State v. Kennedy

2025 Ohio 5581

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kennedy, 2025-Ohio-5581.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. CT2025-0037

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. KAISEAN KENNEDY CR2024-0716

Defendant – Appellant Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry: December 15, 2025

BEFORE: CRAIG R. BALDWIN, P.J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J., DAVID M. GORMLEY, J., Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, for Plaintiff-Appellee; KAISEAN KENNEDY, PRO SE For Defendant-Appellant

OPINION

Popham, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Kaisean Kennedy (“Kennedy”) appeals from his

conviction and sentence following a negotiated guilty plea in the Muskingum County Court

of Common Pleas. For the reasons below, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On August 1, 2024, law enforcement officers were dispatched to perform a

welfare check. Plea T. at 13. Officers discovered Kennedy passed out behind the wheel

of a running white Nissan automobile. Id. at 14. The officers detected the odor of alcohol and ultimately found Kennedy in possession of more than eight but less than nine grams

of fentanyl, a handgun, a scale, and $1,820 in U.S. currency. Id.

{¶3} On November 7, 2024, the Muskingum County Grand Jury returned an

indictment charging Kennedy with:

Count 1: Trafficking in a Fentanyl-Related Compound, a third-degree

felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(9)(d);

Count 2: Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, a third-

degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(11)(c);

Count 3: Illegal Assembly or Possession of Chemicals for the

Manufacture of Drugs, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C.

2925.041(A)/(C);

Counts 4, 5, and 6: Having Weapons While Under Disability, third-

degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), (A)(3), (A)(4)/(B);

Counts 7 and 8: Improper Handling of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle,

fourth-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(A), (B)/(I); and

Count 9: OVI, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(a)/(G)(1)(a).

{¶4} Each count carried a one-year firearm specification under R.C.

2941.141(A), as well as a forfeiture specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A) seeking

forfeiture of the $1,820, a handgun, and the Nissan Altima.

{¶5} On January 22, 2025, a Crim.R. 11(C) and (F) plea form signed by

Kennedy, defense counsel, and the assistant prosecutor was filed. Docket Entry No. 13.

In exchange for Kennedy’s guilty plea to Counts 1, 4, and 9, along with the specifications, the State agreed to dismiss Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The parties also stipulated that

the offenses did not merge and jointly recommended a three-year prison sentence.

{¶6} The trial court conducted a change-of-plea hearing on January 22, 2025.

Although Kennedy initially agreed to waive preparation of a presentence investigation

report (“PSI”), the court deferred sentencing and ordered a PSI. Plea T. at 15, 19.

{¶7} On March 17, 2025, after reviewing the PSI and hearing statements from

counsel and Kennedy, the court imposed a sentence of 24 months on Count 1 plus a

mandatory consecutive one-year term for the firearm specification; 36 months on Count

4; and 180 days of local incarceration on Count 9. Sent. T. at 8. The court ordered the

sentences for Counts 1 and 4 to run consecutively, for an aggregate five-year term plus

the one-year firearm specification. Judgment Entry, Mar. 19, 2025 (Docket Entry No. 18).

{¶8} Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967).

Standard of Review — Anders v. California

{¶9} Under Anders, if appointed counsel, after a conscientious review of the

record, concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous, counsel must so advise the court and

request permission to withdraw, accompanied by a brief identifying any arguable issues.

Id. at 744. Counsel must also provide the defendant with a copy of the brief and

withdrawal request and allow sufficient time for the defendant to raise any matters of his

choosing. Id.

{¶10} Once counsel satisfies these requirements, the appellate court must

independently review the record to determine whether any arguably meritorious issues

exist. If the court concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous, it may grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal or proceed to a decision on the merits if state law so

requires. Id.

{¶11} By Judgment Entry dated July 11, 2025, this Court acknowledged receipt of

counsel’s Anders brief and motion to withdraw, confirmed that Kennedy was served with

both, and granted Kennedy sixty days to file a pro se brief. Kennedy filed his pro se brief

on September 22, 2025.

{¶12} We conclude that appellate counsel has satisfied the procedural

requirements of Anders.

{¶13} An appeal is frivolous if it presents issues “lacking in arguable merit.” State

v. Pullen, 2002-Ohio-6788, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.). An issue lacks arguable merit when, under the

facts and governing law, “no responsible contention can be made that it offers a basis for

reversal.” Id.; State v. Moore, 2009-Ohio-1416, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.); State v. Grant, 2023-Ohio-

4614, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.).

{¶14} We now review the proposed assignments of error and Kennedy’s pro se

argument.

Appointed Counsel’s Proposed Assignments of Error

{¶15} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING

MANDATORY FINES DESPITE KENNEDY’S REQUEST THAT THEY BE WAIVED.”

{¶16} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING KENNEDY’S GUILTY

PLEAS UNDER CRIM.R. 11 AND ERRED IN SENTENCING HIM.” Kennedy’s Pro Se Assignment of Error

{¶17} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A PRISON SENTENCE

LONGER THAN THE THREE-YEAR TERM HE BELIEVED HE WOULD RECEIVE AND

FAILED TO PROPERLY ALLOW HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.”

