DAY, J.
This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals that affirmed a judgment of conviction of the circuit court for Grant County, Honorable John R. Wagner, judge. A jury found the defendant, Mr. Jason A. Jones, guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, sec. 940.01, Stats. 1991-92, and burglary, sec. 943.10(2)(a), Stats. 1991-92. Mr. Jones was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date of 2041 on the homicide count, and a consecutive twenty year prison term on the burglary count. Jones asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress statements he argues were taken in violation of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his sixth amendment right to counsel. Jones also asserts that the court of appeals erred by relying on a decision that was mandated after he committed his crime in upholding the trial court's refusal to allow an offered jury instruction on second degree intentional homicide. We find no error, and so affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
[86]*86At about midnight on May 16,1991, Jones, who at the time was seventeen years old, and Mr. Leonard Crary broke into the apartment of Mr. Gerald Szyman-ski and attacked him, repeatedly stabbing him and cutting his throat. After the attack, Mr. Szymanski managed to walk to a gas station before he collapsed and died.
At about 2:45 a.m. on May 17, 1991, the police notified Ms. Kim Mathews, Mr. Szymanski's daughter, of her father's death. An officer took Ms. Mathews across the street to the police station, where she made a telephone call. The officer was "bothered" because Ms. Mathews showed no signs of emotion upon being told of her father's death. Ms. Mathews returned home at about 3:00 a.m.
About 5:30 a.m., the officer returned to Ms. Mathews home with several other officers and received her permission to search her residence. The officers found Jones and Crary asleep in a bedroom, and Jones was told, at gunpoint, to remain in the living room of the home. The officers also found two knives — the murder weapons — and several items of blood stained clothing.
Deputy Jim Kopp of the Grant County Sheriffs Department asked Jones to accompany him to his squad car which was in front of Ms. Mathews house. Deputy Kopp told Jones that he was not under arrest and that he could return to the house if he wanted, but that he probably would be arrested by the end of the day. Deputy Kopp then advised Jones of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Jones signed a written waiver. The two talked for one hour, during which time Jones made no incriminating statements.
[87]*87While in the squad car outside Ms. Mathew's residence, Jones requested the use of a rest room. Deppty Kopp drove Jones to the Fennimore Police Department, but before arriving at the station, Deputy Kopp stopped briefly outside Mr. Szymanski's residence.1 When they arrived at the police department, Jones used the rest room, and afterwards Deputy Kopp continued the interview. He did not reread the Miranda warnings Jones had waived about one hour before. In this interview, Jones gave a statement that placed him at the scene of the murder, but he denied planning the murder or stabbing the victim. According to Jones' first statement which he signed at 8:47 a.m.:
[88]*88We went, CC and I went up to the guy's house that died, I don't know his name_On the way over, we discussed it and we were going to go into the house and take any money we could find along with VCRs, anything like that. We walked into the house . . . There was a door and CC opened the door and it must have been a bedroom, a dog started barking and a guy jumped up from a bed, CC at this time freaked out and reached out and stuck the guy with the knife, I could hear like blood squirting, I can't really describe the sound. It is something like when a pig has its head cut off.... I at no time stabbed the man.... I washed the knife off while CC was in the bathroom and the reason that I washed the knife off was so I could get rid of any evidence of the burglary or the stabbing.
After giving this statement, Jones was transported to the Grant County Jail.
Because Jones was seventeen, the District Attorney's office notified the Grant County Social Services Department of the arrest. A juvenile intake worker, Mr. Thomas Hughey, received notice that a juvenile was being held in the Grant County Jail at about 9:30 a.m., May 17,1994. Mr. Hughey met with Jones at the jail and gave the following testimony about that meeting:
Q. What did you do in regard to the interview itself with the defendant?
A. I let Mr. Jones know that he had a right to an attorney and that right to an attorney included detention hearings that he would have for the court to determine whether there was reason to hold him in secure detention.
Q. Did Jason Jones at that time say anything concerning a lawyer?
[89]*89A. He did say he had an attorney in Sauk County and I let him know that that may not be practical for the detention hearing as far as an attorney getting down here, but that if the attorney could not, he would have a right to have an attorney probably from the public defender's office at the detention hearing.
Q. Did he say anything more at that time?
A. No, he did not.
Q. What happened after that conversation was concluded?
A. After that conversation, Jason began asking me questions about what was likely to happen. I did let him know it was likely that we would seek to waive him into adult court. That the other questions such as what could happen to him would be better answered by an attorney.
On cross-examination, Mr. Hughey stated:
Q. How did the discussion concerning Sauk County and the Sauk County attorney come up?
A. When I let him know he had a right to an attorney, he said, "I already have got one." That he had one represent him in Sauk County in other matters.
Q. And so he felt that this attorney would be representing him regarding the Grant County matters?
A. I don't know what he thought.
Mr. Hughey later attempted to contact Jones to see if he had any questions about his rights. Again on cross-[90]*90examination, Mr. Hughey was asked about what he was thinking when making that call:
Q. Did you have some reason to believe that J ason might have been confused about those issues?
A. No, it was more an attempt on my part to make sure that, I guess, the I's were dotted and the T's were crossed.
After talking with Jones, at approximately 10:50 a.m., Mr. Hughey filed a Temporary Physical Custody Request form, Form J-103. Mr. Hughey then notified the Public Defender's Office that there was a juvenile in custody and that a Detention Hearing had been scheduled for 1:00 p.m.2 The Assistant District Attorney requested that Mr. Hughey not give the Public Defender's Office the name of the juvenile, and not to contact the defendant's parents or the defendant's legal guardian, Sauk County. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hughey told the Assistant District Attorney that he was obligated by law to inform the defendant's parents and his legal custodian, and the Assistant District Attorney told him to do so.
Upon learning of the Detention Hearing, the Public Defender's Office in Lancaster, Wisconsin appointed local counsel, attorney Mark Hoskins to represent Jones. Someone from Attorney Hoskins' office immediately advised jail personnel that no one was to interview the defendant. Grant County Sheriffs Captain Krohn knew of the instruction, but decided to [91]*91interview Jones anyway because jail personnel told him that Jones had not requested an attorney.
At the outset of the interview, Captain Krohn asked Jones if he had been informed of his constitutional rights, and Jones responded that he had. Captain Krohn then asked Jones if he understood that those same rights still applied. Jones said he did. Jones then made an incriminating statement which hq signed at 12:07 p.m. That signed statement contains his admissions that he stabbed the victim and that he discussed the possibility of killing the victim prior to the assault. It reads in pertinent part:
[T]he plan was to go and rob this gentleman's apartment. We discussed before leaving that if the plan didn't work we would kill the man. CC had a buck knife and I had a silver-handled knife. After we got to the apartment, the man jumped up out of the bed and got the knife away from CC. We both then jumped at the man. We were fighting for the knife. I had the man from the back with one arm aromad the neck and the other on top of his forehead. CC was underneath him. CC was trying to get the knife back away from him. The man's arm which was holding the knife came down and CC got stabbed in the arm. I reached in my pocket and opened the blade by pushing the knob on the blade and it came out. I then stabbed the man in the left side. I also stabbed the man in the back. I don't recall how many times. I also stabbed him on the front I believe once. After CC got the knife back, I went over to the dog to try to kill it.
Over the next few days, Deputy Kopp received, messages from Jones that Jones wanted to speak to him. Deputy Kopp did not contact Mr. Hoskins or th§ District Attorney's Office prior to meeting with Jones, [92]*92Deputy Kopp testified that he did not interrogate Jones, but only took him into the interviewing room and listened while Jones talked. Jones was not given his Miranda rights before these interviews. Deputy Kopp obtained at least four other statements from Jones in these interviews.
Jones was waived into adult court, where the State alleged that Jones and Crary murdered the victim because they were asked to do so by Ms. Mathews or by the victim's son-in-law. Jones sought to introduce evidence that Mr. Szymanski had allegedly sexually assaulted Ms. Mathews and her daughter and had been convicted of sexually assaulting Ms. Mathew's sister-in-law. Jones also sought to introduce evidence of other crimes the victim had committed. In addition, Jones requested a jury instruction on second degree intentional homicide (formerly manslaughter/imperfect defense). The trial court did not admit the evidence of the victim's alleged crimes or criminal record and rejected the offered instruction.
A jury convicted Jones of first-degree intentional homicide contrary to sec. 940.01, Stats. 1991-92, and burglary contrary to sec. 943.10(2)(a), Stats. 1991-92. Jones appealed his conviction to the court of appeals asserting fifth and sixth amendment arguments, an improper refusal to permit the jury instruction, and two other arguments not before this court: unlawful search and seizure and erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion. The court of appeals issued a decision affirming the conviction, deciding all issues against Jones. State v. Jones, No. 92-1316-CR, unpublished opinion (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1993). Jones petitioned for review which was granted on March 8,1994.
[93]*93This case presents both statutory and constitutional interpretation issues. These questions are reviewed without deference to the lower courts. State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 1052, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994). The case also presents several questions that require "application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).3 Those issues are questions of constitutional fact which must be independently determined by this Court. Id. at 715.
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL ISSUES
It is clear under the well known decision in Miranda and the many decisions that have followed it that if a suspect requests an attorney during custodial interrogation, one must be provided before continuing any questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
[94]*94Jones only mention of an attorney was his statement, "I already got one," referring to an attorney in Sauk County who had represented him in another matter. Jones argues that State v. Lampe, 119 Wis. 2d 206, 349 N.W.2d 677 (1984), adopted a "bright line" rule that any reference to an attorney requires the police to cease all questioning. That interpretation of Lampe was rejected in State v. Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 2d 478, 515 N.W.2d 863 (1994). There this Court stated that the terms "lawyer" and "attorney" do not have "talis-manic qualities." Id. at 487.
At oral argument, Jones' counsel argued that Jones' statement, "was not an ambiguous request for an attorney, this was a request for an attorney, there is nothing ambiguous about it." In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the United States Supreme Court stated, "[w]here nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, all questioning must cease." Id. at 98. However, Jones' statement simply was not a request for counsel. A request for counsel is a statement in which the person, "expresses] his desire to deal with the police only through counsel." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Jones’ mention of a lawyer in another county does not even arguably express that desire. Therefore, we conclude that Jones' statement was not a request for an attorney.
Also at oral argument, Jones' counsel stated, "I did in my initial argument mention the Walkowiak case which said, if there is an ambiguity, it has to be cleared up, and I think that in this particular case if there was an ambiguity the state had the burden to pick it up...." In Walkowiak, this Court held that a suspect's statement, "Do you think I need an attorney?" necessitated a [95]*95response from the questioning officer because it showed that the "suspect has uncertainty." Id. at 486.4 Such a statement was said to be an equivocal question or reference to an attorney. Id. Jones' statement here shows no uncertainty. In fact, his statements and actions show that Jones knew of his right to an attorney and chose to go on without one present. Further, courts throughout the country are almost unanimous in holding that a suspect's reference to an attorney who [96]*96had previously or is currently representing him in another matter is not a request for counsel.5
[97]*97We examine not only the words Jones used. We also look at the circumstances leading up to the statement and the context of the actual statement. Here those circumstances demonstrate that Jones' statement was not an equivocal reference to counsel. Jones made the statement after being advised of his rights for the second time, and after he had already given one incriminating statement to the authorities. Further, the statement was not made in the coercive environment of a police interrogation, but rather was made to a juvenile intake worker while the two were discussing not the fifth amendment right to have an attorney present at questioning, but the sixth amendment right to have one at his detention hearing. Finally, minutes later Jones expressed his willingness to answer further questions after he was reminded of his constitutional rights and again stated that he remembered and waived those rights.
Jones also argues that this Court must find his statement about his lawyer in Sauk County to be an invocation of his right to have an attorney present during questioning because that was the way that Mr. Hughey, the juvenile intake worker, interpreted it. Jones' interpretation of Mr. Hughey's thought process is not supported by the record. Mr. Hughey did contact the Public Defender's Office after his meeting with Jones. However, he did not inform the Public [98]*98Defender's Office of the name of the individual who the Detention Hearing concerned, but only told them the time of the Detention Hearing. Further, when asked the direct question of whether Jones felt that the Sauk County attorney would be representing him, Mr. Hughey responded, "I don't know what he thought." Finally, the fact that Mr. Hughey later attempted to contact Jones shows that he did not believe that Jones had requested counsel. The evidence thus demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hughey contacted the Public Defender's Office to assure Jones' statutory right to an attorney at the Detention Hearing was honored, not because he thought Jones had invoked his fifth amendment rights.
Jones did not personally invoke his fifth amendment right to an attorney prior to giving the statement he signed at 12:07 p.m. However, Captain Krohn knew that Attorney Hoskins had been appointed for Jones and that he had asked that no one interview Jones until he arrived. Jones argues that this knowledge was enough to invoke his fifth amendment rights.
Such a claim was rejected in Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 213. There, the defendant's parents asked an attorney to represent their son. Id. at 203. That attorney told the police that no one was to question the defendant unless he was present, but the police interviewed the defendant anyway. Id. at 204-05. This Court held that, "Since the right to counsel and the right to remain silent are given by the constitution to the defendant, he alone can exercise those rights." Id. at 213.
Since Jones never invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel, the statement he signed at 12:07 p.m. is admissible if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones knowingly, intelligently and [99]*99voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d at 722. Jones argues that there was no valid waiver because sec. 48.23(l)(a), Stats. 1991-92,6 requires such a waiver to be made in court. Because that section deals with a juvenile's right to counsel, not during questioning, but during a detention hearing, and because Jones' right to counsel under the section had not yet attached (see infra p. 104 — 105), Jones' waiver did not need to be approved by the court.
Jones argues that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because Captain Krohn did not re-read the Miranda warnings prior to beginning the interrogation and because Jones was not informed of Attorney Hoskin's presence. These arguments are contrary to well established law.
In State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 725, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1026 (1982), this Court held that "[i]t is not necessary to repeatedly recite the Miranda warnings during an investigation of the same person for the same crime." Here, Jones was read his Miranda rights once by the police, once by Mr. Hughey, and he was reminded that they still applied just prior to giving his statement. This was sufficient to satisfy the Miranda requirement that Jones be apprised of his rights.
[100]*100Similarly, in Hanson this Court held that the fifth amendment "does not require the police to advise the suspect of the immediate availability of a particular attorney." Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 208. The reasoning the Hanson court quoted from a United States Supreme Court opinion is equally applicable in the case before us:
Because, as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process, a rule requiring the police to inform the suspect of an attorney's efforts to contact him would contribute to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at all. This minimal benefit, however, would come at a substantial cost to society's legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt.
Id. at 210 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)). Jones saw two attorneys within a minute or so after Captain Krohn completed his questioning and told Jones there were two attorneys "out there that were there to see him." However, this does not cast doubt on the knowing and voluntary nature of his prior waiver. As this Court stated in Hanson, "[a]lthough a suspect who was ready to waive his rights might change his mind when told an attorney was waiting to see him, the critical factor would be the convenience of seeing the attorney, not the intelligent perceived need for legal counsel." Id. at 212.
We agree with the Moran court that:
reading Miranda to require the police in each instance to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him would work a substantial and, we think, inappropriate shift in the subtle balance [101]*101struck in that decision [between] society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law ... [and] constitutionally impermissible compulsion.
Moran, 475 U.S. at 426 (citations omitted). Due to our general policy of following the United States Supreme Court's decisions on fifth amendment issues, we conclude it is for the legislature and not this Court to decide whether to "adopt[ ] different requirements for the conduct of [state] employees and officials as a matter of state law." Moran, 475 U.S. at 428.
Jones also argues that the holdings in Fillyaw and Hanson should not apply to him because both involved adult suspects. Further, Jones notes the conduct of the authorities: the detour past the scene of the murder, the Assistant District Attorney's request that Jones' parents and legal guardian not be notified and refusing to allow Mr. Hughey to speak with him when he phoned the jail. Jones contends that while one may be able to obtain a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver from an adult under these circumstances, one cannot be obtained from a juvenile. See Woods v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1986) (habeas corpus case disagreeing with this Court's conclusion that, under the facts of the case in Woods, a juvenile's confession was voluntary). We disagree.
Since Jones was a juvenile when he gave his statement, "the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). To determine whether a juvenile's waiver was knowing and voluntary, we examine the totality of the circumstances, including the "juvenile's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and (inquiry) into whether he has the capacity to under[102]*102stand the warnings given, the nature of the Fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." Clusen, 794 F.2d at 296 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
There is ample evidence in the record to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones' waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. First, Jones was less than ten months away from his eighteenth birthday when he committed the crime. Thus, his claim that the rulings in Fillyaw and Hanson should not apply to him because he is a juvenile is not persuasive. Further, as stated by the trial judge with reference to the pre-sentence report the record shows that Jones had extensive contact with law enforcement officials in investigating several matters while he was a juvenile as well as during placements in various juvenile facilities. In contrast, the court in Clusen specifically cited the fact that Woods had no prior criminal record and no serious previous contact with the criminal justice system as factors that made his confession involuntary. Clusen, 794 F.2d at 297. Finally, Jones demonstrated his capacity to understand the warnings and the consequences of waiving his rights when he asked questions of Mr. Hughey, was told that some of them would be better answered by an attorney, and decided not to request one.
Jones other claims about the circumstances of the interrogations are likewise without merit. The momentary stop at the murder site four hours prior to the incriminating statement Jones seeks to suppress, as explained supra n.l, simply could not have been so emotionally traumatic as to have taken away Jones capacity to understand and exercise his fifth amend[103]*103ment rights. The improper request made by the Assistant District Attorney and not allowing Mr. Hughey to speak with Jones did not affect Jones. The Assistant District Attorney conformed his conduct to the law immediately upon being informed of what that law was, and even if he had not, his actions could not have influenced Jones' decisions as Jones had no knowledge of them. Similarly, Jones could not have been influenced by the attempted contact by Mr. Hughey because he did not know about it prior to making his statement. Again this case presents facts that contrast sharply to those in Clusen. There two sets of police officers continued to question Woods despite his remaining silent for over one hour, "lied to Woods" about evidence tying him to the crime, and confronted him with graphic pictures of the murder scene. Clusen, 794 F.2d at 297.
We also find no error in admitting the conversations Jones had with Deputy Kopp during the days after he made his initial statements. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held that a suspect may, after asserting his fifth amendment rights, waive them by initiating "further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The United States Supreme Court extended the Edwards analysis to sixth amendment cases in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
Here there is no doubt that Jones initiated the meetings with Deputy Kopp. Jones on several occasions left messages asking Deputy Kopp to come talk to him. Deputy Kopp on at least four occasions answered Jones' requests by going to the jail and listening to Jones talk. As the Supreme Court stated in Edwards, " [h] ad Edwards initiated the meeting... nothing in the [104]*104Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would prohibit the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against him at the trial." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. Deputy Kopp was not required to re-read Jones his Miranda rights prior to these conversations. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d at 725. Defendant claims the record arguably shows that Deputy Kopp did more than just listen, however Jones does not cite any specific statement or question that would rise to the level of interrogation, hence his statements are admissible. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9.
STATUTORY /SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Section 48.23(l)(a), Stats., provides in relevant part, "Any child alleged to be delinquent under s. 48.12 or held in a secure detention facility shall be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings ..." The parent, guardian, or legal custodian must also be notified of the child's right to counsel. Section 48.20(8), Stats. 1991-92.7
In Woods, this Court held that "neither the temporary custody order that [the juvenile intake worker] signed, nor the custodial interrogation of Woods, were 'proceedings' within the meaning of sec. 48.23(l)(a), Stats., for which counsel was required." Woods, 117 Wis. 2d at 736. Instead, "the first proceeding at which [a juvenile] would have been entitled to counsel under sec. 48.23(1), Stats., was a court hearing under sec. [105]*10548.21." Id. at 737. The hearing under sec. 48.21, Stats.,8 had not taken place at the time Jones signed his statement, thus his statutory right to counsel had not yet attached.
[104]*10448.20 Release or delivery from custody . . .. (8) . . . The parent, guardian and legal custodian shall also be notified of... the right to counsel under s. 48.23 regardless of ability to pay....
[105]*105Similarly, Jones' sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel had not attached prior to the incriminating statement he signed at 12:07 p.m. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against the defendant. In Woods, this Court held that "the analog to the 'commitment to prosecute' cited in Kirby is the filing of a delinquency petition under sec. 48.25." Woods, 117 Wis. 2d at 738. At the time Jones gave his statement neither a delinquency petition under sec. 48.25, Stats.,9 nor a petition for waiver of jurisdiction for criminal proceedings under 48.18, Stats.,10 had [106]*106been filed, thus his sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached.
Jones argues that even if a juvenile's right to counsel does not attach until the sec. 48.21 hearing, for that right to be adequately protected, counsel must be allowed access to the juvenile prior to the hearing in order to prepare to examine and cross-examine witnesses at the hearing. Jones continues by stating that this means that Attorney Hoskins should have been allowed immediate access to Jones. While a juvenile's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel would be violated if he were forced to proceed with a sec. 48.21 hearing without having adequate time to consult with his attorney, this does not mean that police must cease their investigation immediately when the attorney arrives. Rather, at most it means that law enforcement officials must allow the attorney an adequate opportunity to see and consult with the juvenile prior to the hearing. Jones does not allege that he did not have adequate time to consult with Attorney Hoskins prior to the detention hearing, and so Jones sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel were not violated by delaying Attorney Hoskin's initial contact with Jones.
DUE PROCESS ISSUE
In rejecting Jones' appeal of the trial court's ruling that he was not entitled to a jury instruction on the [107]*107lesser offense of second degree intentional homicide, the court of appeals relied on this Court's decision in State v. Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993). In Camacho, this Court held that imperfect self-defense manslaughter under sec. 940.05, Stats. 1985-8611 (now second degree intentional homicide under sec. 940.01(2)(b), Stats. 1991-92)12 includes an objective element. That objective element requires the defendant to show a reasonable belief that he was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person, or, as in this case, interference with "another." Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d at 865; sec. 940.01(2)(b), Stats. 1991-92. Jones claims that this Court's decision in Camacho removed a defense that was available at the time he committed his crime, and so cannot be applied to him without violating his right to due process. We conclude that Jones' due process rights were not violated because he had fair warning of the objective element when he committed his crime.
[108]*108The principles underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause "apply to judicial pronouncements as well as to legislative acts." State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 510-11, 509 N.W.2d 712, cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 2712 (1994). "[T]he notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties — is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977). Fair warning is not given, and a due process violation occurs, when a new judicial pronouncement "criminalizes conduct that was innocent when committed, increases the penalty for conduct after its commission, or removes a defense that was available at the time the act was committed." Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d at 513.
In Camacho, this Court held that the objective element could be traced to the plain language of the statute. Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d at 871-72. In reaching that holding, this Court noted that this Court had never rejected an objective element. Id. at 877. This Court went on to explain that, "[T]he 1987 revisions of the Criminal Code did not alter the crime of imperfect self-defense manslaughter.... [T]he crime of imperfect self-defense still consists of an objective threshold element and two subjective elements." Id. at 882-83 (emphasis added).
Camacho thus did not change settled law or take away a defense that existed at the time Jones committed his crime. As such, the trial judge, in Camacho correctly interpreted the law when he did not give the uniform instruction that did not contain the objective element required by statute. Similarly, by refusing to give the offered instruction, the circuit court in this [109]*109case accurately interpreted the law as it existed at the time.
Jones argues that Camacho did in fact change the law, and this is shown by the fact that the court found it necessary to overrule the decision reached by the court of appeals in State v. Harp, 150 Wis. 2d 861, 443 N.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1989). Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d at 881-82. However, the statement of the elements of imperfect self-defense in Harp which this Court overruled was only dicta in that case. Further, at the time Jones committed his crime, the continued validity of that dicta was already in serious question.
In a decision which was handed down one year after Harp and one year prior to Jones' crime, this Court held that a defendant was not entitled to a conviction of imperfect self-defense manslaughter even though the defendant possessed an actual belief, caused by mental delusions and paranoia, regarding an unlawful interference with his person. State v. Seifert, 155 Wis. 2d 53, 68, 454 N.W.2d 346 (1990). One member of this Court stated that this decision could be interpreted as holding that "the crime of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter encompasses an objective element." Id. at 72 (Abrahamson, J. dissenting) (also cited in Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d at 881). Therefore, the Camacho decision, especially after Sei-fert, was not "an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute," and so did not "deprive the defendant of the fair warning to which the Constitution entitles him." Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964).
The Camacho decision did not create the kind of " 'clear break' in the law ... [which] may not be applied retroactively to criminal defendants' detriment." [110]*110United States v. Burnom, 27 F.3d 283, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 196). It did not create a break in the law at all. It only made explicit that which Was implicit in this Court's prior decisions. As such, application of Camacho to Jones' case does not violate !his due process rights.
We hold that the court of appeals correctly concluded that the actions of the police did not violate Jones' right to counsel under the fifth nor under the sixth amendment, and did not violate his statutory right to an attorney. We also hold that Jones' due process rights were not violated by refusing to allow the offered jury instruction.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.