An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-770
Filed 3 June 2026
Craven County, Nos. 19CR050987-240, 21CR000093-240
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
LAJARVIS MARQUEZ JONES
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 January 2024 by Judge Craig
Croom in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
20 May 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Allison J. Newton, for the State.
MK Mann Law, by Mikayla Mann, for defendant-appellant.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Lajarvis Jones (“defendant”) appeals from judgment entered upon his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a penal
institution and attaining habitual felon status. For the following reasons, we discern
no error and affirm defendant’s convictions.
I. Background STATE V. JONES
Opinion of the Court
Defendant was incarcerated at Craven Correctional Institution (“CCI”). CCI
is divided into housing units which each include four different “blocks” where inmates
sleep. The dorms are connected to the other areas of the prison through sallyports
which have doors on either end that can only be opened by CCI’s Central Control.
Inmates at CCI are assigned to specific housing units and wear colored wristbands to
designate their assigned block. Each inmate also wears prison-issued cargo pants
with long pockets.
On 28 March 2019, Officer Mikayla Sykes was working in CCI’s Hatteras
housing unit. Officer Sykes had also been assigned to the same housing unit the day
prior and conducted rounds every hour. Officer Sykes saw defendant inside Hatteras
B block and did not recognize him as one of the inmates assigned to the Hatteras unit.
Defendant attempted to step out of the B block and Officer Sykes directed a control
officer to let defendant into the sallyport. Officer Sykes asked defendant where he
slept, and he responded that he slept in Bed 12. Officer Sykes testified she knew that
defendant was not assigned to Bed 12 but could not remember how she knew.
Finding it suspicious that defendant was in Hatteras B block, Officer Sykes
initiated a pat-frisk search of defendant’s person. Officer Sykes instructed defendant
to keep his hands on the wall during the search, but defendant kept lowering his right
hand to go into his pants pocket. When she patted down defendant’s right pants
pocket, Officer Sykes felt something. She reached into his pants pocket and pulled
out a piece of orange substance wrapped in clear cling wrap. Officer Sykes described
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the orange substance as small, “[a] little bigger than a pinky nail.” She found other
items in defendant’s pocket but none of them were improper.
Through her work, Officer Sykes was familiar with buprenorphine, or
“suboxone,” which she described as “an orange strip that melts on the tongue or
underneath the tongue” and can give the user a high. CCI did not allow inmates to
possess suboxone. Officer Sykes confiscated the orange strip in defendant’s pocket
and called for assistance. The Officer in Charge, Lieutenant Kelvin Windley took
pictures of the orange strip then placed the orange strip in an envelope, stapled a
contraband report to it, and put it in a contraband locker. The contraband was turned
over to local law enforcement on 1 April 2019.
The orange strip was then tested by Expert Forensic Chemist Jamie Weathers
of the North Carolina State Crime Lab. She described the strip as “an orange piece
of paper” with no pharmaceutical markings. Ms. Weathers weighed the orange strip
and it did not register a weight due to its small size. A preliminary color test of the
strip indicated the presence of an opiate-type substance. Ms. Weathers then analyzed
a sample of the orange strip using a gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer which
confirmed the presence of buprenorphine, a controlled substance.
On 1 March 2021, defendant was indicted for possession of a controlled
substance on the premises of a penal institution in violation of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(e)(9)
and attaining habitual felon status. The matter went to trial on 16 January 2024.
On 17 January 2024, it was brought to the attention of the trial court that Juror #1
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was seen speaking with an unknown man who had previously been seen in the
courtroom during the trial. The man was reportedly there for a family member’s trial.
The trial court questioned Juror #1 under oath to investigate any potential
misconduct. Juror #1 testified that he had met the man the day before and they had
a conversation. On the day of Juror #1’s testimony, the man spoke again after Juror
#1 initiated a conversation by saying “What’s up.” The conversation lasted around
30 seconds to one minute. When asked what they spoke about, Juror #1 testified that
the man asked him how long jury duty takes and told him that he was there to “pick
up one of his people.”
The trial court explained to Juror #1 that he could face the penalty of perjury
and asked if the unknown man would testify differently if asked about their
conversation. Juror #1 said that the unknown man would not testify about anything
different. The unknown man had already exited the building and consequently did
not testify about the conversation with Juror #1.
The State proposed removing Juror #1 and seating an alternate juror out of an
abundance of caution. Defendant opposed the removal of Juror #1 because his
conversation with the unknown man appeared to be innocuous and defendant had no
family in the area, so there was no reason to think the man was connected to
defendant. The trial court stated that though it had some concerns, Juror #1 had not
technically broken any of the trial court’s rules regarding who the jurors could
communicate with. Those rules included not discussing the case with friends and
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family and not communicating with parties, attorneys, or witnesses involved in the
case. Accordingly, the trial court initially did not remove Juror #1 but indicated that
they might revisit the issue at another time.
However, the State soon after informed the trial court that an officer, Deputy
Nelson, was previously stopped by a young man asking when court would resume
after lunch. Deputy Nelson wondered if it was the same person who spoke to Juror
#1, so he conferred with Deputy Hill, who originally observed Juror #1’s conversation.
Deputy Nelson concluded that the young man matched the description of the
unknown man that had spoken to Juror #1. Deputy Nelson later watched a video of
the man’s conversation with Juror #1 and testified that they appeared to be the same
person. He was unable to provide any additional information about why the man was
asking and whether he was inquiring specifically about when the jurors would be
back or simply when court would resume.
The trial court revisited the issue in its entirety and called Deputy Hill to
testify. Deputy Hill stated that his Captain had mentioned that the man was in the
audience and exhibited suspicious behavior. Deputy Hill watched the man as he
spoke to Juror #1 and said that the conversation appeared personal or private, as if
they knew each other. After that conversation, Deputy Hill asked the man why he
was there. The man said his family member was on trial and that his family member
was not defendant. At the State’s request, the trial court also called Major McFadyen,
who observed Juror #1 after he testified about his conversation. Major McFadyen
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stated that Juror #1 “had a frown on his face” and “did not appear to be very happy.”
The trial court, defendant, and the State also watched a video of Juror #1’s
conversation with the man. The video had no audio. The State argued that the video
was concerning because it showed the jury being dismissed, at which point the trial
court always instructs everyone else to remain seated. However, the man waited
near where the jury exited and Juror #1 and the man were in contact with each other
almost immediately after the jury was dismissed. Additionally, the State argued that
Juror #1’s demeanor after being questioned could indicate that the inquiry left “a bad
taste in his mouth” and he might “hold that against the State or the defendant[.]”
Defendant’s counsel agreed that the video showed Juror #1 going “virtually directly
to” the man. Defendant’s counsel also said that as an officer of the court, they had a
concern with leaving Juror #1 on the jury, but as defendant’s zealous advocate, their
position that Juror #1 should not be removed remained unchanged.
The trial court found that there were “too many coincidences in this case in
terms of the behavior of Juror #1 and the unnamed man who was in the back of the
courtroom.” Accordingly, the trial court found that the incident constituted
misconduct on the part of Juror #1. Juror #1 was dismissed and replaced with an
alternate.
At the conclusion of trial on 18 January 2024, the jury found defendant guilty
of possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a penal institution.
Defendant then pled guilty to attaining habitual felon status and was sentenced to
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96 to 128 months imprisonment. Defendant provided notice of appeal to this Court
in open court.
II. Discussion
Defendant raises two issues on appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss his possession charge; and 2) whether the trial court
abused its discretion by dismissing Juror #1 and replacing him with an alternate.
For the following reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err.
A. Standard of Review
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62 (2007) (citations omitted). “Upon defendant’s
motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so,
the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378 (2000) (quoting
State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98 (1980)). Substantial evidence exists if there “is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78 (1980) (citations omitted). “In making
its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether
competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State
the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its
favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192–93 (1994) (citations omitted).
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We review a trial court’s decision to remove an impaneled juror for abuse of
discretion. State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 628 (1989); State v. Knight, 262 N.C. App.
