SEVERSON, Presiding Circuit Judge.
[¶ 1J William J. Janklow (Janklow) appeals the trial court’s refusal to stay execution of his sentence and grant bail pending his appeal. Janklow filed a motion to suspend the rules pursuant to SDCL 15-26A-2 and requested that this Court hear this matter on an expedited basis. We granted the request and an expedited briefing schedule was approved in an order dated March 5, 2004. We find that the denial of bail was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] Janklow was charged in Moody County with the offenses of failure to stop at a stop sign, speeding, reckless driving, and second degree manslaughter. The charges arose from an August 16, 2003 collision in which Randolph Scott was killed. Janklow entered a not guilty plea to the charges and requested a jury trial.
[113.] A jury trial commenced on December 1, 2003 in Flandreau, South Dakota. On December 8, 2003, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four charges. A presentence investigation was ordered prior to the sentencing hearing held on January 22, 2004. Pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-13, the trial court granted a suspended imposition of sentence on the second degree manslaughter charge. As required by statute, Janklow consented to the suspended imposition of sentence.
[¶ 4.] Under the suspended imposition of sentence, the trial court placed Janklow on probation for a period of three years upon certain conditions, including that Janklow serve 100 days in the Minnehaha County Jail, pay a fine in the amount of $5,000, and that he not drive a motor vehicle during the term of probation. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the charges of reckless driving, speeding and failure to stop at a stop sign. As to the reckless driving charge, Janklow was ordered to serve thirty days in the Minnehaha County jail concurrent with the jail time ordered on the second degree manslaughter charge and pay a fine in the amount of $350. He was also ordered to pay a $200 fine on both the speeding charge and failure to stop at a stop sign charge.
[191]*191[¶ 5.] Janklow reported to the Minne-haha County Jail on February 7, 2004 to begin serving his jail time. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial on February 18, 2004. After filing an appeal as to the reckless driving and second degree manslaughter convictions, Janklow moved the trial court to stay the execution of his sentence and release him on bail pending appeal. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 2, 2004. After making findings of fact on the record, the trial court denied the motion to stay execution of the sentence and for bail pending appeal. Janklow filed this appeal of the order denying his motion for stay and bail pending appeal. We granted expedited appeal proceedings in this matter.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 6.] The denial of bail pending appeal is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. “ “We determine that an abuse of discretion occurred only if no judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.’ ” Lakota Community Homes, Inc. v. Randall, 2004 SD 16, 9, 675 N.W.2d 437, 440 (quoting City of Sioux Falls v. Johnson, 2003 SD 115, 6, 670 N.W.2d 360, 362 (citations omitted)). In applying the abuse of discretion standard, ‘we do not determine whether we would have made a like decision, only whether a judicial mind, considering the law and the facts, could have reached a similar decision.’ State v. Aesoph, 2002 SD 71, 31, 647 N.W.2d 743, 754-55 (quoting State v. Fowler, 1996 SD 78, 12, 552 N.W.2d 92, 94-5 (citations omitted)).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 7.] “It is well settled that a state petitioner is without an absolute federal constitutional right to bail pending appeal after conviction.” Grooms v. Solem, 562 F.Supp. 512, 513 (D.S.D.1983) (citations omitted). However, South Dakota has a statute permitting bail pending appeal. SDCL 23A-43-16 provides:1
On motion of a defendant who has been convicted of an offense, the court in which the conviction was had may release the defendant prior to the entry of judgment, pending the expiration of time for filing notice of appeal, and pending the outcome of the appeal. The court in determining the eligibility of the defendant for release shall consider the criteria as set forth in § 23A-43-4, the risk that the defendant will flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community, and in the case of an appeal, whether the appeal is frivolous or taken for purposes of delay. If the court in its discretion determines that the defendant is eligible for release, the court shall release the defendant in accordance with §§ 23A-43-2 and 23A-43-3. If, however, the judgment imposes only a fine, conditional release under this section is a matter of right. The provisions of §§ 23A-43-14 and 23A-43-15 do not apply to persons described in this section; however, other rights to judicial review of conditions of release or orders of detention are not affected.
[¶ 8.] While SDCL 23A-43-16 expressly precludes a motion pursuant to SDCL 23A-43-14 to the circuit court judge for an amendment of conditions of release and an appeal pursuant to SDCL 23A-43-15 for amendment of conditions of [192]*192release, an order denying bail pending appeal is an appealable order. See Grooms, 562 F.Supp. at 514; State v. Burgers, 1999 SD 140, 602 N.W.2d 277.
[¶ 9.] SDCL 23A-43-16 states that the court “may” release an individual on bail pending appeal. SDCL 23A-43-16 is a discretionary statute. Burgers, 1999 SD 140 at ¶ 15, 602 N.W.2d at 281. Therefore, a denial of bail pending appeal is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard with deference to the decision of the trial court judge. See Burgers, 1999 SD 140 at ¶ 15, 602 N.W.2d at 281. However, when “a state makes provisions for bail pending appeal, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that it may not be denied arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Grooms, 562 F.Supp. at 513 (citations omitted).
