[574]*574PETERSON, J.
We consider this murder case for the second time on review. The first question presented is whether, in the absence of an express order from an appellate court, a trial court may, on remand, order a limited retrial on the existence of an element of the offense of aggravated murder. If a limited retrial was permissible, the second question presented is whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the state, in the first trial, had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed First Degree Robbery. We hold that the trial court order of a limited retrial was proper, but that the court erred in its instruction to the jury.
Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with alternative theories of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095 (1985), based on the same criminal episode. The indictment alleged that defendant killed the victim in the course of committing the crime of robbery in the first degree, ORS 163.095(2)(d), and in an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrators of that crime, ORS 163.095(2)(e).1 The trial court instructed the jury that it need not agree unanimously on either of those theories, as long as all 12 jurors agreed that defendant committed aggravated murder. The jury returned [575]*575a general verdict finding defendant guilty of aggravated murder.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. State v. Boots, 94 Or App 713, 767 P2d 450 (1989). This court reversed, holding that the instruction that the jury need not unanimously agree on either theory of aggravated murder was reversible error. State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 780 P2d 725 (1989). This court also concluded that the jury necessarily found by its general verdict on the aggravated murder count that defendant was guilty of murder under ORS 163.115, and that the instructional error did not affect that implicit finding. 308 Or at 381. Consequently, this court reversed the aggravated murder conviction and remanded with this instruction:
“On remand, the state may choose whether to reduce the defendant’s conviction and sentence to murder under ORS 163.115 or to retry the charge of aggravated murder.” Id. at 381.2
On remand, the state elected to retry the aggravated murder charge, pursuing only the murder-to-conceal theory under ORS 163.095(2)(e). The state moved to limit the new trial “only to the determination of whether or not the defendant is guilty of the enhanced crime of Aggravated Murder.” The trial court granted the motion. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant had been convicted of murdering and robbing the victim and that the jury’s sole function was to determine whether the murder was committed in an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrators of the robbery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the crime of aggravated murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 20-year minimum.3
Defendant again appealed, raising various claims of error. Without reaching defendant’s other assignments of [576]*576error, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the sole ground that, in limiting the jury’s consideration to the existence of the aggravating factor, the trial court violated this court’s remand order. State v. Boots, 112 Or App 25, 29, 826 P2d 1049 (1992).
The state petitioned for review, asserting:
“The trial court in this case correctly construed this court’s remand order to permit a limited retrial on just the aggravating factor. Nothing in this court’s opinion in Boots I expressly required a complete retrial of all elements [of] the aggravated-murder charge, and the remand order itself did not preclude the trial court from ordering that only the aggravating factor needed to be retried. Thus, [the] approach taken by the trial court on remand fully comported with this court’s order.”
By contrast, defendant argues that the “clear intention of the Supreme Court” was to require a complete retrial.
This court has, on occasion, remanded criminal cases expressly for consideration of specified issues. For example, in State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93, cert den 498 US 879 (1990), and State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 786 P2d 111 (1990), this court affirmed the defendants’ convictions for aggravated murder but remanded the cases for the express purpose of conducting further proceedings on the penalty to be imposed. In State v. Green, 271 Or 153, 531 P2d 245 (1975), this court remanded the case to the trial court for the express purpose of determining whether the defendant killed the victim under extreme mental or emotional disturbance; whether the defendant killed the victim in the first place was not relitigated.4 [577]*577Wagner, Moen, and Green demonstrate the power of this court expressly to limit issues to be considered on remand in a criminal case in which a lesser-included offense was proved without error at trial.
That is not what was done by this court in this case. This court’s remand order neither expressly required the trial court to retry defendant on every element of an aggravated murder charge, nor expressly limited the trial court to a trial on the existence of an aggravating factor. The order nonetheless can be read to permit a limited retrial. Therefore, we consider the question whether, in the absence of an express order from this court limiting the retrial to the existence of the aggravating factor, the trial court in this case erred in ordering a retrial limited to whether defendant murdered the victim in order to conceal defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a crime.
There is no question that defendant, in his original trial, was tried and found guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder, ORS 163.115. State v. Boots, supra, 308 Or at 381. This court’s decisions in State v. Wagner, supra, and State v. Green, supra, are affirmations of the principle that an error-free conviction of a criminal offense need not be retried even though an appellate court has ordered a retrial of a greater offense of which the lesser offense is a lesser-included offense. See also State v. Ferrell, 315 Or 213, 224, 843 P2d 939 (1992) (where the defendants’ convictions for underlying offenses — manufacture, possession, or delivery of a controlled substance — were free from error, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing entire convictions; this court remanded the cases to the trial courts for entry of judgments of conviction on those underlying offenses and for resentencing).
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[574]*574PETERSON, J.
