[Cite as State v. Kashat, 2026-Ohio-2254.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-P-0054 CITY OF RAVENNA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court, Ravenna Division - vs -
DONNA M. KASHAT, Trial Court No. 2024 CRB 01528 R
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: June 15, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed
Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Vincent V. Vigluicci and Timothy P. Bogner, Assistant Prosecutors, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Mark R. Majer, 1750 Woodstock Road, Gates Mills, OH 44040 (For Defendant- Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Donna M. Kashat, appeals the judgment of the Portage County
Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, convicting her, after a jury trial, of domestic violence.
Ms. Kashat challenges various aspects of her conviction, including the sufficiency and
weight of the evidence, her trial counsel’s effectiveness, and the trial court’s determination
that she was not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense. We affirm.
{¶2} On the night of September 6, 2024, Mijo Dejanovic, Ms. Kashat’s husband
and the victim in this matter, was working at his computer when a vehicle pulled into the driveway of his residence. He was not expecting a visitor. Mr. Dejanovic quickly realized
his wife had arrived at the home. The couple were married in Ohio in 2019, but they lived
remotely from one another, Mr. Dejanovic in Portage County, Ohio, and Ms. Kashat in
California. While the couple often spent periods of time together at each other’s
residences, living together “here and there,” Mr. Dejanovic was not aware that Ms. Kashat
would be visiting him on the evening at issue. Mr. Dejanovic, however, stated that he and
Ms. Kashat had discussed moving in together permanently.
{¶3} Mr. Dejanovic answered the door, and Ms. Kashat entered, with a backpack
on backwards, which Mr. Dejanovic found odd. Ms. Kashat greeted the cats in the
residence. She would not immediately answer, however, why she was suddenly visiting.
Ms. Kashat inquired into a package that she ordered and sent to the Ohio residence.
According to Ms. Kashat, she was planning on moving to Ohio to live with Mr. Dejanovic
and thus sent the object to Ohio. At first, Mr. Dejanovic was apparently unaware of the
package to which Ms. Kashat was referring. Mr. Dejanovic did not know Ms. Kashat had
sent a package to the home; he did recognize, eventually, that a parcel addressed to Ms.
Kashat had recently arrived.
{¶4} Ms. Kashat approached Mr. Dejanovic’s computer station and “grabbed” his
phone. She indicated that if he gave her the package, she would return his phone. Mr.
Dejanovic approached Ms. Kashat, grabbed the backpack (which was located on Ms.
Kashat’s front), placed his hand in the front pocket, and obtained his phone. While in the
process of retrieving his phone, he also obtained Ms. Kashat’s phone.
{¶5} Ms. Kashat became upset, and Mr. Dejanovic moved six or seven feet away
from her. At that point, according to Mr. Dejanovic, Ms. Kashat pulled a can of Raid wasp
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 spray from her belongings and sprayed him directly in the face. He retreated to the kitchen
and rinsed his eyes with water. Ms. Kashat apparently sprayed him again in the back of
the head.
{¶6} Mr. Dejanovic began recording the incident on his cell phone. The State
submitted a five-minute video taken from Mr. Dejanovic’s phone depicting the encounter
after he was sprayed. Ms. Kashat subsequently drove away and returned with police. Mr.
Dejanovic provided police with a statement, Ms. Kashat’s phone, and credit card. He then
went to the emergency room to have his eyes and face medically treated.
{¶7} Ms. Kashat agreed that she arrived at the residence and entered with an
interest in obtaining a package. She, however, repeatedly stated that the residence was
“our” residence and that she had moved many of her belongings into the home. When
Mr. Dejanovic would not give her the package, she admitted taking his phone from his
computer station and placing the item in her backpack (which she was wearing
backwards). When Mr. Dejanovic obtained her phone, Ms. Kashat stated he pushed and
pulled her. She indicated that because he would not “get off” of her, she sprayed him with
“wasp spray.”
{¶8} Ms. Kashat stated Mr. Dejanovic washed his face for “ten minutes or so.”
Then, she maintained, Mr. Dejanovic “jump scared” her. While she acknowledged she
sprayed the insecticide toward Mr. Dejanovic, she stated she did not hit him. She
observed that she felt like a “hostage in [her] own home.” Ms. Kashat claimed that Mr.
Dejanovic hit her breasts and the back of her arms during the incident. She asserted she
thought she was “going to die” because “our house is very remote.”