I. Mandatory Fines

{¶18} Appellate counsel first contends that the trial court erred by imposing

mandatory fines despite Kennedy’s request for waiver.

Standard of Review

{¶19} We review the imposition of financial sanctions for abuse of discretion. State

v. Gipson, 80 Ohio St.3d 626, 634 (1998). An abuse of discretion is more than an error of

judgment; it requires a showing of perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or a

violation of legal principles. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993);

State v. McCauley, 2025-Ohio-3158, ¶ 49 (5th Dist.).

Background

{¶20} On January 22, 2025, Kennedy filed a motion to suspend mandatory fines

along with an affidavit of indigency. Docket Entry No. 12. At sentencing, the trial court

found:

- A mandatory $375 fine applied to the OVI conviction.

- A mandatory $5,000 fine applied to the trafficking offense.

- The court declined to waive fines, finding Kennedy to be a “drug

dealer.”

- The court ordered forfeiture of the $1,820 found in Kennedy’s

possession at the time of his arrest. Sent. T. at 9.

I. Applicable Law and Analysis

{¶21} Under R.C. 2929.18(B)(1), a court may not impose mandatory fines if the

offender timely files an affidavit of indigency and the court determines the offender is

indigent and unable to pay. R.C. 2929.18(E) permits—but does not require—a hearing

on ability to pay.

{¶22} Even when an affidavit is properly filed, a defendant is not automatically

entitled to a waiver. Gipson, 80 Ohio St.3d at 634. A trial court must consider the

defendant’s present and future ability to pay but is not required to make specific findings.

State v. Perry, 2005-Ohio-85, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.); State v. Wallace, 2022-Ohio-2352, ¶ 29

(5th Dist.).

{¶23} Here, Kennedy reported that he had recently been employed full-time but

had been laid off. Plea T. at 17-18. He possessed $1,820 at the time of arrest. Sent. T. at

9. Based on this record, the court concluded that Kennedy had the ability to pay the

mandatory fines.

{¶24} We find no abuse of discretion. Wallace, 2022-Ohio-2352, ¶ 31.

II. Validity of the Guilty Plea and Sentencing

Guilty Plea

{¶25} Crim.R. 11(C) requires that guilty pleas be entered knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily. Strict compliance is required for constitutional rights; substantial

compliance is sufficient for nonconstitutional rights. State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶¶

19, 31; State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473 (1981). {¶26} The trial court conducted a thorough colloquy. Kennedy confirmed that he

understood:

- the elements of the offenses;

- the jointly recommended sentence;

- that the judge was not bound by the recommendation;

- the rights he was waiving, including the right to jury trial,

confrontation, compulsory process, and the right against self-incrimination;

and

- the maximum penalties involved.

Plea T. at 6-12. Kennedy also stated that he was satisfied with counsel. Id. at 9. Kennedy

and his attorney signed the written plea form. Docket Entry No. 13.

{¶27} The record demonstrates full compliance with Crim.R. 11. No arguably

meritorious issue exists regarding the validity of the plea.

Sentencing

{¶28} We review felony sentences under R.C. 2953.08. A sentence is contrary to

law if it falls outside the statutory range or is based on improper considerations. State v.

Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34; State v. Ray, 2025-Ohio-2023, ¶¶ 67–71 (5th Dist.).

{¶29} A trial court is not required to make specific findings concerning R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12 but must consider them. Jones, ¶ 20.

{¶30} Kennedy’s sentence falls within the statutory ranges, and the record reflects

proper consideration of the sentencing statutes. We find no error. State v. Elkins, 2023-

Ohio-1358, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.); State v. Parks, 2025-Ohio-960, ¶¶ 29-30 (5th Dist.). III. Kennedy’s Pro Se Argument

{¶31} Kennedy argues that the trial court erred by imposing more than the jointly

recommended three-year sentence and by not allowing him to withdraw his plea.

{¶32} A plea agreement between the State and a defendant does not bind the

sentencing discretion of the trial court. State v. Pettiford, 2002-Ohio-1914 (12th Dist.);

State v. Felder, 2018-Ohio-826, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.). Crim.R. 11 expressly contemplates that

sentencing lies within the court’s discretion. State v. Mathews, 8 Ohio App.3d 145, 146

(10th Dist. 1982).

{¶33} Nothing in the record shows that the trial judge promised Kennedy a three-

year sentence. The State fulfilled its obligations by dismissing the agreed counts and

recommending a three-year term. Plea T. at 5; Sent. T. at 3.

{¶34} Kennedy never moved - either orally at sentencing or in writing - to withdraw

his plea. The record shows he understood the terms of the plea agreement and the

sentencing ranges, and that the trial court was not bound by the joint recommendation.

Plea T. at 10-11.

{¶35} There is no arguable basis for relief.

IV. Conclusion

{¶36} After conducting our independent review of the record pursuant to Anders,

we agree with appellate counsel that no arguably meritorious grounds for appeal exist.

The appeal is wholly frivolous.

{¶37} Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

{¶38} Kennedy’s pro se assignment of error is overruled. For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Muskingum County

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant, Kaisean Kennedy.

By: Popham, J.

Baldwin, P.J. and

Gormley, J., concur