We consider this murder case for the second time on review. The first question presented is whether, in the absence of an express order from an appellate court, a trial court may, on remand, order a limited retrial on the existence of an element of the offense of aggravated murder. If a limited retrial was permissible, the second question presented is whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the state, in the first trial, had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed First Degree Robbery. We hold that the trial court order of a limited retrial was proper, but that the court erred in its instruction to the jury.
Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with alternative theories of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095 (1985), based on the same criminal episode. The indictment alleged that defendant killed the victim in the course of committing the crime of robbery in the first degree, ORS 163.095(2)(d), and in an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrators of that crime, ORS 163.095(2)(e).1 The trial court instructed the jury that it need not agree unanimously on either of those theories, as long as all 12 jurors agreed that defendant committed aggravated murder. The jury returned [575]*575a general verdict finding defendant guilty of aggravated murder.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. State v. Boots, 94 Or App 713, 767 P2d 450 (1989). This court reversed, holding that the instruction that the jury need not unanimously agree on either theory of aggravated murder was reversible error. State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 780 P2d 725 (1989). This court also concluded that the jury necessarily found by its general verdict on the aggravated murder count that defendant was guilty of murder under ORS 163.115, and that the instructional error did not affect that implicit finding. 308 Or at 381. Consequently, this court reversed the aggravated murder conviction and remanded with this instruction:
“On remand, the state may choose whether to reduce the defendant’s conviction and sentence to murder under ORS 163.115 or to retry the charge of aggravated murder.” Id. at 381.2
On remand, the state elected to retry the aggravated murder charge, pursuing only the murder-to-conceal theory under ORS 163.095(2)(e). The state moved to limit the new trial “only to the determination of whether or not the defendant is guilty of the enhanced crime of Aggravated Murder.” The trial court granted the motion. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant had been convicted of murdering and robbing the victim and that the jury’s sole function was to determine whether the murder was committed in an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrators of the robbery. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the crime of aggravated murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 20-year minimum.3
Defendant again appealed, raising various claims of error. Without reaching defendant’s other assignments of [576]*576error, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the sole ground that, in limiting the jury’s consideration to the existence of the aggravating factor, the trial court violated this court’s remand order. State v. Boots, 112 Or App 25, 29, 826 P2d 1049 (1992).
The state petitioned for review, asserting:
“The trial court in this case correctly construed this court’s remand order to permit a limited retrial on just the aggravating factor. Nothing in this court’s opinion in Boots I expressly required a complete retrial of all elements [of] the aggravated-murder charge, and the remand order itself did not preclude the trial court from ordering that only the aggravating factor needed to be retried. Thus, [the] approach taken by the trial court on remand fully comported with this court’s order.”
By contrast, defendant argues that the “clear intention of the Supreme Court” was to require a complete retrial.
This court has, on occasion, remanded criminal cases expressly for consideration of specified issues. For example, in State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93, cert den 498 US 879 (1990), and State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 786 P2d 111 (1990), this court affirmed the defendants’ convictions for aggravated murder but remanded the cases for the express purpose of conducting further proceedings on the penalty to be imposed. In State v. Green, 271 Or 153, 531 P2d 245 (1975), this court remanded the case to the trial court for the express purpose of determining whether the defendant killed the victim under extreme mental or emotional disturbance; whether the defendant killed the victim in the first place was not relitigated.4 [577]*577Wagner, Moen, and Green demonstrate the power of this court expressly to limit issues to be considered on remand in a criminal case in which a lesser-included offense was proved without error at trial.
That is not what was done by this court in this case. This court’s remand order neither expressly required the trial court to retry defendant on every element of an aggravated murder charge, nor expressly limited the trial court to a trial on the existence of an aggravating factor. The order nonetheless can be read to permit a limited retrial. Therefore, we consider the question whether, in the absence of an express order from this court limiting the retrial to the existence of the aggravating factor, the trial court in this case erred in ordering a retrial limited to whether defendant murdered the victim in order to conceal defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a crime.
There is no question that defendant, in his original trial, was tried and found guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder, ORS 163.115. State v. Boots, supra, 308 Or at 381. This court’s decisions in State v. Wagner, supra, and State v. Green, supra, are affirmations of the principle that an error-free conviction of a criminal offense need not be retried even though an appellate court has ordered a retrial of a greater offense of which the lesser offense is a lesser-included offense. See also State v. Ferrell, 315 Or 213, 224, 843 P2d 939 (1992) (where the defendants’ convictions for underlying offenses — manufacture, possession, or delivery of a controlled substance — were free from error, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing entire convictions; this court remanded the cases to the trial courts for entry of judgments of conviction on those underlying offenses and for resentencing). If all elements of a lesser-included offense have been fully and fairly alleged and proved, an appellate court may order a retrial limited to the element establishing the greater offense. Under the directions given by this court to the trial court, the trial court in this case could do the same, that is, order a retrial limited to those issues that caused the appellate court to reverse defendant’s conviction on the greater offense.
