CROCKETT, Justice.
This case comes to us on an appeal from a conviction of grand larceny, arising out of the theft of an automobile. Two questions are presented: First, where there is no evidence of value except a description of the property involved, is it prejudicial error for the court to instruct the jury that the value of the property is greater than $50 and that if defendant is guilty at all he is guilty of grand larceny. The necessity of answering the first question in the [326]*326affirmative gives rise to the second: Where such error has been committed, can the cause be remanded for retrial without violating the constitutional guarantee of the accused not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. After a consideration of the problems involved touching upon those questions we answer both in the affirmative.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant’s counsel moved the court for a directed verdict on the ground that there had been no evidence of value of the stolen car. The State’s attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to re-open and supply the missing evidence. He did not do so but instead argued that judicial notice could be taken of the value of the car. The court denied defendant’s motion and included in its instructions to the jury the following:
“Grand Larceny so far as it might be material in this case is committed when the property taken is of a value exceeding $50.00.
“In this case you will take the value of this property as being in excess of $50.00 and therefore the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand larceny.”
It is conceded by the State that there was no direct evidence of value and that the only testimony in the record upon which a finding of value could be based was that of the owner of the automobile describing it saying it was in excellent condition.
This is not a case where the defendant either expressly or impliedly admitted the value, nor by conduct or statements of himself or counsel, allowed it to be assumed that the matter was not disputed. His plea of not guilty cast upon the State the burden of proving every essential element of the offense by evidence sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In a charge of grand larceny, one of those essentials is that the value be greater than $50. A conviction for that offense cannot stand unless there is satisfactory evidence of the value of the property. State v. Harris, Mo., 267 S. W. 802; [327]*327People v. Leach, 106 Cal. App. 442, 290 P. 131. Ordinarily, judicial notice will not be taken of the value of personal property, 31 C. J. S., Evidence, § 101, page 701, and as will later appear herein, this is unquestionably so in connection with the instruction given in this case.
We direct our attention to the argument of the prosecution that the court could take judicial notice of the value of the car and so instruct the jury: Judicial notice is the taking cognizance by the court of certain facts without the necessity of proof, 31 C. J. S., Evidence, § 6, page 509. One class of factual material which is the subject of judicial notice is that dealt with by statute. Section 104-46-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides: “Courts take judicial notice of the following facts:” and proceeds to list in eight separate categories, such things as English words, whatever is established by law, acts of departments of government, seals of courts, states and the United States, etc. It would be of no value to list them all here because the value of the car in question could not be thought to come under any subdivision of that statute by any stretch of the imagination.
Section 104-54-4, U. C. A. 1943, under the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:
“* * * Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, who are hound to accept it.”
The word “knowledge” in the foregoing section is apparently used advisedly, there being a distinction between “judicial knowledge” of the public records, laws, etc. which the court is deemed to know by virtue of his office and “judicial notice” of things which are commonly known. 31 C.' J. S., Evidence, § 6, page 509, 20 Am. Jur. 47. The further discussion in this opinion will show that this statute has no application to the instant case. We are not here concerned with what the result might be if the evidence in [328]*328question were such that the statute required that the jury be bound to accept it.
Beyond the scope of the statute providing that certain matters will be taken judicial notice of, there is another class of facts which are so well known and accepted that they are judicially noticed without taking the time, trouble and expense necessary to prove them. Under this doctrine the court will consider, without proof of such generally known facts, its knowledge of what is known to all persons of ordinary intelligence. 31 C. J. S., Evidence, § 7, page 510. This court has recognized that class of judicial notice in a great variety of matters, a few examples of which are: Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 P. 54, (that assignment or garnishment of wages ordinarily imputes no wrong or misconduct to the debtor) ; Union Savings & Inv. Co. v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 221, (the general purpose and methods of doing business of building and loan associations) ; Salt Lake City V. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654 (location of school buildings); Utah State Fair Ass’n v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 P. 1016 (that betting follows horse racing); State Tax Commission v. City of Logcm, 88 Utah 406, 54 P. 2d 1197 (that most consumers of electrical energy are constant users). For numerous cases on judicial notice of many different subjects of common knowledge outside the classes covered by our statute see Pacific Digest, Evidence §§ 1 to 52, Inc. The taking of judicial notice of this latter class of commonly known evi-dentiary facts does not establish them so conclusively as to prevent the presentation of contrary evidence or the making of a finding to the contrary. The subject is treated in Wig-more on Evidence, 3d Ed., Sections 2555 et sequi, and he states in Section 2567:
“(a) That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without the offering proof by the party who should ordinarily have done so. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But the opponent [329]*329is not prevented from disputing the matter by evidence, if he believes it disputable.”
In discussing this further, Wigmore refers to statutes which expressly provide that the judicial notice is the final determination and binding on the jury; and in Subsection b of the above section, continues:
«* * * Does it signify that the settlement of the matter rests with the judge and not with the jury, that the jury are to accept the fact from the judge, and that so far as any further investigation is concerned, it is for the judge alone? Such is the view sometimes found, in decisions as well as statutes [citing statutes including Utah]. Yet it seems rather that the jury are not concluded; that the process of notice is intended chiefly for expedition of proof;
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CROCKETT, Justice.
