[Cite as State v. Ray, 2025-Ohio-2023.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2024 CA 00115 IVAN LESTER RAY : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024-CR-0765
JUDGMENT: June 5, 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KYLE L. STONE CATHERINE MEECHAN Prosecuting Attorney 16855 Foltz Industrial Parkway BY: CHRISTOPHER A. PIEKARSKI Strongsville, OH 44149 Assistant Prosecutor 110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510 Canton, OH 44702-1413 [Cite as State v. Ray, 2025-Ohio-2023.]
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Ivan Lester Ray (“Ray”) appeals his convictions and
sentences after a jury trial in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On May 1, 2024, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Ray on four counts
of aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(1)/(B)(2), felonies of the first degree;
and one count of aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2)/(B)(3), a felony of
the second degree.
{¶3} A jury trial began on June 21, 2024, during which the following evidence
was presented.
{¶4} M.F. (“husband”) and T.F. (“wife”) are married and live on Hoover Place
NW, in Canton, Stark County, Ohio, with two children: fourteen-year-old H.F., and 10-
month-old W.F. 1T. at 188. Husband also has a six-year-old son, K., from a previous
relationship with a woman named Krystal. Krystal is Ray's ex-wife and current girlfriend.
1T. at 190, 233, 254-255.
{¶5} On the night of March 29, 2024, K. was at Krystal’s home. Husband and
wife, and their other children, spent the evening at a friend's home and returned home
between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. 1T. at 190-191. Husband and wife went to bed
around 1:00 a.m. Wife got up around 1:45 a.m. to care for her 10-month-old child,
W.F., and went back to bed around 2:00 a.m. 1T. at 192-195, 236. Wife woke up
again a short time later when W.F. began fussing. At that point, she noticed "everything was hazy" and she smelled smoke or something burning. 1T. at 195,
210.
{¶6} Wife woke husband, who searched the house and eventually saw
flames on the front porch through a window. 1T. at 196-197, 210, 236-237. Husband
called 9-1-1 while he and wife gathered the kids and exited through the back door.
1T. at 197, 237; State's Exhibit 1 (9-1-1 call).
{¶7} Outside, they met husband’s father, D.F. (“father”), who lives two houses
down, and another neighbor at the end of their driveway. 1T. at 197-198, 216-218, 238.
Father testified that he had been awakened by one of the neighbor’s children banging on
his door to alert him to the fire. 1T. at 214-215, 217. Father asked husband if the water
to the garden hose had been turned back on since winter. Husband then used the hose
to try to extinguish the fire. 1T. at 198, 218, 238.
{¶8} Father told wife (his daughter-in-law) to check the footage from their Nest
doorbell camera to see what caused the fire. 1T. at 198. In the footage recorded at 2:39
a.m., a person is seen pouring liquid over the side railing and onto the porch, and then
setting it on fire. 1T. at 199, 201-202, 218, 239; State's Exhibit 3 (Nest video). Husband
testified that when he first watched the Nest footage, he had a "suspicion" who the
perpetrator was, but he was not entirely certain. 1T. at 239, 251.
{¶9} Father also reviewed his own Ring camera footage. At approximately 2:04
a.m., the footage showed someone walking toward husband and wife’s house. 1T. at
220-222. Later footage showed the same person running down the alley at approximately
2:29 a.m. 1T. at 224. Father did not recognize the individual in the video. {¶10} After watching his father's Ring video and seeing the suspect's "side
profile," husband "knew right away” it was Ray. He testified: "As soon as I saw the video
on that garage camera of my dad's, I knew. I had the suspicion on the [Nest] ones, but
that [Ring] one, I immediately knew. I mean, I had no doubt who that was." 1T. at 266.
{¶11} Husband testified that Ray enjoys outdoor activities like hunting, fishing, and
that Ray frequently wears camouflage hunting gear, just like the person shown in the
videos. 1T. at 248- 249, 253. Husband recognized Ray based on the clothing and the
person’s profile. He “testified that he knew it was Ray because:
The side profile of his face. I mean…initially, the whole thing…told
me who it was, like I had no second guess, but the camo, the camouflage
clothing…fits him and what he wears. I mean, I can't say [on] a daily basis,
but [he] definitely wears it often.
1T. at 249, 252-253.
{¶12} Husband first met Ray in 2021. He testified that their interactions have been
"a little bit tense” because husband has "majority custody" of K. 1T. at 234, 245, 255-256.
According to husband, he and Krystal have had custody disputes nearly every year since
K. turned one year old. 1T. at 265. They have gone to court multiple times as Krystal
has sought increased parenting time. 1T. at 255. On March 29, 2024, the same day as
the fire, husband filed a small claims action against Krystal seeking reimbursement from
Krystal for her portion of K.'s preschool tuition. 1T. at 265. She was served the same
day. 1T. at 266. Husband also testified to the ongoing issues with Krystal and his strong
dislike for Ray. {¶13} After the fire, husband admitted that he made a Facebook post describing
what happened. In the post, he referred to Ray as a "lowlife piece of shit," and said he
hoped Ray “burns in hell”, that karma would catch up to him, and that he hopes Ray
remembers “who he fucked with.” 1T. at 259-262, 266; Defense Exhibit B (Facebook
post). Husband also admitted that on July 18, 2021, he sent Krystal a text message
stating: "Tell your child molester boyfriend he won't be around long." 1T. at 258, 261- 262;
Defense Exhibit A (text message).
{¶14} Wife testified that she immediately recognized Ray when she watched her
father-in-law’s Ring camera footage. 1T. at 200. She explained:
[F]or one, he was wearing camo[uflage] and…that's all I've seen him
in is camo. We know he likes to go hunting. And I could just tell - - I mean,
when you see somebody that you know, you know that you know them[,]
and I could tell by the profile of him, by the way he was walking, I just - - I
knew exactly who it was.
1T. at 200, 207-209.
{¶15} After watching father’s video, wife looked at her own Nest camera footage
again. She saw Ray walking in front of her house earlier at 2:03 a.m., then walking in
front of and beside father’s house. 1T. at 201. She presumed that Ray must have walked
around the block, because at 2:29 a.m., he again came from the same direction and
walked up the side of their yard by the porch. 1T. at 201. She testified again that, after
watching all the videos, she knew that the person who set the fire was Ray. 1T. at 205-
206. {¶16} Although husband and wife had multiple cameras on their home, the one
on the side of the house where Ray stood while he set the fire was not working at the time
because it was uncharged. 1T. at 202-203.
{¶17} Inspector Andrew Crawn, a Canton fire investigator, investigated the case.
2T. at 282-286. When he arrived at the scene, he took photos of the "heavy fire damage"
to the porch. 2T. at 286-290; State's Exhibit’s 21-42. He spoke with husband, wife, and
father, and then reviewed both the Nest and Ring videos. 2T. at 290-292, 317.
{¶18} Inspector Crawn testified that, in the videos, he could see the suspect's
general size, shape, walk, and in some instances, partial facial features. 2T. at 320-321.
One of the videos showed the suspect pouring a flammable liquid over the side of the
porch and lighting it, causing the fire. The flames spread to nearby combustibles including
a chair, other furniture, flooring, knee wall, and the wooden porch structure. 2T. at 291-
292; State's Exhibit 3 (Nest video). Based on the video, Inspector Crawn believed it was
"100% likely" that an ignitable fluid was used. 2T. at 299. From his training and
experience, Inspector Crawn classified the fire as "incendiary," meaning it was
intentionally set in a place where a fire should not be. 2T. at 292-293.
{¶19} Inspector Crawn also testified that he frequently receives suspect
identifications from victims and that, in this case husband and wife both identified Ray as
the suspect in the videos. 2T. at 293, 319, 328.
{¶20} Later, Inspector Crawn returned to the scene after husband found a butane
Coleman torch (in his lawn). 2T. at 294. The torch was clean and free of debris. Inspector
Crawn testified there was a high probability that the torch had been used to start the fire.