[¶ 10.] Although State v. Hickey, 269 N.W.2d 816, 818 (S.D.1978) was decided under the prior statute which granted both the trial court judge and a justice of the Supreme Court the power to grant bail pending appeal, it referred to US ex rel. Bad Heart Bull v. Parkinson, 381 F.Supp. 985 (D.S.D.1974)2 in outlining the procedure for handling applications for bail pending appeal. This Court stated:
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SEVERSON, Presiding Circuit Judge.
[¶ 1J William J. Janklow (Janklow) appeals the trial court’s refusal to stay execution of his sentence and grant bail pending his appeal. Janklow filed a motion to suspend the rules pursuant to SDCL 15-26A-2 and requested that this Court hear this matter on an expedited basis. We granted the request and an expedited briefing schedule was approved in an order dated March 5, 2004. We find that the denial of bail was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] Janklow was charged in Moody County with the offenses of failure to stop at a stop sign, speeding, reckless driving, and second degree manslaughter. The charges arose from an August 16, 2003 collision in which Randolph Scott was killed. Janklow entered a not guilty plea to the charges and requested a jury trial.
[113.] A jury trial commenced on December 1, 2003 in Flandreau, South Dakota. On December 8, 2003, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four charges. A presentence investigation was ordered prior to the sentencing hearing held on January 22, 2004. Pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-13, the trial court granted a suspended imposition of sentence on the second degree manslaughter charge. As required by statute, Janklow consented to the suspended imposition of sentence.
[¶ 4.] Under the suspended imposition of sentence, the trial court placed Janklow on probation for a period of three years upon certain conditions, including that Janklow serve 100 days in the Minnehaha County Jail, pay a fine in the amount of $5,000, and that he not drive a motor vehicle during the term of probation. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the charges of reckless driving, speeding and failure to stop at a stop sign. As to the reckless driving charge, Janklow was ordered to serve thirty days in the Minnehaha County jail concurrent with the jail time ordered on the second degree manslaughter charge and pay a fine in the amount of $350. He was also ordered to pay a $200 fine on both the speeding charge and failure to stop at a stop sign charge.
[191]*191[¶ 5.] Janklow reported to the Minne-haha County Jail on February 7, 2004 to begin serving his jail time. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial on February 18, 2004. After filing an appeal as to the reckless driving and second degree manslaughter convictions, Janklow moved the trial court to stay the execution of his sentence and release him on bail pending appeal. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 2, 2004. After making findings of fact on the record, the trial court denied the motion to stay execution of the sentence and for bail pending appeal. Janklow filed this appeal of the order denying his motion for stay and bail pending appeal. We granted expedited appeal proceedings in this matter.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 6.] The denial of bail pending appeal is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. “ “We determine that an abuse of discretion occurred only if no judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.’ ” Lakota Community Homes, Inc. v. Randall, 2004 SD 16, 9, 675 N.W.2d 437, 440 (quoting City of Sioux Falls v. Johnson, 2003 SD 115, 6, 670 N.W.2d 360, 362 (citations omitted)). In applying the abuse of discretion standard, ‘we do not determine whether we would have made a like decision, only whether a judicial mind, considering the law and the facts, could have reached a similar decision.’ State v. Aesoph, 2002 SD 71, 31, 647 N.W.2d 743, 754-55 (quoting State v. Fowler, 1996 SD 78, 12, 552 N.W.2d 92, 94-5 (citations omitted)).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 7.] “It is well settled that a state petitioner is without an absolute federal constitutional right to bail pending appeal after conviction.” Grooms v. Solem, 562 F.Supp. 512, 513 (D.S.D.1983) (citations omitted). However, South Dakota has a statute permitting bail pending appeal. SDCL 23A-43-16 provides:1
On motion of a defendant who has been convicted of an offense, the court in which the conviction was had may release the defendant prior to the entry of judgment, pending the expiration of time for filing notice of appeal, and pending the outcome of the appeal. The court in determining the eligibility of the defendant for release shall consider the criteria as set forth in § 23A-43-4, the risk that the defendant will flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community, and in the case of an appeal, whether the appeal is frivolous or taken for purposes of delay. If the court in its discretion determines that the defendant is eligible for release, the court shall release the defendant in accordance with §§ 23A-43-2 and 23A-43-3. If, however, the judgment imposes only a fine, conditional release under this section is a matter of right. The provisions of §§ 23A-43-14 and 23A-43-15 do not apply to persons described in this section; however, other rights to judicial review of conditions of release or orders of detention are not affected.
[¶ 8.] While SDCL 23A-43-16 expressly precludes a motion pursuant to SDCL 23A-43-14 to the circuit court judge for an amendment of conditions of release and an appeal pursuant to SDCL 23A-43-15 for amendment of conditions of [192]*192release, an order denying bail pending appeal is an appealable order. See Grooms, 562 F.Supp. at 514; State v. Burgers, 1999 SD 140, 602 N.W.2d 277.
[¶ 9.] SDCL 23A-43-16 states that the court “may” release an individual on bail pending appeal. SDCL 23A-43-16 is a discretionary statute. Burgers, 1999 SD 140 at ¶ 15, 602 N.W.2d at 281. Therefore, a denial of bail pending appeal is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard with deference to the decision of the trial court judge. See Burgers, 1999 SD 140 at ¶ 15, 602 N.W.2d at 281. However, when “a state makes provisions for bail pending appeal, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that it may not be denied arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Grooms, 562 F.Supp. at 513 (citations omitted).
[¶ 10.] Although State v. Hickey, 269 N.W.2d 816, 818 (S.D.1978) was decided under the prior statute which granted both the trial court judge and a justice of the Supreme Court the power to grant bail pending appeal, it referred to US ex rel. Bad Heart Bull v. Parkinson, 381 F.Supp. 985 (D.S.D.1974)2 in outlining the procedure for handling applications for bail pending appeal. This Court stated:
We are of the opinion that such applications should originally be made and heard before the trial court. We are aware that during the course of the proceedings and trial, the trial court has heard evidence which would allow it to make an adequate inquiry to bring forth pertinent facts at a bail hearing. After such hearing, the trial court may set a reasonable bail pending appeal or deny such bail with findings of fact sufficient to pass the “constitutional muster” alluded to in the Bad Heart Bull decisions.
It will then be for this court to determine from the record made whether a reasonable bail has been set, whether the denial of bail is constitutionally permissible ....
Hickey, 269 N.W.2d at 818.
[¶ 11.] In Bad Heart Bull, 381 F.Supp. at 987, the federal district court stated:
In the opinion of this court, the failure of the trial judge to indicate on the record, at the time of his ruling, the factors he considered and facts upon which he relied, constitutes a violation in itself of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. As is stated in United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F.Supp. 784, 787 (N.D.Ill):
When a state court denies bail authorized by the state legislature without providing any supporting reasons, the failure to indicate the motivating reasons for the denial of bail is in and of itself an arbitrary action that violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Any other rule would effectively nullify the protection of those Amendments.
[¶ 12.] SDCL 23A-43-16 provides that the court “consider the criteria as set forth in § 23A-43-4, the risk that the defendant will flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community, and in the case of an appeal, whether the appeal is frivolous or taken for purposes of delay” in determining whether to grant bail pending appeal.3
[193]*193[¶ 13.] While this case has generated a great deal of public attention, Junk-low’s status as a public figure does not change the standard of review under which we review the trial court judge’s decision. The same criteria must be applied.4 We review the trial court judge’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard.
[¶ 14.] At the hearing on lank-low’s motion for stay of execution and bail pending appeal, the trial court judge heard details from Janklow’s attorney on the pertinent factors favoring granting bail. As in Burgers, we may presume that the trial court judge was familiar with the file and the relevant facts. Burgers, 1999 SD 140 at ¶ 15, 602 N.W.2d at 281. The trial court judge referred to factors found in SDCL 23A-43-4 and SDCL 23A-43-16. He made findings on the record at the time of his ruling regarding the factors he considered and his reasons for denying the motion. By his remarks, it is clear that he read the statutes and, therefore, considered the factors of each of them. Having presided over the trial, the trial court judge was in the best position to assess the weight of the evidence. In particular, the trial court judge commented on the nature and circumstances of the offense. The trial court judge also discussed the substantial weight of the evidence against the defendant. This case involves a serious felony in which a death occurred. The jury found Janklow guilty of the crimes charged. “Having been convicted, defendant is no longer clothed with the presumption of innocence.” State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 600 .(S.D.1977). As we have stated previously, there is no absolute right to bail pending appeal. The decision to grant bail pending appeal is discretionary. Burgers, 1999 SD 140 at ¶ 15, 602 N.W.2d at 281. The statutes and relevant case law do not require that findings be made on each factor, nor is there a requirement to balance the competing factors. The trial court judge made findings on pertinent statutory factors and those findings support the decision to deny bail pending appeal. The mere fact that the trial court judge mentioned other considerations does not rise to the level of abuse of discretion.
[¶ 15.] Applying the abuse of discretion standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion by the. trial court judge in refusing to stay execution and grant bail pending the outcome of the underlying appeal.5
[¶ 16.] Affirmed.
[194]*194[¶ 17.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER and MEIERHENRY, Justices, disqualified.
[¶ 18.] SEVERSON, Presiding Circuit Judge, and RUSCH, VON WALD, CALDWELL and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges, sitting by appointment.
[¶ 19.] CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, concurs.
[¶ 20.] BASTIAN, Circuit Judge, concurs specially.
[¶ 21.] RUSCH and VON WALD, Circuit Judges, dissent.