Brown, J.
This is an appeal on questions of law by defendant Eric Furry, appellant herein, from a conviction by a jury on four counts in an indictment charging narcotics violations contrary to R. C. 3719.42, 3719.43, 3719.-47 and 3719.101, which allegedly occurred June 1, 1970. A similar appeal was lodged by defendant Charles Cohn, the other appellant herein, from a conviction by a jury on three counts in an indictment charging violation of R. C. 3719.09, 3719.47 and 3719.101 and growing out of the same narcotics raid on June 1, 1970, at 519 Thurstin Avenue, Bowling Green, Ohio.
Both defendants challenge in four assigned errors the validity of their convictions by assigning as the reason that the search warrant was unlawfully executed and the search unlawfully made because the officers did not knock and announce their identity and purpose before opening- the unlocked screen door and entering the house; that the warrant issued for the search of the house occupied by defendants was not based upon probable cause; that such warrant was issued by a magistrate who had no power to issue it because he was not a detached (impartial) magistrate; and that the narcotics statutes under which defend
ants were prosecuted are arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Tbe first claimed error by defendants is that tbe search warrant was unlawfully executed by the police officers in that they failed to knock and announce their identity and purpose before entering and searching the house occupied by defendants. The salient facts developed at the hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence seized were as follows.
Three officers approached the front door and
two officers went to the rear of the house to prevent escape. The three officers approaching the front door, as they neared the front porch, saw occupants seated in the front living room. The occupants, upon seeing the officers, stood up and the officers saw them move. Thereupon, the three officers hurried their approach to the front door shouting “Police, stay where you are!” Without any further announcement, they immediately opened the unlocked front screen door and entered the house. The search warrant and Miranda rights were read to defendants at once and the house was searched. Narcotics and related items were found and seized. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
The facts are uncontradicted that the police announced their identity (authority) as police officers, but failed to announce their purpose — namely, to search the house occupied by defendants for narcotics and narcotics law violations — and thereupon opened an unlocked screen door and entered the house of defendants. In
Sabbath
v.
United States
(1968), 391 U. S. 585, where officers arrested a defendant without a warrant and searched his house after they knocked on his door, received no response and made an immediate entry thereupon through the unlocked door, it was held that the validity of a warrantless arrest must be tested by criteria identical to those embodied in 18 U. S. Code, Section 3109, which deals with an entry to execute a
search warrant.
Title 18, Section 3109, U. S. Code, is basically the same as R. C. 2935.12, Forcible Entry to Make Arrest, which governs the conduct of the police officers in the present cases.
This federal statute and its Ohio statutory counterpart have codified a common law rule of announcement, and this rule proscribes an unannounced intrusion into a dwelling, whether the officers break down a door, force open a chain lock on a partially opened door, open a locked door by use of a pass key, or, as here, open a closed but unlocked door.
Sabbath
v.
United States
(1968), 391 U. S. 585, at p. 590;
United States, ex rel. Ametrane,
v.
Gable,
(C. C. A. 3, 1968), 401 F. 2d 765; Blakey,
The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller
v.
United States
and
Ker
v.
Calif.,
112 Pa. L. Rev. 499 (1964);
cf. Miller
v.
United States
(1958), 357 U. S. 301 at 308, 309, footnote 8, which lists R. C. 2935.15, now R. C. 2935.12.
States other than Ohio have similarly applied the rule prohibiting unannounced intrusion into a dwelling as enunciated in
Sabbath, supra,
and have rested this rule upon the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Commomwealth
v.
McCloskey
(1970), 217 Pa. Super 432, 272 A. 2d. 271;
Commonwealth
v.
Newman
(1968), 429 Pa. 441, 240 A. 2d. 795;
State
v.
Monteith
(Ore. App. 1970), 477 P. 2d. 224;
cf., Ker
v.
California
(1963), 374 U. S. 23;
Mapp
v.
Ohio
(1961), 367 U. S. 643; and
State
v.
Vuin
(Ohio 1962), 185 N. E. 2d 506.
One United States District Courl has held that the principle of law that one has the right to know the identity and
purpose
of a person advancing upon one’s doorstep derives not from statute, but from the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
United States
v.
Blank
(E. D. Ohio, 1966), 251 F. Supp. 166.
Cf., People
v.
