An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-660
Filed 15 April 2026
Guilford County, Nos. 21CR079882-400, 21CR079883-400, 21CR079885-400, 22CR026020-400
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JAMES ARTHUR JONES, III
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 September 2024 by Judge
Stephanie L. Reese in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
11 March 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General BreAnna VanHook, for the State.
Gilda C. Rodriguez, for Defendant.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
James Arthur Jones, III (“defendant”) appeals from judgment entered after
jury trial where he was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon,
misdemeanor possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, and simple possession
of a Schedule VI controlled substance. Defendant admitted to having attained the STATE V. JONES
Opinion of the Court
status of habitual felon. For the following reasons, we find no plain error and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
I. Introduction
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following events. On
4 August 2021, Jonnie Joyce (“Mr. Joyce”) and James Wagner (“Mr. Wagner”) had
walked to a gas station on Brentwood Street in High Point, where they saw defendant
driving a Jeep, and defendant agreed to drive them back to a nearby motel. At the
same time, High Point Police Department Detectives Hohn, Lanier, and Manzo were
in an unmarked vehicle patrolling the area, known for criminal activity. The officers
ran the Jeep’s license plate and found it was expired, so they conducted a traffic stop.
Defendant was in the driver’s seat, Mr. Joyce was in the front passenger seat, and
Mr. Wagner was in the rear.
Detective Hohn approached the driver’s side while Detective Lanier
approached the passenger side, and they smelled marijuana. Both Mr. Wagner and
Mr. Joyce told Detective Lanier they had just got into the car moments earlier.
Detective Lanier asked Mr. Joyce to step out, and in searching his person, found a
crack pipe and detained him. Mr. Wagner was also briefly detained but not charged,
because he freely admitted that he had a needle in his pocket before Detective Lanier
searched him.
Detective Manzo and Detective Hohn conducted a search of the vehicle. From
the driver’s door and the floorboards of both the driver’s and front passenger’s area,
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Detective Manzo recovered several pieces of a white substance and a clear plastic
baggie with a suspected illegal narcotic substance, as well as a bud of marijuana in
the front center console. Detective Hohn found suspected illegal narcotics and a
firearm under the front passenger seat. The State Crime Lab tested the unknown
substances and found they were fentanyl and ANPP, a chemical precursor to fentanyl.
Detective Hohn spoke with and searched defendant, who told Detective Manzo
he was driving Mr. Joyce’s car and was giving Mr. Joyce and Mr. Wagner a ride from
the gas station to their motel. Defendant was detained due to a suspended license
and had a powdery substance on his person. Defendant denied the gun was his.
However, he admitted that the Jeep was full of his possessions, and several of his
relatives arrived during the stop to retrieve his suitcase and other personal
belongings. Mr. Joyce, who testified at trial, was the Jeep’s registered owner, but he
was allowing defendant to use the vehicle for several weeks in exchange for crack
cocaine.
During the vehicle search, Detective Lanier noticed defendant speaking quietly
to Mr. Joyce and offered to speak to the men individually. At the scene, Mr. Joyce
first said he did not know the gun was under his seat. Defendant said, “He was letting
me drive his car, they pulled me over, and I guess, goddamn, they found his little gun
he be having in his car,” whereupon Mr. Joyce immediately stepped aside to speak to
an officer individually. Detective Hohn told Detective Lanier that Mr. Joyce said
defendant saw police behind them and told him to take a gun from under the gear
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shifter and put it under the front passenger seat. He also relayed that Mr. Wagner
confirmed that defendant had been driving the car and said he had never known Mr.
Joyce to carry a gun. Detective Lanier then spoke individually with Mr. Joyce and
confirmed that he heard defendant telling him to take the gun possession charge.
Detective Lanier said, “Trust me . . . . I know. You look pissed off and [defendant]
looks completely nervous.” At the police station, when the two men were in separate
adjacent holding cells, Detective Hohn heard defendant saying, “You take this,” and
Mr. Joyce responding, “I’m not taking this.”