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 {¶9} Ms. Kashat located the spray in her backpack and sprayed Mr. Dejanovic
in the face. Although Ms. Kashat stated she had “sprayed [wasp spray] in her face
accidentally before[,] it will not bring you to your knees.” Nevertheless, Ms. Kashat
testified Mr. Dejanovic washed his eyes for “like ten minutes.” She commented that “[h]e
washed for a long time, and rightfully so. He should have.” Even though Ms. Kashat
stated that she did not feel threatened after the initial spray, she made the decision to
spray Mr. Dejanovic a second time. Although she thought the spray did not hit him, she
stated, “I’m standing there hostage in my own home.”
{¶10} Ms. Kashat noted that she had always felt comfortable in the residence and
she “had already moved in [to the home.]” She ultimately stated, however, she did not
spray Mr. Dejanovic the second time because he was attacking her.
{¶11} In September 2024, a criminal complaint was filed against Ms. Kashat for
one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25, a misdemeanor of the first
degree. The matter proceeded to jury trial after which Ms. Kashat was found guilty of the
charge. She was sentenced to serve 30 days in jail, with 15 days suspended, and credit
for four days served. Ms. Kashat filed a notice of appeal and assigns six errors for this
court’s review.
{¶12} Ms. Kashat’s first assigned error provides:
{¶13} “The conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.”
{¶14} “In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry, the question is whether the
evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow
any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 reasonable doubt.” State v. Dent, 2020-Ohio-6670, ¶ 15, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶15} Unlike the standard for the sufficiency of the evidence, the “[w]eight of the
evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence . . . to
support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v.
Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 24, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). When
considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews “‘the
entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [fact-
finder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting State
v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “‘The discretionary power to grant a
new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Martin at 175.
{¶16} Thus, a conclusion that a conviction is supported by the weight of the
evidence necessarily includes a determination that the State produced sufficient evidence
in support of the conviction. State v. DiBiase, 2012-Ohio-6125, ¶ 38 (11th Dist.).
{¶17} “[C]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same
probative value.” State v. Fasline, 2015-Ohio-715, ¶ 39 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Biros,
1997-Ohio-204, ¶ 65. “Circumstantial evidence has been defined as testimony not
grounded on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of
other facts from which inferences are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be
established.” State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Nicely, 39
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988). “An inference is ‘a conclusion which, by means of data
founded upon common experience, natural reason draws from facts which are
proven.’” State v. Windle, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Nevius, 147
Ohio St. 263 (1947). “It consequently follows that ‘when circumstantial evidence forms
the basis of a conviction, that evidence must prove collateral facts and circumstances,
from which the existence of a primary fact may be rationally inferred according to common
experience.’” State v. Armstrong, 2016-Ohio-7841, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), quoting Windle at ¶
34.
{¶18} Ms. Kashat argues the State failed to present sufficient, credible evidence
that Mr. Dejanovic is a family or household member such that she could be convicted of
domestic violence. We do not agree.
{¶19} R.C. 2919.25(A) provides, “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to
cause physical harm to a family or household member.” A family or household member
includes a “spouse, [or] a person living as a spouse” who is residing or has resided with
the offender. . . .” R.C. § 2919.25, R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i). A person living as a spouse
includes anyone who “has cohabited with the offender within five years prior to the date
of the alleged commission of the act in question.” R.C. 2919.25(F)(2). The elements of
cohabitation are “(1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2)
consortium.” State v. Williams, 1997-Ohio-79, paragraph two of the syllabus. Factors that
may support a sharing of familial or financial responsibilities include “provisions for
shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets.” Id. at ¶ 14. Factors to consider
as to consortium include “mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society, cooperation, solace,
comfort, aid of each other, friendship, [or] conjugal relations.” Id. Notably, “[t]hese factors
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 are unique to each case and how much weight, if any, to give to each of these factors
must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the trier of fact.” Id.
{¶20} Further, “Ohio courts recognize that ‘[t]he burden of establishing
cohabitation is not substantial.’” State v. Crisp, 2023-Ohio-3537, ¶ 32 (6th Dist.),
quoting State v. Woullard, 2004-Ohio-3395, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). Indeed, in Williams, the Ohio
Supreme Court discussed the special nature of domestic violence, explaining that “the
offense of domestic violence arises out of the relationship itself, not the fact that the
parties happen to share one address.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 11. See also State v.
