State v. Wilder

2025 Ohio 3075

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 114716
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wilder, 2025-Ohio-3075.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114716 v. :

JASON WILDER, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 28, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-683353-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brad S. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Robert A. Dixon, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

Appellant Jason Wilder appeals from the trial court’s judgment

denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no merit to the

appeal, this court affirms. I. Procedural History

In August 2023, the State named Wilder and his younger brother and

codefendant, Jaden Hughey, in a 13-Count indictment charging them both with

aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), an unclassified felony (Count 1);

two counts of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and (B), unclassified felonies

(Counts 2 and 3, respectively); two counts of felonious assault, in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A)(1), second-degree felonies (Counts 4 and 7); four counts of felonious

assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), second-degree felonies (Counts 5, 8, 10,

and 13); two counts of attempted murder, in violation of R.C. 2923.02/2903.02(A),

first-degree felonies (Counts 6 and 9); and two counts of discharge of a firearm on

or near prohibited premises, in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), first-degree

felonies (Counts 11 and 12). Each count contained one-, three-, and six-year firearm

specifications, and sought forfeiture of the weapons involved. The charges arose

from a shooting where a teenager died and two other teenagers suffered serious

physical harm. Wilder pleaded not guilty, and the trial court assigned two attorneys

to represent him.

In March 2024, after approximately a year of pretrials, the trial court

granted Wilder’s request for new counsel and assigned him two new attorneys. The

court set a trial date for July 10, 2024, but subsequently continued the trial until

September 30, 2024, because of ongoing discovery and plea negotiations.

On the day of trial, the State offered both Wilder and Hughey a

packaged plea agreement, contingent upon both defendants accepting the plea offer. During discussions about the agreement, it was clear that the parties were confused

about the State’s sentencing parameters. The court adjourned for lunch, permitting

the parties to continue their plea negotiations, but the court advised that following

lunch, the matter would proceed with either a plea or a trial.

Following the lunchbreak, the State advised that no further plea

negotiations occurred because the parties were at an impasse concerning the

definite sentencing range between 25 and 32 years. After the trial court provided an

example of how it could potentially reach the 25-year mark, the court granted a joint

motion to continue trial until the following morning. Wilder executed a written jury

waiver, which the court accepted following the requisite colloquy. The record

further reflects that the trial court permitted Wilder to visit with his father in the

courtroom. The court adjourned for the evening.

When the court reconvened the following day, counsel advised:

[Wilder] has indicated that there is an interest in working out the case as offered by the State of Ohio yesterday. As the Court knows, this is a package deal. I don’t know if the Court knew that or not. This is a package deal, Your Honor. It does appear that the co-defendant, Mr. Hughey, wants to go to trial in this case. I did reach out to the State of Ohio and asked, you know, under these circumstances, with so much at stake, a possible life without parole sentence versus 25 to 32 range, would the State of Ohio consider unpackaging the cases so that Mr. Wilder could plead guilty, take responsibility if that’s what he wants to do, and try to receive a 25-year sentence from this Honorable Court.

The State of Ohio at this time, it’s my understanding, is not willing to unpackage the cases. So therefore, my client is being forced pretty much to go to trial with a case that he is likely or has indicated a willingness to enter into some type of plea agreement. So it’s my understanding the State will not unpackage it, so we are here for trial, Judge. (Oct. 1, 2024 hearing, tr. 1-2.) Thereafter, Hughey’s counsel noted that his client

had changed his mind and wished to accept the State’s offer.

The State placed the plea agreement on the record that it would (1)

amend the aggravated murder offense in Count 1 to involuntary manslaughter and

delete both the one- and six-year firearm specifications, leaving the three-year

firearm and forfeiture specifications intact; (2) amend the felonious assault offense

in Count 7 by deleting the one- and six-year firearm specifications, leaving the three-

year firearm and forfeiture specifications intact; and (3) amend the felonious assault

offense in Count 10 by deleting the one- and six-year firearm specifications, leaving

the three-year firearm and forfeiture specifications intact. The State further advised

that by accepting the agreement, (1) the State would dismiss all other charges and

specifications, (2) Wilder waives his right to judicial release; and (3) the parties

agree to a definite sentencing range of 25 to 32 years, plus the Reagan Tokes

indefinite sentence.

The trial court meticulously followed along with the State’s

presentation of the plea offer, asked questions, and clarified the terms when

necessary, including explaining how the firearm specifications would necessarily

run consecutively to the underlying offenses and that it would then “craft the

sentences” to “honor the agreement.” (Oct. 1, 2024 hearing, tr. 7.)

The trial court then conducted a thorough and complete change-of-

plea hearing and advised Wilder of his Crim.R. 11 rights, verified that he understood

that pleading guilty waives those rights, and confirmed that he understood the nature of the offenses, the effects of his plea, and the maximum penalties involved.

Wilder confirmed that no threats or promises (except the agreed-definite-

sentencing range) were made to induce him into pleading guilty to the offenses.

Additionally, the court stated it would honor the agreed definite sentencing range of

25 to 32 years. Wilder indicated that he had no questions regarding his rights, the

charges, or possible sentence and all parties agreed that the trial court complied with

Crim.R. 11. Wilder then pleaded guilty to the offenses and specifications in

accordance with the plea agreement. The trial court ordered a presentence

investigation and report and continued the matter for sentencing.

A. Wilder Moves to Withdraw His Plea

On November 12, 2024, Wilder moved to withdraw his guilty plea by

generally professing actual innocence and arguing that he did not fully understand

the terms of the plea agreement. Hughey filed his own motion to withdraw his plea.

On December 5, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on both

motions. Relevant to this appeal, counsel reiterated that Wilder claimed actual

innocence and wished to go forward with trial. His protestation of innocence,

however, was not based on any specific defense or fact revealing innocence.

The State opposed Wilder’s motion, contending that the plea spanned

over two days, with the court allowing Wilder to speak to family, counsel, and “sleep

on it,” prior to accepting the plea agreement. According to the State, Wilder’s

motion was merely a change of heart. The State then attempted to produce multiple exhibits purportedly

refuting Wilder’s claim of actual innocence. Wilder objected to the trial court

viewing the exhibits because he previously waived his right to a jury, and any

subsequent trial could be before the trial judge. The trial court agreed with Wilder,

and further agreed that Wilder had yet to offer any evidence of his innocence for the

State to rebut. Accordingly, the trial court accepted the exhibits as proffered

evidence, preserving them for solely appellate review. The trial court therefore did

not review the exhibits in rendering its decision on Wilder’s motion.1

The trial court permitted the State to present arguments about the

evidence, including video of the shooting, and ballistic and DNA evidence

purportedly linking Wilder to the weapons recovered, and a letter written between

Wilder and Hughey about accepting a plea deal. Wilder disputed that the exhibits

proved his guilt.

Wilder then addressed the court, stating that even though he had time

to go over the agreement, he really did not understand it. He explained that he did

not understand how the State could ask for a maximum sentence when the court

makes that decision, nor did he understand how he could receive nine years on

firearm specifications when it was all “one transaction.” He generally asserted that

1 A proffer assists a reviewing court when determining whether the trial court’s

exclusion of evidence affected a substantial right of the appellant as required by Evid.R. 103. On appeal, Wilder does not raise any argument that the trial court should have reviewed or considered the State’s proffered exhibits when rendering its decision. nothing made sense to him. The trial court explained that it would impose the

sentence, not the State.

After hearing arguments from both parties, including Wilder’s

statements, and reviewing the transcripts from both days of the plea hearing, the

trial court denied Wilder’s request to withdraw his plea. The trial court then

sentenced Wilder within the agreed and jointly recommend sentence, imposing a

definite sentence of 27 years with a maximum of 32 years.

II. The Appeal

Wilder now appeals, contending in his sole assignment of error that

the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his presentence motion to

withdraw his guilty plea.2

Under Crim.R. 32.1, “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no

contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest

injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and

permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”

In general, “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be

freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). It is well

established, however, that “[a] defendant does not have an absolute right to

withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. A trial court must conduct a hearing to

determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of

2 The trial court also denied Hughey’s motion to withdraw his plea. He has filed his own appeal under State v. Hughey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 114712. the plea.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Although a presentence motion to

withdraw should be “freely and liberally granted,” the decision to grant or deny a

presentence motion to withdraw is within the trial court’s discretion. Id. at

paragraph two of the syllabus. An abuse of discretion occurs when “a court

exercise[s] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it

has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

Courts have traditionally considered nine factors when reviewing a

trial court’s decision denying a defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw a guilty

plea. Those factors include whether a defendant was (1) represented by competent

counsel, (2) given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before he entered the plea, (3) given a

complete hearing on the motion to withdraw, and (4) the record reflects that the

court gave full and fair consideration to the plea-withdrawal request. State v.

Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 (8th Dist. 1980), paragraph three of the syllabus. See

also State v. Owens, 2025-Ohio-1908, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.).

Additionally, courts evaluate whether (5) the motion was made in a

reasonable time, (6) the motion stated specific reasons for withdrawal, (7) the

defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, and (8)

the defendant had evidence of a plausible defense. State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d

236 (1st Dist. 1995), see also State v. Heisa, 2015-Ohio-2269 (8th Dist.); Owens at

id. Finally, courts have considered (9) “whether the state would be prejudiced if the

defendant were permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.” State v. Barnes, 2022-Ohio-

4486, ¶ 32 (Brunner, J., concurring), citing State v. Richter, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15476, *2 (8th Dist. Sept. 29, 1983). Consideration of these factors is a balancing

test, and no one factor is conclusive. Fish at 240.

On appeal, Wilder contends that the trial court abused its discretion

because it did not consider his defense of actual innocence or confusion about the

potential sentence, but focused entirely on the prejudice to the State if the plea

would be withdrawn. We disagree.

First, prejudice to the State is one factor that the trial court considered

— a factor that courts typically consider in reviewing a presentence motion to

withdraw a plea. See Barnes, 2022-Ohio-4486, at ¶ 32 (Brunner, J., concurring).

The trial court noted that the case had been set for trial three times, with witnesses

subpoenaed, and the “State might be prejudiced [if the motion was granted],” but it

did not focus entirely on this factor alone.

Rather, the trial court considered all the relevant factors, including

the State’s concession that Wilder’s motion was timely and that it afforded Wilder a

hearing on his motion to withdraw. The court stated that it had reviewed the

transcripts of the plea hearing and considered Wilder’s arguments for withdrawing

his plea. The court then addressed that it granted Wilder’s request for new counsel

when he expressed dissatisfaction with his originally assigned counsel, afforded

Wilder multiple continuances of trial for ongoing discovery, and provided him

opportunities to meet with counsel and family members in the courtroom, including

when negotiating and contemplating whether to accept the State’s plea offer. The

court further noted that the plea occurred on the day of trial and after it confirmed with Wilder that he wished to take the plea. The court stated it reviewed the Crim.R.

11 plea colloquy, finding that it adhered to the Crim.R. 11 requirements, including

that Wilder understood the nature of charges and possible penalties. The court

highlighted that highly competent counsel represented Wilder and that this was not

Wilder’s first experience with the criminal justice system or accepting a plea

agreement. The court agreed with the State that it appeared that Wilder merely

changed his mind after pleading — it was a “change of heart.”

On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

judgment denying Wilder’s motion to withdraw his plea. The record reveals that the

trial court reviewed the change-of-plea hearing transcript, held a complete hearing

on Wilder’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and gave full and fair consideration

to his request. The trial court considered the relevant factors, including that Wilder

was represented by two highly competent attorneys and that he received a full

Crim.R. 11 hearing at which he unequivocally stated that he understood the nature

of the charges, the effect of his plea, and that he wanted to enter into the plea,

including the agreed-upon definite sentencing range, which Wilder knew at the time

of his plea that the court would honor. Accordingly, Wilder possessed all the

pertinent information at the plea hearing that he needed to enter a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary plea. After the court afforded Wilder multiple

opportunities to speak with counsel and family, including a brief recess during the

plea colloquy to address a question raised by his codefendant, Wilder did not express

confusion, have any questions, or ask the trial court to clarify or further explain his rights, waiver of those rights, nature of the offenses, effects of the plea, or potential

penalties. In fact, unlike his codefendant Hughey, Wilder wanted to take the plea,

but because the offer was contingent on Hughey also accepting the plea, he felt

forced to go forward with trial. When Hughey changed his mind, Wilder received

the result he wanted.

Finally, regarding Wilder’s argument that the court did not consider

his claim of actual innocence, we note that this court has repeatedly held that “[a]

defendant’s protestations of innocence are not sufficient grounds for vacating a plea

that was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered.” Heisa, 2015-Ohio-2269,

at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Minifee, 2013-Ohio-3146, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). “‘By

inference, all defendants who request a withdrawal of their guilty plea do so based

upon some claim of innocence. . . . A mere change of heart regarding a guilty plea

and the possible sentence is insufficient justification for the withdrawal of a guilty

plea.’” State v. Bloom, 2012-Ohio-3805, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Abdelhag,

1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3394, *11 (8th Dist. July 31, 1997).

Our review of the record reveals that Wilder did not claim innocence

at any time during the plea negotiations or during the plea colloquy. In fact, in his

motion to withdraw his plea and during the subsequent hearing, he did not offer any

specific defense or fact revealing innocence. This was discussed when addressing

the State’s desire to introduce video, ballistic, and DNA evidence, contending that

the State’s evidence could not be used to rebut any claim of innocence because no evidence of innocence was presented. Accordingly, the trial court could not consider

Wilder’s claim of actual innocence without something to consider.

Rather, the record shows that Wilder’s conversation with the court

during the motion hearing only focused on the potential sentence and whether the

State was dictating the court’s role in sentencing. It appears from our review of the

record that Wilder’s motivation to withdraw his plea was merely a change of heart.

Based on the foregoing, this court finds that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Wilder’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea.

The assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J., and JILL FLAGG LANZINGER, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by Assignment: Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger, of the Ninth District Court of Appeals.)