State v. Inoue

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

YUI INOUE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0214

FILED 08-19-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2024-006565-001

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Alice Jones Counsel for Appellee

Michael J. Dew Attorney at Law, Phoenix By Michael J. Dew Counsel for Appellant

Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Yui Inoue appeals her convictions and sentences for first-degree murder, child abuse and disorderly conduct. Inoue, through counsel, filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search of the record, no arguable question of law existed. Counsel asks this Court to search the record for reversible error. Inoue did not file a supplemental brief. After reviewing the record, this Court affirms Inoue’s convictions and sentences as modified.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This Court views the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining Inoue’s convictions and “resolve[s] all [reasonable] inferences against [Inoue].” State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).

¶3 Inoue’s convictions arise from the murder of her two minor children. After their recent divorce, Inoue had been staying at Husband’s apartment and was in the process of moving out. Late one night after their children went to bed, Inoue and Husband began arguing over the divorce settlement. Inoue demanded $3,000 from Husband, the remaining balance from their divorce agreement. Husband promised to get the money the next morning. Inoue became angry, destroying Husband’s monitor, laptop and keyboard by pounding on it and slashing it with a cleaver. Feeling

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this Court when the matter

was assigned to this panel of the Court. He retired effective June 30, 2026. In accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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threatened, Husband fled from the home telling Inoue that he was leaving to try to get the money that night. Shortly after leaving the apartment, Husband called police and reported the incident.

¶4 Officers responded and conducted a welfare check at the apartment in the early morning hours the next day. They contacted Inoue and noticed a damaged cleaver in the kitchen sink. They also observed the children sleeping in a bedroom. In another room, they found multiple items thrown around, including a severely damaged monitor, laptop and keyboard. The officer photographed the items, including the cleaver, and informed Inoue that Husband would not be returning that evening. The officers left.

¶5 Later that morning, Inoue flagged down a police officer. Based on his conversation with Inoue, the officer requested a welfare check at the apartment. Husband met other officers at the apartment and provided access for the welfare check. Upon entry, the officer on scene found blood and the children dead. Inoue was immediately arrested as she stood next to her vehicle. In a search subsequent to arrest, detectives found packed luggage, a cleaver containing hair and blood and bloodied clothing. The children’s autopsy determined that multiple sharp force and chop injuries to the head and neck area, including severed spinal cords, caused their deaths.

¶6 The State charged Inoue with two counts of first-degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1), (Counts 1 and 2), class 1 felonies and dangerous crimes against children; two counts of child abuse, A.R.S. § 13- 3623(A)(1), (Counts 3 and 4), class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children; and one count of disorderly conduct, A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(6), (Count 5), a class 6 felony.

¶7 The court held a 7-day jury trial where Inoue received assistance from an interpreter at all proceedings. At the start of trial and before each day of trial, Inoue waived her presence and declined to participate after the court’s colloquy on her rights. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Inoue moved for a judgment of acquittal on all charges. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). She claimed that no substantial evidence supported a conviction. The court denied her motion and the jury found Inoue guilty on all counts.

¶8 With Inoue present, the court sentenced her to two natural life terms on the first-degree murder counts (Counts 1 and 2); presumptive terms of 17 calendar years on the child abuse counts (Counts 3 and 4); and

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a presumptive term of 1 year on the disorderly conduct count (Count 5). See A.R.S. §§ 13-751(A), -705(F), -702(D). The court ordered all sentences to run consecutively. At sentencing, the court awarded Inoue 1,405 days of pre- sentence incarceration credit but its written order awarded her 1,447 days.

¶9 Inoue timely appealed and requested appellate counsel. The court appointed counsel for the appeal. This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 This Court reviews the entire record for reversible error. State v. Thompson, 229 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 3 (App. 2012). This Court has read and considered counsel’s brief and fully reviewed the record for reversible error, see Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300. This Court finds none.

I. The record supports exclusion of diminished capacity evidence at trial.

¶11 During pre-trial proceedings, Inoue initially notified the State that she would pursue guilty except insane proceedings but instead, later asserted insanity and diminished capacity defenses. The State moved to preclude those defenses arguing that outside a guilty except insane (“GEI”) trial, it would be improper to present an insanity defense or evidence of Inoue’s behavioral traits. The State noted in its motion that Inoue had not provided a mental health evaluation to support GEI proceedings. Counsel did not file a response to the State’s motion to preclude.

¶12 The superior court held oral argument on the State’s motion and waived Inoue’s presence for the hearing. During the hearing, Inoue’s counsel acknowledged the lack of response to the State’s motion, stating no legal argument supported opposing it. The parties discussed the admissibility of evidence for diminished capacity, but the court delayed the conversation until Inoue was present. The court then granted the State’s motion to preclude.

¶13 Diminished capacity evidence is only appropriate at sentencing for mitigation purposes, not to negate specific intent. State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 541 (1997); see also State v. Styers, 227 Ariz. 186, 189, ¶ 12 (2011). The court did not err in precluding evidence of diminished capacity during trial. But even so, a court may order a defendant be examined for competency if reasonable grounds exist for doing so. See A.R.S. § 13-4503 (“[A]ny party or the court on its own motion may request in writing that the defendant be examined to determine the defendant’s competency to

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stand trial, to enter a plea or to assist the defendant’s attorney.”); see also State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 162 (1990) (requirements for reasonable grounds before a court orders a competency hearing).

¶14 Here, early in the case, the superior court ordered Inoue to submit to a GEI evaluation. After that evaluation, the appointed physician found that though Inoue’s “mental health symptoms largely contributed to [Inoue’s] actions,” it did not “r[i]se to the level of a GEI defense.” The superior court appropriately allowed Inoue’s counsel to present information about Inoue’s mental health issues during sentencing. At sentencing, Inoue addressed the court stating that her children were alive and with her parents. Following this statement, the court asked Inoue’s counsel if there was “[a]ny legal cause” to not proceed with sentencing. Inoue’s counsel replied “No” and the court proceeded with sentencing. This Court discerns no error.

II. The court did not include the financial assessments in its oral pronouncement.

¶15 Though the record reveals minor errors occurred during sentencing, the superior court corrected one, and this Court corrects the other two.

¶16 First, the superior court initially pronounced a “presumptive term of 20 years, three calendar years or day for day consecutive” on Count 3 and a presumptive term of 20 years on Count 4 at sentencing. But these terms conflict with the statutory range. The court noticed this error during sentencing and corrected it, amending its findings to the statutory presumptive of 17-year terms. The sentencing order reflects the corrected sentence for both counts. See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992) (remand is appropriate only when pronouncement and minute entry cannot be resolved by reference to the record). And because Arizona law compelled the court to impose consecutive sentences on Counts 3, 4 and 5, no error occurred. See A.R.S. § 13-705(P) (“The sentence imposed on a person for any other dangerous crime against children in the first or second degree shall be consecutive to any other sentence imposed on the person at any time.”).

¶17 Second, the court’s sentencing order imposed six assessments on Inoue,

$20.00 probation assessment $13.00 criminal penalty assessment $50.00 family offense assessment

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$50.00 address confidentiality assessment $2.00 victim rights enforcement assessment $9.00 victim rights/compensation fund.

But the court’s oral pronouncement did not include these assessments. See State v. Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, 188, ¶ 38 (2013) (oral pronouncement of a sentence in open court controls over the sentencing order); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.16(a) (“The judgment of conviction and sentencing on the judgment are complete and valid at the time the court orally pronounces them in open court.”). Before sentencing Inoue, the court noted it reviewed the State’s and Inoue’s sentencing memorandum. But neither addressed the assessments. Moreover, neither the State nor the superior court discussed the assessments at sentencing. And the court did not address the issue when scheduling the restitution hearing.

¶18 The lack of discussion of the assessments in the sentencing memorandum and during sentencing results in the court’s inability to impose the fees through the sentencing order. See State v. Powers, 154 Ariz. 291, 295 (1987). This Court therefore modifies the sentencing order, striking the $20 mandatory probation assessment. See A.R.S. §§ 12-269(C), -114.01, - 116.06; State v. Gutierrez, 130 Ariz. 148, 150 (1981) (modifying a sentencing order to correct technical errors). And without any underlying fine, the court erred in imposing the remaining administrative fees. See State v. Dustin, 247 Ariz. 389, 392, ¶ 12 (App. 2019) (the criminal penalty assessment and victim rights’ enforcement assessment require a predicate fine or penalty); A.R.S. § 12-116.08 (the victims’ rights compensation fund also requires a predicate fine or penalty). This Court therefore further modifies the sentencing order, striking the $13 criminal penalty assessment, the $50 address confidentiality, the $50 family offense assessment, the $9 victims’ rights/compensation fund and the $2 victim rights enforcement assessment fee. See Ovante, 231 Ariz. at 188, ¶ 38; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.16(a).

¶19 Third and lastly, the court failed to award Inoue the proper amount of pre-sentence incarceration credit. Inoue was incarcerated on May 15, 2021 and sentenced on May 2, 2025. When calculating presentencing credit, the court excludes the sentencing date. State v. Hamilton, 153 Ariz. 244, 245–46 (App. 1987). At sentencing, the court awarded Inoue 1,405 days of credit. But in its sentencing order, the court awarded 1,447 days of credit. The court should have awarded Inoue 1,448 days of credit. This Court may correct pre-sentence incarceration credit but still affirm Inoue’s convictions and sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-4037; State v. Stevens, 173 Ariz. 494, 496 (App. 1992). Because the superior court’s

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calculation is incorrect and a detriment to Inoue, this Court directs the sentencing order be corrected.

¶20 Other than these issues, the record reflects that the superior court afforded Inoue all her constitutional and statutory rights and that it conducted the proceedings in compliance with the Rules. Counsel represented Inoue at all critical stages, and the court provided interpreter services during proceedings. Although Inoue did not attend trial, she expressly waived her right to be present after an advisement of her rights. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1. The evidence presented at trial supports the jury’s verdicts. The court properly composed and instructed the jury, and the record contains no evidence of jury misconduct.

CONCLUSION

¶21 This Court affirms Inoue’s convictions and sentences as modified by this decision. Unless defense counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review, counsel’s obligations regarding Inoue’s appeal will end once informing her of the outcome of this appeal and her future options. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Inoue shall have 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if she desires, with a pro per motion for reconsideration or petition for review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.3(a), 31.20(c), 31.21(b)(2)(A).

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR