[186]*186OPINION OF THE COURT BY
TSUKIYAMA, C.J.
Defendants, David K. Hasliiinoto, George M. Tanisne, Florendo Guillermo, Leo Bajo, Aurelio Barro, Alfred L. [187]*187Canianes and Henry A. Alejandro, were indicted, tried and convicted in the First Circuit Court of the crime of rape. They are now before this court on writ of error.1
According to the evidence upon which there appears to be no dispute, on July 8, 1959, Janet Schenck and her escort Gene Smith drove to Ala Moana Park at approximately 10:30 p.m. While there, the girl waded in the water along the beach for some time and about three-quarters of an hour later when she and her escort were about to leave, several young men suddenly appeared and surrounded them. One of the men grabbed Smith and together with others started to beat him. At the same time, someone seized Janet and holding both her arms at her back took her to a car parked about two city blocks away and pushed her into it. There was a man at the wheel who drove off as soon as the rest of the hoys entered. Janet identified the man at the wheel as defendant Hashimoto and the man who seized her by the arms and took her to the car as Canianes. She testified that the latter told her not to scream for if she did not do so she would not be hurt; that he similarly warned her again while the car proceeded toward Diamond Head; that three of the defendants were in the front seat and four in the rear in addition to herself, she sitting between the legs of Canianes; that she heard the boys talking about sexual relations and rape; that the hoys in the rear except Canianes made passes at her and touched places “they shouldn’t have had their hands”; that Canianes “grabbed something, a coat, jacket or blanket and put it over my legs and told the guys to leave me alone”; that she did not scream because she was scared.
Janet further testified that after they had passed the Blow Hole, the car turned off the road and came to a stop [188]*188about a city block away where there were many fir trees; that as she was being pushed out of the car, one of the boys choked her neck with both hands and shook her, applying considerable pressure; that she hit her head on the door-sill ; that she then “passed out”; that she remembered that as she was regaining consciousness, she heard somebody say “I think she’s dead”; that somebody was rubbing beer on her face and that “someone had been jabbing me in the thigh or pushing me or something and it hurt”; that she also remembered that “there was someone on top of me, maybe up to my stomach, no one close to my face, but I remember the pressure on my body”; that she noticed that she was lying nude on the ground on what seemed like a blanket.
After Janet dressed, she engaged the boys in conversation because, as she testified, she did not know what would happen next. Testifying further, she recalled that in the course of the conversation, Canianes and Guillermo told her they were sorry; that she heard Alejandro say “Let’s get rid of her, she might turn us in, she might get us in trouble”; that while driving back to town, she again heard Alejandro say “let’s feed the sharks”; that as they approached the place where she was to be let off the car, “They just kept telling me not to say anything because if I did, that I would never get off the island alive and they would hate to have anything happen to me, because it wasn’t just them, there were other guys around here to take care of me, too.”
The prosecuting witness also testified that, except during the small hours of the morning of the 9th when she did have sexual intercourse without her consent or knowledge, she had not had sexual intercourse on July 6th, 7th, 8th or up to the noon hour of the 9th when she was given a pelvic examination by Dr. West; and that although her knowledge was derived from her doctor’s statement, some [189]*189of the boys sitting in the car on the back seat with her on the return trip told her that she had been used.
Dr. West, who conducted the pelvic examination in the forenoon of July 9th, testified that he had found sperm in the vagina of the prosecuting witness and that the “more than usual” reddening of the vaginal area “looked like there had been some sort of excessive friction there.” He stated that in his opinion she had had sexual intercourse within twenty-four to thirty-six hours prior to his examination.
Defendants, as appellants here, assign as error numerous orders and rulings of the trial court, but have culled out and specified four assignments of error in support of their contention on appeal that the judgment of the court below should be reversed and defendants ordered discharged.
The first error specified is that which is embodied in assignment of error No. 2, to wit, that “the court erred in denying the motion for severance of trial for each of the defendants separate and apart from the other.” It is noted that shortly after their arraignment and entry of their respective pleas of not guilty, defendants either jointly or individually filed several written motions including the motion in question for separate trial. All the motions were denied by written orders separately filed. Subsequently, at the inception of the trial, defendants orally renewed inter alia their motion for severance of trial on the ground that “it is impossible to have a fair and impartial trial for each of them under the circumstances of this case.” In the course of the argument presented out of the presence of the jury, defendants alluded to the difficulty allegedly encountered in the selection of the jury and to the prejudicial effect of being unable to “cross-examine or dispute what another counsel for another defendant says * * *.” Argument concluded, the trial resumed and- the court an[190]*190nounced its denial of the motion to which ruling defendants duly excepted.
It is a rule generally recognized and established that where several persons are collectively indicted for a crime, the usual procedure is to try them jointly. The rule is also settled that exceptions may be made by the court in its sound discretion and separate trials ordered when it is shown to the court’s satisfaction that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had without a severance. State v. Hashimoto, 46 Haw. 183, 377 P.2d 728 (1962); Territory v. Robello, 20 Haw. 7; Territory v. Johnson, 16 Haw. 743; Rex v. Tin Ah Chin, 3 Haw. 90.
As movants, defendants had the burden of affirmatively showing the existence of factual circumstances which would not only warrant but make severance obviously imperative in the interest of judicial fairness. The trial court’s denial of a plea for severance is not subject to reversal on appeal unless the appellate court finds that there was a clear abuse in the exercise of its discretion. United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 944 (6th Cir. 1963 appeal pending); Hashimoto, supra.
In the light of the argument presented to the trial court by one of counsel speaking, without objection, in behalf of all the defendants, this court has carefully examined the entire record but has observed nothing which indicates an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to grant a severance. Reference by counsel to the alleged difficulty in the selection of the jury is patently unsupported by the record. On account of the number of defendants and their entitlement to an aggregate of forty-two peremptory challenges, much time was naturally taken to conclude the voir dire. Counsel for each defendant freely participated in the examination of each prospective juror and at no point does the record reveal any conflict [191]*191or seeming disagreement between or among the several counsel.
Counsel, moreover, argued to the trial court that there were separate defenses and a joint trial would possibly result in differences and confusion among counsel representing different defendants. The record affirmatively discloses that the apprehension expressed by counsel was unfounded. The trial proceeded smoothly, punctuated from time to time only by instances of verbal brushes between the prosecution and the defense and there was no noticeable disagreement within the ranks of the defense. It is also to be noted that the separate statements allegedly made by each defendant to an investigating detective, held by the court upon voir dire to have been voluntarily made by each, were admitted into evidence, albeit over objection, only after the portion or portions thereof which pertained to a codefendant or codefendants had been obliterated or excised and duly checked by all counsel as required by the court. “The feature of certain evidence being evidence against one defendant but not against another defendant is usually present in every joint trial. It is well settled that the fact that in a joint trial there will be evidence against one defendant which is not evidence against another defendant does not require separate trials * * Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810, 818 (8th Cir. 1962). See also Commonwealth v. Snopek, 200 Pa. Super. 455, 190 A.2d 161 (1963), in which the court held that there was no prejudicial error in allowing a consolidation for single trial of three separate indictments against three different defendants for the crime of rape on the same victim.
The cases cited by the defense on the question of severance have been examined. It is evident that in every case in which the trial court’s discretion was questioned or disturbed, there was a clear showing of abuse patently prejudicial to some of the codefendants. Defendants here ar[192]*192gued to the trial court that the additional costs of separate trials should not be a factor in resolving the question of severance. Although the record fails to show any remark by the court in that regard, this court agrees that the element of costs should not be allowed to outweigh justice. However, in every case of a single trial involving several defendants, in the absence of a clear showing of prejudice a trial court cannot be totally insensible of the public burden in conducting duplicitous trials involving the same issue or issues. In United States v. Verra, 203 F.Supp. 87, 90 (S.D. N.Y. 1962) where the court denied severance requested by the defendants jointly tried on two counts, one for conspiracy and the other for perjury, the court said: “Where there are common elements of proof in the joined offenses, the public interest in avoiding duplicitous, time-consuming and expensive trials must be weighed against the prejudice which the defendants envision. Here it is clear that, should separate trials of the conspiracy and perjury counts be ordered, the Government’s efforts would be duplicated and without benefit to the movants * *
In the case at bar, all the defendants' were indicted jointly for the crime of rape. Under R.L.H. 1955, § 252-1, and State’s requested instruction No. 5, given by the court with defendants’ approval, they were all treated and tried •as principals. As the trial developed, it transpired that the same witnesses, including the rape victim would have been called to testify in each case, had separate trials been ordered.
The motions for severance, as filed, contained only general grounds except in the case of Hashimoto. He asserted, in addition to anticipated prejudice from the confessions of other defendants, a point already considered, the additional ground that in a separate trial he could compel other defendants to take the stand. In the joint trial, Guillermo and Barro did take the stand and counsel for Hashi[193]*193moto did not cross-examine them. No prejudice, therefore, appears upon consideration of this additional ground of Hashimoto’s motion.
This court is satisfied that there is nothing in the record which lends support to defendants’ claim that the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing a severance. Assignment of error No. 2 (specified as error No. 1) is accordingly overruled.
Assignment of error No. 3 (specified as error No. 2) relates to the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for an order of mistrial made immediately after the jury had been sworn. It is urged in support of defendants’ claim of error that (1) “the guards had at various times brought in the defendants handcuffed to each other and in full view of certain jurors”; (2) “the guards have, throughout the selection of the jury, been sitting side by side with the defendants in full view of all the jurors* * (3) “the guards have been present in the courtroom throughout the selection of the jury, in full uniform, and frequently even dangling handcuffs at certain points in the proceedings * * *.”
A facet of the problem pertaining to the use of handcuffs was discussed and ruled upon by this court in State v. Brooks, 44 Haw. 82, 352 P.2d 611. Unless it is shown that the court abused its discretion or that the accused was actually prejudiced before the jury under the stated circumstances, a refusal to grant a motion for mistrial does not constitute reversible error.
In retrospect, this court is aware of the fact that in many jurisdictions the problem of manacled defendants being escorted to the courthouse or even into the courtroom under guard has been made an issue for ultimate determination by the appellate courts. In light of this court’s comment in State v. Brooks, supra, it is not deemed necessary [194]*194to labor the point at great length.
The record in this case discloses that during the argument on the motion for mistrial held in chambers, counsel for the defense narrated to the court what they themselves had observed relative to the presence of uniformed guards and to the fact that defendants Avere brought in handcuffed. In the course of the colloquy, it is noted that the court stated that he had seen some of the defendants out in the corridor handcuffed but questioned whether the jury had seen it. The colloquy shown in the footnote below is illustrative of the point involved in this particular issue.2 The court was not approached on the point until the motion for mistrial was made, after the jury had been sworn.
The jury was never polled in this regard. As a matter of fact, if, as represented to the court, there was so much concern about the guards and handcuffs, it would seem that the defense would have touched upon the subject during the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors to ascertain their attitude in respect to the circumstance. But, as reflected by the record, not one of the several defense counsel examined the jurors on that point.
This court repeats that pleadings and statements made by counsel to the court are not self-proving, and that there [195]*195is no reversible error in the absence of a showing that the court clearly abused its discretion or that defendants were actually prejudiced before the jury. State v. Brooks, supra.
Assignment of error No. 3 is therefore without merit.
We now reach assignment of error No. 18 (specified as error No. 3). Defendants contend that the trial court committed a reversible error by restricting their cross-examination of Janet Schenck when she was called to the witness stand by the prosecution for the second time. Earlier in the case, Janet had taken the stand to give testimony in behalf of the prosecution.
On her first appearance on the stand, her entire testimony was given on direct examination by the prosecution. Upon its conclusion, defendants urgently requested a recess, obviously for the purpose of conferring on what course of action to take. When court resumed, each defendant separately stated to the court that he would waive the cross-examination.
When called to the stand this first time Janet testified to her abduction and the ride through Waikiki, ending up at a place with fir trees past the Blow Hole. She then testified that she was choked, hit her head on the doorsill of the car, and passed out. She partially regained consciousness and was lying on a blanket, nude. At some point “there was someone on top of me * * * pressure on my body.” When she finally regained consciousness “my stomach hurt an awful lot.” Also “my thigh hurt from something * * *.” She further testified to the conversation she had had with defendants while dressing, and threats made while returning in the car to a spot about four blocks from her place of residence where defendants let her go. Included in her testimony was her statement that after she had dressed, “we talked for a while about surfing, about climbing coconut trees, about my home town, about just anything I could think of.”
[196]*196Dr. West then was called. As has been stated, he examined the prosecuting witness about eleven hours after the occurrence in question to find out whether anyone had had intercourse with her. He found sperm in the vagina and gave it as his opinion that she had had sexual intercourse within the past twenty-four hours, or at most thirty-six hours.
Janet then was, over objection, recalled to the witness stand by the prosecution. On direct examination on this occasion she testified that on July 9, between midnight and 1:00 a.m., she had sexual intercourse without her consent, that she was not certain with whom, that she did not'have any sexual intercourse on July 6th or 7th or on the 8th up to this time, that she did not have sexual intercourse on July 9th during the period between the time she was let out of the car near her place of residence and the time of her physical examination. She further testified that there were bruises on her right arm and throat which she didn’t have before the incident and couldn’t have received elsewhere, that “I still had that stomach ache and I was tired.”
Cross-examination by defendants ensued without objection, but when one of counsel commenced to question Janet on her testimony given earlier during her first appearance as to “the things you talked about was sports and your home life in Indiana, surfing and a few other matters,” the prosecution objected “on the grounds that this is improper cross-examination.” Whereupon, the court ruled: “I will rule that your cross-examination on her testimony on her first appearance is waived and that you may now cross-examine her only on what she testified to upon being recalled.” Exception was taken by all defendants and made the subject of this assignment of error.
This court finds no quarrel with the general principle that, though it may be waived, “the right of cross-examination is absolute and not a mere privilege.” But the [197]*197phrase is meaningless unless amplified and shown to coincide with the particular circumstance to which it is applied and with the established rules concerning prejudicial error.
We are of the view that the trial court’s ruling holding defendants to the waiver of cross-examination which they made when prosecutrix was examined the first time was erroneously restrictive. Defendants were not in a position to judge whether they would cross-examine the prosecuting witness on the basis of the first installment of her testimony when they did not know it was only a first installment.
However, the trial judge’s ruling requiring defendants to limit their cross-examination “to her testimony at the second time she took the stand” allowed defendants considerable latitude. The testimony of the prosecuting witness on the second occasion went beyond the fact of sexual intercourse. She testified, in effect, that the circumstances were such that she had had sexual intercourse at the hour named without knowledge on her part other than that derived from her doctor. She further testified that as a result of the incident she ached and had bruises. This opened up the subject matter of the assault upon her which rendered her unconscious, and with it the whole question whether the sexual intercourse, if it occurred, was by force and against her will, on the one hand, or with her consent on the other hand. To that question all of the circumstances —the ride through Waikiki without the witness calling for aid, the conversation she conducted with defendants while she was dressing, the threats made on the return trip, and the like — were pertinent.
At the time when the ruling complained of was made counsel had been laying the background for questioning the prosecuting witness as to the conversation she had with defendants while dressing. The questions asked were an[198]*198swered. There was no motion to strike. After the court’s ruling defendants, without objection, cross-examined the witness on a variety of subjects, including the stomachache and possible causes of it, whether she claimed to be a virgin before the incident, possible normal causes of the unusual reddening in the vaginal area to which Dr. West had testified, what defendants had said on the return trip (this being in response to a question whether the only basis for her testimony that she had sexual intercourse was Dr. West’s testimony), and what prosecuting witness said when first questioned by the police, specifically the question “did you relate to the police the story that you related to us yesterday on the stand.” No question asked was ruled out.
Pursuant to R.L.H. 1955, § 212-14, which applies in this case, no judgment may be reversed unless the court “is of the opinion that error was committed which injuriously affected the substantial rights of the plaintiff in error.” It may well be that, as held in Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, prejudice from denial of the right to cross-examine does not necessarily depend upon a showing that the cross-examination would have brought out facts tending to discredit the witness. In the present case, however, we are unable to find prejudice because it is not shown that the cross-examination was in fact limited by the ruling requiring counsel to confine themselves to the prosecutrix’s testimony on the second occasion. Cf., Berkson v. Post, 38 Haw. 436, 438; State v. Vigorito, 2 N.J. 185, 186-187, 65 A.2d 841, 842; People v. Stone, 89 Cal. App. 2d 853, 202 P.2d 333.
Furthermore, whatever adverse effect the court’s error in ruling on the defendants’ scope of cross-examination may have had was offset and cured by the fact that before the prosecution rested its case in chief it offered to recall the complaining witness for cross-examination in respect [199]*199to her testimony on her first appearance and the witness was subsequently called to the stand for that purpose, but each of the defendants, through his attorney, declined3 to take advantage of the offer and opportunity. Cf., State v. Wilkins, 100 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Mo.); Malatkofski v. United States, 179 F.2d 905, 915 (1st Cir. 1950); Harris v. State, 203 Md. 165, 173, 99 A.2d 725, 729. Upon careful consideration of the circumstances of this case we fail to perceive wherein the examination at the time the witness was recalled4 would not have afforded defendants adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness effectively.
Assignment of error No. 18 is overruled.
Defendants’ assignment of error No. 18 [24] (specified as error No. 4) pertains to their exceptions to the trial court’s rulings (1) denying a motion for mistrial and (2) denying defendants’ request to order some eighteen police recruits present at the trial as observers to vacate the courtroom.
It appears that during one of the trial sessions, a group of police recruits dressed in white were present in the courtroom. A counsel for defendants requested and obtained the court’s permission to poll certain members of the audience. Eesponding to the interrogation which ensued, the police lieutenant in charge of the recruits informed the court that they were members of his police recruiting class and that they were present for experience in courtroom procedure as a part of the class program. Perceivably, the move on the part of counsel was prompted by his apprehension that the presence of the group had or, [200]*200if allowed to continue, would have an adverse effect upon the jury. It is not shown that the recruits or anyone else in the courtroom were indecorous, disorderly, or in any manner disturbing the proceedings.
Courts are established for the judicial administration of justice. They are open to the public, subject only to the control and supervision of the court proceedings by the presiding judges in whom is vested the authority to clear the courtroom of persons customarily excluded or of persons whose conduct or presence in the courtrooms is. such that the orderly, fair and impartial functioning of the courts is affected. The fact that they are open serves as a safeguard of the integrity of our courts. 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 39, p. 98; 53 Am. Jur., Trial, § 41, p. 54 et seq. See Sugg v. Sugg, 152 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
When Hawaii was a Territory, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States was held to apply directly to Territorial judicial proceedings. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516; Ex Parte Higashi, 17 Haw. 428, 441. The same provisions of the amendment now appear in the State Constitution of Hawaii. Article I, § 11. It is there provided that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial * * *
The words “public trial” are self-explanatory. In Territory v. Scharsch, 25 Haw. 429, 430, this court granted a new trial because the trial court had ordered “all those in the courtroom to leave except the officers of the court.” Ironically, in the case at bar, defendants and not the court demanded the exclusion of a segment of the audience, whereas in S chars eh, supra, the defendants objected to the exclusion on the ground that it was a public trial.
It appears from the record relating to this phase of the proceedings that the police recruits dressed in their standard white classroom attire were present in the courtroom [201]*201as observers. There was no disorderly conduct or overt act of any kind to lead this court to believe that any pressure or influence was exercised or intended to be exercised upon the jury. The reason for their presence was clearly stated and explained by the lieutenant under poll in open court. We are satisfied that the trial court properly applied his discretion in refusing to grant defendants’ motions.
Assignment of error No. 24 (incorrectly numbered “18” in defendants’ brief) has no merit.
We come now to defendants’ final assignment of error No. 30 (specified as error No. 5). At the close of the prosecution’s case, defendants all moved for a directed verdict and noted exceptions to the denial thereof. Defendants claim error contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish the fact of sexual intercourse between them and the complaining witness and that even if the evidence did show such intercourse, it affirmatively showed that the complaining witness did not put up the degree of resistance required by the law relating to the crime of rape.
Upon a careful review of the entire evidence, it manifestly appears to this court that defendants’ contention cannot be substantiated. It is a rule firmly established in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions including ours that the submission of a case to the jury over objection constitutes reversible error only if there is no substantial and competent evidence to warrant a finding of guilt by the jury. Territory v. Aquino, 43 Haw. 347. The record in this case perspicuously shows that there was adduced substantial and competent evidence of the crime charged. In the face of the evidentiary facts stated earlier in this opinion, we think that the trial court would have been deemed to have made a travesty of justice, had it withheld the case from the jury on the ground that there was no evidence of sexual intercourse.
Apropos of the claim that the rape victim failed to put [202]*202up tlie degree of resistance required by law, suffice it to say that the law on rape requiring resistance by the victim when carnally attacked does not apply to an unconscious victim. In the lone case cited by defendants, Territory v. Nishi, 24 Haw. 677, 682, this court, in recognition of the exception to the rule, declared that “There was no evidence whatsoever that the ability of the prosecuting witness to resist was overcome or even impaired by reason of unconsciousness, threats or exhaustion.”
In the instant case, the evidence appears overwhelming that after the victim was choked in the car, she lost consciousness and remained totally insensible until she partially “came to,” when she felt a pressure on her body and a pain about her thigh; that she again lapsed into unconsciousness and as she later gradually recovered, she realized that one of the men was rubbing beer on her face obviously to revive her; and that while still in a daze, she heard someone say, “I think she’s dead.” According to the evidence which includes the respective statements made by defendants to the investigating detective, all the acts constituting the crime of rape were perpetrated while she was in a physical and mental condition in which resistance was utterly impossible.
Defendants further argue that she should or could have screamed for help on the way to the scene of the crime when the car was proceeding along Waikiki. The rule of resistance does not apply unless a. woman is being carnally attacked. The fact that the victim in this case was squeezed in the car surrounded by seven men, with one of them holding and warning her to the effect that if she did not scream she would not be hurt, was an element for the jury to consider in determining whether her failure to scream in Waikiki was an indication of her acquiescence in or consent to the acts of sexual relation which later took place among the fir trees.
[203]*203Robert Kimicra for defendants, plaintiffs in error, David K. Hashimoto, Henry A. Alejandro and George M. Tanisue.
Robert H. K. Chang for defendant, plaintiff in error, Alfred L. Canianes.
David K. Namaka for defendant, plaintiff in error, Leo Bajo.
Nathaniel Felzer for defendants, plaintiffs in error, Florendo Guillermo and Aurelio Barro.
Daniel C. Ridley for all defendants, plaintiffs in error.
George I. Hieda, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu (John H. Peters, Prosecuting Attorney), for plaintiff, defendant in error.
All of the foregoing were matters for the jury and not for the presiding judge. Factual conflicts, differences and inferences as well as the determination of credibility and weight of evidence lie within the province of the jury. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant the motion for a directed verdict.
We, therefore, find no merit in assignment of error No. 30. All other minor assignments not specified or argued are deemed abandoned. In Re Silva, 32 Haw. 855; Akana v. Territory, 22 Haw. 479; State v. Hashimoto, supra.
Judgment affirmed.