121, 129 (2018). “[T]he trial court’s determination is only an abuse of discretion if it
was manifestly unsupported by reason and is so arbitrary that it could not have been
the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Gillard, 386 N.C. 797, 853 (2024) (cleaned
up).
B. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant contends that the State presented insufficient evidence that he
violated N.C.G.S. § 90-95(e)(9). Specifically, defendant argues that since the
buprenorphine strip had no weight or identifying markings, the State failed to
demonstrate that he was aware of the strip in his pocket. Defendant likens the small
strip to residue and argues that additional evidence beyond the strip being found in
defendant’s pocket is necessary to show that he was aware of its presence and that it
was a controlled substance.
N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(3) states that it is unlawful for any person “[t]o possess a
controlled substance.” In turn, § 90-95(e)(9) states that “[a]ny person who violates
G.S. 90-95(a)(3) on the premises of a penal institution or local confinement facility
shall be guilty of a Class H felony.” Thus, to overcome defendant’s motion to dismiss,
the State had to provide substantial evidence that defendant (1) possessed a
controlled substance (2) in a penal institution. It is undisputed that defendant was
in a penal institution and that buprenorphine is a controlled substance.
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“Possession may be either actual or constructive. Actual possession requires a
party to have physical or personal custody of the item.” State v. Bowens, 140 N.C.
App. 217, 222 (2000) (citations omitted). For example, a person has actual possession
of items found on their person. See id. at 223. Meanwhile, “[c]onstructive possession
occurs when a defendant has ‘the intent and capability to maintain control and
dominion over [the contraband].’ ” State v. McNeil, 294 N.C. App. 233, 236 (2024)
(quoting State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 99 (2009)).
“To convict a defendant of possessing a controlled substance,” the State must
also prove “that defendant knowingly possessed the substance.” State v. Crudup, 157
N.C. App. 657, 662 (2003) (emphasis added). Actual possession can itself “giv[e] rise
to the inference defendant knowingly possessed the [controlled substance].” State v.
Johnson, 124 N.C. App. 462, 468 (1996). For example, in Johnson, this Court held
that testimony from an investigator stating that he recovered a bag containing 2.1
grams of cocaine from the defendant’s right front pants pocket was substantial
evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine. Id.
Possession of a controlled substance is unlawful regardless of the amount
involved. State v. Thomas, 20 N.C. App. 255, 257 (1973). Accordingly, “[t]his Court
has previously held that a residue quantity of a controlled substance, despite its not
being weighed, is sufficient to convict a defendant of possession of the controlled
substance . . . .” State v. Williams, 149 N.C. App. 795, 798–99 (2002) (citing Thomas,
20 N.C. App. 255). However, the amount possessed may still be relevant to
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defendant’s knowledge. For example, in Thomas, the defendant possessed a bottle
cap containing mere traces of heroin. Thomas, 20 N.C. App. at 257–58. This Court
held that evidence of defendant’s familiarity with heroin was relevant because
“[p]ossession of a bottle cap containing a residue as described in the evidence in this
case by a person unfamiliar with the uses of heroin might well be consistent with
innocent possession because of lack of knowledge by the possessor of the contraband
nature of the article possessed.” Id. at 258.
Defendant provides other examples of cases involving mere residue in which
there was circumstantial evidence outside of the defendant’s possession
demonstrating knowledge. In Williams, the defendant was apprehended “at a known
drug house after he absconded with a house arrest unit around his ankle” and
possessed a piece of drug paraphernalia containing cocaine residue. 149 N.C. App. at
797. Additionally, in State v. Davis, 186 N.C. App. 242, 247–48 (2007), residue of
methamphetamine was found in the defendant’s home and the defendant voluntarily
stated that the police found meth in his house that he used for pain relief. However,
in neither of those cases, nor in Thomas, did this Court find that the additional
circumstantial evidence was necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.
Here, defendant had actual possession of the buprenorphine strip because it
was found in his pants pocket. We hold that despite the strip’s small size and lack of
pharmaceutical markings, defendant’s actual possession is sufficient to give rise to
the inference that defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance.
