State v. Newton

2026 Ohio 120

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 114965
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Newton, 2026-Ohio-120.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114965 v. :

ANTHONY NEWTON, JR., :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 15, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-681383-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew W. Moretto and Daniel Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

The State appeals the denial of restitution after Anthony Newton,

Jr., pleaded guilty to a fifth-degree felony violation of R.C. 2913.03(B), unauthorized use of a vehicle. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial

court’s order denying restitution and remand for further proceedings.

The victim and Newton had an agreement that Newton would borrow

the victim’s 2019 Chevrolet Malibu for a short period of time. Days turned into

months, and that limited consent was revoked. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 2023-Ohio-

3064, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.) (The trial court erred by not conducting a restitution hearing

on conviction for unauthorized use of vehicle committed by retaining vehicle after

rental period expired.); State v. Gibert, 2017-Ohio-7676, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing State

v. Bryant, 2012-Ohio-3909, ¶ 15-16 (1st Dist.) (noting that “a conviction for

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is supported by sufficient evidence if, after the

original use of a rental car was authorized by contract, a rental company withdraws

consent”). Newton ceased contact with the victim and took the car to the State of

New York. After months of accruing several thousand dollars in parking and toll

violations, Newton abandoned the vehicle, which was impounded after the victim

reported it stolen. For his criminal conduct, Newton agreed to plead guilty to

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2913.03(B), which provides

that “[n]o person shall knowingly use or operate [a] . . . motor vehicle . . . without

the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent, and either remove it

from this state or keep possession of it for more than forty-eight hours.” There was

no jointly recommended sentence and, importantly, no specified amount of

restitution offered in exchange for the guilty plea. Tr. 18:13-16; see State v. Brasher,

2022-Ohio-4703, ¶ 15, citing State v. Danison, 2005-Ohio-781, syllabus (“‘An order of restitution imposed by the sentencing court on an offender for a felony is part of

the sentence.’”).

At the time of the guilty plea, the State had been unable to contact the

victim for several months. Tr. 19:16-25. When setting the date for the sentencing

hearing, the State asked for additional time to comply with Marsy’s Law. The

amount of restitution was unknown at the time of the plea, but the prosecutor

“believe[d]” it to be approximately “$3,000 in rental fees that is being sought.”

Tr. 20:10-13. The State was unaware of the parking and toll violations at that time.

At the sentencing hearing, Newton, through counsel, tacitly

confirmed there was no prior agreement on restitution, telling the trial court that

Newton had a witness to rebut the State’s restitution evidence and “I’ll wait for

restitution until the State presents what they want to ask for.” Tr. 26:9-12. At no

point did either party reference any form of agreement on the question of restitution.

Importantly, at no point during the sentencing hearing did Newton ever claim his

plea was contingent on an agreement to restitution that was being violated and that

withdrawal of the plea would be necessary.

The State called the victim to testify about the restitution request.

After presenting the court with copies of the outstanding balances on the New York

parking and toll violations committed by Newton while in possession of the victim’s

vehicle, copies of the invoices for the replacement vehicle the victim rented while

deprived of her own car, and copies of the monies spent to have the car returned

from New York, the State began questioning the victim. The trial court interceded after the State asked two questions and began directing the questioning of the

victim. Tr. 33:9-36:12. In total, the victim was seeking $10,241.23 in restitution

based on the documentation presented and her testimony under the trial court’s

questioning.

Newton’s wife testified on his behalf, claiming to have reimbursed the

victim $120 during the time Newton had possession of the vehicle. Newton’s wife

could not verify whether Newton reimbursed the victim for the toll or parking

violations or the rental costs. The remainder of her testimony was limited to a claim

that the victim had allowed Newton to take the car out of state for several months

and the only reason the victim reported it as stolen was because her family pressured

her to do so. Newton made a statement at sentencing echoing his wife’s claims. In

other words, Newton attempted to claim he had an affirmative defense against the

charges despite his unequivocable agreement to plead guilty to the criminal

conduct.1

The trial court denied the victim’s request for restitution in its entirety

without explanation. The State timely appealed the sentence.

1 R.C. 2913.03(C) provides:

(C) The following are affirmative defenses to a charge under this section:

(1) At the time of the alleged offense, the actor, though mistaken, reasonably believed that the actor was authorized to use or operate the property.

(2) At the time of the alleged offense, the actor reasonably believed that the owner or person empowered to give consent would authorize the actor to use or operate the property. Marsy’s Law provides victims the right “to full and timely restitution

from the person who committed the criminal offense or delinquent act against the

victim[.]” Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(A)(7). R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) applies in determining

which losses qualify for restitution. Cleveland v. Fuller, 2023-Ohio-1669, ¶ 16 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Yerkey, 2022-Ohio-4298, ¶ 12. Under that statutory section,

“the amount of restitution [is] based on the economic loss suffered by the victim as

a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense.” Id. at ¶ 16.

“Economic loss” is defined as “any economic detriment suffered by a victim as a

direct and proximate result of the commission of an offense . . . .” R.C. 2929.01(L).

The victim or the State is permitted to introduce documentary evidence or testimony

that supports a restitution order. Fuller at ¶ 16, citing State v. Moore, 2022-Ohio-

4261, ¶ 12 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-374 (10th Dist.).

In this case, the evidence presented by the victim and the State was

largely undisputed. Newton did not contest the accrued fines on the violations, tolls,

or the rental fees themselves. Instead, Newton’s wife testified that of the $10,241

requested, she reimbursed the victim $120 on Newton’s behalf but could not say

whether any other amount was paid. She then attempted to present evidence of

affirmative defenses and actual innocence to the charges that Newton already

waived by pleading guilty to having committed the offense of unauthorized use of a

motor vehicle.

Those belated protestations of innocence had no bearing on the

question of restitution or sentencing as a whole. See State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio- 4415, syllabus (“A defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual

innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt.”).

According to this record, the denial of restitution could only have been based on

Newton’s claims of innocence first asserted at sentencing; no other complete defense

was presented. See Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4

(“‘[O]ur judicial system relies on the principle of party presentation, and courts

should ordinarily decide cases based on issues raised by the parties.’”), quoting

Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-

4989, ¶ 15. Defendants, having unequivocally pled guilty, cannot contest restitution

or a sentence in general by claiming innocence or attempting to undermine their

guilty plea after realizing the severity of the sentence actually being contemplated.

See State v. Hughey, 2025-Ohio-3152, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Heisa, 2015-

Ohio-2269, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (A defendant’s claim of actual innocence at sentencing

is not sufficient to overcome the guilty plea at sentencing.).

Courts in general will not permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea

based on belated protestations of innocence at or before sentencing, but after

pleading guilty. State v. Wilder, 2025-Ohio-3075, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.) (“A defendant’s

protestations of innocence are not sufficient grounds for vacating a plea that was

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered.”), citing Heisa at ¶ 23. If a plea

cannot be withdrawn in that situation, it follows that a defendant cannot rely on

those same arguments to mitigate the sentence to be imposed on an unequivocal

guilty plea. The denial of restitution based on claims of the defendant’s innocence first raised after pleading guilty constitutes an abuse of discretion. Johnson v.

Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 39 (a trial court lacks discretion to commit errors of

law).

Further, and contrary to Newton’s appellate argument, the plea

agreement did not include any agreed sentencing component, much less any

agreement on restitution. The victim was permitted to request the full amount of

economic loss suffered by Newton’s admitted misconduct. If restitution was an

important consideration for the plea agreement, Newton was required to include

that term as a condition before pleading guilty.

Nevertheless, the trial court’s generic denial of restitution provided

no other analysis supporting its decision for this panel to review. Restitution should

be determined for the first time by the trial court, not an appellate panel applying

the abuse-of-discretion standard. Under that standard, Ohio courts have

consistently held that the record must contain some analysis or support for the trial

court’s decision. State v. N.S., 2025-Ohio-5166, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.). Without any

explanation in the transcript of the proceedings or a later entry, appellate courts are

left to mere speculation as to the trial court’s rationale. Id. at ¶ 22, citing State v.

Lanxiang Yu, 2024-Ohio-3083, ¶ 21-22 (1st Dist.) (“Where the trial court offers no

reasons for its denial, [appellate courts] cannot blindly defer to its unexplained

exercise of discretion.”); see also State v. S.D.F., 2025-Ohio-1832, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.);

Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 2004-Ohio-6552, ¶ 21 (trial court erred by failing

to provide reasons in support of summary conclusion certifying the class action lawsuit). “The lynchpin of abuse-of-discretion review is the determination whether

the trial court’s decision is reasonable.” State v. Chase, 2015-Ohio-545, ¶ 17 (2d

Dist.), citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment

Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). Unless the appellate court can discern the

reason for the trial court’s decision from the record or from the arguments presented

for review, it is arguably impossible for an appellate panel to determine if the

exercise of discretion is reasonable. Id.

The State presented largely undisputed evidence of an economic loss

suffered by the victim for Newton’s criminal act, to which he unequivocally pleaded

guilty to committing. Newton’s evidence only contested $120 of the $10,241

sought, demonstrating that the victim was entitled to at least some restitution. The

amount, however, must first be determined by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial

court’s decision denying restitution is reversed and this matter remanded for a new

restitution hearing to be conducted, at which the parties shall be permitted to

present their evidence and arguments solely pertaining to the economic loss

suffered by the victim, and any rationale for granting or denying restitution be

memorialized for further review. Newton’s guilty plea and term of community-

control sanctions are unaffected by this decision and remain final in consideration

of his failure to cross-appeal his guilty plea or sentence. The only issue left for

consideration is the amount of restitution owed to the victim.

Reversed and remanded.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR