[Cite as State v. Jordan, 2026-Ohio-1562.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115625 v. :
AIRIK KAHLEAD JORDAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-691301-B
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Adrienne Linnick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Robert McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Airik Kahlead Jordan (“Jordan”) appeals the
decision denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Factual and Procedural History
In April 2024, a grand jury convened and issued an indictment
charging Jordan in the August 15, 2023 murder of 14-year-old T.M., and the
attempted murder of 13-year-old J.H. as follows: aggravated murder in violation of
R.C. 2903.01(A), an unclassified felony (Count 1); aggravated murder in violation of
R.C. 2903.01(B), an unclassified felony (Count 2); murder in violation of
R.C. 2903.02(A), an unclassified felony (Count 3); murder in violation of
R.C. 2903.02(B) (Count 4); kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), a felony
of the first degree (Count 5); felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a
felony of the second degree (Count 6); felonious assault in violation of
R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second degree (Count 7); discharge of firearm on
or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), a felony of the first
degree (Count 8); attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02/2903.02(A), a
felony of the first degree (Count 9); felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree (Count 10); felonious assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second degree (Count 11); and
kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), a felony of the first degree (Count 12).
Each count included one- and three-year firearms specifications. 1
1 The indictment also charged codefendants, Reginald Perkins and Ian Price. On August 20, 2025, the State and Jordan entered into a plea
agreement in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-25-691301-B.2 Pursuant to the plea agreement
the State would dismiss the remaining charges if Jordan agreed to plead guilty to
Count 3, amended to involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and
the three-year firearm specification; to Count 5 as charged, kidnapping with the one-
year firearm specification and with the State amending the count to include both
victims; and Count 8, discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises
amended to a felony of the third degree and the one-year firearm specification. The
plea was also contingent upon an agreed recommended sentence of 20 to 30 years
with no early release, not including Reagan-Tokes time, and agreements that the
offenses were not allied offenses of similar import and that Jordan would have no
contact with the surviving victim.
After the State described the plea deal, the trial court questioned
Jordan and his counsel in preparation for taking the plea. The trial court asked
Jordan’s attorneys the status of the case. They represented that “if” Jordan pleaded
guilty today it would be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. In
response to introductory questions, Jordan told the court his name and age: Airik
Kahlead Jordan, 22, and that he completed school through the tenth grade and that
he had not obtained a General Education Development (GED) certificate.
2 Jordan’s plea agreement encompassed three additional cases that are not the
subject of this appeal. The court then asked Jordan whether he was under the influence of
any drug, alcohol, or medication that would prevent him from either understanding
what was happening or prevent him from entering a plea. In response, Jordan told
the court that he was intoxicated from smoking “K2” or “spice” while in the jail.
Based on that information, the trial court immediately stopped the proceedings and
continued the case to the following day.
The next day the trial court sought clarification on Jordan’s name
because the indictment was under “Kahlead Jordan.” Jordan informed the court
that Kahlead was his middle name, and his first name was Airik. The court then
inquired how Jordan was feeling and whether he ingested any “K2” since yesterday’s
hearing. Jordan denied smoking “K2” and denied being under the influence of any
substance that would impair his ability to understand the proceedings or prevent
him from entering a plea. The court then asked if he understood what was
happening today. In response, Jordan indicated, “I’m trying to get a better
understanding.” When asked to specify, Jordan questioned how much time was
being offered. The court explained the plea deal and that the sentence would be
between 20 and 30 years with no judicial release. Jordan then questioned the
meaning of judicial release. The trial court discussed the issue in greater detail.
The trial court then asked Jordan if he had any other questions.
Jordan asked the court whether he would be able to tell the court on the record what
happened at the scene. The trial court responded “no,” describing in detail why the
court would not consider that statement prior to the plea. The court noted that if Jordan did not feel he was guilty of the charges, he could proceed to trial to allow a
jury to make that determination. After listening to the trial court’s explanation,
Jordan inquired when he would be able to tell what happened if he were to go to
trial. After further explanation, Jordan asked whether he could try the case to the
bench. The trial court informed him that a bench trial was always a possibility.
Finally, Jordan indicated that he did not have any additional questions. The trial
court asked if Jordan wished to proceed with the plea or talk to his lawyers. Jordan
asked if he could talk with his lawyers.
After a recess, Jordan returned to the courtroom and indicated that
he wanted to proceed with the plea. The trial court then engaged Jordan in a
colloquy, in which the court asked Jordan whether he was entering the plea because
he was “in fact” guilty. Jordan responded “yes” to that question in relation to all the
charges.
After accepting Jordan’s pleas, the trial court inquired about
sentencing. The defense represented that they needed a few days to secure witnesses
on Jordan’s behalf and asked that the sentencing hearing proceed the following
Wednesday, August 27, 2025.
On August 26, 2025, Jordan filed a pro se motion to withdraw his
pleas under Crim.R. 32. Jordan claimed that prior to the pleas his lawyers advised
him that the prosecutor was a “beast and would find [Jordan] guilty regardless of
any court session/proceeding.” Further, he alleged he was told by his lawyers that
they could not present a plausible defense and, therefore, Jordan needed to plead guilty instead of going to trial. As a result of the foregoing, Jordan alleged that,
despite being innocent, he entered his pleas out of fear and his pleas were not freely
and voluntarily given. In support of his motion, Jordan cited case law arguing that
a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be liberally granted, the court
must hold a hearing, compliance with Crim.R. 11 does not excuse the court from
holding a full hearing, and the trial court may not presume the State would be
prejudiced if it granted the motion.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court addressed Jordan’s motion
to withdraw his pleas. Jordan’s lawyers represented that they became aware of the
motion that day and it was their understanding that Jordan wanted to address the
court. Jordan reiterated his claims in the motion regarding the skill of the
prosecutor, his innocence, his belief that he would be found guilty if he went to trial
with his current representation, and his fears drove him to enter into the plea deal.
The trial court pointed out that when Jordan was asked whether he was in fact guilty,
he responded affirmatively. Jordan responded that he wanted to say “no,” but his
lawyers told him he had to say “yes.” The trial court denied Jordan’s motion noting
that at the time of the pleas, the court was satisfied that Jordan made his pleas
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
During its statement to the court, the State noted that it had reviewed
Jordan’s phone calls from the jail after the plea hearing. The State represented that
Jordan and his father spoke and Jordan admitted lying about ingesting “K2” in order
to have more time to think about the plea deal. The trial court ultimately sentenced Jordan to 11 to 16 1/2 years on
the involuntary-manslaughter charge and three years on the firearm specification;
11 years on the kidnapping charge and one year on the firearm specification; and 36
months on the firing a weapon in a prohibited place plus one year for the attached
firearm specification. The trial court imposed the firearm specifications
consecutively to one another for a total of five years, to be served prior to and
consecutive to the underlying offenses, which were also imposed consecutively.
Jordan’s aggregate sentence was a 30 to 35 1/2 year term in prison.
Jordan appeals and raises one assignment of error, as follows.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it denied [Jordan’s] presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Jordan argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Jordan claims that the record reflects that
the trial court’s decision was “predetermined” and it did not fully consider his
arguments in support of granting the motion.
The decision to grant or deny a presentence request to withdraw a
plea falls within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Maddox, 2017-Ohio-
8061, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992), paragraph
two of the syllabus. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s conduct is
“unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Hill, 2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
A defendant “does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior
to sentencing.” State v. Hines, 2020-Ohio-663, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). Nevertheless, when
considering such a motion, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine
whether the defendant has “‘a reasonable legitimate basis’” for withdrawing the plea.
Id., quoting Xie at 527. A full hearing is not required in all cases, rather “[t]he scope
of [the] hearing . . . should reflect the substantive merits of the motion.” State v.
Read-Bates, 2020-Ohio-3456, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Robinson, 2008-Ohio-
4866, ¶ 24-25 (8th Dist.); State v. Wittine, 2008-Ohio-5745, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting
State v. Hall, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 1602 (8th Dist. Apr. 27, 1989) (“[B]old
assertions without evidentiary support simply should not merit the type of scrutiny
that substantiated allegations would merit.”).
A court does not abuse its discretion when denying a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea
(1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accused is given a complete and impartial hearing on the motion, and (4) where the record reveals that the court gave full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request.
Maddox at id., quoting State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 (8th Dist. 1980),
paragraph three of the syllabus. Additional factors include “(5) whether the motion was made timely;
(6) whether the motion states specific reasons for withdrawal; (7) whether the
defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties; (8)
whether the defendant was perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense, and (9)
whether the State would suffer prejudice if the defendant is allowed to withdraw a
plea.” Hines at ¶ 10, citing State v. Benson, 2004-Ohio-1677, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); State
v. Sellers, 2007-Ohio-4523, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.); State v. Moore, 2012-Ohio-5734, ¶ 13
(8th Dist.).
Moreover, when a trial court complies with Crim.R. 11, it “raises a
presumption that a plea is voluntarily entered.” Read-Bates at ¶ 17, citing State v.
McKissick, 2018-Ohio-282, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). When a defendant moves to withdraw
that plea, he must rebut the “‘presumption by demonstrating that the plea was
infirm.’” Id., quoting Robinson, 2008-Ohio-4866, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).
Jordan argues that there were several factors that supported the trial
court granting his motion to withdraw his plea: (a) that his motion stated a reason
for the withdrawal of the plea; (b) whether the defendant was “perhaps” not guilty;
(c) whether the government would be prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea; (d)
whether he was given a full and impartial hearing on the motion to withdraw; and
(e) whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the motion. We will
address each issue in turn. Initially, we note that the record does not reflect that the
trial court addressed whether the State would be prejudiced if it granted Jordan’s
motion. Nevertheless, Jordan’s other arguments fail. Next, we will consider whether Jordan was given a full and impartial
hearing and whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the motion.
Jordan characterizes the trial court’s ruling as “predetermined” suggesting that the
court made up its mind prior to any hearing. We disagree. Our review of the record
shows that during the motion hearing, the trial court referenced the entire plea
hearing, including the trial court’s detailed discussions with Jordan describing his
options prior to entering his pleas. Jordan had several questions about how he
should proceed. The trial court answered each question in detail and, when
necessary, afforded Jordan the opportunity to discuss any concerns with counsel.
The trial court made a point, as we discuss below, to ensure that Jordan understood
the ramifications of entering into a plea, including that he could proceed to trial, tell
his version of events, and let the jury or the bench decide his guilt. Given the trial
court’s thorough colloquy with Jordan, the trial court determined that it only needed
a brief conversation with Jordan to rule on the motion.
With respect to whether the trial court fully considered Jordan’s
motion, we find that it did. The trial court has discretion to determine the scope of
the motion hearing. Read-Bates, 2020-Ohio-3456, at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Jordan’s
claims were based on a change of heart. At the time of the plea hearing, he was aware
of his belief in his own innocence and the potential consequences of entering guilty
pleas. Jordan made the decision to plead guilty anyway. Jordan did not raise any
new information, such as recently disclosed evidence; rather, he literally changed
his mind between the plea and sentencing hearings. A mere change of heart is not a sufficient basis to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Resto, 2020-
Ohio-4299, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Elliott, 2016-Ohio-2637, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Hoyle, 2016-Ohio-586, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.).3
Based on the foregoing, we find that the scope of the trial court’s
hearing was sufficient given Jordan’s motion and full and fair consideration was
given to the motion.
Next, Jordan argues that he asserted a basis for his desire to withdraw
his guilty pleas. Specifically, he asserted that he was advised by counsel that taking
the plea offer was in his best interest because of the skill of the prosecutor. Further,
his attorney’s assessment of his chances of success if he were to proceed with trial
were low. Based on that advice, Jordan alleged he entered his pleas out of fear.
Notably, Jordan claims he always professed his innocence. Thus, his decision to
plead guilty was based on his understanding of his attorney’s evaluation that he was
unlikely to prevail at trial, even though he claimed to be innocent.