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Moreover, even assuming arguendo, that additional circumstantial evidence was
needed to survive a motion to dismiss, the State met that burden. The State’s
evidence that the buprenorphine strip was protectively wrapped in cling wrap and
defendant repeatedly lowered his hand to the pocket where the strip was found
during the search suggests that defendant knew that the buprenorphine strip was in
his pocket and was a controlled substance. Altogether, the State presented
substantial evidence that defendant knowingly possessed the buprenorphine strip.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss.
C. Dismissal of Juror #1
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Juror
#1 because Juror #1 did not engage in misconduct by speaking with an uninterested
party. Defendant further alleges that the trial court failed to follow best practices
when it allowed the testifying deputies to hear the testimony of other witnesses.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a) allows an alternate juror to be seated and replace any
juror that “dies, becomes incapacitated or disqualified, or is discharged” prior to a
verdict being rendered. Trial courts may discharge a juror based on misconduct. See
State v. Nobles, 297 N.C. App. 719, 722 (2025); State v. Drake, 31 N.C. App 187, 190–
91 (1976). Our Supreme Court has also upheld juror substitutions made “to
safeguard the trial of defendant from even the appearance of impropriety.” State v.
Price, 301 N.C. 437, 453–54 (1980).
“When allegations of juror misconduct are made, the trial court must make
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‘such investigations as may be appropriate’ to determine if misconduct has occurred
and if the defendant has been prejudiced.” State v. Galbreath, 295 N.C. App. 523, 527
(2024) (quoting Drake, 31 N.C. App. at 191). “[Q]uestions of juror misconduct and its
effect depend on facts and circumstances specific to the case.” Id. (citation omitted).
“[T]he trial court is in the best position to examine the facts and circumstances” due
to its ability to “question witnesses and observe their demeanor, and make
appropriate findings.” Id. at 527, 529 (citation omitted); see also Knight, 262 N.C.
App. at 129. Accordingly, “we give great weight to its determination of whether juror
misconduct occurred” and rarely disturb trial court rulings on juror misconduct where
the court conducted a sufficient investigation. Galbreath, 295 N.C. App. at 527–29.
Here, the State made an allegation of juror misconduct and the trial court
properly responded by conducting a thorough investigation. The trial court
considered testimony from several witnesses including deputies and the juror
himself. The trial court also reviewed a video of Juror #1 speaking to the unknown
man and found that the man had been waiting for the jury to come down, and Juror
#1 went over to him and engaged in conversation. The trial court allowed the State
and defendant to be heard on the matter. Both the State and defendant’s attorney
expressed at least some level of concern that leaving Juror #1 on the jury would invite
error into the proceedings.
While defendant argues that the investigation was impaired by the fact that
the deputies could hear the other testimony, defendant concedes that there is no strict
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requirement that the witnesses be separated. Notably, the trial court had no advance
notice that each of the deputies would be relevant witnesses in order to separate
them. Deputy Nelson only realized that his conversation with the man was
significant after he heard Juror #1’s testimony, and the State first requested to
question Major McFadyen after Deputy Nelson and Deputy Hill had provided their
testimonies. Additionally, the trial court’s finding of misconduct was also supported
by Juror #1’s testimony and the video which were not affected by the deputies’
testimony. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court conducted
a sufficient investigation into Juror #1’s misconduct. Accordingly, we give great
weight to its finding of misconduct.
Defendant relies on Juror #1’s testimony to argue that no misconduct actually
occurred because the contents of Juror #1’s conversation with the man was innocuous.
However, the trial court had discretion to assess the juror’s credibility and weigh his
testimony with the other evidence. Moreover, even without testimony that the
contents of juror #1’s conversation was improper, the conversation created the
appearance of impropriety and the trial court acted reasonably in safeguarding the
trial by removing Juror #1. See Price, 301 N.C. at 453–54. Therefore, we hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Juror #1 and substituting
him with an alternate.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions.
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NO ERROR.
Judges TYSON and GRIFFIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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