm themselves ; that harm to self or harm to a particular class is not within the public interest and is outside the scope of the police power to legislate' in thé public interest.
The State argues that decreasing fatalities and injuries [518]*518from motorcycle accidents does impinge directly on the public interests in three respects: (1) economic impact: (a) lessens burden on public agencies such as hospitals, medical and ambulance facilities; (b) reduces addition to the public assistance roles of disabled motorcyclists and their dependents or survivors; (2) “flying missile theory”: loose stones on the highway or fallen objects may strike the motorcyclist on the head, thus causing him to lose control and become a menace to other vehicles on the highway; (3) the increase in fatalities and serious injuries is so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that it threatens the very fabric of society.
The legislature has clearly stated its purpose. “Deaths of persons and injuries to them and damage to property with the other losses suffered on account of highway traffic accidents are of grave concern to the State and its citizens as well as to the federal government. The legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest that the State initiate, coordinate and accelerate every available means to decrease the fatalities, injuries, damages and losses resulting from highway traffic accidents.” S.L.H. 1967, c. 214, § 1.
It is true that courts often attribute to statutes the constitutionally permissible objectives which the statute might plausibly be construed to reflect, rather than that purpose which the statute in fact, or most probably, reflects. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). However, where the legislature has clearly stated its purpose, we are reluctant to attribute other purposes, unless the facts underlying such other purposes are clearly and convincingly shown. In this case the legislature has not alluded to either “economic impact” or the “flying missile theory”, there was no evidence introduced by the State to substantiate either argument, [519]*519and the claimed facts are not susceptible to judicial notice.
Thus we are squarely faced with the issue whether the legislature may constitutionally regulate the conduct of an individual so as to require him to protect himself from physical injury and or death; that is, whether physical harm to self is a proper subject of public interest and thus subject to the police power of the legislature. This case raises a question that goes to the very heart of the néxus between the individual and the state: where does the public interest begin? This is particularly difficult where the purpose of the statute is beneficent, as Justice Brandéis pointed out in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) : “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning, but without understanding.”
It is contended that the increase in fatalities and serious injuries largely to people under 25 due to motorcycle accidents is so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that it threatens the very fabric of society. It would seem a necessary implication of such contention that when the physical harm to a group of people due to their own recklessness or imprudence becomes sufficiently widespread the public interest generally is affected. Unfortunately, the State merely asserts this proposition without offering statistical evidence to document the degree and extent of the claimed epidemic of motorcycle injuries and fatalities. However, there is statistical evidence available which is properly susceptible of judicial notice.
The Secretary of Transportation’s report, “National Uniform Standards for State Highway Safety Programs”, H.B. Doc. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which [520]*520set up the motorcycle safety helmet as a minimum standard to which state highway safety programs must conform, contained the following background information:
“Deaths and injuries from motorcycle accidents doubled between 1963 and 1965. This fact is particularly alarming when it is understood that most of those killed and injured were young people under the age of 25. Motorcycle registrations have jumped from 574,080 in 1960 to 1,914,700 in 1966. By 1970 the annual increase is expected to reach 1 million per year. Motorcycle safety takes on grave dimensions in view of the fact that since 1960 the rate of motorcycle fatalities has increased at about the same rate as the number of motorcycles [i.e., almost 3y2 times in 6 years].”
The New York Department of Motor Vehicles’ statistics:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[517]*517OPINION OP THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON, C.J.
Appellant was cited on May 15, 1968, for failing to wear a safety helmet as required by HRS § 286-81 (1) (A) : “No person shall: (1) Operate a motorcycle or motor scooter on any highway in the State unless he and any passenger he carries on the motorcycle or motor scooter wears (A) a safety helmet securely fastened with a chin strap . . . .” Appellant was convicted. He appeals from a judgment sustaining the constitutionality of the statute.
“The term ‘police power’ connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. . . . The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), is still valid today: ‘To justify the State in [thus] interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public [generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class] require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.’ ” Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
Appellant argues that the first precondition required by the due process clause of the U. S. Constitution to the exercise of the police power by the legislature enumerated above, namely, “it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference” has not been met. He contends that other members of the public at large are not affected in a deleterious manner, if indeed at all, by the conduct regulated by this statute; that the only realistic effect of the statute is to compel motorcyclists to take precautionary méasures so that they will not harm themselves ; that harm to self or harm to a particular class is not within the public interest and is outside the scope of the police power to legislate' in thé public interest.
The State argues that decreasing fatalities and injuries [518]*518from motorcycle accidents does impinge directly on the public interests in three respects: (1) economic impact: (a) lessens burden on public agencies such as hospitals, medical and ambulance facilities; (b) reduces addition to the public assistance roles of disabled motorcyclists and their dependents or survivors; (2) “flying missile theory”: loose stones on the highway or fallen objects may strike the motorcyclist on the head, thus causing him to lose control and become a menace to other vehicles on the highway; (3) the increase in fatalities and serious injuries is so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that it threatens the very fabric of society.
The legislature has clearly stated its purpose. “Deaths of persons and injuries to them and damage to property with the other losses suffered on account of highway traffic accidents are of grave concern to the State and its citizens as well as to the federal government. The legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest that the State initiate, coordinate and accelerate every available means to decrease the fatalities, injuries, damages and losses resulting from highway traffic accidents.” S.L.H. 1967, c. 214, § 1.
It is true that courts often attribute to statutes the constitutionally permissible objectives which the statute might plausibly be construed to reflect, rather than that purpose which the statute in fact, or most probably, reflects. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). However, where the legislature has clearly stated its purpose, we are reluctant to attribute other purposes, unless the facts underlying such other purposes are clearly and convincingly shown. In this case the legislature has not alluded to either “economic impact” or the “flying missile theory”, there was no evidence introduced by the State to substantiate either argument, [519]*519and the claimed facts are not susceptible to judicial notice.
Thus we are squarely faced with the issue whether the legislature may constitutionally regulate the conduct of an individual so as to require him to protect himself from physical injury and or death; that is, whether physical harm to self is a proper subject of public interest and thus subject to the police power of the legislature. This case raises a question that goes to the very heart of the néxus between the individual and the state: where does the public interest begin? This is particularly difficult where the purpose of the statute is beneficent, as Justice Brandéis pointed out in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) : “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning, but without understanding.”
It is contended that the increase in fatalities and serious injuries largely to people under 25 due to motorcycle accidents is so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that it threatens the very fabric of society. It would seem a necessary implication of such contention that when the physical harm to a group of people due to their own recklessness or imprudence becomes sufficiently widespread the public interest generally is affected. Unfortunately, the State merely asserts this proposition without offering statistical evidence to document the degree and extent of the claimed epidemic of motorcycle injuries and fatalities. However, there is statistical evidence available which is properly susceptible of judicial notice.
The Secretary of Transportation’s report, “National Uniform Standards for State Highway Safety Programs”, H.B. Doc. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which [520]*520set up the motorcycle safety helmet as a minimum standard to which state highway safety programs must conform, contained the following background information:
“Deaths and injuries from motorcycle accidents doubled between 1963 and 1965. This fact is particularly alarming when it is understood that most of those killed and injured were young people under the age of 25. Motorcycle registrations have jumped from 574,080 in 1960 to 1,914,700 in 1966. By 1970 the annual increase is expected to reach 1 million per year. Motorcycle safety takes on grave dimensions in view of the fact that since 1960 the rate of motorcycle fatalities has increased at about the same rate as the number of motorcycles [i.e., almost 3y2 times in 6 years].”
The New York Department of Motor Vehicles’ statistics:
“A summary of the Department statistics indicates that 89.2% of the motorcycle accidents result in injury or death and that almost all fatalities occurring as a result of such accidents involve head injuries. Most of these fatalities could have been avoided, or the severity lessened, by the use of a proper helmet.” N.Y. Session Laws 2961, 2962 (McKinney 1966). Michigan State Police data:
“Michigan State Police datum 1962-1966 (Exhibit A) shows a mortality rate of 11.5 for 10,000 registrations of motorcycles, as compared with 5.2 per 10,000 for all vehicles in the same period.” American Motorcycle Ass’n v. Davids, 158 N.W. 2d 72, 75 n.9 (Mich. App. 1968). However, this figure is not reflective of the total statewide picture since “. . . accidents which occurred in cities over 25,000 population [were] not included in this summary.” Brief for Defendants and Appellees in American Motorcycle Ass’n v. Davids, supra.
[521]*521In our opinion these statistics fairly show that motorcycle accidents are significantly more dangerous than motor vehicle accidents; that there is an enormous increase in motorcycle registrations; that there is a corresponding enormous increase in the number of deaths and injuries due to motorcycle accidents. The question is whether the accelerating rate of deaths and injuries due to motorcycle accidents coupled with the increase in motorcycle registrations has reached such proportions and the class of motorcycle users has become so large and widespread that the continued viability of our society requires that they protect themselves from physical injury or death — in short, is the public interest generally affected?
We hold that it is.
We wish to make it clear that this holding is limited to this case. We start from the proposition that where an individual’s conduct, or a class of individuals’ conduct, does not directly harm others the public interest is not affected and is not properly the subject of the police power of the legislature. However, where the legislature has determined that the conduct of a particular class of people recklessly affects their physical well-being and that the consequent physical injury and death is so widespread as to be of grave concern to the public and where the incidence and severity of the physical harm has been statistically demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court, then the conduct of that class of people affects the public interest and is properly within the scope of the police power. Of course, where the conduct sought to be regulated is in furtherance of a specific constitutional right, a different situation arises.
Having determined “that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class” is involved, we move on to consider whether “the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of [522]*522the purpose.” Appellant has not referred us to any arguments refuting the reasonableness of the regulation in light of its purpose. Nor has appellant pointed the way to less drastic or less burdensome means by which substantial head injuries to motorcyclists may be prevented. The burden imposed is directly and immediately related to the evil sought to be controlled. The legislation is not broadly prohibitive; a narrower means to protect motorcyclists could hardly be conceived.
Appellant also contends that the standard “safety helmet” in the statute is indefinite and subject, by the terms of-the regulations, to amendment without notice.
We find “safety helmet” to be an adequate standard by which the legislature, the courts, and the public may ascertain the reasonableness of the rules promulgated by the Coordinator. The term is one likely of general ordinary understanding upon which reasonable men may agree. We find “safeguards” by Avhich administrative actions may be reviewed. We find in the history and purpose of the statute a policy sufficient to test regulations adopted by the Coordinator. The rule-making power of the Coordinator, like that of other administrative bodies, if exercised beyond the scope of authority or in contravention' of a governing statute, a constitutional provision, or a rule-making procedure, may be challenged by any interested party in the courts without first applying to the agency. HRS §91-7.
Since the approval of owners’ helmets under the regulations may not be withdrawn at any time except after a definite period set for re-inspection, the regulations give warning sufficient to satisfy due process.
We hold that HRS § 286-81 (1) (A) and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it are within the proper exercise of police power.
Judgment affirmed.
[523]*523Francis T. De Mello for defendant-appellant.
John Campbell, Jr., Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Barry Chung, Prosecuting Attorney, with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Dennis C. H. Leong, Deputy Attorney General (Bert T. Kanbara, Attorney General, and H. K. Bruss Keppeler, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief), for amicus curiae.