[Cite as State v. Kennedy, 2026-Ohio-442.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025CA00097
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2023-CR-1475 WILLIS KENNEDY Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: February 11, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King, William B. Hoffman, David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Christopher A. Piekarski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Appellate Division, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Willis Kennedy, Pro se, for Defendant-Appellant OPINION
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Willis Kennedy appeals the July 14, 2025 Judgment
Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition to
vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of
Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
{¶2} On August 16, 2023, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one
count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and (D), an unclassified felony (Count 1);
and one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2), a felony of
the second degree (Count 2). Appellant appeared before the trial court for arraignment
on August 18, 2023, and entered a plea of not guilty to the Indictment.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to jury trial on January 29, 2024. After hearing all
the evidence and deliberating, the jury found Appellant guilty of both counts. On February
5, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a period of incarceration of 15 years to life
on Count 1. The trial court merged Count 2 with Count 1 for purposes of sentencing.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court, which affirmed his convictions and
sentence. State v. Kennedy, 2025-Ohio-1330 (5th Dist.). Appellant appealed this Court’s
decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which declined to accept jurisdiction. See State v.
Kennedy, 07/22/2025 Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-2537.
1 A statement of the facts is not necessary to our disposition of this appeal. {¶4} On July 14, 2025, Appellant filed an application for reopening, which this
Court denied on August 19, 2025. Appellant appealed this Court’s decision to the Ohio
Supreme Court, which declined to accept jurisdiction. See State v. Kennedy, 11/12/2025
Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-5078.
{¶5} On May 5, 2025, Appellant filed in the trial court three motions, to wit: a
petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence; a motion for
appointment of counsel; and a motion for expert assistance. Via Judgment Entry filed
July 14, 2025, the trial court, treating Appellant’s petition to vacate as a petition for
postconviction relief, denied the same. The trial court found Appellant’s claims his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file certain pretrial motions and failing to request
funds to hire an expert were barred by res judicata. The trial court further found “[t]he
remainder of [Appellant’s] claims set forth only vague and speculative statements as to
what he believes his trial counsel should have done” and Appellant “had not set forth
operative fact to establish counsel’s ineffectiveness.” July 14, 2025 Judgment Entry at p.
4, unpaginated. The trial court noted it had previously denied a motion for the appointment
of counsel and would “not revisit the motion.” Id., fn. 1.
{¶6} It is from this judgment entry Appellant appeals, raising the following
assignments of error: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FINDING APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA WHERE THE
ISSUES PRESENTED THEREIN WERE DE HORS THE RECORD AND
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL.
II. TRIAL COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW
STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, PREJUDICING
APPELLANT[‘S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
I, II
{¶7} Because Appellant’s assignments of error are interrelated, we elect to
address them together. In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts the trial court
erred and abused its discretion in finding his petition for postconviction relief was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata as the issues presented were de hors the record and could
not be raised on direct appeal. In his second assignment of error, Appellant raises a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶8} The trial court treated Appellant’s motion as a petition for postconviction
relief. Although Appellant has not challenged the trial court’s treatment as such, we, nonetheless, find the trial court’s treatment of the motion as a petition for postconviction
relief was proper.
{¶9} In State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St. 3d 158 (1997), the Ohio Supreme Court
found, despite its caption, an appellant's pleading which (1) is filed subsequent to the
expiration of appellant's time for filing a direct appeal; (2) claims the denial of
constitutional rights; (3) seeks to render the judgment void or voidable; and (4) asks the
trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence, is a petition for post-conviction relief
pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). Id. at 160. If the pleading meets the definition of a petition
for postconviction relief, it must be treated as such. State v. Green, 2015-Ohio-4441, ¶
10 (5th Dist.). Appellant's motion meets the definition of a petition for postconviction relief.