Defendant argues that the limited retrial violated his state and federal constitutional rights not to be put in [578]*578jeopardy twice for the same offense.5 Defendant is incorrect. It is well settled that, where a defendant appeals a conviction and error is found by the appellate court, retrial on the original charge for which the defendant was convicted does not violate the state or federal prohibition against double jeopardy. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 US 33, 109 S Ct 285, 102 L Ed 2d 265 (1988) (the general prohibition against successive prosecutions found in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant whose first conviction is set aside, on the defendant’s appeal, due to trial error); State v. Verdine, 290 Or 553, 560-61, 624 P2d 580 (1981) (for the same reasons that the Fifth Amendment does not bar a second trial, neither does Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution). See also ORS 131.525(l)(a) (previous, prosecution is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution where the defendant has appealed a judgment of conviction resulting from the former).
Here, defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095. His conviction for that offense was set aside due to trial error, although his underlying conviction for murder, ORS 163.115, was affirmed. State v. Boots, supra, 308 Or at 381. Defendant was subsequently retried for aggravated murder. Defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense were not violated.
Defendant next argues that the limited retrial ordered by the trial court violated his right to trial by jury.6 This argument also is unpersuasive. Although it is true that [579]*579defendant is entitled to have the state prove to a jury all elements of the offenses of which he is accused, he has received that protection here. This court held in State v. Boots, supra, 308 Or at 381, that the jury in defendant’s first trial properly had found him guilty of the crime of murder, ORS 163.115. In his second trial, a jury found him guilty of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095. Defendant’s right to trial by jury on all elements of the offenses of which he has been convicted has not been violated.
Neither has defendant’s right to be presumed innocent of the crime with which he is charged been violated.7 We repeat, once again, that defendant was convicted, without error, in his first trial of the crime of murder, ORS 163.115. State v. Boots, supra, 308 Or at 381. On that conviction, defendant lost the benefit of the presumption of his innocence as to that crime. See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 416, 840 P2d 62 (1992) (stating principle). During his second aggravated murder trial, he was entitled to, and received, the presumption of innocence as to the crime of aggravated murder. Defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence was not violated.
For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in ordering a retrial limited to whether defendant murdered the victim in order to conceal defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a crime.
Defendant next argues that, in his second trial, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
“the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt' * * * that the Defendant * * * committed the crime of Robbery in the First Degree of [the victim] during the same incident in which [the victim] was shot and killed * * *.
“The jury selected to try this case is to take these as established facts and they are not to be questioned or re-examined. They are considered true for all purposes of this case.”
In defendant’s first trial, the court instructed the jury that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
[580]*580“That the Defendant intentionally caused the death of [the victim], another human being, in the course of committing the crime of Robbery in the First Degree, or in an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime.”
Because all 12 jurors agreed with at least one of these theories, the jury necessarily found that a robbery had been committed. The question becomes, did the jury necessarily find that defendant committed the robbery?
The state argues that, at the first trial, defendant’s only defense to the robbery-murder was an alibi. He did not question that the victim was killed by the robber or robbers in the course of a robbery. Therefore, the state contends, the evidence from the first trial was capable of no other interpretation but that whoever killed the victim did so in the course of robbing him or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of the robbery. The state argues that, by its verdict, the jury rejected defendant’s alibi defense and thus implicitly must have found that defendant committed robbery.
The verdict returned in the first trial did not disclose whether defendant was found guilty of causing the death of another “in the course of committing the crime of Robbery” or “to conceal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime.” We have again examined the record from the first trial. Under all the evidence, much of which was circumstantial, it is possible that the jury could have found that defendant killed the victim to conceal the identity of a robber other than himself. Based on the second theory of aggravated murder (the killing was “an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime”), the jury could have believed part of defendant’s testimony and nonetheless found rationally that defendant committed murder to conceal the identity of another person who had committed the robbery. Under that scenario, defendant would have been guilty of aggravated murder without having committed a robbery. Therefore, the verdict in the first trial did not necessarily establish that defendant committed robbery and the trial court erred by instructing the jury that defendant had committed first degree robbery.
This error was not harmless. In the retrial, the state chose to prove aggravated murder under the sole theory that defendant killed the victim in order to conceal the identity of [581]*581the perpetrator of the robbery. The jury was erroneously told that defendant committed the robbery. The jury might have been more likely to believe that defendant committed the murder to conceal his own identity than to conceal another’s identity. Therefore, the jury instruction that defendant had committed First Degree Robbery prejudiced him and is reversible error. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction must again be reversed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed. This case is remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. On remand the state may choose whether to reduce the defendant’s conviction and sentence to murder under ORS 163.115 or to retry the charge of aggravated murder. If the state chooses to retry the charge of aggravated murder, the trial may be limited to the determination of whether defendant is guilty of the enhanced crime of aggravated murder, and the jury may be instructed that defendant’s responsibility for the intentional murder of the victim has been established.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.