State v. Henderson

756 P.2d 1057, 114 Idaho 293, 1988 Ida. LEXIS 59

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: June 15, 1988
• Docket: 16852
• Status: Published

Opinions

HUNTLEY, Justice.

We are here required to decide whether a police roadblock designed to detect and deter drunk driving is constitutionally permissible where the police have failed to obtain a judicial warrant, have no probable cause to believe the automobile driver is engaged in criminal wrongdoing, and lack legislative authority to establish a roadblock. The issue is whether the warrantless search is prohibited by the Idaho constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In light of the individual’s right of freedom from arbitrary governmental intrusion, and the questionable efficacy of roadblocks, we conclude that such roadblocks cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. We reverse.

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On appeal from a judgment of conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), David Henderson contends that the roadblock at which he was stopped and subsequently arrested was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of both the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. Henderson moved to suppress all evidence of his intoxicated condition obtained during the stop on the basis that the evidence resulted from an unlawful seizure. Following a denial of that motion by the magistrate, Henderson entered a conditional plea of guilty. The district court, acting in an appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate’s judgment and sentence. Henderson now brings this appeal.

During Memorial Day weekend, the Boise City Police Department conducted a DUI roadblock on Main Street at its intersection with 29th Street, between midnight and two a.m. on Saturday, May 25, 1985. The chief of police approved the roadblock. Also, advance announcement of the date, but not the exact location of the intended roadblock, was publicized for several weeks by the local news media. The site was selected because it was an area having a history of alcohol-related traffic violations as well as being a street with heavy traffic. The roadblock, starting on Main at about 18th Street, was visible for a number of blocks. A flashing arrow, merge signs, reflectorized barrels and traffic-control cones marked the area which funneled vehicles from five lanes into one. An adjacent parking lot was used for administering field-sobriety tests.

For the first five to ten minutes every vehicle was stopped. However, the resulting congestion prompted the roadblock commander either to stop vehicles on a sequence basis or to allow all vehicles to pass until the backup subsided. All drivers were given a pamphlet describing the purpose of the roadblock. By distributing the pamphlet, the officers could induce the driver to open his window and observe each driver for signs of intoxication, check for open containers, and signal the appropriate officer if a driver was believed to be intoxicated. If the particular car was not in the diverting pattern, but was believed to present a direct threat to the safety of those operating the roadblock, the car could be diverted.

Twenty-one uniformed police officers participated in the operation. Of the 942 drivers passing through the roadblock, 293 were diverted to an evaluation point. Eleven people, including David Henderson, were arrested for driving while intoxicated.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides:

Unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited. — The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. (Emphasis added).

The language of the fourth amendment to the'United States Constitution is virtually identical.¹ The essence of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of governmental officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). The fourth amendment grew out of colonial opposition to the infamous general warrants known as writs of assistance, which empowered British officers to search at will, and to break open receptacles or packages wherever they expected contraband. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980):

It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of “general warrants” were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, as originally proposed in the House of Representatives, the draft contained only one clause, which directly imposed limitations on the issuance of warrants, but imposed no express restrictions on warrantless searches or seizures. As it was ultimately adopted, however, the Amendment contained two separate clauses, the first protecting the basic right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the second requiring that warrants be particular and supported by probable cause____

It is thus perfectly clear that the evil the Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant. Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the Amendment. Almost a century ago the Court stated in resounding terms that the principles reflected in the Amendment “reached farther than the concrete form” of the specific cases that gave it birth, and “apply to all invasions on the part of the Government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 [6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746],

445 U.S. 573, at 483-485, 100 S.Ct. 1371 at 1378-1379 (footnotes omitted). Warrant-less searches are deemed “unreasonable” per se, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 726, 701 P.2d 671, 674 (Ct.App.1985). The court stated in Zapp that there are three categories of encounters between citizens and the police. First is the arrest — a full scale seizure of the person, which the fourth amendment requires to be supported by probable cause. 108 Idaho at 726-727, 701 P.2d at 674-675. Second is the investigative detention — a seizure of limited duration which, when supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, falls within a judicially created exception to the fourth amendment. Id. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Third is voluntary contact, an encounter free of restraint or coercion outside the fourth amendment. Zapp, 108 Idaho at 727, 701 P.2d at 675. See e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). When a vehicle is stopped by a police officer and its occupants are detained, a seizure within the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution has occurred, even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082-3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). Thus, at a minimum, precedent suggests that police have individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to stopping the driver of an automobile. Prouse, supra. Significantly, all exceptions to the warrant requirement, including a limited Terry stop, require individualized suspicion.

In Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, the Court stated that “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.” The constitutionality of warrantless roadblocks is a question of first impression in Idaho. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United States has had occasion to determine whether police use of roadblocks constitutionally justifies» recognition of a novel exception to the warrant requirement.

C. THE TRAVESTY OF THE DRUNK DRIVER

Without question, the drunk driver is one of society’s greatest concerns. In 1986, the last year for which information is available, there were 2,584 alcohol related accidents, which comprised 19.2 percent of all accidents which resulted in fatalities or injuries requiring hospitalization.² Authorities made 11,611 DUI arrests in 1986. Id. The state has a vital interest in promoting public safety by reducing alcohol-related traffic accidents and by ensuring the fitness of drivers behind the wheel. As was aptly stated by the district court in its memorandum decision:

The weight of a motor vehicle, its ability to attain high speeds that can crush obstacles in its path, its ability to maim and extinguish human life is so great that the state has a compelling interest in insuring that those who operate vehicles on its streets and highways are not impaired by alcohol. The days of social tolerance for drunk drivers have passed. Society has come to realize the devastation caused by drunk drivers. The social cost in ruined lives is too great. It is estimated that drunk drivers kill 25,000 people a year. Annually they cause an estimated one million injuries and $5 billion worth of property damage. See “Curbing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amendment; The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures.” 71 Geo.L.J. 1457 (1983).

Memorandum Decision, pp. 23-24.

In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Supreme Court of the United States commented on the gravity of the public concern in the following words:

The situation underlying this case— that of the drunk driver — occurs with tragic frequency on our Nation’s highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here. This Court, although not having the daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439, 77 S.Ct. 408, 412, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957) (“The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401, 91 S.Ct. 668, 672, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (deploring “traffic irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways”); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657, 672, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1715, 1722, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (“The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars”); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-19, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2620-2621, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979) (recognizing the “compelling interest in highway safety”).

Neville, 459 U.S. at 558-59, 102 S.Ct. at 919-20.

As public concern over the drunk driver has grown recently, measures have been taken to strengthen laws against drunk driving. A decade ago, in many jurisdictions, driving under the influence was merely considered a petty traffic violation. The law today has increased the penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol. In Idaho, the convicted drunk driver is subject to up to six months imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, and is automatically stripped of his or her license to drive. I.C. § 18-8005. Quite simply, the state’s interest can be characterized as compelling. Protecting citizens from life-threatening danger is a paramount concern.

D. ROADBLOCKS ARE NOT AN EFFICIENT MEANS OF DETECTING OR DETERRING DRUNK DRIVING.

Although the state interest in limiting drunk driving is great, the efficacy of roadblocks is questionable. Boise Chief of Police Jim Montgomery stated that his general experience was that the same number of officers on patrol would make more DUI arrests than the same number of officers engaged in a roadblock. Tr., p. 75-76. Lieutenant Spears, the roadblock commander, acknowledged that it is more efficient to have well-trained officers on patrol for DUI than at a roadblock. Tr., p. 95. When asked if he could expect more arrests by putting the same number of officers on the street for the same amount of time, Lieutenant Spears replied, “absolutely.” Tr., p. 94. Thus, the testimony of the two police officials most responsible for the roadblock shows unequivocally that these warrantless searches conducted without any suspicion of criminal wrongdoing are less efficient than the normal stops based on probable cause. Therefore, roadblocks are an inefficient and unnecessary constraint on a person’s right to remain free of search or seizure absent probable cause.

Lieutenant Spears testified that one of the purposes of the roadblock was to raise public awareness, so that drivers are deterred from driving while intoxicated. R., p. 98. However, if there were no arrests by the police, only “warnings,” citizens would not be deterred from driving while drunk. People fear the loss of their license, jail, shame, and attorney fees, which result from the penal nature of the DUI offense. A roadblock is not an administrative search merely designed to raise awareness of the DUI problem. It is carried out by police — not OSHA or Health and Welfare officials — and if convictions are sustained, it has penal consequences. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated in holding a roadblock unconstitutional: “[Tjhere is nothing in this record, nor in decisions from other jurisdictions, to indicate that a roadblock program has any greater deterrent value than a well-publicized program of highly visible roving patrols.” State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977, 982 (1985). A contrary view is stated by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Lowe v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986):

[T]he deterrent effect of such a highly publicized program is obvious; such a visible project is bound to increase the perceived risk of arrest in the minds of those drunk drivers who are never arrested.

337 S.E.2d at 277. We cannot fairly conclude that the deterrent effect of sobriety roadblocks is negligible. Nevertheless, although the government interest in reducing alcohol related accidents is great, that end is not necessarily best served by a warrantless roadblock search, which yields fewer DUI arrests than does the usual procedure which first detects criminal wrongdoing.

E. THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH A ROADBLOCK

For constitutional purposes, the action of an individual law enforcement officer is the action of the state itself. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 346-347, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880). The roadblock in the instant case, however, was not conducted pursuant to authority granted by the Idaho legislature. If anything, the legislature disapproves of roadblocks conducted without evidence of criminal wrongdoing. In 1984 the legislature promulgated a “Report of the Joint Subcommittee on DUI,” regarding the evidentiary test embodied in I.C. 18-8002. The report states:

The committee has chosen to include probable cause [as a prerequisite] to stop and request that the exam be taken to discourage such practices as roadblocks which are strictly allowable only in certain situations as provided in I.C. § 19-621.

Idaho Senate Journal, Feb. 22, 1984, p. 96 (emphasis added).

Idaho Code § 19-621, which grants authority to establish roadblocks, does so only where it is reasonably believed that persons have broken the law. The statute provides:

Authority to establish road blocks.— The duly elected or appointed sheriffs, state policemen or policemen of cities of the first or second class of the state of Idaho are hereby authorized to establish, in their respective or adjacent jurisdictions, temporary road blocks upon the highways of this state or city streets for the purpose of apprehending persons reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for violation of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United States, and using such highways or streets, (emphasis added).

Consequently, not only are warrantless roadblocks relatively ineffective in that they yield fewer DUI arrests than does the normal procedure which first detects criminal wrongdoing, but also the police lack legislative authority to establish such roadblocks. The legislature has determined that suspicion of criminal wrongdoing is a condition precedent for authority to establish a roadblock. In the instant case, contrary to I.C. § 19-621, neither Henderson nor any other person was “reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for violation of the law.”

F. THE LACK OF SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL WRONGDOING

Perhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in Idaho is individual liberty. A citizen is free to stroll the streets, hike the mountains, and float the rivers of this state without interference from the government. That is, police treat you as a criminal only if your actions correspond. Such is not the case with roadblocks. As the Court stated in Commonwealth v. Tarbert, [348 Pa.Super. 306] 502 A.2d 221 (1985):

While the arguments supporting the constitutionality of systematic roadblocks are persuasive, the rationale supporting them is flawed. No amount of control or limited discretion can justify the “seizure” that takes place in the complete absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred.

502 A.2d at 225-26. Of the states addressing the issue, 15 have suppressed evidence resulting from DUI roadblocks:

Arizona: State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State [136 Ariz. 1] 663 P.2d 992 (1983); Florida: State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433 (1986); Indiana: State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125 (1984); Massachusetts: State v. McGeoghegan [389 Mass. 137] 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); Minnesota: State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599 (1985); Nebraska: State v. Crom [222 Neb. 273] 383 N.W.2d 461 (1986); New Jersey: State v. Kirk [202 N.J.Super. 28] 493 A.2d 1271 (1985); South Dakota: State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (1976); Texas: Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676 (1985); Vermont: State v. Martin [145 Vt. 562] 496 A.2d 442 (1985); Washington: State v. Marchand [104 Wash.2d 434] 706 P.2d 225 (1985); Oregon: State v. Anderson, 743 P.2d 715 (1987); New Hampshire: State v. Koppel [127 N.H. 286] 499 A.2d 977 (1985); Oklahoma: State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (1984); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Tarbert [348 Pa.Super. 306] 502 A.2d 221 (1985); Washington: City of Seattle v. Mesiani, [110 Wash.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775] (1988) (en banc).³

The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned as follows in State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (1987):

This roadblock, however, like the roadblock held unconstitutional in State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139, 743 P.2d 715 (1987), was used to gather evidence for defendant’s criminal prosecution. Before the government officials can embark on a search or seizure for evidence to be used for this purpose, they must have individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Further, unless they can show to a court’s satisfaction, after the fact, that they did not have time to obtain a warrant, the authorities must have judicial authorization, in the form of a warrant, before the search or seizure.

743 P.2d at 712.

Similarly, the Oklahoma court in State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl.App.1984), stated:

The Court finds such activities by law enforcement authorities, while commendable in their ultimate goal of removing DUI offenders from the public highways, draw dangerously close to what may be referred to as a police state. Here, the state agencies have ignored the presumption of innocence, assuming that criminal conduct must be occurring on the roads and highways, and have taken an ‘end justifies the means’ approach. The Court is not so naive to think that criminal conduct does not occur regularly in the form of DUI offenders. Yet, a basic tenet of American jurisprudence is that the government cannot assume criminal conduct in effectuating a stop such as the one presented herein. Were the authorities allowed to maintain such activities as presented in this case, the next logical step would be to allow similar stops for searching out other types of criminal offenders. For example, it is well known to the public that shoplifting is an everyday occurrence which constantly plagues merchants in Oklahoma and elsewhere. Are law enforcement authorities then to be allowed to establish fixed checkpoints, permanent or otherwise, outside of every shopping center in the area to question all exiting shoppers as to whether they possess sales receipts? Are law enforcement authorities to be allowed to demand all shoppers to produce such receipts or be subject to arrest everytime they go shopping? The potential for abuse is apparent.

674 P.2d at 564-65.

The states of Oregon, Oklahoma, and Washington have adopted per se rules which provide that drunk driver roadblocks are unconstitutional under any circumstance. See State v. Boyanovsky, supra, 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (1987); State v. Smith, supra, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl.App.1984); and City of Seattle v. Mesiani, supra, 110 Wash.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (en banc). However, we decline to adopt such a rigid rule.

The Idaho legislature has not provided police with statutory authority to establish roadblocks, nor has the legislature promulgated rules of procedures under which a magistrate or district judge can issue a warrant to authorize the police to conduct a roadblock designed to apprehend drunk drivers. Legislators elsewhere have utilized such an approach. For example, in New Hampshire a trial court must make an affirmative finding that the intrusion upon individualized rights of privacy is outweighed by the public interest prior to authorizing a roadblock to apprehend intoxicated drivers. See Opinion of the Justices, note 3 supra, 128 N.H. 14, 509 A.2d 744 (1986). However, such facts are not now before us. We therefore express no view as to the constitutionality of roadblocks established with prior judicial authorization pursuant to legislative authority.⁴

Accordingly, we hold that where police lack express legislative authority, particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and prior judicial approval, roadblocks established to apprehend drunk drivers cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether warrantless roadblocks violate the federal constitution, we base our decision today solely on art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The Idaho Constitution can, where appropriate, grant more protection than its federal counterpart. See Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 635, 718 P.2d 283, 287 (1986); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 520 n. 1, 716 P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 (1986); State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n. 6, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n. 6 (1985); State v. Lewis, 107 Idaho 616, 618, 691 P.2d 1231, 1233 (1984). See also, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (each state has the “sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”) (emphasis added).

G. CONCLUSION

Because the evidence used to convict the appellant was unconstitutionally obtained pursuant to a warrantless search, prior to which the police lacked individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and authority to establish a roadblock, the magistrate erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed.

No costs on appeal.

BISTLINE, J., and McFADDEN, J. Pro Tern., concur.

1 . United States Const.Amend. 4 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis added).

2 . Idaho Traffic Accident Analysis 1986, Idaho Transportation Department. Judicial notice may be taken of the public and private official acts of the executive department, such as its publication of the Idaho Traffic Accident Analysis. I.C..§ 9-101; Howard v. Missman, 81 Idaho 82, 337 P.2d 592 (1959) (judicial notice taken of “Idaho Drivers Handbook” published under authority of Department of Law Enforcement).

Alcohol Related

Year: Accidents:

1982 2,967

1983 2,857

1984 2,671

1985 2,401

1986 2,584

The following chart shows the same statistics between 1982 and 1986:

Percentage of Accidents Resulting in Fatality or Number of Serious Injury That DUI Ar-Were Alcohol Related: rests:

21.7 11,637

20.4 12,096

18.3 11,646

17.4 11,047

19.3 11,611

3 . Other courts have upheld roadblocks. E.g., State v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal.1987); State v. Abelson, 485 So.2d 861 (Fla.App.1986); State v. Golden, 171 Ga.App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); Illinois v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 93 Ill.Dec. 347, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985); State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S.Ct. 1889, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa App.1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky.App.1983); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me.1985); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985); Stark v. Perpich, 590 F.Supp. 1057 (D.Minn. 1984); Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 14, 509 A.2d 744 (1986); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J.Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980); City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (N.M.App.1987); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 473 N.E.2d 1 (1984); People v. Torres, 125 Misc.2d 78, 478 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1984); People v. Peil, 122 Misc.2d 617, 471 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1984); State v. Alexander, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 34, 489 N.E.2d 1093 (Ohio Mun.1985); State v. Goines, 16 Ohio App.3d 168, 474 N.E.2d 1219 (1984); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986).

4 . Similarly, we express no view as to the constitutionality of roadblocks established pursuant to administrative order, for example, where officials enforce fish and game or commercial trucking regulations. Cf. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299 (1987); see also Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 Cornell L.Rev. 856 (1979).