{¶10} A trial court's denial of a postconviction petition is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 45. “The trial court serves a
gatekeeping function in the postconviction relief process and is ‘entitled to deference,
including the court's decision regarding the sufficiency of the facts set forth by the
petitioner and the credibility of the affidavits submitted.’” State v. Beasley, 2025-Ohio-
1599, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.), quoting Gondor at ¶ 52. An abuse of discretion is the trial court's
failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making. (Internal quotations
omitted.) State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black's Law
Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). Accordingly, we review the trial court's denial of Appellant's
petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
{¶11} A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral civil attack on a criminal
judgment, not an appeal of the judgment. State v. Lenard, 2020-Ohio-1502, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410 (1994). To prevail on a petition for postconviction relief, a defendant must establish a violation of his constitutional rights
which renders the judgment of conviction void or voidable. R.C. 2953.21. A petition for
postconviction relief is a means to reach constitutional issues which would otherwise be
impossible to reach because the evidence supporting those issues is outside the record
of the petitioner's criminal conviction. State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-274, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).
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[Cite as State v. Kennedy, 2026-Ohio-442.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025CA00097
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2023-CR-1475 WILLIS KENNEDY Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: February 11, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King, William B. Hoffman, David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Christopher A. Piekarski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Appellate Division, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Willis Kennedy, Pro se, for Defendant-Appellant OPINION
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Willis Kennedy appeals the July 14, 2025 Judgment
Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition to
vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of
Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
{¶2} On August 16, 2023, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one
count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and (D), an unclassified felony (Count 1);
and one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2), a felony of
the second degree (Count 2). Appellant appeared before the trial court for arraignment
on August 18, 2023, and entered a plea of not guilty to the Indictment.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to jury trial on January 29, 2024. After hearing all
the evidence and deliberating, the jury found Appellant guilty of both counts. On February
5, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a period of incarceration of 15 years to life
on Count 1. The trial court merged Count 2 with Count 1 for purposes of sentencing.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court, which affirmed his convictions and
sentence. State v. Kennedy, 2025-Ohio-1330 (5th Dist.). Appellant appealed this Court’s
decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which declined to accept jurisdiction. See State v.
Kennedy, 07/22/2025 Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-2537.
1 A statement of the facts is not necessary to our disposition of this appeal. {¶4} On July 14, 2025, Appellant filed an application for reopening, which this
Court denied on August 19, 2025. Appellant appealed this Court’s decision to the Ohio
Supreme Court, which declined to accept jurisdiction. See State v. Kennedy, 11/12/2025
Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-5078.
{¶5} On May 5, 2025, Appellant filed in the trial court three motions, to wit: a
petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence; a motion for
appointment of counsel; and a motion for expert assistance. Via Judgment Entry filed
July 14, 2025, the trial court, treating Appellant’s petition to vacate as a petition for
postconviction relief, denied the same. The trial court found Appellant’s claims his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file certain pretrial motions and failing to request
funds to hire an expert were barred by res judicata. The trial court further found “[t]he
remainder of [Appellant’s] claims set forth only vague and speculative statements as to
what he believes his trial counsel should have done” and Appellant “had not set forth
operative fact to establish counsel’s ineffectiveness.” July 14, 2025 Judgment Entry at p.
4, unpaginated. The trial court noted it had previously denied a motion for the appointment
of counsel and would “not revisit the motion.” Id., fn. 1.
{¶6} It is from this judgment entry Appellant appeals, raising the following
assignments of error: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FINDING APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA WHERE THE
ISSUES PRESENTED THEREIN WERE DE HORS THE RECORD AND
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL.
II. TRIAL COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW
STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, PREJUDICING
APPELLANT[‘S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
I, II
{¶7} Because Appellant’s assignments of error are interrelated, we elect to
address them together. In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts the trial court
erred and abused its discretion in finding his petition for postconviction relief was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata as the issues presented were de hors the record and could
not be raised on direct appeal. In his second assignment of error, Appellant raises a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶8} The trial court treated Appellant’s motion as a petition for postconviction
relief. Although Appellant has not challenged the trial court’s treatment as such, we, nonetheless, find the trial court’s treatment of the motion as a petition for postconviction
relief was proper.
{¶9} In State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St. 3d 158 (1997), the Ohio Supreme Court
found, despite its caption, an appellant's pleading which (1) is filed subsequent to the
expiration of appellant's time for filing a direct appeal; (2) claims the denial of
constitutional rights; (3) seeks to render the judgment void or voidable; and (4) asks the
trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence, is a petition for post-conviction relief
pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). Id. at 160. If the pleading meets the definition of a petition
for postconviction relief, it must be treated as such. State v. Green, 2015-Ohio-4441, ¶
10 (5th Dist.). Appellant's motion meets the definition of a petition for postconviction relief.
{¶10} A trial court's denial of a postconviction petition is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 45. “The trial court serves a
gatekeeping function in the postconviction relief process and is ‘entitled to deference,
including the court's decision regarding the sufficiency of the facts set forth by the
petitioner and the credibility of the affidavits submitted.’” State v. Beasley, 2025-Ohio-
1599, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.), quoting Gondor at ¶ 52. An abuse of discretion is the trial court's
failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making. (Internal quotations
omitted.) State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black's Law
Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). Accordingly, we review the trial court's denial of Appellant's
petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
{¶11} A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral civil attack on a criminal
judgment, not an appeal of the judgment. State v. Lenard, 2020-Ohio-1502, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410 (1994). To prevail on a petition for postconviction relief, a defendant must establish a violation of his constitutional rights
which renders the judgment of conviction void or voidable. R.C. 2953.21. A petition for
postconviction relief is a means to reach constitutional issues which would otherwise be
impossible to reach because the evidence supporting those issues is outside the record
of the petitioner's criminal conviction. State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-274, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).
{¶12} "The most significant restriction on Ohio's statutory procedure for
postconviction relief is that the doctrine of res judicata requires that the claim presented
in support of the petition represent error supported by evidence outside the record
generated by the direct criminal proceedings." (Internal quotations and citation omitted.)
Lenard, 2020-Ohio-1502, at ¶ 10. "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of
conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and
litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any
claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant
* * * on an appeal from that judgment." State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, paragraph nine
of the syllabus (1967). If an issue has or should have been raised on direct appeal, the
trial court may dismiss the petition on the basis of res judicata. Id.
{¶13} However, res judicata will not bar a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel if it is based upon evidence dehors the record. State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112,
113-114 (1982). Overcoming the bar of res judicata with evidence outside the record does
not automatically entitle the petitioner to a hearing unless petitioner proffers "evidence
which, if believed, would establish not only that his trial counsel had substantially violated
at least one of a defense attorney's essential duties to his client but also that said violation
was prejudicial to the [petitioner]." Id. {¶14} In State v. Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, the Ohio Supreme Court established
a two-part inquiry for courts to use when evaluating a postconviction claim premised upon
an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. First, the court must
conduct a res judicata analysis to determine whether the petitioner has introduced
competent evidence of ineffective assistance which was not included in the trial court
record. Id. at ¶ 33. If so, the court must determine if such evidence presents substantive
grounds for relief; "that is, if believed, would the newly presented evidence—together with
any evidence in the trial record—establish that counsel was ineffective?" Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.
The Blanton Court cautioned, because courts often "conflate" these two inquiries, the
"better practice is to treat [them] as analytically distinct." Id.
{¶15} In his Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or Sentence,
Appellant referenced five omissions by trial counsel which he contends support of his
claim his constitution right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated. We shall
address each in turn.
{¶16} In his first claim for postconviction relief, Appellant argued trial counsel was
ineffective for neglecting to file motions for a change of venue and to reduce bond after
Appellant instructed him to do so, then lying to Appellant the motions had been filed, but
had been denied by the trial court. Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction
or Sentence at p. 3.
{¶17} Appellant supported these claims with his own affidavits, a copy of the trial
court docket, and copies of news articles covering his case. {¶18} In his affidavit in support of his claim he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion for change of venue, Appellant
averred:
Trial counsel was ineffective as he not only failed to file for motion of
a change of venue but purposely lied about the absence of news coverage
of the case and media presence for trial.
Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or Sentence,
Exhibit B(1).
{¶19} In a second affidavit, Appellant stated:
Trial attorney was ineffective as he not only failed to fil for a motion
of bond reduction but purposely lied about him filing the motion and the
judge denying said motion. Whereas my original bond was set for the crime
of Aggregated [sic] Murder I was later indicted for the lesser charge of
Murder. It makes perfect sense that a lesser charge would equate to a
lesser bond.
Id., Exhibit B(2).
{¶20} Because the information was in existence and available for use at the time
of trial and direct appeal, we find the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Appellant's evidence dehors the record does not overcome the bar of res judicata. See, State v. Cook, 2022-Ohio-97, ¶ 14 (3rd Dist.). Postconviction proceedings do not allow a
defendant to relitigate claims where there are no allegations to show those claims could
not have been fully adjudicated by the judgment of conviction and an appeal therefrom.
State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, paragraph nine of the syllabus (1967).
{¶21} In his second claim for postconviction relief, Appellant alleged trial counsel
was ineffective for failing “to present crucial exculpatory evidence,” specifically, evidence
establishing Appellant “was preventing serious bodily harm and death as the deceased
was in the active process of the commission of multiple felonies as the time of death.”
Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or Sentence at p.5. In support of
this claim, Appellant attached copies of the Ohio Revised Code sections of the felonies
he alleges the victim was committing at the time of his death.
{¶22} We find Appellant has failed to “proffer evidence which, if believed, would
establish not only that his trial counsel had substantially violated at least one of a defense
attorney's essential duties to his client but also that said violation was prejudicial to
[Appellant].” (Citation omitted) Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 31. A copy of Ohio Revised
Code sections coupled with Appellant’s assertion he “was preventing serious bodily harm
and death as the deceased was in the active process of the commission of multiple
felonies as the time of death” does not constitute evidence de hors the record.
{¶23} In his third claim for postconviction relief, Appellant maintained trial counsel
was ineffective for failing “to investigate [a] potential defense,” specifically, “digital cellular
forensic evidence which could have produced exculpatory evidence by confirming the
motives and malice of deceased.” Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction
or Sentence at p. 7. Appellant offered no evidence to support this claim. The two affidavits attached to his petition addressed only his first claim. We find Appellant has failed to
satisfy his “burden to present evidence in his petition which meets a minimum level of
cogency to support his claims.” State v. King, 2022-Ohio-676, ¶ 33.
{¶24} In his fourth claim for postconviction relief, Appellant contended trial counsel
was ineffective for failing “to present crucial evidence of entire police interview exposing
intentional prejudice, bias, negligence of sworn duties and misrepresentation of laws and
Ohio Revised Code by detectives.” Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of
Conviction or Sentence at p. 10. Appellant attached an excerpt from his interview with
police, during which Canton Police Officer Romanin advised Appellant of his duty to
retreat and his failure to do so would negate his defense. Id., Exhibit E(1). Appellant
merely speculated the entire police interview would support his claim of police
misconduct.
{¶25} In his fifth claim for postconviction relief, Appellant asserted counsel was
ineffective for failing to request funds to hire a digital forensics expert to investigate the
victim’s cellular correspondences. Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction
or Sentence at p. 13. Appellant failed to present any evidence to support this claim.
{¶26} We conclude Appellant’s claims as to what trial counsel should have done
are speculative. Further, in Cole, the Ohio Supreme Court held a petitioner “must proffer
evidence which, if believed, would establish not only that his trial counsel had
substantially violated at least one of a defense attorney's essential duties to his client but
also that said violation was prejudicial to the [petitioner].” Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3895, at ¶
31, citing State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d, at 114. Assuming, arguendo, trial counsel was ineffective, Appellant failed to present any evidence to establish he was prejudiced by
such deficiencies.
{¶27} Based upon the foregoing, Appellant’s first and second assignments of error
are overruled.
{¶28} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to Appellant.
By: Hoffman, J.
King, P.J. and
Gormley, J. concur