An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-873
Filed 5 November 2025
Wake County, No. 21CR205416-910
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ERICK GAEL HERNANDEZ-MENDEZ
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 March 2024 by Judge Keith O.
Gregory in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May
2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Henry, for the State.
Marilyn G. Ozer for defendant.
FREEMAN, Judge.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him
guilty of first-degree murder. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in (1)
admitting testimony of an overheard phone call made by the victim; and (2) excluding
testimony of statements made by defendant’s roommate about being good with STATE V. HERNANDEZ-MENDEZ
Opinion of the Court
knives. After careful review, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial free
from prejudicial error.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following. Defendant and
Kailey Lynch had been friends since childhood. In the summer of 2020, defendant
met Christina Matos. Kailey and Christina had been friends since middle school but
went through periods when they did not speak to each other. Defendant, Kailey, and
Christina graduated from the same high school in 2020.
Defendant was a gay man who moved to the United States from Mexico when
he was a toddler; he was not a United States citizen. After graduating from high
school, defendant took classes at Johnston Community College and Liberty
University online and worked 80 hours per week at a yarn plant.
In August 2020, Kailey and Christina moved into apartment 220 at the
Signature 1505 apartment building near the North Carolina State University
campus. The apartment had four separate bedrooms and a common kitchen and
living area. Each bedroom was leased and locked individually. The remaining two
rooms were occupied by Jayda Kerlew and Reagan Orr, who were assigned to live in
apartment 220 through the apartment building’s roommate selection process. The
four roommates had a tense relationship: Jayda and Reagan repeatedly contacted
apartment management to complain about Kailey and Christina’s behavior.
Around December 2020, defendant told Christina that he wanted to obtain a
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green card. To help him do so, Christina agreed to marry him; in return, defendant
promised to pay her $10,000 or $15,000.1 In January 2021, defendant moved into
Christina’s room, Room B after the two signed a double occupancy lease. Defendant
and Christina lived together platonically, and defendant started paying half of
Christina’s rent. In March 2021, Jayda and Reagan moved out of the apartment.
Christina and defendant texted about the money multiple times in February
2021. In these text conversations, Christina expressed that she wanted the money
that defendant had promised to pay her. On 24 February, Christina texted
defendant, “you gotta give me what you told me you would,” and that he had “pushed”
paying her “back two days.” Christina further texted that she “wanted the full thing,”
and she didn’t “have any money.” Christina asked defendant to “transfer all on Apple
Pay,” but defendant said he would have to go to the bank but confirmed “[e]verything
is in my account.”
Records from defendant’s financial history showed that on 26 February 2021,
defendant withdrew $2,750 from his savings account, leaving a balance of
approximately ten dollars. On 25 March 2021, defendant’s balance was $1,844.33
after a sixty-dollar withdrawal.
Around this time, tensions continued to rise between defendant, Christina, and
Kailey. Defendant started to side with Kailey in arguments, which made Christina
1 Christina’s brother Abraham Matos testified that Christina was being paid $10,000 to marry
defendant, while defendant testified that he agreed to pay Christina $15,000.
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feel “betrayed” and upset with both defendant and Kailey. Christina planned to move
out when her lease ended.
On 20 March 2021, defendant searched online, “What happens if my U.S.
citizen wife dies?” and found an article detailing the green card process after the
sponsor dies. On 29 March, defendant married Christina. That same day, Christina
moved into a different room in the apartment, Room D. After they married, Christina
told defendant they would not be friends until he was no longer friends with Kailey,
and that she was “only doing strictly business” with him. Christina told defendant
he should only contact her if he needed “something specific.”
Christina was murdered on the morning of 3 April 2021. Kailey left the
apartment around 9:17 a.m. to go to work. Around 11:30 a.m., defendant left the
apartment and disposed of trash bags in the apartment building trash chute.
Defendant left the apartment building at noon. He returned to the apartment around
3:25 p.m.
Christina’s friend Jordan Phillips repeatedly texted Christina and received no
response. On 4 April 2021, Jordan contacted law enforcement to report that Christina
was missing. When Christina’s family learned from the police that Christina had
been reported missing, her mother and brother, Abraham Matos, traveled to the
apartment. When they arrived, no one else was in the apartment. Abraham had a
spare key to Room B from when Christina first moved in but could not enter any of
the other bedrooms. After looking around the apartment, Abraham found a
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Walgreens receipt showing that bleach, cleaning supplies, and cold medicine had been
purchased on 3 April 2021 at 2:55 p.m. Abraham unlocked and entered Room B, but
found it was defendant’s room. After searching the apartment, Abraham went to the
parking lot to look for Christina’s car. Once outside, he met Jordan. They went back
inside the apartment to look around again, and they called defendant.
Christina’s family and Jordan asked defendant which room was Christina’s.
Defendant told them that he was unsure whether she lived in Room A or Room B,
and he was worried about her. Defendant asked them to wait until he got home to
search the apartment.
The police called Jordan and spoke to Abraham on the phone. The police officer
told Abraham that if his daughter were missing, he would break down the door.
Abraham broke down the door to Room A, believing it to be Christina’s but found it
was Kailey’s room. Christina’s family and Jordan then went out to the parking lot to
wait for law enforcement to arrive. Before law enforcement arrived, defendant
returned to the apartment and met Christina’s family and Jordan. Defendant asked
if the group had heard anything from Christina and told them he last saw her around
9:00 in the morning on April 3.
Captain Matt VanAntwerp and Lieutenant Batton of the Raleigh Police
Department arrived at the apartment building. After obtaining keys to all the
individual rooms in the apartment, they searched the apartment.
When they entered Room D, they found Christina’s body lying on the floor in a
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pool of dried blood. Christina’s body had numerous cuts and sixteen stab wounds on
her head and neck. Both the left and right jugular veins were completely transected,
and there were multiple holes in the left jugular vein which indicated that a sharp
object penetrated the vein multiple times. There were many cuts on her hands and
wrists, some of which were on her palms, indicating that she may have grabbed the
knife during the attack. Christina was missing several acrylic nails. Christina died
of blood loss from the severing of the jugular veins.
Footage from the apartment building’s surveillance system showed that the
only other people in the apartment at the approximate time of Christina’s murder
were defendant and Kailey. The footage also showed defendant disposed of trash
bags in the apartment building trash chute. Investigators located the two bags. They
contained a cell phone, a cell phone case, gloves and tissues with “suspected blood”
on them, cold medicine packaging, and a white takeout container with “Kailey”
written on it.
Detective Wilbur O’Neal of the Raleigh Police Department testified that
shortly after Christina’s murder, defendant told him that he never gave Christina
more than $280.00. When he asked whether defendant intended to pay Christina the
money for the marriage, defendant laughed and said, “As if I had that type of money.”
Defendant was arrested on 7 April 2021 for the murder of Christina. On 19
April 2021, defendant was indicted on the charge of first-degree murder. Defendant’s
matter came on for trial on 26 February 2024.
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During trial, defendant testified to his version of events. He reported hearing
“banging on the walls” in Christina’s room and went to check on her. When defendant
went into Christina’s room, he saw Kailey stabbing Christina. Defendant grabbed
Kailey and threw her off Christina, then Kailey charged at him with the knife.
Defendant tossed Kailey out of the room. Defendant then held Christina as she was
dying. Defendant testified that he wanted to seek help, but Christina told him, “No,
let me die.”
After Christina died, defendant locked her body in her room. He then
confronted Kailey. Defendant asked Kailey what she was thinking, and Kailey
responded that she was “so tired of [Christina] always trying to get away with
everything,” so she “just went ahead and did it[,]” because Christina “was going to die
either way.” Kailey then threatened to hurt his family if he did not help her “clean
up.” By Kailey’s demand, defendant cleaned up the room and threw away Christina’s
phone and broken nails. Defendant testified that Kailey’s threat scared him so much
that he did not tell his version of events until two years after Christina was murdered,
and only after Kailey was arrested as an accessory after the fact. Defendant took
Kailey’s threat seriously because he knew that “she beat up her own mother . . . to
the ground” and that Kailey was “violent towards other people.” He testified he did
not let Kailey go back into Christina’s room.