At trial, Mr. Joyce testified that defendant asked him several times to throw
the gun underneath the passenger seat and he complied, and that defendant told him
to admit the gun was his, but Mr. Joyce refused. The State’s other evidence included
Detective Lanier’s body cam footage, and defendant did not object to its admission.
After its publication, and as it played for the jury, defendant objected to statements
Detective Hohn attributed to Mr. Wagner, who did not testify. The trial court
sustained the objection, struck the statements, and specifically instructed the jury to
disregard them. Three other videos were admitted and published for the jury without
objection: Detective Manzo’s body cam footage and video interviews with Mr. Joyce
and defendant.
The clerk of court testified that defendant was previously convicted of a felony.
Defendant moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State’s evidence, did not
present evidence or testify himself, then moved to dismiss the charges again, but the
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court denied both motions. The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm
by a felon, and misdemeanor possession of both fentanyl and marijuana. Defendant
stipulated to being a habitual felon. The court sentenced defendant to a term of 130
to 168 months imprisonment. He filed written notice of appeal on 30 September 2024.
II. Discussion
Defendant requests that we vacate his convictions and order a new trial. He
makes four arguments on appeal, which we discuss in turn.
A. Admission of the Interview Videos was Neither an Error Nor Plain Error
The video interviews with defendant and Mr. Joyce contain references to
defendant’s criminal history and previous incarceration, as well as inferences to gang
activity and Mr. Joyce’s fear for his safety. Defendant argues that the admission and
publication of these videos amounted to plain error.
Relevant evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2019). All relevant
evidence is admissible, except if disallowed by the Constitutions of the United States
and North Carolina, Acts of Congress or the General Assembly, or by the Rules of
Evidence. State v. Thomas, 281 N.C. App. 159, 186 (2021) (citing N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,
Rule 402).
North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: “Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
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that [the person] acted in conformity therewith.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2019).
Rule 404(b) is a “general rule of inclusion.” State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154
(2002) (quotes omitted). Rule 404(b) permits admission of any evidence “relevant to
any fact or issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.” State
v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 284, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994 (1995). Rule 403 supplies an
additional limitation on a trial court’s ability to admit evidence under Rule 404(b):
“Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2019).
“We review de novo the legal conclusion that the evidence is, or is not, within
the coverage of Rule 404(b).” State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130 (2012). When
a trial court weighs the likely probative and prejudicial value of evidence one party
offers over the opposing party’s objection, we review only for abuse of discretion. Id.
On appeal, defendant specifically challenged the admission of statements that
defendant had previous charges, had been in prison, and had two of his children
taken. But these facts were crucial to the meandering and contradictory story
defendant spun for police in his interview, in which he accuses Mr. Joyce of bringing
the gun into the Jeep without his knowledge, which he would never allow because, as
a felon, he cannot have guns in his car. “I know for a fact that I would never let this
man get in my car with a gun because I done stopped millions of people since 2014
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when I got that charge.” “I didn’t never knew that he had that gun in that car . . . .
Only time I knew he had that gun was when he pulled it out when y’all pulled us and
he tried to hide it.”
Defendant begins the interview by saying, “It was his car. I don’t do drugs. I
don’t sell drugs.” Seconds later, he admits to using marijuana that day. He then tells
police his version of how he and Mr. Joyce became acquainted. A few weeks prior,
defendant was at the motel to meet a woman and met Mr. Joyce through friends. He
says he made a deal to borrow Mr. Joyce’s Jeep, in exchange for money Mr. Joyce
needed to buy drugs. They repeated the deal the following day and had been making
the same exchanges for the Jeep ever since, with cash. However, defendant says that,
other than the bud of marijuana, the drugs in the car are Mr. Joyce’s, and he claims
that the motel would verify the gun is Mr. Joyce’s because he was repeatedly using it
to rob prostitutes at the motel. “Anything I say can be verified. He had that gun
before today. You can go to the hotel room and talk to them people.”
Setting aside the obvious question why any motel would knowingly host a
guest who repeatedly robs women at gunpoint on its premises, the statements about
defendant’s criminal history were directly relevant to issues other than his propensity
to commit the charged offense. They are both relevant and probative on the factual
question whether the gun was in his actual or constructive possession, because his
entire interview hinges on his repeated claims that he would not allow a gun in the
vehicle because of his criminal history.
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Furthermore, the interview’s probative value is not outweighed by unfair
prejudice. The nature of defendant’s previous offense is never discussed. Moreover,
the challenged statements are far less prejudicial than the various contradictions of
defendant’s story. He admits the Jeep was full of his clothing and other personal
belongings, but claims the gun and drugs are not his, including the drugs found on
the driver’s door and floorboard. He claims that he does not sell drugs himself, but
says he knows the dealer who has been selling Mr. Joyce drugs with the cash
defendant gives him to use the Jeep. And he claims knowledge that Mr. Joyce is
armed and dangerous, but has continued to do business with him, drive his Jeep, and
let him ride in its passenger seat, even though defendant is already a felon who
cannot be around firearms. By comparison, the mere mention of defendant’s criminal
past is minimally prejudicial. Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting his
interview video in full.
Defendant also challenges statements from Mr. Joyce’s interview: that
defendant threatened him and that he fears for his safety because defendant is
involved in gang activity and would kill him if he does not say the gun is his.
Mr. Joyce’s interview is consistent with his testimony in all relevant details.
He admits that, while in town for a job, he has allowed defendant to use the Jeep in
exchange for drugs for the preceding two weeks, alleging that defendant comes to the
motel several times a day to make drug transactions. The week before the arrests,
he told defendant he would need the Jeep back, and he claims defendant threatened
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him in response. Asked if defendant is in a gang, Mr. Joyce says he is, and that his
street name is “Big Fool.”
Mr. Joyce says he panicked after officers began tailing the Jeep and defendant
told him, “Man, move that gun.” He says he picked up the gun by the barrel and
threw it under the seat, and that his fingerprints would not be found on the handle.
They discuss his attempt to take the officers aside to tell them that defendant was
trying to convince him to take the gun charge, and the officer confirms that he heard
defendant saying this on the scene. Mr. Joyce tearfully accepts the officers’ offer of
future assistance if defendant puts him in danger.
These statements about defendant’s other criminal activity were properly
admissible, as they “establishe[d] the chain of circumstances [and] context” of the
possession charges and were “necessary to complete the story of the charged crime
for the jury.” White, 340 N.C. at 284. Moreover, his details help explain the holes in
defendant’s story, and they elucidate Detective Hohn’s testimony that Mr. Joyce’s
visible “fear” at the scene was the turning point for the investigation. The statements
are relevant and probative as to defendant’s knowledge at the time of the stop, and
therefore whether he actually or constructively possessed the gun. Because of their
detail, Mr. Joyce’s statements were slightly more prejudicial than defendant’s
statements, but this prejudice does not outweigh their probative value for the jury.
In fact, the State offered this evidence although it was arguably highly prejudicial to
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its own case. The drug transactions and his decision to ride alongside a man who
recently threatened him risked affecting the credibility of Mr. Joyce’s testimony.
Defendant did not object to the admission of the two interview videos, so we
review their admission only for plain error. Because the statements were relevant
for various reasons other than defendant’s propensity to commit the charged offenses
and more probative than prejudicial, the trial court did not err in admitting the full
videos. Accordingly, further analysis is unnecessary here. Without a “grave” error
denying a “fundamental right of the accused,” no showing of plain error is possible.
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660 (1983). Therefore, this argument cannot succeed.
B. Admission of the Body Cam Videos was not Plainly Erroneous
The court initially admitted Detective Lanier’s body cam footage as State’s
Exhibit 1 without objection. Approximately the first 24 minutes of the video played
for the jury before defense counsel raised a hearsay objection to the statements
attributed to Mr. Wagner and spoken off-camera, that Mr. Wagner had never known
Mr. Joyce to carry a gun, which Detective Hohn relays to Detective Lanier. The State
argued that his statements were not “offered for the truth of the matter” but as
“essentially assisting the law enforcement officers in determining what their next
step should be.”