Brown, 2015-Ohio-950, ¶ 32 (11th Dist.). As such, resolving the question of whether two
persons had cohabited for purposes of R.C. 2919.25(F)(2), “courts should be guided by
common sense and by ordinary human experience.” State v. Young, 1998 WL 801498,
*3 (2d Dist. Nov. 20, 1998).
{¶21} In State v. McGlothan, 2014-Ohio-85, the Supreme Court of Ohio also
clarified that the “sharing of familial or financial responsibilities” does not require evidence
of shared living expenses to establish cohabitation; rather, such conduct is merely one of
a non-exhaustive list of factors a court may consider in determining cohabitation, none of
which are, by themselves, a necessary condition for cohabitation. Id. at ¶ 13-14. The
Court emphasized that the domestic violence statute was enacted because the General
Assembly “‘believed that an assault involving a family or household member deserves
further protection than an assault on a stranger.’” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting Williams at 463. And
that domestic violence legislation represents the General Assembly’s desire to offer
protection to a wide class of persons that include family members as well as residents of
the same household. Id. at ¶ 17, citing State v. Carswell, 2007-Ohio-3723, ¶ 32.
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 {¶22} During the State’s case in chief, evidence established that the couple had
been married for four years. And, while they lived in separate states, they would reside
together “a few weeks here and there . . . .” Even though they had a long-distance
relationship, Mr. Dejanovic stated he would travel to see Ms. Kashat, or she would come
to Ohio and stay with him for approximately “four months maximum.” Moreover, Mr.
Dejanovic spent a month in California from December 2023 to January 2024. During this
period, Ms. Kashat was recovering from breast cancer, which required surgery. While
assisting Ms. Kashat with her recovery, Mr. Dejanovic testified that he also helped “fix”
her residence in California.
{¶23} The couple had conversations in the summer of 2024 regarding Ms. Kashat
moving to Ohio. Mr. Dejanovic stated that it “was four years in the making.” He also noted
that the couple owned at least two campers. He testified that “[b]oth campers are in both
of [their] names.” Although their communication was not as frequent as before Mr.
Dejanovic’s visit in late 2023 through early 2024, the couple generally had “non-stop
communication. Texting, talking, sometimes three times daily. . . .”
{¶24} Moreover, Mr. Dejanovic made a video recording of the couple’s
interactions after Ms. Kashat had already sprayed him. During this exchange, Ms. Kashat
was insistent that Mr. Dejanovic return her phone; he refused and stated she would have
her phone once police arrived. While the couple argued about the encounter, Mr.
Dejanovic asked her to leave on multiple occasions. Ms. Kashat repeatedly emphasized
her position that the residence at issue was her home and she did not intend on leaving
the same. (“I’m here at my home . . . .”; “This is my home, Milo.”; “I’m not going, this is my
home.”; “It’s our house.”). Ms. Kashat additionally (and repeatedly) emphasized that she
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 was Mr. Dejanovic’s wife and he is her husband. She also indicated that she had arrived
to move her “things” into the home and that the couple had these “plans” apparently for
some time. These admissions by Ms. Kashat provide additional basis that the State met
its initial burden of production that the relationship the couple mutually recognized was
an important factor between them and their separate living arrangements was not critical.
See Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d at 463. Indeed, the evidence, from both Mr. Dejanovic and
Ms. Kashat, indicated they each had some, albeit nebulous, understanding that the latter
would be moving into the residence in Ohio.
{¶25} Given these points, the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome
defense counsel’s Crim.R. 29 motion. There was some evidence to support the parties
had a significant and caring relationship, regardless of their respective living
circumstances. See Williams at 464. Indeed, Mr. Dejanovic’s testimony indicated the
parties had “mutual respect,” “affection,” “society,” “cooperation,” “comfort,” “aid of each
other,” and “friendship. . . .” Id. at 465. Although the evidence did not discuss issues of
fidelity, nothing in the record indicates infidelity was an issue. Moreover, the couple had
(at least) two campers registered in their mutual names. We therefore conclude the trial
court did not err in determining that the State presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude Mr. Dejanovic and Ms. Kashat were living as spouses such
that they were sharing familial or financial responsibilities.
{¶26} Next, we address the weight of the evidence. Considering the evidence
adduced during the State’s case-in-chief, Ms. Kashat additionally testified that, on multiple
occasions, the house in Ohio was “our” house. She also testified that she had essentially
“already moved in” and she was in the process of moving “the rest of [her] things” into
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 what she characterized as “our” home. Ms. Kashat’s consistent characterization of the
residence as the couple’s mutual home weighs strongly in favor of the jury’s verdict.
{¶27} We also point out that the trial court provided the jury with the following
instructions regarding what is encompassed by a “family or household member.” The
court observed that the phrase “means a person who is residing with the defendant or
has resided with the defendant and who is a spouse of or the former spouse of the
defendant. Reside means to live in a place on an ongoing basis.”
{¶28} The foregoing definitions essentially track the statute and, in light of the
general testimony as well as the video evidence Mr. Dejanovic provided from his home,
we conclude the State met its burden of persuasion.
{¶29} In sum, we hold that the State produced sufficient evidence and the
evidence, in its entirety, militates in favor of the jury’s verdict. That is, the State
established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Kashat knowingly caused physical
harm by deploying wasp spray to Mr. Dejanovic’s face and head, and that Mr. Dejanovic
was a family or household member of Ms. Kashat, i.e., the couple was married and
cohabited for purposes of the domestic violence statute. See Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d at
463 (emphasizing that the crime of domestic violence arises out of a relationship, not
necessarily a shared address).
{¶30} Ms. Kashat’s first assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶31} Her second assigned error provides:
{¶32} “Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.”
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 {¶33} “There is a general presumption that trial counsel’s conduct is within the
broad range of professional assistance.” State v. Andrus, 2020-Ohio-6810, ¶ 60 (11th
Dist.), citing State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142-143 (1989). The burden of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel falls upon the appealing defendant. State
v. Robinson, 2021-Ohio-1064, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).
{¶34} “In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an
appellant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance fell ‘below an objective
standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s
performance.’” Andrus at ¶ 60, quoting Bradley, paragraph two of the syllabus (adopting
the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
{¶35} To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must establish there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. Bradley at paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶36} Under this assigned error, Ms. Kashat argues counsel was ineffective for
failing to directly challenge the “family or household member” element of the domestic
violence statute. Considering our disposition of her first assignment of error, Ms. Kashat
cannot establish counsel’s performance was deficient or that it caused her defense
prejudice.
{¶37} The second assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶38} Similar to the second, Ms. Kashat’s third assignment of error provides:
{¶39} “Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 {¶40} Under this assigned error, Ms. Kashat argues trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to request a hearing to address missing witness statements, 911 call records,
and photographs. She asserts that a hearing was necessary to determine whether the
evidence was lost in bad faith and to determine whether the evidence was exculpatory.
We do not agree.
{¶41} Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance should be highly deferential and
should refrain from second-guessing strategic decisions of trial counsel. State v. Sallie,
1998-Ohio-343, ¶ 9-10. Tactical trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally
constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Carter, 1995-Ohio-104, ¶ 41. Rather, any
alleged errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s essential
duties to his or her client. Id.
{¶42} In this case, Deputy Vincent Valentini of the Portage County Sheriff’s Office
(“the Office”) responded to the incident. He testified to the essential facts of the incident
and observed fingernail scratches on Ms. Kashat’s forearm and finger. His body camera
also recorded his interactions with the defendant and the victim.
{¶43} On cross-examination, Deputy Valentini admitted that both Ms. Kashat and
Mr. Dejanovic provided him with thoroughly written statements. He testified, however, the
statements were misplaced and were never entered into the Office’s record system. The
deputy conceded that, despite the body camera footage, the lost statements could not be
compared with what he observed. The deputy admitted that the statements were
important and obtaining the statements is part of police protocol. Although the deputy
stated that he did not perceive the lack of the statements as a fundamental problem,
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 defense counsel responded, “O.K. So if it[’]s not a problem, maybe we can just get rid of
doing it, right?”
{¶44} Defense counsel also cross-examined the deputy regarding the lack of
evidence of the 911 calls and challenged the Office’s failure to preserve the same. The
deputy stated he does not have the personal ability to preserve the calls and could not
account for their loss or lack of preservation. Defense counsel additionally took issue with
the Office’s failure to preserve certain photographs of Ms. Kashat after the incident.
{¶45} Given these points, defense counsel challenged the deputy’s position that
the Office does a “thorough job” because such work “protects everyone.” Defense counsel
concluded cross-examination by observing that the work in this case was not “very
detailed.” Although the deputy disagreed, counsel strategically addressed the absence of
the evidence and, in doing so, elected to challenge the credibility of the investigation.
