[Cite as State v. Henderson, 2026-Ohio-2315.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
v. : No. 115318
AMIER HENDERSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 18, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-694064-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Timms, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Elizabeth Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Assistant Public Defender, Faith M.R. Edwards, for appellant.
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J.:
Defendant-appellant Amier Henderson (“Henderson”) appeals from
the juvenile court’s finding that Henderson was not amenable to the juvenile court system and the subsequent decision to grant the State’s motion for discretionary
transfer to adult court. Henderson also appeals from the trial court’s sentence and
argues that the sentence was contrary to law because the trial court did not properly
consider R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b)’s youth mitigating factors. For the following reasons,
we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I. Factual and Procedural History
This case stems from an incident that occurred on September 11,
2023, when Henderson attempted to steal a vehicle and fled from the Shaker
Heights police.
A. Prior Adjudications and Commitments
Prior to that time, on November 30, 2022, Henderson was adjudged
delinquent on charges of robbery, theft, telecommunications fraud, and failure to
comply. Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL 22-109205. In February 2023, pursuant to that
adjudication, the juvenile court placed Henderson on community-control sanctions
and ordered his participation in Cognitive Behavioral Intervention Center (“CBIC”)
programming — the most intensive probation supervision available in the juvenile
system. Henderson violated his probation when he attacked the driver transporting
him to CBIC, resulting in his being unsuccessfully discharged from the program. In
April 2023, two juvenile cases, Cuyahoga J.C. Nos. DL 23-104157 and DL 23-104512,
were filed against Henderson that related to stolen vehicles and Henderson was
remanded to the juvenile detention center. Henderson underwent hospitalization for psychiatric care and was diagnosed with depression and suicidal ideations
related to his arrest and incarceration. In July 2023, the juvenile court committed
Henderson to the emergency temporary care and custody of the Cuyahoga County
Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) and he received a suspended
commitment to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”).
On August 1, 2023, the CCDCFS placed Henderson at Lighthouse
Youth Services (“Lighthouse”), a youth residential facility in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Lighthouse was not a lockdown facility, but Henderson was under the supervision
of Cuyahoga County Probation Officer Harrison Brill (“Probation Officer Brill”)
during his placement there. At Lighthouse, Henderson was diagnosed with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), cannabis use, and depression and
was to receive individualized counseling, group counseling, and cognitive behavioral
treatment. On September 10, 2023, Lighthouse notified Probation Officer Brill that
Henderson had left the facility and had been missing for 48 hours.
B. September 11, 2023 Incident
On September 11, 2023, the Shaker Heights Police Department
received a telephone complaint that a young Black male dressed in a gray hoodie
was attempting to break into a vehicle at an apartment complex. The police were
dispatched, and Patrolman Ward and Officer Brian Borgione (“Officer Borgione”)
stopped Henderson, who was in the vicinity of the apartment complex, wearing a
gray hoodie. The officers engaged verbally with Henderson, and during that time,
Officer Borgione noticed a phone charger and screwdriver in Henderson’s pocket. When Patrolman Ward went to his police cruiser to verify
Henderson’s identity, Henderson attempted to flee on foot. Officer Borgione chased
after Henderson, and when Officer Borgione was approximately ten to 15 feet behind
Henderson, he heard a loud noise. As Officer Borgione continued running behind
Henderson, he heard the sound again and realized that Henderson had twice
discharged a firearm at him. The second discharged bullet entered a house where
several people resided; no one was injured.
While running from the police, Henderson attempted to enter a house
but his actions were curtailed by the homeowner. Henderson ended up on the top
of a garage where the police, including Patrolman Ray Douglas (“Patrolman
Douglas”), interacted with the youth before arresting him. During the exchange with
Patrolman Douglas, Henderson admitted that he had shot at the officers and stated
that he did not mean to harm them. Henderson also informed the officers that they
would have to shoot him because he was not going back to jail. A firearm, shell
casing, phone charger, and screwdriver were discovered in the back yard where
Henderson had shot at Officer Borgione.
Henderson was arrested on September 11, 2023, and remanded to the
juvenile detention center on September 14, 2023. On September 18, 2023, a ten-
count complaint was filed in the juvenile court alleging that 17-year old Henderson
was a delinquent child for committing Count 1, felonious assault in violation of
R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with a furthermore clause because the victim was a peace officer;
Counts 2 and 3, improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1); Count 4, having a weapon while under disability in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); Count 5, breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13(B);
Count 6, attempted grand theft in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2913.02(A)(1);
Count 7, carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) with a
furthermore clause; Count 8, possessing criminal tools in violation of
R.C. 2923.24(A), with a furthermore clause; Count 9, criminal damaging or
endangering in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1); and Count 10, inducing panic in
violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(3). Counts 1, 2, and 3 included one- and three-year
firearm specifications; Counts 5 and 6 included a one-year firearm specification; and
Counts 1 through 7 contained forfeiture of a weapon specifications.