Defendant kept the key to Christina’s room with him throughout the following
days. On 3 April, defendant bought bleach, cleaning supplies, and cold medicine from
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Walgreens. He told his mother that he was not feeling well. At Kailey’s suggestion
“to support [defendant’s story],” he and Kailey went to a drug store to buy cold
medicine as “part of a plan that [defendant and Kailey] made up.”
On Sunday, 4 April, defendant went to his parents’ house in Clayton. As he
was preparing to leave their house to go to work, he received a phone call from
Christina’s brother. Before he left, he threw away Christina’s key chain in his
parents’ garbage bin and threw the bedroom key under their house. Defendant
testified that he knew Christina was in Room D but lied because he did not want
Christina’s family “to see her body laying there dead.” After defendant took
Christina’s family and Jordan back to the apartment, he excused himself to use the
restroom. But instead of using the restroom, defendant put bloody gloves and
Christina’s phone in a trash bag and threw the bag away in the trash chute.
Defendant maintained that he needed Christina alive to go through the
immigration process. Defendant testified that he searched “what happens if my U.S.
citizen wife dies?” because he was concerned that Christina might commit suicide.
Defendant also testified that he paid Christina over $4,000 before they were married,
and he planned to pay her $1,000 per month until he paid her the full amount.
Defendant testified that he paid her $1,000 in March but did not pay her in April
because he needed to go to the bank.
Defendant also described Kailey to Detective O’Neal as “a little princess
charming . . . but with an explosive attitude” and detailed an incident where Kailey
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was livid at Christina for eating one of Kailey’s muffins, culminating in Kailey
throwing the empty muffin container at Christina’s bedroom door.
The State sought to introduce testimony from Reagan regarding a phone call
she had overheard between Christina and Kailey while she still lived in apartment
220. During the voir dire examination, Reagan said she overheard Christina make a
speakerphone call to Kailey after Christina found defendant’s diary that detailed
sexually explicit fantasies about Christina. Reagan said that Kailey and Christina
were both “shocked” by this discovery, and that Christina was “cussing, yelling,
talking fast, just in a panicked state.”
Defendant objected to the admission of this testimony on the basis that it was
inadmissible hearsay, “extremely prejudicial,” and violated the Confrontation Clause
of the United States Constitution. The State contended that it was not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted and thus not hearsay, and if it were hearsay, it was a
present sense impression and an excited utterance. Ultimately, the trial court
overruled defendant’s objection on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. The trial
court concluded that the testimony was “being offered for present sense impression, .
. . [and for] excited utterance.” The trial court further concluded that “the probative
value outweighs any prejudicial effect that this would have.”
At trial, Reagan similarly testified about Christina’s reaction to finding
defendant’s diary, and described Christina as sounding “confused, yelling, super
panicked” because of “what she just found.” Reagan described this event as “the final
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straw” that caused her to move out of the apartment. Defendant renewed his
objection to admitting Reagan’s testimony “under the United States Constitution
Confrontation Clause.”
Defendant sought to introduce testimony of Gabrielle Mueller, one of Kailey’s
roommates in February 2023. Gabrielle testified during voir dire examination that
on one occasion, Kailey lost her phone in a rideshare vehicle. While waiting for the
police to call about the phone, Kailey grabbed “the biggest knife in the drawer” and
waved it around saying, “I’m going to go get it . . . I’m good with knives. I’m known
for being good with knives.” Gabrielle stated that Kailey had threatened to fight
whoever stole her phone. When Kailey, Gabrielle, and another roommate went to
collect Kailey’s phone, Kailey tried to bring the knife with her, but Gabrielle stopped
her from bringing it.
The State objected to the admission of Gabrielle’s testimony, arguing that it
was inadmissible character evidence, hearsay without an exception, and irrelevant.
Defendant maintained that it was relevant to Kailey’s “identity” and “technique” of
“picking up a knife and going after someone.” Defendant further argued that it was
not hearsay, as it proved the effect of the statement on Gabrielle rather than the truth
of the matter asserted; if it were hearsay, then it was admissible as a statement
against Kailey’s penal interest. The trial court concluded that the statements were
hearsay without an exception and inadmissible under Rule 404(b). The trial court
reasoned:
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This is a specific instance that this witness wants to refer to. That’s not the purpose of character evidence. She can talk about reputation . . . .
...
My understanding is that she’s testifying to something that may have occurred two or three years later on a separate incident dealing with a cell phone and [Kailey’s] reaction to her cell phone potentially being taken and/or stolen. In that she may have been waving a knife around not near anybody as far as the person she thought had stolen the phone . . . . I don’t see how the effect on the listener—why that’s pertinent that the jury should hear this statement.
At trial, Gabrielle testified that she was Kailey’s roommate from August 2022
until May 2023. Gabrielle explained an “incident” involving Kailey made it “not safe”
for her to continue live with Kailey anymore and prompted her to move out. Further,
Gabrielle reported that incident to the police. Gabrielle testified that, in her opinion,
Kailey “wasn’t able to tell the truth very much.”
On 13 March 2024, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The
trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment of a
superior court. N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b), 15A-1444(a) (2023). Accordingly, we have
jurisdiction over defendant’s appeal of right.
III. Standard of Review
“The standard of review for admission of evidence over objection is whether it
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was admissible as a matter of law, and if so, whether the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the evidence.” State v. Clawson, 291 N.C. App. 234, 240 (2023)
(citation omitted). The trial court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is manifestly
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.” Id. We review “alleged constitutional errors in the admission of
testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause de novo.” State v. Pabon, 380 N.C.
241, 252 (2022).
IV. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting Reagan’s
testimony about overhearing Christina’s phone call; and (2) excluding Gabrielle’s
testimony about Kailey waving a knife while saying, “I’m known for being good with
knives.” We address each argument in turn.
A. Admission of Reagan’s Testimony
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting Reagan’s testimony
about the phone call she heard between Christina and Kailey. Specifically, defendant
argues this evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because the
State did not show that Kailey was unavailable to testify. Defendant also challenges
the admission of Reagan’s testimony under the best evidence rule, as an excited
utterance, and under the Rule 403 balancing test. We address each argument in turn.
1. Confrontation Clause
Defendant argues that the admission of Reagan’s testimony violated his rights
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under the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “Testimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial [are] admitted only where the declarant is
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (emphasis added); accord
State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 153–54 (2004). “Where non-testimonial evidence is
involved, however, the ordinary rules of evidence apply in regards to admissibility.”
State v. Ferebee, 177 N.C. App. 785, 788 (2006). A testimonial statement includes
material “that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorial,” which
could include statements “made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial[.]” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (cleaned up).
Here, defendant argues that “the State made no showing that Kailey was
unavailable[,]” so the speakerphone conversation that Reagan overheard between
Christina and Kailey was inadmissible. But Reagan’s testimony was limited to what
she heard Christina say while Christina was on the phone with Kailey—not what
Kailey said. Reagan described Christina as “very panicked . . . yelling, just cursing,
wondering what she had just found, what happened.” She did not testify at trial
about Kailey’s statements during this phone call: Reagan merely identified Kailey as
the recipient of Christina’s phone call. Based on Reagan’s testimony, Christina was
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reacting to her discovery of the diary’s contents and discussing that discovery with
her roommate. Christinia’s statements were not made for the purpose of establishing
in a later trial that defendant had a diary containing explicit fantasies about her, but
instead to express that she was upset by what she had read. Thus, the statements
were not testimonial and do not implicate defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause regardless of Kailey’s unavailability.
2. Evidentiary Rulings
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Reagan’s testimony
under the best evidence rule, as an excited utterance, and under the Rule 403
balancing test.2 Though defendant raised these arguments during the voir dire
examination, defendant did not renew his objection to the admission of Reagan’s
testimony on these bases at trial. Accordingly, these arguments are not preserved on
appeal. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1); State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 554 (2007) (“a
trial court’s evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the
issue of admissibility for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during
trial.”).
Even if these arguments were preserved, the trial court did not err. First, the
2 Defendant also argues for the first time in his reply brief that “[t]he trial court erred by
allowing the State to introduce unsubstantiated evidence without giving a limiting instruction[.]” Defendant has abandoned this argument by not presenting it in his opening brief. See Larsen v. Black Diamond French Truffles, Inc., 241 N.C. App. 74, 79 (2015) (“[W]here a party fails to assert a claim in its principal brief, it abandons that issue and cannot revive the issue via reply brief.”).
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best evidence rule is inapplicable in the present case where the State did not seek to
introduce the diary to prove its contents, but to show an event contributing to the
deterioration of Christina’s and defendant’s friendship shortly before her death. See
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 1002 (2023) (The best evidence rule requires the original
document be produced to “prove the content of a writing.”); see also State v. Clark,
324 N.C. 146, 156 (1989) (“The best evidence rule applies only when the contends of
a writing are in question.”). Second, even if the trial court erred in admitting
Reagan’s testimony as an excited utterance, the trial court also admitted Reagan’s
testimony as a present sense impression, which defendant does not challenge on
appeal. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in
support of which or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”). Third,
defendant does not argue the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the
evidence under Rule 403 balancing, but instead asks this court to re-weigh the
evidence. See State v. Richardson, 385 N.C. 101, 147 (2023) (“On appellate review,
we will reverse a trial court’s decision to admit evidence after undertaking the Rule
403 balancing determination only where an abuse of discretion is demonstrated.”
(emphasis added)).
But even if the trial court had erred by admitting Reagan’s testimony, the error
must be prejudicial. “A defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising
other than under the Constitution of the United States when there is a reasonable
possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result
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would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.” N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1443(a) (2023).
There is no reasonable possibility that a different outcome would have resulted
had Reagan’s testimony been excluded. The State presented ample evidence from
which the jury could have concluded that defendant, not Kailey, killed Christina.
Defendant had agreed to pay Christina at least $10,000 or $15,000 because Christina
married him. Text messages between defendant and Christina showed that their
friendship had soured in the several weeks before Christina was murdered. Further,
Christina’s friend Jordan testified that Christina was upset with both defendant and
Kailey shortly before she died.
Defendant also researched how Christina’s death would impact his citizenship
process days before she was killed. Defendant alone cleaned up Christina’s room and
threw away evidence of his involvement. He exclusively possessed the key to
Christina’s room after she was killed. Defendant lied to Christina’s family and the
police for two years, despite having multiple opportunities to explain what happened
and to tell the police about Kailey’s alleged threat against his family.
In light of this overwhelming evidence, Reagan’s brief testimony that Christina
was “panicked” after finding defendant’s diary that detailed sexual stories about
Christina could not have impacted the outcome at trial. Accordingly, there is no
reasonable possibility that absent Reagan’s testimony, the jury would have acquitted
defendant, so the trial court did not prejudicially err by admitting it.
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B. Exclusion of Gabrielle’s Testimony
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding Gabrielle’s
testimony as Rule 404(b) character evidence. Defendant further argues that the
exclusion of Gabrielle’s testimony violated his constitutional right to present a
complete defense.
As an initial matter, defendant contends that the trial court erred by not
admitting Gabrielle’s hearsay testimony under the statement against interest
exception to the hearsay rule. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(3). Aside from
asserting that “[t]he trial court’s ruling was erroneous” under Rule 804(b)(3), and
reiterating defendant argued below that Gabrielle’s testimony was admissible as a
statement against interest, defendant makes no argument on appeal explaining the
trial court’s purported error. Accordingly, defendant has abandoned this argument
on appeal. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6). (“Issues not presented in party’s brief, or in
support of which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”).
3. Rule 404(b)
Defendant contends that Gabrielle’s testimony should have been admitted
under Rule 404(b). Generally, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person to show that he acted in conformity
therewith.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2023). This evidence may be admitted for
“other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment, or accident.” Id. However,
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Rule 404(b) evidence must be otherwise admissible. Because the trial court
determined that Gabrielle’s testimony was hearsay without an exception, and
defendant abandoned any argument to the contrary, the testimony was inadmissible
irrespective of the trial court’s determination of whether it was admissible for
purposes other than establishing Kailey’s character.
However, even if the trial court erred by excluding Gabrielle’s testimony, the
error was not prejudicial. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a). As discussed above, the State
presented ample evidence to support its argument that defendant was the one who
murdered Christina. Further, there was testimony presented at trial that
demonstrated Kailey’s aggressive temperament and her deteriorating relationship
with Christina. For instance, defendant testified about a time with Kailey hit her
own mother, and another time where Kailey became irate at Christina after she ate
one of Kailey’s muffins. Jordan Phillips testified that Christina was upset with
Kailey before her murder. And Gabrielle herself testified that an incident with Kailey
caused her to move out of their apartment that made it unsafe for her to live there.
Thus, Gabrielle’s account that over two years after Christina was murdered, Kailey
waved a knife around and said that she was “known for being good with knives” does
little to establish her viability as the one who murdered Christina. Accordingly,
defendant cannot show that absent the exclusion of Gabrielle’s testimony about
Kailey and the knife there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached
a different result.
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4. Constitutional Right to Present a Defense
Defendant argues that excluding testimony about Kailey waving around a
knife violated his constitutional right to present a defense. Essentially, defendant
contends that the trial court’s evidentiary errors deprived him of a fundamentally
fair trial by abridging his right to present a defense.
However, defendant did not argue below that the trial court’s exclusion of
Gabrielle’s testimony violated his constitutional rights. “In order to preserve an
argument for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely
request, objection, or motion, . . . [and] obtain a ruling upon the party’s request or
motion.” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). “[T]he failure to raise a constitutional issue at trial
generally waives that issue for appeal[.]” State v. Wilson, 363 N.C. 478, 484 (2009).
Unpreserved issues may be reviewed for plain error “when they involve either
(1) errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury, or (2) rulings on the admissibility of
evidence.” State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 584 (1996). However, when the
constitutional issue arises from an alleged instructional or evidentiary matter, then
we may review the alleged constitutional error for plain error. See State v. May, 368
N.C. 112, 118 (2015) (“[B]ecause the alleged constitutional error occurred during the
trial court’s instructions to the jury, we may review for plain error.”); State v. Stroud,
252 N.C. App. 200, 211 (2017) (applying plain error review to an unpreserved
constitutional argument because it was “rooted in an evidentiary matter[.]” (cleaned
up)). Because defendant’s unpreserved constitutional argument stems from an
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alleged evidentiary error, and defendant requested plain error review in his appellate
brief, we may review it for plain error.
A defendant must satisfy a three-step test to show that plain error was
committed below.
First, the defendant must show that a fundamental error occurred at trial. Second, the defendant must show that the error had a probable impact on the outcome, meaning that absent the error, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict. Finally, the defendant must show that the error is an exceptional case that warrants plain error review, typically by showing that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.
State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 158 (2024) (cleaned up). The second step—that a jury
probably would have returned a different verdict absent the error—“requires a
showing that the outcome is significantly more likely than not.” Id. at 159 (cleaned
up).
A defendant’s right to present relevant evidence in his defense “is not
unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.” United States v. Scheffer,
523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). Thus, evidentiary rules “do not abridge an accused’s rights
to present a defense so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve.” Id. (cleaned up). Excluding a defendant’s
evidence is “unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has
infringed on a weighty interest of the accused.” Id. The exclusion of evidence is only
unconstitutional when the exclusion “significantly undermined fundamental
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elements of the defendant’s defense.” Id. at 315.
For the reasons discussed above, even with the exclusion of Gabrielle’s
testimony about Kailey wielding the knife, defendant was still able to present
evidence to establish Kailey’s violent nature and conflict with Christina, and
defendant testified at length about how Kailey murdered Christina. Thus, the trial
court did not prejudicially err, let alone plainly err, by excluding Gabrielle’s testimony
about Kailey and the knife.
V. Conclusion
The trial court did not err by admitting Reagan’s testimony about the phone
call she overheard Christina make, nor did this admission violate defendant’s right
under the Confrontation Clause. The trial court did not err by excluding Gabrielle’s
testimony about the knife incident involving Kailey.
NO ERROR.
Judges ZACHARY and GORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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