The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury: “I’m going to strike
any testimony from Detective Hohn -- Officer Hohn on the screen about statements
from a Mr. Wagner.” The jury then saw the rest of the video. Defendant did not
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object to the admission of the State’s Exhibit 2, Detective Manzo’s body cam footage.
In that video, Detective Hohn states that Mr. Wagner “confirmed” Mr. Joyce had not
been driving the vehicle, and Mr. Joyce says, “[Mr. Wagner] says it’s not my gun.”
Defendant did not object while the video was played or to the remainder of the State’s
direct examination of Detective Manzo.
On appeal, defendant contends that all three statements attributed to Mr.
Wagner were inadmissible hearsay, and their erroneous admission amounts to plain
error. “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801; see State v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 35 (2002)
(“The prohibition against hearsay bars the admission of out-of-court statements
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”) (citation omitted).
Because Mr. Wagner did not testify, the three challenged statements are
hearsay. However, as to the first statement, to which defendant objected, “it is well-
settled in this jurisdiction that when the court withdraws incompetent evidence and
instructs the jury not to consider it, any prejudice is ordinarily cured.” State v. Smith,
301 N.C. 695, 697 (1981). Because the court withdrew the statement and expressly
instructed the jury not to consider it, any prejudice from its introduction was
effectively cured.
“To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the
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ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent
from the context.” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (2021). Because the court admitted
without objection the next two statements attributed to Mr. Wagner, we review their
admission for plain error. To show plain error, defendant must first show that a
fundamental and “grave” error occurred at trial, amounting to “a denial of a
fundamental right of the accused.” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660. Defendant then must
show both that the error “had a probable impact on the outcome, meaning that absent
the error, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict” and that the
“error is an exceptional case,” requiring a showing that it “seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Reber, 386
N.C. 153, 158 (2024) (citations and quotation marks omitted). As to probable impact,
“[t]he test examines the state of all the evidence except for the challenged evidence
and asks whether, in light of that remaining evidence, the jury probably would have
done something different.” Id. at 162. “In ordinary English usage, an event will
‘probably’ occur if it is ‘almost certainly’ the expected outcome; it is treated as
synonymous with words such as ‘presumably’ and ‘doubtless.’ ” Id. at 158.
As to Detective Hohn’s statement that defendant had been driving Mr. Joyce’s
Jeep, the admission had no probable impact on the outcome. The State’s other
competent evidence revealed defendant stated this fact multiple times, both at the
gas station and in his later interview. He cannot plausibly argue plain error here.
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The statement Mr. Joyce attributes to Mr. Wagner, that the gun was not Mr.
Joyce’s, raises a different question, because Detective Lanier’s body cam recorded Mr.
Wagner himself making other statements about the issue. Defendant raises no
objection about these statements. Although his speech is somewhat muddled, Mr.
Wagner clearly says that although he can “vouch for” Mr. Joyce, he knows nothing
about defendant or the gun and did not see any gun changing locations in the front
seat. Detective Lanier says, “If I give you a phone number, and you call us later
whenever they’re not here watching us, is it gonna be the same thing that
happened? . . . . We’ve heard different stories at this point, and you would be the one
to set it straight.” But Mr. Wagner sticks to his story.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “A violation of the Confrontation
Clause occurs when a ‘testimonial’ statement from an unavailable witness is
introduced against a defendant who did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant.” State v. Garner, 252 N.C. App. 393 (2017). “[P]retrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially” are “testimonial” for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51
(2004). Because Mr. Wagner spoke during an ongoing stop, after police discovered
contraband and handcuffed all three men, it would have been reasonable to expect a
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future prosecution to use his statements, and their introduction without his cross-
examination would appear to implicate the Confrontation Clause.