C. Probable Cause Hearing
On December 21, 2023, the juvenile court conducted a probable-
cause hearing and heard testimony from Officer Borgione. Officer Borgione
discussed the September 11, 2023 incident and testified consistently with the above
facts. Portions of Officer Borgione’s and Patrolman Douglas’s body-camera footage
from the September 11, 2023 incident were shown. The evidence demonstrated that
Henderson was involved in a prior robbery, and thus, he was under a weapon
disability when the September incident occurred. The court found probable cause
that Henderson committed Counts 1 through 8 of the complaint and the commission
of those counts would constitute felonies if they had been committed by an adult. D. Amenability Hearing
An amenability hearing was held on July 25, 2024. The State
submitted Henderson’s Juv.R. 30 psychological evaluation prepared on
February 26, 2024, by Dr. Lynn Williams (“Dr. Williams”), a forensic psychologist
with the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Diagnostic Clinic. Dr. Williams and Probation
Officer Brill testified on Henderson’s behalf.
1. Dr. Williams
Dr. Williams testified that she had interviewed Henderson’s guardian
ad litem (“GAL”), sister, and Henderson. Dr. Williams testified that Henderson
grew up in a difficult environment where he observed his mother tasered by police
and pistol-whipped by an assailant during a robbery; experienced the loss of a
brother to drowning; and experienced the death of his grandmother. Additionally,
the family had unstable housing and Henderson’s mother suffered from mental-
health and substance-abuse issues and had a criminal history. Dr. Williams stated
that being raised in an unstable home can affect brain development; cause increased
behavioral difficulties, aggression, depression, or mental-health issues; and affect
academic performance, the ability to regulate emotions, and attachment issues.
After Henderson was arrested for the charges in the instant case in
September 2023, he was placed in the juvenile detention center where he was
diagnosed with ADHD, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and an unspecified
anxiety disorder and placed on the mental-health docket. Dr. Williams testified that
an individual with PTSD is more reactive and has a more difficult time managing his or her emotions and behaviors, and she stated that Henderson’s leaving Lighthouse
without permission could have been a response to PTSD. Dr. Williams spoke about
a report from December 2023 that indicated Henderson’s frequent fights with his
peers resulted in his relocation within the juvenile detention center.
Dr. Williams testified that Henderson qualified for an IEP for reading
comprehension and he earned his high school diploma and began taking college
courses while at the juvenile detention center. According to Dr. Williams,
Henderson did not have an intellectual development disorder or psychiatric
disturbance that impaired his ability to understand reality.
Dr. Williams also testified about a desistance study that reported
high-level youth offenders usually peak between the ages of 18 and 21, but they then
desist in delinquency over time, with only 6-10% of the youths becoming life-long
offenders. The desistance study indicated that the incarceration of youths in an
adult facility could increase rearrest rates and increase antisocial tendencies.
Dr. Williams agreed that the study provided risk assessments and trends but could
not anticipate the future behavior of individuals, and she stated that an individual’s
past and current behavior may be better indicators of his potential future behavior.
On February 26, 2024, Dr. Williams performed the Risk
Sophistication Treatment Inventory (“RSTI”) and Structured Assessment of
Violence Risk in Youth (“SAVRY”) tests on Henderson. On the RSTI scale of
sophistication-maturity, Henderson scored 96%, exhibiting a higher level of
sophistication and maturity as compared to other juvenile offenders. The test demonstrated Henderson’s development of personal autonomy and self-
determination, his capacity to make decisions with reasonable and sound judgment,
and his awareness of his emotions. Dr. Williams’s test results indicated Henderson
applies his sophistication and maturity in a primarily antisocial, criminogenic
manner.
As to the RSTI scale of amenability, Dr. Williams stated that
Henderson’s test score of 33% placed him in the middle-offender range as compared
to other juvenile offenders, with zero being the least likely that the individual would
be amenable to treatment. Dr. Williams testified that Henderson’s characteristics
were primarily unfavorable for amenability. Dr. Williams stated that Henderson’s
graduation from high school and participation in college classes — which occurred
after her testing — would have increased his amenability score and decreased his
risk for violence. Dr. Williams also stated that Henderson’s unprovoked assault of
a youth in his housing unit, which occurred after her testing, would have been a
negative indicator. Dr. Williams could not quantify the potential change in
Henderson’s test results without retesting him.