{¶46} While the evidence at issue may have been useful, we cannot conclude trial
counsel’s decision not to seek a hearing on the misplaced evidence rendered his
assistance ineffective. To the contrary, counsel challenged the process of the
investigation in a reasonable manner and, in doing so, took strong issue with the
management of the investigation as well as the rigorousness of the Office’s handling of
fundamental investigatory protocols. We hold this was a reasonable tactical decision.
{¶47} Ms. Kashat’s third assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶48} Her fourth assigned error provides:
{¶49} “Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 {¶50} Similar to the previous assigned errors, Ms. Kashat challenges her
counsel’s effectiveness for failing to provide notice of an intent to plead self-defense.
{¶51} “Whenever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer evidence or
argue self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence, the
defendant shall, not less than . . . fourteen days before trial in a misdemeanor case, give
notice in writing of such intent.” Crim.R. 12.2. “If the defendant fails to file such written
notice, the court may exclude evidence offered by the defendant related to the defense,
unless the court determines that in the interest of justice such evidence should be
admitted.” Id. Accordingly, “under Crim.R. 12.2, a trial court has discretion whether to
exclude a defendant’s evidence of self-defense after the defendant fails to file the
requisite notice, and an appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination for an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Hawkins, 2024-Ohio-1253, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). The phrase
“abuse of discretion” connotes a judgment exercised by a court which does not comport
with reason or the record. State v. Marcellino, 2019-Ohio-4837, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.).
{¶52} As previously highlighted, during Mr. Dejanovic’s direct examination, he
testified that Ms. Kashat appeared at the residence unexpectedly, asked for a package,
and when he did not immediately produce the same, she grabbed his phone and placed
it in her backpack. He asserted he simply attempted to re-obtain his phone by placing his
hands into the backpack and retrieving it. He was successful but he also, in retrieving his
phone, took Ms. Kashat’s phone.
{¶53} Ms. Kashat testified to similar facts but added that Mr. Dejanovic pulled her
toward him and commenced pushing and pulling her. She added that she felt she was
being attacked “in [her] own house.” Ms. Kashat admitted that Mr. Dejanovic offered for
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 her to sit down during the incident, but she declined. Because, however, Mr. Dejanovic,
would not “get off” of her, Ms. Kashat stated she sprayed him with the wasp spray.
{¶54} “‘Self-defense is an affirmative defense whereby the defendant, in essence,
admits to the facts of the state’s case but offers additional facts that justify or excuse the
defendant’s use of force.’” State v. Lewis, 2025-Ohio-2178, ¶ 41 (6th Dist.), quoting
Maumee v. Yeager, 2024-Ohio-858, ¶ 65 (6th Dist.). Where a defendant wishes to assert
the defense of self-defense involving the use of nondeadly force, he or she must provide
evidence that (1) he or she was not at fault in creating or starting the conflict giving rise
to the affray; (2) he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that he or she was in
imminent danger of bodily harm, and (3) he or she did not use more force than was
reasonably necessary to defend against the perceived threat of harm. See, e.g., State v.
Weemes, 2025-Ohio-2319, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.)
{¶55} R.C. 2901.09(B) provides that, “[f]or purposes of any section of the Revised
Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person has no duty to retreat before using force
in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person's residence if that person
is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.” “The elements of self-defense
are cumulative, and a defendant’s claim of self-defense fails if any one of the elements is
not present.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Ridley, 2022-Ohio-2561, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).
{¶56} Although Ms. Kashat indicated she was afraid when Mr. Dejanovic
approached her and grabbed both his and her phone, the evidence failed to credibly
demonstrate she was not at fault in creating the situation which resulted in the charges.
Ms. Kashat, by her own admission, took Mr. Dejanovic’s phone without his permission.
And, even assuming Mr. Dejanovic, pushed and pulled Ms. Kashat in an attempt to
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 retrieve the phone, this does not negate Ms. Kashat’s initial action, i.e., the action that
created the situation giving rise to the affray. This alone could reasonably undermine the
first element of self-defense.
{¶57} Moreover, a legitimate argument can be made that Ms. Kashat’s reaction to
Mr. Dejanovic’s attempt to retrieve the phone was disproportionate or more than
reasonably necessary to defend the perceived threat. It is strange that Ms. Kashat was
carrying wasp spray in her backpack (carried on her front) when she arrived at the
residence that she characterized as “our home.” That is, there was no testimony that the
home had, or Ms. Kashat was worried about, wasp infestation in any way.
{¶58} Further, it is also unusual that she deploys the insecticide at Mr. Dejanovic’s
face when he was simply attempting to retrieve the phone Ms. Kashat took. Both Mr.
Dejanovic and Ms. Kashat generally indicated that the couple had a historically amicable
relationship. Hence, counsel cannot be viewed as providing deficient performance in
failing to file a notice of self-defense because, he could reasonably conclude, Ms. Kashat,
under the circumstances, used more force than reasonably necessary to defend against
Mr. Dejanovic’s perceived advances.
{¶59} For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Kashat’s fourth assignment of error lacks
merit.
{¶60} For her fifth assignment of error, she alleges:
{¶61} “The trial court abused its discretion in not instructing the jury concerning
self-defense.”
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 {¶62} Ms. Kashat asserts that the record overwhelmingly demonstrated that a
self-defense instruction was warranted. As a result, she claims the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to provide the jury with the instruction. We do not agree.
{¶63} We incorporate our analysis of Ms. Kashat’s previous assignment of error
for efficiency. Given this point, at the close of the case, Ms. Kashat, via counsel, moved
the court for a self-defense instruction. In overruling the request, the trial court stated:
Number one, Criminal Rule . . . 12.2, requires that the notice of self-defense must be in writing no later, in a misdemeanor case, which this is, less than - - no less than two weeks. The - - and I’m going to put this into evidence just to - - I mean, the - - file speaks for itself. This case is approximately ten months old. Looks like at least a half dozen pre-trials. I will note that, counselor, you didn’t have this case the whole time. . . The whole ten months. Probably just four of this ten maybe? Round about. . . And at no time was, at least in the court’s record, the issue of self-defense was raised. So then what - - and - - I’ll put this in the record just to make sure we’re all on the same thing. And instructions were prepared, and I did ask . . . the court reporter, and the record will reflect that, and I’m going to put these two exhibits in, her correspondence with the parties about sending you the advance instructions. . . Also, I . . . realize I have discretion on that. . . even with the two weeks, this was not fatal, [however,] I don’t feel there was sufficient evidence to justify a self-defense instruction.
{¶64} In light of the trial court’s ruling, we point out that Ms. Kashat admitted that
she was irritated that Mr. Dejanovic did not provide her with the package she demanded
when she arrived in Ohio. She also admitted she placed his phone in her backpack. Even
when Mr. Dejanovic attempted to retrieve his phone, Ms. Kashat stated he did not try to
take her backpack. Ms. Kashat admitted that when she sprayed Mr. Dejanovic with the
wasp spray, she was concerned. The second time she sprayed, she asserted he was not
trying to attack her. In particular, the following exchange took place on cross-examination:
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 Q. When he’s opening the door and you spray him with the Raid wasp spray - -
A. I didn’t spray him.
Q. - - is he attacking you? Yes or no.
A. I did not spray him with the wasp spray.
Q. Yes or no?
A. He’s not attacking me - - then.
(Emphasis added.) {¶65} Interestingly, viewing Ms. Kashat’s testimony objectively, it is unclear what
she was defending, particularly during the second confirmed spraying. She testified that
even though she sprayed Mr. Dejanovic with the wasp spray, she did not try to spray him.
She testified that she grabbed his phone and, in the act of Mr. Dejanovic attempting to
retrieve the phone, she stated, “no you can’t touch me,” and, as a result, she admitted
she sprayed him. Also, she indicated that, while apparently initially attacking her (to obtain
his phone), Mr. Dejanovic was not attacking her when she discharged the spray again.
The evidence and testimony, to say the least, is ambiguous and unusual.
{¶66} Ms. Kashat’s rendition of events undercuts any claim that the trial court
erred in overruling defense counsel’s motion to obtain a self-defense jury instruction. We
hold the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the request.
{¶67} Ms. Kashat’s fifth assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶68} For her final assignment of error, Ms. Kashat claims:
{¶69} “The cumulative errors of the trial court, coupled with the cumulative errors
of defense counsel violated the appellant’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.”
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 {¶70} Because this court has found no errors in the course of the trial, the
cumulative-error doctrine is inapplicable.
{¶71} Ms. Kashat’s sixth assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶72} The trial court’s decisions and final judgment are affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-P-0054 JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
lack merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Portage
County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND, concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Case No. 2025-P-0054