This case comes to us on an appeal from a conviction of grand larceny, arising out of the theft of an automobile. Two questions are presented: First, where there is no evidence of value except a description of the property involved, is it prejudicial error for the court to instruct the jury that the value of the property is greater than $50 and that if defendant is guilty at all he is guilty of grand larceny. The necessity of answering the first question in the [326]*326affirmative gives rise to the second: Where such error has been committed, can the cause be remanded for retrial without violating the constitutional guarantee of the accused not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. After a consideration of the problems involved touching upon those questions we answer both in the affirmative.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant’s counsel moved the court for a directed verdict on the ground that there had been no evidence of value of the stolen car. The State’s attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to re-open and supply the missing evidence. He did not do so but instead argued that judicial notice could be taken of the value of the car. The court denied defendant’s motion and included in its instructions to the jury the following:
“Grand Larceny so far as it might be material in this case is committed when the property taken is of a value exceeding $50.00.
“In this case you will take the value of this property as being in excess of $50.00 and therefore the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand larceny.”
It is conceded by the State that there was no direct evidence of value and that the only testimony in the record upon which a finding of value could be based was that of the owner of the automobile describing it saying it was in excellent condition.
This is not a case where the defendant either expressly or impliedly admitted the value, nor by conduct or statements of himself or counsel, allowed it to be assumed that the matter was not disputed. His plea of not guilty cast upon the State the burden of proving every essential element of the offense by evidence sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In a charge of grand larceny, one of those essentials is that the value be greater than $50. A conviction for that offense cannot stand unless there is satisfactory evidence of the value of the property. State v. Harris, Mo., 267 S. W. 802; [327]*327People v. Leach, 106 Cal. App. 442, 290 P. 131. Ordinarily, judicial notice will not be taken of the value of personal property, 31 C. J. S., Evidence, § 101, page 701, and as will later appear herein, this is unquestionably so in connection with the instruction given in this case.
We direct our attention to the argument of the prosecution that the court could take judicial notice of the value of the car and so instruct the jury: Judicial notice is the taking cognizance by the court of certain facts without the necessity of proof, 31 C. J. S., Evidence, § 6, page 509. One class of factual material which is the subject of judicial notice is that dealt with by statute. Section 104-46-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides: “Courts take judicial notice of the following facts:” and proceeds to list in eight separate categories, such things as English words, whatever is established by law, acts of departments of government, seals of courts, states and the United States, etc. It would be of no value to list them all here because the value of the car in question could not be thought to come under any subdivision of that statute by any stretch of the imagination.
Section 104-54-4, U. C. A. 1943, under the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:
“* * * Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, who are hound to accept it.”
The word “knowledge” in the foregoing section is apparently used advisedly, there being a distinction between “judicial knowledge” of the public records, laws, etc. which the court is deemed to know by virtue of his office and “judicial notice” of things which are commonly known. 31 C.' J. S., Evidence, § 6, page 509, 20 Am. Jur. 47. The further discussion in this opinion will show that this statute has no application to the instant case. We are not here concerned with what the result might be if the evidence in [328]*328question were such that the statute required that the jury be bound to accept it.
Beyond the scope of the statute providing that certain matters will be taken judicial notice of, there is another class of facts which are so well known and accepted that they are judicially noticed without taking the time, trouble and expense necessary to prove them. Under this doctrine the court will consider, without proof of such generally known facts, its knowledge of what is known to all persons of ordinary intelligence. 31 C. J. S., Evidence, § 7, page 510. This court has recognized that class of judicial notice in a great variety of matters, a few examples of which are: Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 P. 54, (that assignment or garnishment of wages ordinarily imputes no wrong or misconduct to the debtor) ; Union Savings & Inv. Co. v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 221, (the general purpose and methods of doing business of building and loan associations) ; Salt Lake City V. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654 (location of school buildings); Utah State Fair Ass’n v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 P. 1016 (that betting follows horse racing); State Tax Commission v. City of Logcm, 88 Utah 406, 54 P. 2d 1197 (that most consumers of electrical energy are constant users). For numerous cases on judicial notice of many different subjects of common knowledge outside the classes covered by our statute see Pacific Digest, Evidence §§ 1 to 52, Inc. The taking of judicial notice of this latter class of commonly known evi-dentiary facts does not establish them so conclusively as to prevent the presentation of contrary evidence or the making of a finding to the contrary. The subject is treated in Wig-more on Evidence, 3d Ed., Sections 2555 et sequi, and he states in Section 2567:
“(a) That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without the offering proof by the party who should ordinarily have done so. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But the opponent [329]*329is not prevented from disputing the matter by evidence, if he believes it disputable.”
In discussing this further, Wigmore refers to statutes which expressly provide that the judicial notice is the final determination and binding on the jury; and in Subsection b of the above section, continues:
«* * * Does it signify that the settlement of the matter rests with the judge and not with the jury, that the jury are to accept the fact from the judge, and that so far as any further investigation is concerned, it is for the judge alone? Such is the view sometimes found, in decisions as well as statutes [citing statutes including Utah]. Yet it seems rather that the jury are not concluded; that the process of notice is intended chiefly for expedition of proof; and remains possible for the jury to negative it.” (Emphasis added.)
See also 31 C. J. S., Evidence, § 13, page 520, note 62.
Accordingly, if we assume that the value of the car is of that class of facts which is so well known that judicial notice should be taken thereof, that would not necessarily be conclusive upon the jury. It would merely take the place of evidence. Upon that basis the court could have instructed the jury to this effect: If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant stole the automobile in question and that it was a 1947 Ford Sedan in good condition, then you may take into consideration your knowledge acquired in the every day affairs of life in determining what value you will place upon said automobile.
Suppose any number of thoroughly competent and credible witnesses had testified that the car was worth more than $50, and there had been no evidence to the contrary, no matter how clear and convincing the evidence might have been, in a criminal case it was not the prerogative of the court to tell the jury that they have to believe it and so find. See State v. Estrada, 119 Utah 425, 227 P. 2d 247, 248, wherein this court reiterated the time honored rule that it is the sole and exclu[330]*330sive province of the jury to determine the facts in criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the State is strong or weak; and expressly stated:
“If the trial judge may not find a verdict of guilty, so, likewise he may not find any of the facts which are necessary elements of the crime for which the accused is being tried. * * * The provision of our State Constitution which grants accused persons the right to a trial by jury extends to each and all of the facts which must be found to be present to constitute the crime charged, and such right may not be invaded by the presiding judge indicating to the jury that any of such facts are established by the evidence.” (Emphasis added.)
See that case and the case of State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177, cited therein for the further elaboration on this principle.
It is to be admitted that upon the surface there doesn’t appear to be much logic to the thought that a jury would not be bound to find that the car involved here (1947 Ford 2-Door Sedan) is worth more than $50. However, under our jury system, it is traditional that in criminal cases juries can, and sometimes do, make findings which are not based on logic, nor even common sense. No matter how positive the evidence of a man’s guilt may be, the jury may find him not guilty and no court has any power to do anything about it. Notwithstanding the occasional incongruous result, this system of submitting all of the facts in criminal cases to the jury and letting them be the exclusive judges thereof has lasted for some little time now and with a fair degree of success. If the result in individual cases at times seems illogical, we can be consoled by the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, that in some areas of the law, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” We, who live with it, have a fervent devotion to the jury system, in spite of its faults. We would not like to see it destroyed nor whittled away. If a court can take one important element of an offense from the jury and determine the facts for them because such facts seems plain enough to him, then which element [331]*331cannot be similarly taken away, and where would the process stop?
For the court to instruct the jury as it did in its Instruction No. 4 “* * * you will take the value of this property as being in excess of $50.00” was an invasion of their province as the exclusive triers of the fact and was prejudicial error. This case presents different problems than were considered in State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 P. 531. No case has been cited which supports the action of the trial court. One case has been found, certain language of which seems to indicate that the court could take judicial notice of the value of the car, State v. Phillips, 106 Kan. 192, 186 P. 743, 744, the court said:
“We must not assume to be more ignorant than everybody else, and everybody else knows that such a car is worth more than $20.”
But that case did not involve an instruction as to the value the jury must place on the car as in the instant case. In the Phillips case, the judgment was attacked for failure to prove value but the court recited that the defendant himself testified that he and his accomplice had sold the car for $200 (ten times the amount necessary to make grand larceny in that State) and taken $100 each. The evidence of value was sufficient and the conviction was affirmed.
This appeal presents no question relating to the failure of the court to submit the question of the included offense of petty larceny to the jury and the effect of Section 105-34-6, U. C. A. 1943, which provides that the jury may find the defendant guilty of any necessarily included offense. That grand larceny usually includes the offense of petty larceny, See People v. Wilder, 52 Cal. App. 320, 198 P. 841; People v. McElroy, 116 Cal. 583, 48 P. 718; Commander v. State, 28 Ala. App. 42, 178 So. 241.
[332]*332[331]*331The major portion of the Attorney General’s brief deals with the contention that if the failure to prove value re[332]*332quires a reversal of the case, the defendant is not entitled to go free, but only to a new trial. With this we agree. It is well settled that reversal of a conviction at the instance of the defendant, and subsequent remand of the case for new trial does not constitute the defendant twice in jeopardy to entitle him to go free. 15 Am. Jur. 89, Crim. Law, Sec. 427; People v. Travers, 77 Cal. 176, 19 P. 268; People v. Eppinger, 109 Cal. 294, 41 P. 1037; People v. Stratton, 136 Cal. App. 201, 28 P. 2d 695. And see Sec. 105-39-2, U. C. A. 1943, and State v. Kessler, 15 Utah 142, 49 P. 293.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
WADE, McDONOUGH, and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.