Dr. Williams testified that Henderson’s characteristics in favor of
amenability included no court involvement prior to the age of 15; some of his legal
charges included codefendants; Henderson held employment for more than a year;
Henderson helped his mother pay household expenses; and Henderson received his
high school diploma. The following characteristics weighed against Henderson’s
amenability: several of Henderson’s criminal cases were completed without codefendants showing Henderson was the primary actor; Henderson failed to
engage in court-ordered interventions such as CBIC and residential placement at
Lighthouse; Henderson left Lighthouse without permission and failed to attend
court hearings in violation of probation; Henderson failed to conform with
behavioral expectations at home, school, and while on probation; Henderson
accumulated additional charges while on probation; Henderson engaged in fights
while housed at the juvenile detention center; and Henderson experienced
significant family instability because of his mother’s mental-health and substance-
abuse issues.
Dr. Williams stated that the SAVRY test results indicated a high risk
for future violence.
2. Probation Officer Brill
According to Probation Officer Brill, Henderson was initially placed
on community-control sanctions in November 2022.
Probation Officer Brill testified about Henderson’s initial behavioral
issues at the juvenile detention center in September 2023, followed by a “good
stretch” that resulted in his assignment to “Level 4” from January through July
2024. Probation Officer Brill also stated that because of Henderson’s involvement
with several physical assaults in July 2024 — following the juvenile court’s finding
of probable cause — he was moved back to probation-level housing. 3. Juvenile Court’s Findings
At the conclusion of the amenability hearing, the juvenile court
announced that it found Henderson was not amenable to care or rehabilitation
within the juvenile system. The court found the relevant factors in favor of transfer,
R.C. 2152.12(D)(5), (6), (7), (8), and (9), outweighed the single factor against
transfer — R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) — and the court ordered the transfer of Henderson’s
case to the adult court.
R.C. 2152.12(D)(5)-(9) factors that weighed in support of
Henderson’s transfer to adult court are as follows:
(D) In considering whether to transfer a child under division (B) of this section based on an act charged that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall consider the following relevant factors, and any other relevant factors, in favor of a transfer under that division:
...
(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.
(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction.
(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system.
(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer. (9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system.
In support of factors (D)(5) and (D)(6), the court stated that at the
time of the alleged offenses, Henderson possessed a firearm that he allegedly
discharged at Officer Borgione and he was under community-control sanctions. As
to factor (D)(7) — whether the results of prior juvenile sanctions or programs
indicate rehabilitation will not occur in the juvenile system — the court stated:
Per what’s been testified to and my understanding there was OhioRISE[’]s tried to be involved, Children and Family Services was involved, the Children and Family Services Residential Placement at Lighthouse, CBIC, and then also taking into account the Rule 30 psychological evaluation for transfer of jurisdiction and that treatment amenability was 33 percent, middle, regarding any treatment outcome.
Tr. 102.
The juvenile court found support for factor (D)(8) because
Henderson was emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for
transfer. As to factor (D)(9), the court found in favor of transfer because there was
not sufficient time to rehabilitate Henderson within the juvenile system.
Specifically, the juvenile court stated that Henderson was 18 years old, his Juv.R. 30
evaluation indicated a high risk for future violence, and he had multiple prior cases
that resulted in probation.
The juvenile court referenced Henderson’s mental-health concerns as
the only R.C. 2152.12(E) factor in favor of retaining jurisdiction of the offender.
R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) reads: (E) In considering whether to transfer a child under division (B) of this section based on an act charged that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall consider the following relevant factors, and any other relevant factors, against a transfer under that division:
(7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability.
On July 29, 2024, in conjunction with the juvenile court’s finding of
nonamenability, the court issued a corresponding judgment entry granting the
State’s motion for discretionary transfer.
E. Indictment
On August 2, 2024, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted
Henderson on Counts 1 through 8 and the related specifications as listed in the
original complaint, except Count 7, carrying a concealed weapon, did not include a
furthermore clause and Count 8, possessing criminal tools, included a forfeiture of
a weapon specification. Henderson pleaded not guilty to the charges on August 16,
2024.
F. Change-of-Plea Hearing
On May 28, 2025, the trial court conducted a change-of-plea hearing.
Henderson retracted his former pleas and pleaded guilty to amended Count 1,
felonious assault with a three-year firearm specification; amended Count 2,
improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation, with a three-year firearm
specification; Count 4, having a weapon while under disability; amended Count 6,
attempted grand theft, with a one-year firearm specification; and Count 7, carrying a concealed weapon. All counts included a forfeiture specification; the court nolled
Counts 3, 5, and 8.
G. Sentencing Hearing
On June 11, 2025, the trial court sentenced Henderson to the
following: amended Count 1, three years on the firearm specification to be served
prior to and consecutively to a prison term of four to six years on the base charge;
amended Count 2, three years on the firearm specification to be served prior to and
consecutively to a prison term of four years on the base charge; 30 months on
Count 4; amended Count 6, one year on the firearm specification to be served prior
to and consecutively to a prison term of six months on the base charge; and 180 days
on Count 7. The sentences in Counts 1, 4, and 6 were to be served consecutively to
each other, and the sentences in Counts 2 and 7 were to be served concurrently with
each other and all other counts. The stated prison term is a mandatory seven years
on the firearm specifications to be served prior to and consecutively to an aggregate
prison term of seven to nine years on the base charges.
On July 14, 2025, Henderson filed a notice of appeal, and he now
presents two assignments of error:
Assignment of Error 1: The juvenile court abused its discretion when it transferred Henderson’s case for criminal prosecution, without sufficient credible evidence of non-amenability, in violation of R.C. 2153.12(B); U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ohio Const., art. I, § 16; State v. Nichols, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 3.
Assignment of Error 2: Henderson’s adult prison sentence is contrary to law because the trial court plainly failed to comply with the mandatory sentencing provisions of R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b), which now require trial courts to consider a child’s youth and all of its attendant characteristics before sentencing them to adult prison. Ohio Const., art. I, § 9; R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b); State v. Patrick, 2020-Ohio-6803.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Amenability
1. Guilty Plea
An initial issue is whether Henderson’s guilty plea in adult court
waived his right to appeal the juvenile court’s July 29, 2024 finding that he was not
amenable to the juvenile system and granting the State’s motion for discretionary
transfer to adult court. The State contends that Henderson’s guilty plea in adult
court waived his right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues arising at prior stages of
the proceedings.
This court previously found that a guilty plea in adult court does not
preclude the individual defendant from subsequently challenging, on appeal, the
juvenile court’s handling of its amenability decision: “We do not believe a defendant
must choose to go to trial, rather than enter a guilty plea, in order to preserve his or
her right to challenge errors in the juvenile court’s handling of . . . its amenability
determination.” State v. D.T., 2024-Ohio-4482, ¶ 79 (8th Dist.) (“D.T. I”).
The State’s reliance on State v. Griffin, 2026-Ohio-925 (8th Dist.),
which addressed an appeal from a juvenile court’s probable-cause determination
rather than an amenability finding, is misguided. An appellant’s rights following a
guilty plea vary depending upon whether his assigned error challenges the juvenile
court’s probable-cause or amenability finding, and here the issue is Henderson’s ability to challenge his amenability finding. A guilty plea does not waive a
defendant’s right to challenge his amenability finding in the same way that it waives
his right to appeal a juvenile court’s probable-cause finding. See State v. T.S., 2024-
Ohio-4898, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.), D.T. I at ¶ 76 (“‘While a defendant, when entering a
guilty plea in adult court, admits committing the acts that constituted the offenses
to which he pleads guilty (and which were the subject of the juvenile court’s
probable-cause determination), he does not make any admission as to his
competency during prior juvenile proceedings or that he was not amenable to care
or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.’”).
We recognize that the Ohio Supreme Court granted the State’s motion
to stay this court’s decision in D.T. I and accepted for review the State’s appeal from
that opinion. See State v. D.T., 2024-Ohio-4777 (“D.T. II”), and State v. D.T.,
01/28/2025 Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-231, (“D.T. III”).1 Accordingly, we
recognize that if the Ohio Supreme Court overrules the D.T. I decision, Henderson’s
challenge to the juvenile court’s amenability decision would be rendered moot.
However, according to D.T. I, which continues to be controlling as of the publication
of this opinion, Henderson’s guilty plea in adult court did not waive his subsequent
appeal of the juvenile court’s amenability finding.
1 D.T. III is currently pending before the Ohio Supreme Court. Thus, Henderson did not waive his right to challenge this issue
because a guilty plea does not act as an admission that he was not amenable to the
juvenile system.
2. Finding of Amenability
In his first assigned error, Henderson contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it found he was not amenable to juvenile court sanctions.
We disagree.
“Juvenile courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over children alleged
to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if committed by
an adult.” In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 11; R.C. 2151.23(A). Pursuant to
R.C. 2152.12, under specified circumstances, a juvenile may be subject to a
mandatory or discretionary transfer from the juvenile court setting to adult court for
criminal prosecution. The instant case involves a discretionary transfer.
“Discretionary transfer, as its name implies, allows judges the
discretion to transfer or bind over to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear
to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or appear to be a
threat to public safety.” State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 (2000); R.C.
2152.12(B). When considering discretionary transfer of a case, the juvenile court
determines the child was at least 14 years old at the time of the charged act; the
existence of probable cause to believe that the child committed the charged acts; and
“the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and
the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(1), (2), and (3). The juvenile court must also order an investigation
into the child’s social history, education, family situation, and other relevant factors
including a mental examination. R.C. 2152.12(C).
To evaluate amenability, the juvenile court weighs the
R.C. 2152.12(D) statutory factors that support transfer with the R.C. 2152.12(E)
factors that weigh against transfer and the court must indicate on the record the
specific factors it considered in making its determination. R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). No
one factor under R.C. 2152.12(D) or (E) is outcome-determinative. The juvenile
court’s decision to exercise its discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult court must be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276,
¶ 35. The State bears the burden of persuasion when it asks the juvenile court to
transfer a juvenile’s case to adult court. Nicholas at ¶ 27. “Thus, the facts presented
to the juvenile court with respect to a discretionary transfer must persuade the court
that the juvenile is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system.” Id.
We review a juvenile court’s amenability determination for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at ¶ 22. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its
judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has
discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. The term
abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983); Johnson.
“‘[G]iven the discretion afforded the juvenile court by the legislature in determining
a juvenile’s amenability to the juvenile justice system, “[i]f there is some rational and factual basis to support the trial court’s decision, we are duty bound to affirm it
regardless of our personal views of the evidence.”’” State v. Nicholson, 2022-Ohio-
2037, ¶ 206 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Crosby, 2019-Ohio-2217 ¶ 28 (8th Dist.),
quoting State v. West, 2006-Ohio-3518, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.).
“‘There is no requirement that every factor must be “resolved against
the juvenile so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding that the juvenile
is not amenable to treatment.”’” T.S., 2024-Ohio-4898, at ¶ 78, quoting State v.
Bryant, 2024-Ohio-1192, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Haynie, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 517, *13 (12th Dist. Feb. 13, 1995). Here, following the amenability hearing,
the juvenile court stated on the record that it found the relevant factors in support
of transfer to adult court were R.C. 2152.12(D)(5), (6), (7), (8), and (9). The court
explained the application of each factor and noted that R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) was the
only factor that weighed against transfer because Henderson had mental-health
concerns and a history of trauma.
The record supports the juvenile court’s determination on
amenability. The record shows that Henderson allegedly discharged a firearm
during the September 11, 2023 incident and he was already under community-
control sanctions at the time of the alleged offense.
As to his level of maturity, Henderson scored 96% on the RSTI test —
exhibiting a higher level of sophistication and maturity as compared to other
juvenile offenders — and Dr. Williams testified that Henderson used his high level
of sophistication and maturity in a criminogenic manner. Henderson’s SAVRY test results indicated a high risk for future violence, and his RSTI amenability test score
of 33% placed Henderson in the middle-offender range as compared to other
juvenile offenders, with zero being the least likely that the individual would
successfully interact with treatment.
As to whether there was sufficient time to rehabilitate Henderson
within the juvenile system, “[t]he severity of a crime can be a strong indicator that
there remains insufficient time to rehabilitate a child offender in the juvenile justice
system.” State v. Hennings, 2019-Ohio-4675, ¶ 25-26 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
Johnson, 2015-Ohio-96, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.). Henderson was charged under a ten-count
complaint that included, but was not limited to, charges of felonious assault, a felony
of the first degree, and improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation, a felony
of the second degree.
Additionally, the failure to rehabilitate the juvenile during prior
juvenile-court adjudications may support a finding that there is insufficient time to
rehabilitate him within the juvenile system. Crosby, 2019-Ohio-2217, at ¶ 52 (8th
Dist.) (“The court expressly based its decision upon Crosby’s prior conduct in the
juvenile system and failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate him.”).
Here, Henderson was adjudicated three prior times in the juvenile system between
November 2022 and April 2023 and those adjudications resulted in community-
control sanctions. Henderson was previously offered numerous services, including
OhioRise, CBIC, and Lighthouse, but he was either unsuccessfully discharged or
chose to leave the programs prior to completion. Henderson exhibited good behavior at the juvenile detention center from January through June 2024, and then
initiated an unprovoked assault on another individual in July 2024. Despite his
engagement with the juvenile system since November 2022, Henderson allegedly
committed the offense on September 11, 2023.
Henderson also contends that when assessing whether there was
sufficient time to rehabilitate him within the juvenile system, the juvenile court
should have taken into consideration the programs available within the juvenile
system and the fact that he had not been committed to the ODYS prior to the
underlying offenses. “While we understand that a sanction such as a disposition to
ODYS instead of transfer to adult court would have been more palatable to
[Henderson], ‘there is no requirement that a juvenile first be committed to the
[O]DYS before he may be transferred to the general division for trial as an adult
offender.”’ Bryant, 2024-Ohio-1192, at ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Whisenant,
127 Ohio App.3d 75, 91 (11th Dist. 1998). We also note that in July 2023, Henderson
received a suspended commitment to ODYS and he was referred for multiple
services, but he did not fully participate in the services or apparently benefit from
them. The testimony and evidence supported a finding that there was insufficient
time to rehabilitate Henderson in the juvenile system.
The record indicated Henderson suffered from mental illness, but this
was the only factor that weighed against his transfer to the adult court.
Henderson argues that earning his high school degree, enrolling in
college courses, and improving his behavior at the juvenile detention center during the five months between his Juv.R. 30 evaluation and the amenability hearing
indicated increased maturity that would have improved his scores on the RSTI and
SAVRY tests. While Dr. Williams stated these accomplishments would increase his
amenability score, she could not quantify the improvement in his scores without
reassessing him. “The appellate focus is on the totality of the consideration required
under R.C. 2152.12(B)-(E)” and we cannot assume the possible improvement of one
factor would have changed the juvenile court’s finding on amenability. State v.
Jordan, 2023-Ohio-311, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Further, Dr. Williams testified that past
and current behaviors are better indicators of an individual’s future behavior rather
than the RSTI and SAVRY risk-assessment tests.
Additionally, we find Henderson’s contention that the record is
insufficient to provide meaningful appellate rule is without merit. The juvenile court
identified each applicable R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) factor and stated in open court
the reasoning behind its determination on each factor; the court’s findings were
supported by the record. Lastly, Henderson’s contention that the juvenile court’s
decision was based upon race is meritless because the juvenile court made no
mention of race during the amenability proceedings.
Based upon the record, a rational, factual basis existed for the juvenile
court’s findings with respect to the R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) factors and the court’s
determination that Henderson was not amenable to the care or rehabilitation of the
juvenile system. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it found Henderson was not amenable to the juvenile system and transferred his case to adult
court. Henderson’s first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Sentencing
In his second assignment of error, Henderson argues his sentence is
contrary to law because the trial court did not consider, prior to sentencing him to
adult prison, the statutory mitigating youth factors listed in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b).
We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1, 21. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
provides that an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and remand
a felony sentence if the court clearly and convincingly finds either that the record
does not support the sentencing court’s findings, or the sentence is otherwise
“contrary to law.”
R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) requires the trial court to consider additional
mitigating factors when, as here, the offender was under the age of 18 at the time the
subject offense was committed. The statute provides, in relevant part:
(B)(1) At the sentencing hearing, the court, before imposing sentence, shall do all of the following:
(b) If the offense was committed when the offender was under eighteen years of age, in addition to other factors considered, consider youth and its characteristics as mitigating factors, including:
(i) The chronological age of the offender at the time of the offense and that age’s hallmark features, including intellectual capacity, immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (ii) The family and home environment of the offender at the time of the offense, the offender’s inability to control the offender’s surroundings, a history of trauma regarding the offender, and the offender’s school and special education history;
(iii) The circumstances of the offense, including the extent of the offender’s participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have impacted the offender’s conduct;
(iv) Whether the offender might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for the incompetencies associated with youth, such as the offender’s inability to deal with police officers and prosecutors during the offender’s interrogation or possible plea agreement or the offender’s inability to assist the offender’s own attorney;
(v) Examples of the offender’s rehabilitation, including any subsequent growth or increase in maturity during confinement.