However, it is unclear that Mr. Wagner’s own statements even amount to
testimony. Lay opinion testimony encompasses “those opinions or inferences which
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” State v. Hill,
247 N.C. App. 342, 346 (2016). Here, the jury heard Mr. Wagner deny having
perceived anything about which he could have formed a rational opinion or inference
on the question of who possessed the gun or contraband. His statements offered the
jury no assistance whatsoever in determining the issue, about which this jury heard
multiple strands of testimony and evidence that were far more probative. Indeed,
their only effect was to negate the reliability of the statement Mr. Joyce attributed to
him. As a result, these statements actually prejudiced the State’s case and the
credibility of its key witness. Accordingly, the verdict would have been no different
absent either the challenged statement attributed to Mr. Wagner or the statements
recorded by Detective Lanier’s body cam.
In sum, because the trial court cured the erroneous introduction of Detective
Hohn’s hearsay statement, and because the other statements’ introduction generated
no prejudice against defendant, had no effect on the outcome, and were unexceptional
as to the integrity of this trial and the judicial process generally, defendant has failed
to show plain error in relation to the admission of the body cam videos.
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C. The Record Does Not Show Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel deprived him of effective
assistance by failing to file motions in limine and timely object to the admission and
publication of unredacted body camera and police interview videos. We disagree.
Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. See State v. Baker, 109 N.C. App. 643, 644 (1993); U.S. Const. amends. VI,
XIV; N.C. Const. Art. I §§ 19, 23. This right is abridged when (1) counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of professional reasonableness, and (2)
but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
867 (1984); State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563 (1985). However, we need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if we find a “lack of sufficient
prejudice” because the second prong of defendant’s ineffective assistance argument is
unavailing based on “the totality of the evidence.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 697;
see also Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Even assuming arguendo that it was unreasonable for defendant’s counsel to
forgo motions in limine and objections here, we have already concluded that the
verdict was most likely unaffected by the admission and publication of the full videos,
based on the totality of the evidence. The State offered the interview videos for proper
purposes, and their contents were sufficiently probative and insufficiently
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prejudicial, meeting the legal standard for admission. Admission of the unredacted
body cam footage neither unfairly prejudiced defendant nor raised the probability of
contrary jury verdicts. Therefore, defendant fails to show any violation of his
Constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
D. We Decline to Reach the Merits of Defendant’s Argument that N.C.G.S. § 14- 415.1 is Unconstitutional
Defendant was charged and convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon
under N.C.G.S. § 14.415-1(a). He argues that the statute is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied to him, burdening his right to bear arms in light of New York
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v.
Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). However, he concedes that this argument is
unpreserved on appeal, and requests that we exercise our discretion to invoke Rule 2
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure to reach the merits of his argument.
“To prevent manifest injustice to a party . . . either court of the appellate
division may . . . suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these rules
in a case pending before it . . . upon its own initiative.” N.C. R. App. P. 2. This Court’s
ability to invoke Rule 2 is discretionary. State v. Bursell, 372 N.C. 196, 201 (2019).
“Rule 2 relates to the residual power of our appellate courts to consider, in exceptional
circumstances, significant issues of importance in the public interest or to prevent
injustice which appears manifest to the Court and only in such instances.” State v.
Campbell, 369 N.C. 599, 603 (2017) (emphasis in original).
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Defendant concedes that this Court has upheld this statute following the above
Supreme Court opinions. See State v. Nanes, 297 N.C. App. 863 (2025) (rejecting
facial challenge); State v. Ducker, 298 N.C. App. 759, 770 (2025), cert. denied, 924
S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 2026). We are bound by this jurisprudence, and defendant has not
shown that his case gives rise to exceptional circumstances warranting review on the
merits pursuant to Rule 2. We therefore decline to invoke Rule 2 to reach defendant’s
argument as to this statute’s constitutionality.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we find no plain error and affirm the court’s judgment.
NO PLAIN ERROR.
Judges STROUD and WOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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