However, “[c]laims that counsel recommended the plea agreement
and pressured the defendant to accept a plea bargain are of limited weight where the
plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.” State v. Lawhorn, 2009-Ohio-3216,
¶ 23 (6th Dist.). In the instant case, Jordan expressed more than once that he
3 Jordan argues that the language “mere change of heart” was created in the State’s
courts of appeals and is not found in Ohio Supreme Court cases. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that this court has held that a mere change of heart is not a sufficient basis for granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. desired to tell his side of the story during the plea colloquy. When asked whether he
could explain what happened before he entered his pleas, the trial court explained:
Court: No. Thank you for asking. The answer is no. I don’t want to make a decision based upon what you are suggesting is what happened. That is a decision — my issue right here is guilt or innocence, are you guilty of a charge of involuntary manslaughter. If you don’t feel you’re guilty of that charge, that’s fine. That’s what we have trials for. You let the jury make that decision.
Court: The time, if you will — let me just explain. If we were to continue through this plea process and go through it all like we’ve been trying to do, advise you of all your rights and all your possibilities, and assuming we completed that, I accept your plea of guilt, we would set it for sentencing.
The trial court then addressed what would happen at sentencing and
that Jordan would be permitted to speak in due course. After this discussion, Jordan
asked when he would be able to tell his side of the story if he proceeded with trial.
The trial court responded by explaining the order of trial and when he would be
permitted to testify, if he chose to do so. After this discussion, Jordan was asked and
received an opportunity to speak to his lawyers. When he returned, he told the trial
court he wished to proceed with his guilty plea.
Based on the foregoing, Jordan evaluated his chances, understood the
consequences of pleading guilty, and entered pleas of guilty. He then changed his
mind. He does not allege that he received new information, rather he argues he
made the initial decision to plead guilty out of fear. While Jordan’s motion did
present a reason for his desire to withdraw his pleas, that reason was a mere change
of heart and was insufficient. Resto, 2020-Ohio-4299, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). Finally, we consider whether Jordan was “perhaps” not guilty and
whether that claim required the trial court to grant his motion. According to his
motion, Jordan always maintained his innocence. Jordan’s motion, however, did
not give a basis for that assertion. During his statement at sentencing, he alleged
that he did not kill T.H., but that he knew who did. The State presented a video of
the incident and stated that it showed Jordan shooting T.H. as he was running away,
then walking up to T.H. and shooting him in the head.4 A defendant’s claims of
innocence are insufficient “‘grounds for vacating a plea that was voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently entered.’” State v. Wilder, 2025-Ohio-3075, ¶ 26 (8th
Dist.), quoting State v. Heisa, 2015-Ohio-2269, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
Minifee, 2013-Ohio-3146, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). Jordan understood that he had the
option to proceed to trial. He made the decision to plead guilty, despite his
innocence after evaluating the advice of counsel. Accordingly, his claim of innocence
was insufficient grounds to support his motion to withdraw his plea.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Jordan’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and the sole assignment
of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
4 The video was not introduced into evidence, so we only provide the State’s
description of the evidence without comment. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS; MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURRING:
I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately as I did in State
v. Cox, 2026-Ohio-560 (8th Dist.), to emphasize that I agree with Justice Brunner’s
concurring opinion in State v. Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486, and believe that “[t]he
nine-factor analysis should not overshadow the exercise of judicial discretion
needed to analyze a presentence plea withdrawal in accordance with the basic
principles established by [State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 (1992)] and Crim.R. 32.1.”
Id. at ¶ 40 (Brunner, J., concurring).
Xie was decided 30 years ago and, as Justice Brunner stated, the
“nine-factor test” “has overshadowed the basic principles established by Xie and
Crim.R. 32.1.” Id. at ¶ 38 (Brunner, J., concurring). In Xie, the Ohio Supreme Court
found that presentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea “should be freely and
liberally granted.” Id. at 527. “Freely and liberally granting the defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea requires the trial court to exercise
discretion in its judgment. And that judgment should not be slighted by making a
trial court essentially answer yes-or-no questions to come up with a weighted score
for a matter that requires the court to engage in human observation, reflection on
accumulated experience, and discretion that only a trial court is in the position to
exercise to reach a final judgment on the matter.” Barnes at ¶ 41 (Brunner, J.,
concurring).
Applying the basic principles established by Xie and Crim.R. 32.1 to
this case, without weighing the nine factors, leads to the conclusion that Jordan’s
presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly denied.
Therefore, I concur with the majority opinion and continue to offer
the above additional suggestions for consideration.