R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b).
This court has recognized that R.C. 2929.19’s mandate that a trial
court consider youth mitigating factors is sufficiently similar to the language of
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and, therefore, the trial court need not make specific
findings regarding the youth mitigating factors. State v. Spencer, 2023-Ohio-3359,
¶ 23-24 (8th Dist.); see State v. Spears, 2023-Ohio-187, ¶ 40 (5th Dist.) (“[T]he trial
court need not specify findings regarding the factors listed in
R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b).”). “The consideration of such factors is presumed, ‘unless the
defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.’” State v. Moncrief, 2026-Ohio-1770, ¶ 17,
quoting Spencer at ¶ 22, citing State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
Thus, our review is limited to whether the record affirmatively shows that the trial
court failed to consider the youth mitigating factors. Spears at ¶ 40. During the sentencing hearing conducted on June 11, 2025, the trial
court referenced the mitigating youth factors multiple times. 2 The trial court stated
that it had received, read, and reviewed defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum
that addressed, in detail, the R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) youth mitigating factors: “I
really read and took to heart your attorney’s sentencing memo.” June 11, 2025
hearing, tr. 55. The court also stated that “this [was] such a tough case.” June 11,
2025 hearing, tr. 55. The court explained that it was familiar with Henderson’s early
drug use, his impulsivity, and research on youth-brain development, and the court
stated that it was empathetic to Henderson’s difficult childhood including his
mother’s mental-health issues and how they impacted the offender. But the court
noted that
[t]here’s a difference between walking by a car that has keys in the ignition and jumping in the car and taking off as impulsive behavior of a teenager, and . . . trying to steal another car, getting caught and instead of just eating the fact that you’re caught here and you got a gun, one, deciding to run.
That’s bad enough, because you, yourself, could have been shot. You, yourself, could have spread — you could put yourself at risk in any number of ways, but to turn and fire not one, but two rounds at a police officer is appalling behavior, and I understand that you’re at a time and place where you feel like you have nowhere to go, and you can’t get out of it, and you’re trying to kill yourself.
I understand that.
But you could have been killed, and then we’ve got a whole other set of circumstances here.
2 The sentencing hearing addressed Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-24-694064 and 694899. This appeal relates to the sentence in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-694064, and accordingly, we will only address the sentencing on that specific matter. You’ve got the officer now . . . .
June 11, 2025 hearing, tr. 56-57.
The trial court further stated:
So I’ve got to weigh all that with, again, the factors with sentencing a juvenile, which is brain development, your age at the time of the offense, your history of trauma, your school and education, and family and peer pressures, and I have to see all of that.
And I am, and I’ve considered this, and I thought about it long and hard yesterday evening . . . .
I have to weigh all the juvenile factors, but I also have to see everything else that I’m required to weigh under the law.
June 11, 2025 hearing, tr. 58. The trial court again stated it “considered the youth,
its characteristics and mitigating factors, pursuant to [R.C.] 2929.[19](B)(1),
specifically, you know, 1 through 5.” June 11, 2025 hearing, tr. 61.
The trial court sentenced Henderson on Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 to a
mandatory seven years on the firearm specifications to be served prior to and
consecutively to a prison term of seven to nine years on the base offenses, for an
aggregate prison term of 14-16 years. The court issued a corresponding judgment
entry on June 12, 2025, that stated, “[T]he court considered all required factors of
the law.”
Henderson argues that the trial court’s sentence exceeds the ten-year
sentence requested by the State and defense counsel and the 10-to-12-year sentence
sought by the victim. Further, Henderson contends that the trial court must not
have appropriately applied the mitigating youth factors because the court did not impose a lesser sentence that reflected the court’s consideration of the factors.
Henderson fails to cite any case law to support his position.
The court clearly stated its familiarity with Henderson’s drug use,
impulsivity, difficult upbringing, and his Mother’s mental-health issues. The court
stated it weighed the mitigating youth factors — including brain development,
Henderson’s age at the time of the offense, his history of trauma, his education, and
family and peer pressures — as delineated in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b). Based upon the
court’s statements throughout the sentencing hearing, we cannot state that the
record affirmatively shows the court failed to consider the youth mitigating factors
and, accordingly, Henderson’s second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Conceded Error
Separate from Henderson’s assigned errors, the State cites State v.
Beatty, 2024-Ohio-5684, and concedes that the portion of Henderson’s sentence
that imposes three consecutive firearm specifications is contrary to law. This issue
was not raised in Henderson’s appellate brief although he addresses the three
consecutive firearm specifications in his reply brief. The trial court sentenced
Henderson to three years each on the firearm specifications related to Counts 1 and
2 and one year on Count 6’s firearm specification, with all firearm specifications to
be served prior to and consecutively to the underlying base terms. The State
suggests this sentence is contrary to law pursuant to Beatty, and Henderson agrees.
We find Count 6’s firearm specification sentence is contrary to law, but for other
reasons. This court addressed the imposition of three consecutive firearm
specifications and the precedential value of the Beatty decision in State v. Edwards,
2025-Ohio-641 (8th Dist.). This court noted that Beatty is a plurality opinion with
“‘questionable precedential value’” and declined to follow the nonbinding authority.
Edwards at ¶ 112, quoting State v. Hayes, 2023-Ohio-4119, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), and
Edwards at ¶ 126. We will follow the precedent established in this district.
In Edwards, like here, the relevant question was “whether [a third]
firearm-specification prison term imposed at the court’s discretion under R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(g) may be imposed consecutively.” Edwards at ¶ 123. The Edwards
Court concluded that “[w]hile the court has discretion under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g)
regarding whether to impose an additional prison term for a third firearm
specification, if it does impose a prison term, the term is mandatory and must be
run consecutively.” Id. at ¶ 125.
Here, the firearm specifications associated with Counts 1 and 2 had to
be sentenced consecutively. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). The court then had discretion
to sentence Henderson on the Count 6 firearm specification; once the court
determined to impose a sentence on the third firearm specification, the sentence was
mandatory and had to be run consecutively. Edwards at ¶ 125.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court correctly instructed
Henderson on the Count 1 and 2 firearm specifications and sentenced those
specifications to be served consecutively. The court stated that Count 6, attempted
grand theft of a motor vehicle, carries a one-year firearm specification “which must be served prior to and consecutive with the underlying felonies, as well as each of
the other two firearm specifications.” June 11 hearing, tr. 35. When the court later
imposed Henderson’s sentence, it stated, “In Count 6, I’m going to sentence you to
six months for the [base offense], plus the one-year firearm spec, which must be
served prior to and consecutive with the underlying prison sentence, and
consecutive with each of the three-year firearm specifications in Counts 1 and 2.”
June 11 hearing, tr. 62. The court’s statements that the third firearm specification
had to be imposed in a consecutive nature were contrary to Edwards and R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(g).
The trial court erroneously sentenced Henderson with the belief that
Count 6’s firearm specification was mandatory and had to be run consecutively with
the firearm specifications in Counts 1 and 2. The trial court did not exercise its
discretion to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the case warranted
the imposition of Count 6’s one-year firearm specification. Only if the court elected
to impose a prison term on Count 6’s firearm specification did that sentence become
mandatory with the requirement that it be imposed consecutively to the other
firearm specifications. Accordingly, the trial court’s mistaken belief that it was
mandated to sentence Henderson on Count 6’s one-year firearm specification was
error and rendered the sentence on Count 6’s firearm specification contrary to law.
Thus, we vacate the trial court’s sentence on Count 6’s firearm
specification and remand the case for resentencing only on Count 6’s one-year
firearm specification. State v. Johnson, 2008-Ohio-69, ¶ 19-20 (Sentence vacated, and case remanded for resentencing because the trial court imposed consecutive
sentences based upon its mistaken belief that it was statutorily required to do so
whereas the court had discretion to determine if the facts and circumstances
warranted the imposition of consecutive prison terms.); State v. Haskins, 2026-
Ohio-19, ¶ 81, 83 (6th Dist.) (Where the trial court erred by imposing sentences for
three firearm specifications under the mistaken belief that all three were mandatory,
the case was remanded and at the resentencing hearing, the trial court was to
“impose consecutive sentences for two of the firearm specifications and use its
discretion to determine if it [was] appropriate to impose a sentence for the third
firearm specification, as outlined in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g).”); and State v. Jones,
2021-Ohio-4117, ¶ 59 (12th Dist.) (“Therefore, because the trial court was under the
mistaken belief that R.C. 2929.13(F)(3)(c)(ii) applied to the case at bar, thereby
requiring it to sentence Jones to a mandatory prison term, we . . . agree that this
matter should be remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of
resentencing.”).
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for the
limited purpose of resentencing on Count 6’s one-year firearm specification.
It is ordered that parties share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________ TIMOTHY W. CLARY, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR