BAKES, Chief Justice.
The defendant-appellant Troy Gascon entered a conditional plea of guilty to robbing a bank. Appellant appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence. The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court in an opinion issued October 12, 1989. A petition for review was granted and the case reargued before this Court. We now affirm.
On March 26, 1987, a man walked into a bank in Twin Falls with a box. He handed the teller a note, which stated that the box [933]*933had a bomb in it, and if the teller handed over all the cash, the bomb would not be detonated. The teller complied, and the man walked out of the bank with his box and the money. The police were notified of the robbery and given a description of the bank robber. The description was of a man approximately five feet four inches, with blonde hair, wearing a baseball cap and jacket. No description of a getaway car was provided, and no one knew for sure whether the robber did in fact enter a vehicle on leaving the bank.
The police immediately set up an “invisible” roadblock just outside of town at the south end of the Perrine Bridge. During the “invisible” roadblock, the police parked alongside the road and attempted to match the description of the felon with the appearance of the drivers and passengers in passing vehicles. Later, the order was given to set up a “visible” roadblock at the same location. To set up the “visible” roadblock, traffic cones were placed on the road leading to the bridge, to merge all the northbound traffic into one lane. Several police cars, with their overhead lights flashing, and traffic cones restricted all but one of the northbound lanes, providing notice to motorists that they should be slowing down as they advanced into the roadblock. An officer in an Idaho State patrol car was stationed approximately 150 yards prior to entry into the roadblock. As the vehicles headed toward the roadblock, the state patrol officer would observe the occupants.
Appellant’s vehicle approached the roadblock, and the Idaho State Police officer observed the driver leaning over toward the passenger side and reaching under the seat. The vehicle appeared to have no passengers. As appellant’s vehicle proceeded into the roadblock, the police stationed in the roadblock were alerted by the first state patrol officer to stop the vehicle because the driver was thought , to be acting suspiciously.
After the vehicle was stopped and its driver ordered to get out, the driver was then escorted to the rear quarter panel of the car. Another police officer, at the same time, opened the door on the passenger side. He found and removed a baseball cap, the visor of which was seen protruding from under the seat, and a jacket which was under the passenger seat. In short order a search under the driver’s seat produced a bag of money. The driver was identified as appellant Troy Gascon and was formally placed under arrest. Gascon was taken to the police station, where he was advised of his rights under Miranda. Confronted with the physical evidence, he orally confessed to the robbery. He was questioned by the police concerning other notes found in the car which were similar to the note used in this robbery, and he stated that the notes were prepared for use in other robberies that he had contemplated, but he lacked the nerve to carry out. Gascon refused to give a written statement until he was first provided with an attorney, and the interrogation ceased.
The district court denied a motion to suppress the evidence gathered from the roadblock, i.e., the jacket, hat, notes and bag of currency. Gascon then agreed to enter a conditional plea of guilty, did so, was sentenced and then appealed. The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court. This Court granted Gascon’s petition for review.
Gascon argues that the roadblock did not comply with the requirements of I.C. §§ 19-621 and 19-622. We disagree. I.C. § 19-621 permits roadblocks “for the purpose of apprehending persons reasonably believed ... to be wanted for violation of the laws of this state ... and using such highways or streets.” (Emphasis added.) As we noted in State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 298, 756 P.2d 1057, 1062 (1988), § 19-621 “grants authority to establish roadblocks ... only where it is reasonably believed that persons have broken the law.” Therefore, if the police have a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed — as was the case here — and they have a basic description of the suspect — as was also the case here — § 19-621 allows them to set up a roadblock on a likely escape route to apprehend the suspect.
[934]*934In this case, the police were not unreasonable in suspecting that the bank robber, about whom they had a description, would escape by driving over the Perrine Bridge, the quickest route to the interstate highway leading from Twin Falls. As the Court of Appeals stated, “[CJommon sense suggests such a possibility. Trained police officers need not ignore tactical advantages they may employ in effectively identifying and apprehending fleeing felons.” To suggest that it was unreasonable for the police to suspect that the robber would attempt to flee the community in an automobile, using the Interstate highway, ignores the logistic realities which the local trial judge was in the best position to determine. We therefore find no violation of I.C. § 19-621.
Gascon argues further that the roadblock did not comply with the statutory requirements of I.C. § 19-622. This argument is not persuasive. First, Gascon failed to raise this argument before the trial court. It was raised for the first time before the Court of Appeals. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted:
We seriously doubt, however, that our Legislature intended to establish standards of reasonableness for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or of Article 1, § 17, of the Idaho Constitution. Accordingly, while the requirements of I.C. § 19-622 might be of greater importance in a case involving an accident at a roadblock or involving failure to comply with an officer’s directions to stop at a roadblock, the statute is not controlling here. At most, the failure to comply with the statute is but one of the factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct under a totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433 (Fla.1986); State v. Deskins [234 Kan. 529], 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.1983). However, since we find that this issue was not presented to the trial court and that fundamental error is not shown here, we decline to further discuss this argument by Gascon. State v. Hernandez, 107 Idaho 947, 694 P.2d 1295 (1983); State v. Wright, [115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Ct.App.1989)].
State v. Gascon, 119 Idaho 923, 928, 811 P.2d 1103, 1108 (1989). We agree with the Court of Appeals.
Gascon next argues that the stop of his car was unreasonable as the police lacked an individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. He argues that the stop would only have been justified if the police were able to match their description of the suspect with the driver of the vehicle. We find this argument unpersuasive.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
BAKES, Chief Justice.
The defendant-appellant Troy Gascon entered a conditional plea of guilty to robbing a bank. Appellant appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence. The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court in an opinion issued October 12, 1989. A petition for review was granted and the case reargued before this Court. We now affirm.
On March 26, 1987, a man walked into a bank in Twin Falls with a box. He handed the teller a note, which stated that the box [933]*933had a bomb in it, and if the teller handed over all the cash, the bomb would not be detonated. The teller complied, and the man walked out of the bank with his box and the money. The police were notified of the robbery and given a description of the bank robber. The description was of a man approximately five feet four inches, with blonde hair, wearing a baseball cap and jacket. No description of a getaway car was provided, and no one knew for sure whether the robber did in fact enter a vehicle on leaving the bank.
The police immediately set up an “invisible” roadblock just outside of town at the south end of the Perrine Bridge. During the “invisible” roadblock, the police parked alongside the road and attempted to match the description of the felon with the appearance of the drivers and passengers in passing vehicles. Later, the order was given to set up a “visible” roadblock at the same location. To set up the “visible” roadblock, traffic cones were placed on the road leading to the bridge, to merge all the northbound traffic into one lane. Several police cars, with their overhead lights flashing, and traffic cones restricted all but one of the northbound lanes, providing notice to motorists that they should be slowing down as they advanced into the roadblock. An officer in an Idaho State patrol car was stationed approximately 150 yards prior to entry into the roadblock. As the vehicles headed toward the roadblock, the state patrol officer would observe the occupants.
Appellant’s vehicle approached the roadblock, and the Idaho State Police officer observed the driver leaning over toward the passenger side and reaching under the seat. The vehicle appeared to have no passengers. As appellant’s vehicle proceeded into the roadblock, the police stationed in the roadblock were alerted by the first state patrol officer to stop the vehicle because the driver was thought , to be acting suspiciously.
After the vehicle was stopped and its driver ordered to get out, the driver was then escorted to the rear quarter panel of the car. Another police officer, at the same time, opened the door on the passenger side. He found and removed a baseball cap, the visor of which was seen protruding from under the seat, and a jacket which was under the passenger seat. In short order a search under the driver’s seat produced a bag of money. The driver was identified as appellant Troy Gascon and was formally placed under arrest. Gascon was taken to the police station, where he was advised of his rights under Miranda. Confronted with the physical evidence, he orally confessed to the robbery. He was questioned by the police concerning other notes found in the car which were similar to the note used in this robbery, and he stated that the notes were prepared for use in other robberies that he had contemplated, but he lacked the nerve to carry out. Gascon refused to give a written statement until he was first provided with an attorney, and the interrogation ceased.
The district court denied a motion to suppress the evidence gathered from the roadblock, i.e., the jacket, hat, notes and bag of currency. Gascon then agreed to enter a conditional plea of guilty, did so, was sentenced and then appealed. The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court. This Court granted Gascon’s petition for review.
Gascon argues that the roadblock did not comply with the requirements of I.C. §§ 19-621 and 19-622. We disagree. I.C. § 19-621 permits roadblocks “for the purpose of apprehending persons reasonably believed ... to be wanted for violation of the laws of this state ... and using such highways or streets.” (Emphasis added.) As we noted in State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 298, 756 P.2d 1057, 1062 (1988), § 19-621 “grants authority to establish roadblocks ... only where it is reasonably believed that persons have broken the law.” Therefore, if the police have a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed — as was the case here — and they have a basic description of the suspect — as was also the case here — § 19-621 allows them to set up a roadblock on a likely escape route to apprehend the suspect.
[934]*934In this case, the police were not unreasonable in suspecting that the bank robber, about whom they had a description, would escape by driving over the Perrine Bridge, the quickest route to the interstate highway leading from Twin Falls. As the Court of Appeals stated, “[CJommon sense suggests such a possibility. Trained police officers need not ignore tactical advantages they may employ in effectively identifying and apprehending fleeing felons.” To suggest that it was unreasonable for the police to suspect that the robber would attempt to flee the community in an automobile, using the Interstate highway, ignores the logistic realities which the local trial judge was in the best position to determine. We therefore find no violation of I.C. § 19-621.
Gascon argues further that the roadblock did not comply with the statutory requirements of I.C. § 19-622. This argument is not persuasive. First, Gascon failed to raise this argument before the trial court. It was raised for the first time before the Court of Appeals. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted:
We seriously doubt, however, that our Legislature intended to establish standards of reasonableness for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or of Article 1, § 17, of the Idaho Constitution. Accordingly, while the requirements of I.C. § 19-622 might be of greater importance in a case involving an accident at a roadblock or involving failure to comply with an officer’s directions to stop at a roadblock, the statute is not controlling here. At most, the failure to comply with the statute is but one of the factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct under a totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433 (Fla.1986); State v. Deskins [234 Kan. 529], 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.1983). However, since we find that this issue was not presented to the trial court and that fundamental error is not shown here, we decline to further discuss this argument by Gascon. State v. Hernandez, 107 Idaho 947, 694 P.2d 1295 (1983); State v. Wright, [115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Ct.App.1989)].
State v. Gascon, 119 Idaho 923, 928, 811 P.2d 1103, 1108 (1989). We agree with the Court of Appeals.
Gascon next argues that the stop of his car was unreasonable as the police lacked an individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. He argues that the stop would only have been justified if the police were able to match their description of the suspect with the driver of the vehicle. We find this argument unpersuasive. The police knew a bank had been robbed; they had a general description of the suspect; and they were situated at a place likely for a suspect to make an escape. Officer Johnson, the state police officer out in front of the roadblock, testified that as Gascon’s car approached the roadblock, he observed Gascon lean over to the passenger side of the car at least two times and disappear from sight at least once. In light of the circumstances, the moves of the driver were aptly characterized as suspicious and gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gascon could have been involved in the robbery and that he could have been armed and dangerous. We thus hold that the stop of Gascon’s vehicle was not improper.
We also believe that the ensuing investigation of the vehicle was also proper. The Court of Appeals’ reliance upon Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), in its opinion was not misplaced. The Court of Appeals stated:
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that when officers make a lawful investigatory stop of a vehicle, a protective search of the vehicle,
limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the officer in believing that the suspect [935]*935is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. “[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” [Citations omitted.]
119 Idaho at 930, 811 P.2d at 1110 (Ct.App. 1989). After the lawful stop of a vehicle, a search of the vehicle and its occupants is permissible if the police officer or officers involved in the stop have a reasonable belief that the driver or occupants of the car may be armed and dangerous. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). Here, the officers at the scene had a reasonable belief that the suspect may have had a bomb in his car, since the robber threatened to use a bomb in the holdup. As the Court of Appeals noted, “Once the deputies determined no weapons were hidden in the limited area of their search, they stopped searching. Indeed, upon discovering that the plastic bag under the driver’s seat contained something which felt like currency, Deputy Webb replaced the bag intact. These facts show that the deputies concentrated their search to the limited area where Gascon could have placed a weapon. We conclude that the deputies had a level of suspicion warranting a limited search for weapons.” We agree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis on this issue.
As to Gascon’s argument that his Miranda rights were violated, the Court of Appeals stated:
It is also undisputed that after being notified of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent, Gascon signed a waiver of those rights stating that he would make a statement. Gascon then responded to questions. The officers testified that when they showed Gascon the money found under the seat of his vehicle, he admitted to committing the robbery by displaying a box at the bank and giving a note to the teller saying that he had a bomb. The officers testified that after Gascon admitted his involvement in the robbery he was asked to “prepare a written statement.” He said at that time that “he would rather talk to a lawyer before doing that.” The interrogation then ceased. Within a few minutes the officers learned of some additional evidence and information about Gascon. Gascon was brought back for further interrogation. He was reminded of his rights and stated that he understood them. He was asked if he would respond to further questions about the robbery without an attorney being present and he agreed to do so. Gascon incriminated himself further by his answers.
119 Idaho at 930-931,' 811 P.2d at 1110-1111. Based upon those facts, the Court of Appeals concluded:
We believe the issue is controlled by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 [107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920] (1987) — a case not cited to us by either of the parties. In that case, the accused said that “he would not give the police any written statements but he had no problem talking about the incident.” Id. at 525 [107 S.Ct. at 830]. Later the accused reiterated that “he was willing to talk about [the incident] verbally but he did not want to put anything in writing until his attorney came.” Id. at 526 [107 S.Ct. at 830]. A majority of the Supreme Court held that the officers did not violate Edwards by continuing to talk with the accused under these circumstances. The Supreme Court emphasized that the accused’s request for counsel was “accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities.” Id. at 529 [107 S.Ct. at 832].
119 Idaho at 931, 811 P.2d at 1111. We agree with the Court of Appeals analysis, and accordingly the district court’s denial of Gascon’s motion to suppress evidence is affirmed.
JOHNSON, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.