An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1058
Filed 15 July 2026
Wake County, No. 24CR242479-910
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
SEAN KELLY JONES, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 6 May 2025 by Judge Vinston M.
Rozier in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 May 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Kristin C. McCrary, for the State.
Mary M. Reece for Defendant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant Sean Kelly Jones appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
after he pled guilty to felonious secret peeping to capture a photographic image.
Defendant contends the trial court erred: (1) by ordering Defendant to register as a
sex offender where the evidentiary findings were insufficient to support the ultimate
finding that he was a “danger to the community”; and (2) by finding that the offense
of peeping set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d) involved the physical, mental, or STATE V. JONES
Opinion of the Court
sexual abuse of a minor within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b2). We
affirm the trial court’s registration order and dismiss Defendant’s second argument.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 24 February 2024 at a clothing boutique, Defendant reached his arm into
a dressing room with the intention of taking secret photos with his phone of the
sixteen-year-old female inside. After being startled by Defendant’s arm appearing
over the top of her fitting room, M.B. ran out of the dressing room naked to find her
mother in the store. Defendant told the responding officer at the scene: “I was taking
photos of a girl in the dressing room. I deleted the photos already. I’m sorry. I have
a problem.”
On 6 May 2025, Defendant pled guilty. His active sentence was suspended for
a period of twenty-four months of supervised probation. After Defendant’s guilty
plea, the trial court conducted a sex offender registration hearing, which all parties
agreed to address contemporaneously with sentencing. The victim’s father spoke
during the State’s presentation and told the trial court he believed Defendant put in
effort and “actively sought out a sixteen-year-old minor to exploit” by “climbing up on
a bench, extending his arm, [and] sticking his phone over the partition in the stall[.]”
The victim’s father claimed she “was once a carefree, easygoing teenager,” but she is
now “scared to go alone in places.”
Although Defendant has no prior convictions, the State emphasized that
Defendant is a recidivist as the present crime was not an “isolated instance.”
-2- STATE V. JONES
Defendant was conditionally discharged in Maryland for a similar crime in 2017 after
“he admitted to visual surveillance of a private place with prurient intent.”
Defendant was able to avoid a conviction for the Maryland crime by successfully
completing requirements set forth by his Probation Before Judgment, including
complying with court-ordered conditions, avoiding further criminal conduct, and
attending therapy.
Defendant suggests these previous sessions did not get to the “root cause” of
the issues. After the incident here, Defendant started therapy again. The therapy
consisted of attending sex addiction group sessions, a month of intensive treatment
at Triangle Springs, and meeting several times with different mental health
professionals. One of the psychologists, Dr. Bixler, began working with Defendant in
April 2024 and diagnosed Defendant with “Compulsive Sexual Behavior Disorder.”
Dr. Bixler could not “guarantee” Defendant would never reoffend but also opined his
placement on the sex offender registry is “unnecessary.”
Defendant asserted he understands the necessity of his participation in this
therapy “to not have this happen again.” When expressing his remorse, Defendant
also discussed: (1) how his sex addiction had never been properly diagnosed or
treated; (2) his commitment to recovery; and (3) the ramifications of placement on the
sex offender registry for his family, including his two young children.
After considering the totality of the facts presented, the trial court determined,
“based on the actions here, the prior history, even with the actions that [Defendant
-3- STATE V. JONES
took] and the efforts [he] made, there is still significant potential risk and danger to
the community overall.” The trial court signed a 615 Form on 6 May 2025—an official
court document used to enter additional findings and orders related to sex offender
registration—and found that the offense “did involve the physical, mental, or sexual
abuse of a minor.”
The trial court signed the judgment finding: (1) the offense is a reportable
conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-208.6 and imposes special conditions of
probation, and (2) the offense “involved the physical or mental abuse of a minor, and
therefore imposes the special condition[] of probation[.]”
On 13 May 2025, Defendant filed and served his notice of appeal of the trial
court’s judgment, which included a conviction of Felony Secret Peeping and Registry
on the Sex Offender Registry. Additionally, on 26 November 2025, Defendant filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to allow review of the trial court’s determination that
the offense of Felony Secret Peeping as set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d)
involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor within the meaning of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b2).
II. Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Trial Court’s Findings
Although a defendant who pleads guilty generally has limited appellate rights,
sex offender registration proceedings are treated differently. This Court has held
that such registration under Article 27A constitutes a “civil, non-punitive regulatory
-4- STATE V. JONES
regime” rather than criminal punishment. State v. White, 162 N.C. App. 183, 191,
590 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2004). Accordingly, appeals challenging a registration order are
governed by civil procedures and are reviewable by this Court despite a defendant’s
guilty plea. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2023); see State v. Pell, 211 N.C. App. 376,
379, 712 S.E.2d 189, 191 (2011).
Here, Defendant challenges the trial court’s determination under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-202(l) that he “is a danger to the community” and must register as a sex
offender. Because Defendant challenges the registration order itself, rather than a
criminal judgment entered after his guilty plea, the limitations contained in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444 do not bar appellate review. Defendant's appeal from the final
registration order is properly before this Court.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d) explains that a person commits a Class I felony
when they secretly peep into a room and use a device to photograph another
individual for the purpose of sexual gratification. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d) (2023).
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1058
Filed 15 July 2026
Wake County, No. 24CR242479-910
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
SEAN KELLY JONES, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 6 May 2025 by Judge Vinston M.
Rozier in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 May 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Kristin C. McCrary, for the State.
Mary M. Reece for Defendant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant Sean Kelly Jones appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered
after he pled guilty to felonious secret peeping to capture a photographic image.
Defendant contends the trial court erred: (1) by ordering Defendant to register as a
sex offender where the evidentiary findings were insufficient to support the ultimate
finding that he was a “danger to the community”; and (2) by finding that the offense
of peeping set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d) involved the physical, mental, or STATE V. JONES
Opinion of the Court
sexual abuse of a minor within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b2). We
affirm the trial court’s registration order and dismiss Defendant’s second argument.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 24 February 2024 at a clothing boutique, Defendant reached his arm into
a dressing room with the intention of taking secret photos with his phone of the
sixteen-year-old female inside. After being startled by Defendant’s arm appearing
over the top of her fitting room, M.B. ran out of the dressing room naked to find her
mother in the store. Defendant told the responding officer at the scene: “I was taking
photos of a girl in the dressing room. I deleted the photos already. I’m sorry. I have
a problem.”
On 6 May 2025, Defendant pled guilty. His active sentence was suspended for
a period of twenty-four months of supervised probation. After Defendant’s guilty
plea, the trial court conducted a sex offender registration hearing, which all parties
agreed to address contemporaneously with sentencing. The victim’s father spoke
during the State’s presentation and told the trial court he believed Defendant put in
effort and “actively sought out a sixteen-year-old minor to exploit” by “climbing up on
a bench, extending his arm, [and] sticking his phone over the partition in the stall[.]”
The victim’s father claimed she “was once a carefree, easygoing teenager,” but she is
now “scared to go alone in places.”
Although Defendant has no prior convictions, the State emphasized that
Defendant is a recidivist as the present crime was not an “isolated instance.”
-2- STATE V. JONES
Defendant was conditionally discharged in Maryland for a similar crime in 2017 after
“he admitted to visual surveillance of a private place with prurient intent.”
Defendant was able to avoid a conviction for the Maryland crime by successfully
completing requirements set forth by his Probation Before Judgment, including
complying with court-ordered conditions, avoiding further criminal conduct, and
attending therapy.
Defendant suggests these previous sessions did not get to the “root cause” of
the issues. After the incident here, Defendant started therapy again. The therapy
consisted of attending sex addiction group sessions, a month of intensive treatment
at Triangle Springs, and meeting several times with different mental health
professionals. One of the psychologists, Dr. Bixler, began working with Defendant in
April 2024 and diagnosed Defendant with “Compulsive Sexual Behavior Disorder.”
Dr. Bixler could not “guarantee” Defendant would never reoffend but also opined his
placement on the sex offender registry is “unnecessary.”
Defendant asserted he understands the necessity of his participation in this
therapy “to not have this happen again.” When expressing his remorse, Defendant
also discussed: (1) how his sex addiction had never been properly diagnosed or
treated; (2) his commitment to recovery; and (3) the ramifications of placement on the
sex offender registry for his family, including his two young children.
After considering the totality of the facts presented, the trial court determined,
“based on the actions here, the prior history, even with the actions that [Defendant
-3- STATE V. JONES
took] and the efforts [he] made, there is still significant potential risk and danger to
the community overall.” The trial court signed a 615 Form on 6 May 2025—an official
court document used to enter additional findings and orders related to sex offender
registration—and found that the offense “did involve the physical, mental, or sexual
abuse of a minor.”
The trial court signed the judgment finding: (1) the offense is a reportable
conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-208.6 and imposes special conditions of
probation, and (2) the offense “involved the physical or mental abuse of a minor, and
therefore imposes the special condition[] of probation[.]”
On 13 May 2025, Defendant filed and served his notice of appeal of the trial
court’s judgment, which included a conviction of Felony Secret Peeping and Registry
on the Sex Offender Registry. Additionally, on 26 November 2025, Defendant filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to allow review of the trial court’s determination that
the offense of Felony Secret Peeping as set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d)
involved the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor within the meaning of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b2).
II. Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Trial Court’s Findings
Although a defendant who pleads guilty generally has limited appellate rights,
sex offender registration proceedings are treated differently. This Court has held
that such registration under Article 27A constitutes a “civil, non-punitive regulatory
-4- STATE V. JONES
regime” rather than criminal punishment. State v. White, 162 N.C. App. 183, 191,
590 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2004). Accordingly, appeals challenging a registration order are
governed by civil procedures and are reviewable by this Court despite a defendant’s
guilty plea. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2023); see State v. Pell, 211 N.C. App. 376,
379, 712 S.E.2d 189, 191 (2011).
Here, Defendant challenges the trial court’s determination under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-202(l) that he “is a danger to the community” and must register as a sex
offender. Because Defendant challenges the registration order itself, rather than a
criminal judgment entered after his guilty plea, the limitations contained in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444 do not bar appellate review. Defendant's appeal from the final
registration order is properly before this Court.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d) explains that a person commits a Class I felony
when they secretly peep into a room and use a device to photograph another
individual for the purpose of sexual gratification. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d) (2023).
The sentencing court is mandated to determine whether the defendant “is a danger
to the community” and if sex offender registration is necessary to further the purposes
of Article 27A. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(l). Since N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(l) is silent
regarding the criteria and relevant period for determining if a defendant is a “danger
to the community,” it is the responsibility of the sentencing court to determine if the
defendant currently constitutes a danger to the community. State v. Fuller, 376 N.C.
862, 867, 855 S.E.2d 260, 265 (2021).
-5- STATE V. JONES
This standard may be satisfied by the defendant demonstrating a “reasonable
probability” of future recidivism based on his relevant past conduct. Id. at 868, 855
S.E.2d at 265. Notably, this determination does not rest on a singular fact or isolated
predictive analysis. Id. at 868, 855 S.E.2d at 266. Instead, the trial court must reach
its finding by weighing the cumulative evidence contained in the record. Id.
The trial court’s determination of whether an individual “is a danger to the
community” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(l) is an ultimate fact. Id. at 864, 855
S.E.2d at 263 (citing Woodard v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 470, 67 S.E.2d 639, 644
(1951)). This finding represents the “final resulting effect” reached through logical
reasoning based on the evidentiary facts appearing on the record. Id. On appeal, a
trial court’s finding of an ultimate fact is conclusive if the evidentiary facts appearing
on the record reasonably support that finding. Id. (citing Williams v. Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 288 N.C. 338, 343, 218 S.E.2d 368, 372 (1975)). Only when there is no “rational
connection” between the basic facts and the ultimate fact, or the evidentiary findings
do not “adequately address” the legal conclusion(s), the ultimate fact is not binding
on appeal. State v. Geter, 383 N.C. 484, 501, 881 S.E.2d 209, 220 (2022) (Earls, J.
dissenting).
The trial court’s finding of danger is supported by two factors identified in
Fuller: (1) the defendant’s ability and willingness to cause significant and lasting
emotional harm to the victim; and (2) the ease with which the defendant could commit
similar crimes again in the future. 376 N.C. at 869, 855 S.E.2d at 266. Here, the
-6- STATE V. JONES
evidence of a pattern based on the 2017 Maryland incident, coupled with Defendant’s
own admission to the officer at the scene that he had a problem, provided reasonable
support for the court to determine a reasonable probability of recidivism exists.
Defendant claims he was unaware the victim was a minor, but the record indicates
his conduct caused lasting emotional harm based on the testimony of the victim’s
father, specifically by disrupting the victim’s sense of safety in public spaces. The
statement provided by the victim's father not only addressed the emotional impact on
the minor victim but also detailed the blatant nature of the crime and the ease with
which Defendant could reoffend.
However, Defendant contends the evidentiary findings were insufficient to
establish that he constitutes a present or prospective danger to the community.
Specifically, Defendant asserts the trial court erred by reaching its ultimate finding
by relying exclusively on a 2017 Maryland incident. Defendant maintains the trial
court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors appearing on the record,
including his lack of stealth and sophistication, the specific nature of the privacy
invasion, and his immediate, voluntary commitment to therapy.
Defendant emphasizes his voluntary commitment to therapy and other
rehabilitative efforts, but this evidence does not prevent a trial court from reaching
an ultimate finding of dangerousness if the weight of the evidence supports a contrary
conclusion as mandated under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(l). Here, the record includes
a 2017 incident in Maryland where Defendant admitted to “visual surveillance of a
-7- STATE V. JONES
private place with prurient intent,” demonstrating a pattern of relevant past conduct.
Notably, Defendant completed a therapeutic program as part of his Maryland
discharge but repeated the behavior here.
We affirm the trial court’s order requiring Defendant to register as a sex
offender because the evidentiary findings adequately support the ultimate finding
that Defendant “is a danger to the community” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(l).
B. Special Condition of Probation
Defendant also challenges a special condition of his probation resulting from
his guilty plea. Defendant argues the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding
the offense of peeping set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202(d) involved the physical,
mental, or sexual abuse of a minor within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1343(b2). Alternatively, if no appeal of right exists, Defendant petitions this Court
to exercise its discretionary authority and issue a writ of certiorari to review the issue.
The right to appeal in a criminal proceeding is created by statute. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1444 (2025). When a defendant enters a plea of guilty in superior court,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a2) strictly limits the grounds for appeal as a matter of
right to three specific categories: (1) incorrect findings of prior record levels; (2)
unauthorized sentence dispositions; or (3) unauthorized terms of imprisonment.
Here, Defendant’s challenge to a special condition of probation does not fall within
any of these narrow statutory exceptions. Consequently, he “is not entitled to
appellate review as a matter of right.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e). This Court
-8- STATE V. JONES
confirmed this jurisdictional bar in State v. Sale, dismissing a similar challenge to a
special condition of probation because such an issue is not listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1444(a2) and therefore does not confer a right to appeal. 232 N.C. App. 662, 665,
754 S.E.2d 474, 477 (2014).
In instances where no direct right of appeal exists, a defendant’s sole
remaining avenue for review is to petition for a writ of certiorari. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1444(e). While this Court maintains jurisdiction to issue such writs “in aid of its
own jurisdiction[,]” judicial precedent requires a petitioner to satisfy a two-factor test
to demonstrate that review is appropriate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2025). First,
the petitioner must show “merit or that error was probably committed below[,]” and,
second, they must establish “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the writ, such
as “substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘wide-reaching
issues of justice and liberty at stake.’” State v. Springs, 292 N.C. App. 207, 213, 897
S.E.2d 30, 36 (2024) (citing Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCA, 384 N.C. 569, 572–73,
887 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2023)).
Defendant lacks a statutory right to appeal and has failed to demonstrate
either probable error or extraordinary circumstances warranting discretionary
review. Accordingly, we deny his writ of certiorari.
III. Conclusion
The trial court’s ultimate finding that Defendant was a danger to the
community was reasonably supported by the evidentiary findings in the record;
-9- STATE V. JONES
therefore, we affirm the registration order. Furthermore, Defendant has no statutory
right to appeal the special conditions of his probation following a guilty plea, and we
deny his writ of certiorari.
AFFIRMED.
Judges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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