He took photos of the torch lying on the lawn, then collected it. 1T. at 243-245, 263-264; 2T. at 294-297; State's Exhibit 6 (torch) and 7-11 (photos). The torch was sent to the
Fire Marshal’s lab for testing. No fingerprints were found, but DNA samples were
collected for analysis. 2T. at 297-298. The torch was also tested for flammable liquids,
but those results came back negative. 2T. at 298-299.
{¶21} Inspector Crawn also reviewed video footage from three street cameras
operated by the Crime Center in Canton. 2T. at 300-301. One camera, located at 18th
Street NW and Cleveland Avenue, showed the suspect wearing camouflage and carrying
a backpack, walking west across Cleveland Avenue. 2T. at 301-302; State's Exhibit 18
(18th & Cleveland video). Another camera, at 15th Street NW and Arnold Avenue NW,
captured the same person a few blocks away, still wearing camo, a backpack, a hat,
gloves, and boots, and walking south on Arnold. 2T. at 302; State 's Exhibit 19 (15th &
Arnold video).
{¶22} Inspector Crawn testified that the suspect in those videos matched the
suspect seen in the Nest and Ring videos. 2T. at 303. He also noted that something in
or near the suspect's hands is seen giving off brief little flickers, or flashes of light, as he
walked, crossed streets, and occasionally paused before continuing toward the victims'
home. 2T. at 302-303; State's Exhibit 19 (15th & Arnold video).
{¶23} A third video from a camera located at Taggarts Ice Cream shop, showed
the same suspect running northeast across the street, without his backpack. 2T. at 303-
304; State's Exhibit 20 (14th & Fulton video). Inspector Crawn testified that a Ring
camera at father’s garage also captured the suspect fleeing west toward Fulton Road,
still without his backpack. 2T. at 305, State's Exhibit 15 (Ring video, garage). According
to Inspector Crawn, the backpack is important because it likely contained the accelerant used to start the fire. He concluded that the backpack probably burned up in the fire since
it never appeared in any subsequent footage. 2T. at 305.
{¶24} Hannah Smith testified that she is a crime analyst with the Canton Police
Department. 2T. at 352-353. Smith works in the real-time Crime Center, which houses
all the city's traffic cameras and license plate readers. 2T. at 353. Smith was asked by
the Fire Prevention Bureau to review the city cameras in reference to the arson on Hoover
Place NW. 2T. at 354. The suspect was described to her as a short white male, dressed
in an "Army" jacket, carrying a backpack, and wearing black boots. 2T. at 355.
{¶25} Smith located footage of a suspect matching that description on several city
cameras. 2T. at 355. A camera located at 15th Street NW and Arnold Avenue NW
captured the suspect matching the description, i.e. wearing black or dark-colored boots,
pants, a jacket with the hood up, and a book bag, walking southbound down the east side
of Arnold. 2T. at 356; State's Exhibit 19 (15th & Arnold video). He eventually crossed
the street and out of view of the camera, walking down Platinum Place NW. 2T. at 356-
357; State's Exhibit 19 (15th & Arnold video). In another camera, positioned at Taggarts
Ice Cream, located at 14th Street NW and Fulton Drive NW (State Route 687), the same
suspect is seen running across 14th Street from the south to the north side, then
continuing to run eastbound, eventually running up the little court down the street. 2T. at
357; State's Exhibit 20 (14th & Fulton video).
{¶26} Olivia McLaughlin is a laboratory technician in the State Fire Marshal's
forensic lab. 2T. at 339. She testified that she received a butane torch for latent print
and DNA analysis from the Canton Fire Department in reference to an arson that occurred
on Hoover Place NW. 2T. at 340-341. She swabbed and processed the torch for latent prints but found none. 2T. at 341-342, 346; State's Exhibit 6 (torch). McLaughlin
explained that fingerprints may not be left on an item in the first place if gloves are worn
or could be destroyed by heat or fire exposure. McLaughlin swabbed the torch’s nozzle,
on/off switch, and label for DNA, and submitted the samples to the Ohio Bureau of
Criminal Investigation ("BCI") for testing. 2T. at 343-347; State's Exhibit 43 (DNA swab,
nozzle & switch) and 44 (DNA swab, label).
{¶27} Andrew Sawin a forensic scientist and DNA analyst at BCI, was asked to
perform DNA analyses in this matter. 2T. at 364-365, 373. Sawin recalled receiving two
swabs from the State Fire Marshal to examine: one from a torch nozzle and on/off knob,
and another from the torch's label. 2T. at 368, 373; State's Exhibit 43 (DNA swab, nozzle
& switch) and 44 (DNA swab, label). DNA was present on the swab from the torch nozzle
and on/off knob, but Sawin concluded that the DNA profile was "not of sufficient quality
for comparison due to insufficient data." 2T. at 373-375; State's Exhibit 43 (DNA swab,
nozzle & switch). DNA was also present on the swab from the torch’s label, and it was
sufficient for comparison. 2T. at 375-376; State 's Exhibit 44 (DNA swab, label). Sawin
compared the DNA from the torch label to Ray’s known DNA sample, and concluded to
a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that the DNA profile found on the torch’s label
was consistent with the DNA standard from Ray. 2T. at 376-377, 381, 389-392, 395-396.
The estimated frequency of occurrence of the DNA profile was rarer than one in one
trillion unrelated individuals. 2T. at 377, 395.
{¶28} The jury found Ray guilty of all charges. The trial court merged the second-
degree felony aggravated arson charge in Count 5 into Count 1 for sentencing, and
sentenced Ray to an indefinite aggregate minimum prison term of 28 years, up to a maximum prison term of 31.5 years. The trial court further classified Ray as an arson
offender.
Assignments of Error
{¶29} Ray raises four assignments of error,
{¶30} “I. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶31} “II. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
{¶32} “III. APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUION AND ARTICLE 1 SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUION.”
{¶33} “IV. THE TRIAL, COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES.”
I & II.
{¶34} Ray’s first and second assignments of error are interrelated in that they
challenge both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence; therefore, we address them
together.
Standard of Appellate Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶35} The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, along
with the Due Process Clause, requires the State to prove each element of a crime to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995);
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). {¶36} Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v.
Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30; State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 13. The review entails
examining the elements of the offense and the evidence presented. State v. Richardson,
2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13.
{¶37} In assessing sufficiency, an appellate court does not weigh credibility. State
v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded on other
grounds by constitutional amendment as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102
n.4 (1997); Walker, ¶ 30. The question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543 (2001), citing Jenks; see
also Walker, ¶ 31; State v. Poutney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19.
{¶38} A verdict will be upheld unless “reasonable minds could not reach the
conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” State v. Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 94, quoting
State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997); accord State v. Montgomery, 2016-Ohio-
5487, ¶ 74.
{¶39} Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a failure to timely make a
Crim.R. 29(A) motion during a jury trial does not waive an argument on appeal concerning
the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 346 (2001); State v.
Carter, 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 223 (1992). In both Jones and Carter, the Supreme Court
held that the defendant's “not guilty” plea preserves his right to object to the alleged
insufficiency of the evidence. Id. We have previously recognized that a Crim.R. 29(A)
motion is not necessary to preserve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for appeal.
State v. Henderson, 2014-Ohio-3121, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Straubhaar, 2009- Ohio-4757, ¶ 40 (5th Dist.). See also State v. Buckley, 2017-Ohio-9358, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.).
Moreover, because a conviction based on legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial
of due process, a conviction based upon insufficient evidence would almost always
amount to plain error. State v. Barringer, 2006-Ohio-2649 at ¶ 59 (11th Dist.); State v.
Coe, 153 Ohio App.3d 44, 48-49 (4th Dist. 2003); State v. Lee, 2016-Ohio-1045, ¶ 30 (5th
Dist.).
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, would convince a rational jury that Ray was guilty of
aggravated arson
{¶40} The jury found Ray guilty of four counts of aggravated arson in violation of
R.C. 2909.02(A)(1)/(B)(2), felonies of the first degree; and one count of aggravated arson
in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2)/(B)(3), a felony of the second degree.
{¶41} There is no dispute that the aggravated arson as alleged in the indictment
actually occurred. Ray’s main argument is that the evidence was not sufficient to prove
he was the person who started the fire.
{¶42} The State must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, including the identity of the person who committed it. State v. Tate,
2014-Ohio-3667, ¶ 15 (Internal citations omitted). That identity can be established
through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at ¶19; State v. Stearns, 2024-Ohio-
714, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.).
{¶43} Circumstantial evidence is defined as “‘testimony not based on actual
personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from
which deductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be proved.’” State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147,150 (1988), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979). This
Court has noted that arson cases often lack eyewitnesses. In such cases, circumstantial
evidence alone can be strong enough to support a conviction. State v. Hall, 2005-Ohio-
4403, ¶31 (5th Dist.).
{¶44} Examples of circumstantial evidence that can help establish identity include
the defendant's presence or fingerprints at or near the crime scene, as well as the motive
and opportunity to commit the crime. State v. Sanders, 2012-Ohio-400, ¶ 39 (11th Dist.)
(“[i]dentification of the shooter is not necessary when there is circumstantial evidence of
appellant's presence at the scene during the time of the incident”); State v. Reese, 2004-
Ohio-6674, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.) (“[t]he identity of the perpetrator may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, such as a fingerprint found at the crime scene”); State v. Reddy,
2010-Ohio-3892, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.) (“reasonable minds could conclude that appellant had
the opportunity and motive to set Copeland's car on fire and, therefore, was the person
who set Copeland's car on fire”); State v. Brickman, 2023-Ohio-2031, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).
{¶45} In this case, the State presented evidence that Ray may have had a motive
due to the ongoing custody issues involving wife, husband, and Krystal. Both wife and
husband identified Ray as the person shown in video footage starting the fire. As
described in our Statement of Facts, surveillance video from the victims’ home, father’s
home, and the City of Canton show a person approaching the home, pouring liquid on the
porch, setting it on fire, and leaving the scene. DNA recovered from a label on a butane
torch found at the scene was tested and found to be consistent with Ray’s DNA.
{¶46} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find
that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ray was the person who started the fire. The State, therefore, met its burden of producing evidence
for each element of the offense, including the identification of Ray as the perpetrator.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to submit the charges to the jury and to support
Ray’s conviction.
{¶47} In his second assignment of error, Ray contends that his conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Appellate Review – Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶48} The term “manifest weight of the evidence” relates to persuasion. Eastley
v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. It concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of
credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.”
(Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), superseded by
constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89,
102 n.4 (1997); State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.
{¶49} When reviewing the manifest weight of the evidence, the question is
whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts, resulting in a manifest
miscarriage of justice, even if the evidence is legally sufficient. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
at 386 - 387; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001). In this role, an appellate court
acts as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree with the jury’s assessment of conflicting
testimony. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800; Thompkins at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982); State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25.
{¶50} Appellate courts traditionally presume the jury’s assessment is correct,
given its ability to observe witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and tone, all critical factors in evaluating credibility. Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).
{¶51} However, the Eighth District recently noted in State v. Reillo, 2024-Ohio-
3307, ¶ 20, appeal allowed, 2025-Ohio-705 (Table), that Eastley arguably extended this
presumption from civil to criminal cases. Id. at ¶ 27. The court cautioned that deferring
to credibility determinations would collapse the distinction between sufficiency and weight
of the evidence. Reillo at ¶ 23. It observed that if credibility findings were insulated from
review, there would be little reason to raise a manifest-weight challenge. Id. See also
State v. Butler, 2024-Ohio-5879, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). Thus, acting as a thirteenth juror, the
appellate court reviews credibility de novo. Id. See also State v. Cox, 2025-Ohio-1819,
¶38 (5th Dist.); State v. Soto, 2025-Ohio-1788, ¶42 (5th Dist.); State v. Beal, 2025-Ohio-
1666, ¶29 (5th Dist.).
{¶52} A manifest-weight claim succeeds only in “the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶53} To reverse a conviction on manifest-weight grounds, all three judges on the
appellate panel must concur. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko,
2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2-4, citing Thompkins, syllabus ¶ 4.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Ray’s convictions for aggravated arson must
be reversed and a new trial ordered {¶54} After reviewing the entire record and weighing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences as a thirteenth juror, including the credibility of the witnesses, we
conclude that the jury did not lose its way or cause a manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶55} Although evidence of animosity and bias by husband and wife toward Ray
was introduced at trial, we are not persuaded that this alone makes their identification of
Ray unreliable. The testimony of husband and wife was corroborated by video footage
showing the suspect approach the victims’ home, pour liquid on the porch, ignite the
liquid, and leave the area. DNA recovered from the label of the butane torch was tested
and found to be consistent with Ray’s DNA.
{¶56} The jurors had the opportunity to observe Ray during the trial and compare
his appearance to the individual shown in the video footage recorded as the events
occurred.
{¶57} The record contains no compelling evidence that weighs heavily against
Ray’s convictions. We find that the greater weight of the credible evidence produced at
trial supports the jury’s conclusion that Ray committed the offenses. Accordingly, we find
no indication that the jury lost its way or ignored substantial evidence in reaching its
verdict.
{¶58} Ray’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶59} In his third assignment of error, Ray argues that he was denied effective
assistance of trial counsel.
{¶60} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-
prong test. First, a defendant must show that trial counsel’s representation was ineffective, specifically that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable
representation and violated an essential duty to the client. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). In assessing such claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id.
{¶61} Even if the defendant establishes deficient performance, he or she must
also satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test by showing prejudice. That is, the
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s errors were so serious as to undermine the
reliability of the trial’s outcome. Id. This requires a showing that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Id. See also State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-2993, ¶¶ 28-29 (5th
Dist.)
{¶62} Ray argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a jury demand
and for failing to move for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A). Appellant’s brief at 10.
{¶63} Ray received a jury trial. Therefore, even assuming that counsel failed to
file a jury demand, Ray has not shown prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.
{¶64} As discussed in our resolution of Ray’s first and second assignments of
error, his convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, because a Crim.R. 29(A) motion would not
have been granted, Ray cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to make
such a motion.
{¶65} Ray’s third assignment of error is overruled. IV.
{¶66} Ray argues in his fourth assignment of error that the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive sentences. Specifically, he contends that the record does not
support a finding that the harm caused by the offenses was so great or unusual as to
support consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4)(b).
Standard of Review
{¶67} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. 2953.08 (F) to
review the entire trial-court record, including any oral or written statements and
Presentence Investigation Reports. R.C. 2953.08 (F)(1) through (4). We review felony
sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Jones, 2020-
Ohio-6729, ¶ 36; State v. Howell, 2015-Ohio-4049, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.). R.C. 2953.08 (G)(2)
provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for
resentencing where we clearly and convincingly find that either the record does not
support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13 (B) or (D), 2929.14 (B)(2)(e)
or (C)(4), or 2929.20 (I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See also State v.
Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 28.
{¶68} Contrary to law, as defined in legal dictionaries, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary
328 (6th Ed.1990), means “in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time[.]”
State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34.
{¶69} “Clear and convincing evidence” is that evidence “which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
See also In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by In re Adoption of T.R.S., 2014-Ohio-3808, ¶¶ 16-17 (7th Dist.),
and In re Adoption of A.L.S., 2018-Ohio-507, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.). “Where the degree of proof
required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine
the record to determine whether the jury had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the
requisite degree of proof.” Cross, 161 Ohio St. at 477.
{¶70} Under State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 39, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does
not authorize appellate courts to modify or vacate a sentence based solely on
disagreement with the trial court’s weighing of factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
See also State v. Toles, 2021-Ohio-3531, ¶ 10 (Brunner, J., concurring).
{¶71} However, when a trial court imposes a sentence based on considerations
extraneous to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the sentence is contrary to law and reviewable.
State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22.
Consecutive sentences
{¶72} Under Ohio’s statutory sentencing scheme, there is a presumption that a
defendant’s multiple prison sentences will be served concurrently, R.C. 2929.41 (A),
unless certain circumstances not applicable in this case apply, see, e.g., R.C. 2929.14
(C)(1) through (3), or the trial court makes findings supporting the imposition of
consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4), which provides:
If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison
terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section R.C. 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code,
or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison
term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of
conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender. (Emphasis added).
{¶73} Conformity with R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4) requires the trial court to make the
statutory findings at the sentencing hearing, which means that “‘the [trial] court must note
that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and
specifie[d] which of the given bases warrants its decision.’” State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-
3177, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326 (1999). To this end, a
reviewing court must be able to ascertain from the record evidence to support the trial
court’s findings. Bonnell, ¶ 29.
{¶74} “A trial court is not, however, required to state its reasons to support its
findings, nor is it required to give a rote recitation of the statutory language, ‘provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated in the sentencing
entry.’” State v. Sheline, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 176 (8th Dist.), quoting Bonnell, ¶ 37; Jones,
2024-Ohio-1083, ¶ 14.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the consecutive-sentence findings
under R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4) have been made, i.e., the first and second findings regarding
necessity and proportionality, as well as the third required finding under R.C. 2929.14
(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c)
R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4): [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison
terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to
protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to
the danger the offender poses to the public
{¶75} In the case at bar, the trial court made this finding during the sentencing
hearing and in his judgment entry. Sent. T. at 20; Entry, filed July 11, 2024 at 2.
R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4)(a): The offender committed one or more of the multiple
offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was
under post-release control for a prior offense
{¶76} This factor does not apply in Ray’s case.
R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4)(b): At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as
part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects
the seriousness of the offender’s conduct
{¶77} In the case at bar, the trial court made this finding during the sentencing
hearing and in his judgment entry. Sent. T. at 20; Entry, filed July 11, 2024 at 2.
R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4)(c): The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates
that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
offender
{¶78} In the case at bar, the trial court made this finding in his judgment entry.
Entry filed July 11, 2024 at 3. However, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court
noted that Ray had no prior felony criminal record, and it was taking that into account in
sentencing. Sent. T. at 19.
{¶79} A trial court need only make one of the three findings under R.C. 2929.14
(C)(4)(a) - (c) to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. Bates, 2024-
Ohio-2587, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.); State v. Gales, 2023-Ohio-2753, * 89-90 (9th Dist.); State v.
Stutes, 2023-Ohio-4582, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.); State v. Parrish, 2023-Ohio-2409, ¶ 24 (2d
Dist.); State v. Malcolm, 2022-Ohio-4708, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.). In this case, the trial court made
the necessary findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b).
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial judge’s decision to impose
consecutive sentences in Ray’s case is supported by the record
{¶80} According to the Supreme Court of Ohio, “the record must contain a basis
upon which a reviewing court can determine that the trial court made the findings required
by R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4) before it imposed consecutive sentences.” Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-
3177 at ¶ 28. “[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the
findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Bonnell, ¶ 29.
{¶81} Here, the case involved four different victims, husband, wife, and their two
minor children, W.F. and H.F. Where there are multiple victims, the imposition of
consecutive sentences is reasonable in order to hold the defendant accountable for
crimes committed against each victim. See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 2002-Ohio-3617, ¶ 67
(10th Dist.); State v. Sparks, 2024-Ohio-2362, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.); State v. Thome, 2017-
Ohio-963, ¶16 (8th Dist.).
{¶82} Representation for each of the victims factored into the trial court’s decision
here to impose consecutive sentences. Husband, wife, and their child H.F. each spoke
at sentencing about their fear, the emotional distress, and the monetary loss caused by
Ray’s actions.
{¶83} Upon review, we find that the trial court’s sentencing on the charges follows
applicable rules and sentencing statutes. The sentence was within the statutory
sentencing range, and Ray has not shown that the trial court imposed the sentence based
on impermissible considerations. Further, the record has evidence supporting the trial
court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4). Therefore, we have no basis for concluding
that it is contrary to law.
{¶84} Ray’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. {¶85} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Popham, J.,
Baldwin, P.J., and
Hoffman, J., concur