Gastelo
(1967), 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P. 2d 706.
The state contends that compliance with R. C. 2935.12,
which requires an announcement of purpose and identity, is excused where the officers are in peril of bodily harm
(Read
v.
Case
(1822), 4 Conn. 166, 10 Am. Dec. 110), or where the persons to be arrested or their house searched are fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence
(People
v.
Maddox
(1956), 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P. 2d 6). This is a correct statement of the law. The state argues that one or more of the foregoing exigent circumstances excusing compliance with the statute requiring announcement of purpose and identity exists in this case. We disagree. The conduct of the defendants in this case does not warrant the conclusion that the officers held a reasonable belief they were in danger of bodily harm, or that the defendants were trying to escape or destroy evidence.
Ker
v.
California
(1963), 374 U. S. 23, at 57;
Wong Sun
v.
United States,
371 U. S. 471
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Brown, J.
This is an appeal on questions of law by defendant Eric Furry, appellant herein, from a conviction by a jury on four counts in an indictment charging narcotics violations contrary to R. C. 3719.42, 3719.43, 3719.-47 and 3719.101, which allegedly occurred June 1, 1970. A similar appeal was lodged by defendant Charles Cohn, the other appellant herein, from a conviction by a jury on three counts in an indictment charging violation of R. C. 3719.09, 3719.47 and 3719.101 and growing out of the same narcotics raid on June 1, 1970, at 519 Thurstin Avenue, Bowling Green, Ohio.
Both defendants challenge in four assigned errors the validity of their convictions by assigning as the reason that the search warrant was unlawfully executed and the search unlawfully made because the officers did not knock and announce their identity and purpose before opening- the unlocked screen door and entering the house; that the warrant issued for the search of the house occupied by defendants was not based upon probable cause; that such warrant was issued by a magistrate who had no power to issue it because he was not a detached (impartial) magistrate; and that the narcotics statutes under which defend
ants were prosecuted are arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Tbe first claimed error by defendants is that tbe search warrant was unlawfully executed by the police officers in that they failed to knock and announce their identity and purpose before entering and searching the house occupied by defendants. The salient facts developed at the hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence seized were as follows.
Three officers approached the front door and
two officers went to the rear of the house to prevent escape. The three officers approaching the front door, as they neared the front porch, saw occupants seated in the front living room. The occupants, upon seeing the officers, stood up and the officers saw them move. Thereupon, the three officers hurried their approach to the front door shouting “Police, stay where you are!” Without any further announcement, they immediately opened the unlocked front screen door and entered the house. The search warrant and Miranda rights were read to defendants at once and the house was searched. Narcotics and related items were found and seized. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
The facts are uncontradicted that the police announced their identity (authority) as police officers, but failed to announce their purpose — namely, to search the house occupied by defendants for narcotics and narcotics law violations — and thereupon opened an unlocked screen door and entered the house of defendants. In
Sabbath
v.
United States
(1968), 391 U. S. 585, where officers arrested a defendant without a warrant and searched his house after they knocked on his door, received no response and made an immediate entry thereupon through the unlocked door, it was held that the validity of a warrantless arrest must be tested by criteria identical to those embodied in 18 U. S. Code, Section 3109, which deals with an entry to execute a
search warrant.
Title 18, Section 3109, U. S. Code, is basically the same as R. C. 2935.12, Forcible Entry to Make Arrest, which governs the conduct of the police officers in the present cases.
This federal statute and its Ohio statutory counterpart have codified a common law rule of announcement, and this rule proscribes an unannounced intrusion into a dwelling, whether the officers break down a door, force open a chain lock on a partially opened door, open a locked door by use of a pass key, or, as here, open a closed but unlocked door.
Sabbath
v.
United States
(1968), 391 U. S. 585, at p. 590;
United States, ex rel. Ametrane,
v.
Gable,
(C. C. A. 3, 1968), 401 F. 2d 765; Blakey,
The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller
v.
United States
and
Ker
v.
Calif.,
112 Pa. L. Rev. 499 (1964);
cf. Miller
v.
United States
(1958), 357 U. S. 301 at 308, 309, footnote 8, which lists R. C. 2935.15, now R. C. 2935.12.
States other than Ohio have similarly applied the rule prohibiting unannounced intrusion into a dwelling as enunciated in
Sabbath, supra,
and have rested this rule upon the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Commomwealth
v.
McCloskey
(1970), 217 Pa. Super 432, 272 A. 2d. 271;
Commonwealth
v.
Newman
(1968), 429 Pa. 441, 240 A. 2d. 795;
State
v.
Monteith
(Ore. App. 1970), 477 P. 2d. 224;
cf., Ker
v.
California
(1963), 374 U. S. 23;
Mapp
v.
Ohio
(1961), 367 U. S. 643; and
State
v.
Vuin
(Ohio 1962), 185 N. E. 2d 506.
One United States District Courl has held that the principle of law that one has the right to know the identity and
purpose
of a person advancing upon one’s doorstep derives not from statute, but from the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
United States
v.
Blank
(E. D. Ohio, 1966), 251 F. Supp. 166.
Cf., People
v.
Gastelo
(1967), 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P. 2d 706.
The state contends that compliance with R. C. 2935.12,
which requires an announcement of purpose and identity, is excused where the officers are in peril of bodily harm
(Read
v.
Case
(1822), 4 Conn. 166, 10 Am. Dec. 110), or where the persons to be arrested or their house searched are fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence
(People
v.
Maddox
(1956), 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P. 2d 6). This is a correct statement of the law. The state argues that one or more of the foregoing exigent circumstances excusing compliance with the statute requiring announcement of purpose and identity exists in this case. We disagree. The conduct of the defendants in this case does not warrant the conclusion that the officers held a reasonable belief they were in danger of bodily harm, or that the defendants were trying to escape or destroy evidence.
Ker
v.
California
(1963), 374 U. S. 23, at 57;
Wong Sun
v.
United States,
371 U. S. 471;
Miller
v.
United States
(1958), 357 U. S. 301;
Sabbath
v.
United States
(1968), 391 U. S. 585 at 591, headnote 8.
vVe conclude, therefore, that the conviction of both de< fenclants should be reversed because of an invalid execution of the search warrant by the police officers who failed to announce their purpose before entering the house of defendants through an unlocked but closed screen door.
The next claimed error is that the affidavit for the search warrant
in this case was triply defective because
it failed to meet the tests established by the United States Supreme Court in
Spinelli
v.
United States
(1969), 393 U. S. 410, and
Aguilar
v,
Texas
(1964), 378 U. S. 108, in these three particulars:
1. The reliability of the informant was not demonstrated or stated;
2. The underlying circumstances necessary to explain the source of the information of the informant and that the informant’s information was credible were not stated;
3. A mere averment of continued police surveillance is no factor in determining probable cause.
The reliability of the informant was stated in the affidavit in
Aguilar, supra
at 109, inter alia, merely, as follows :
“Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe * *
In the cases here the affidavit goes further and states, inter alia:
“Information received from a police informant who has
previously
given truthful, accurate and reliable information who states that T.H.C. * * (Emphasis ours.)
The affidavit contains a sketch of one floor of the dwelling and some of its furniture and pinpoints the location of the narcotics. Thus, the affidavit in the case before us sufficiently states and demonstrates the reliability of the informant.
Spinelli
v.
United States, supra; Giordenello
v.
United States
(1958), 357 U. S. 480. The affidavit in the present case meets the tests of sufficiency and to some degree resembles the avidavit held sufficient in
Jones
v.
United States
(1960), 362 U. S. 257.
The affidavit sufficiently states the underlying circumstances relied upon by the informant providing the information and the circumstances necessary to explain the source of his information, and also contains facts from which the affiant could and did conclude that the informant was creditable and his information reliable. It does this by stating that the informant previously gave truthful, accurate and reliable information, and incorporating a sketch of one floor of the house and the location of the illicit narcotics. This sketch could have been made only if underlying circumstances existed to give a source of information to the informant. These elements or underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that narcotics were where he sketched them to be offered the magistrate issuing the search warrant a reason in support of the informant’s conclusion and explains why the informant’s source of information was reliable and enabled the magistrate to know he was relying on something more substantial than casual rumor circulating in the underworld of
narcotics or an accusation given substance merely by the existence of an individual’s general reputation.
Spinelli
v.
United States
(1969), 393 U. S. 410, at 416. A magistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that an informant had given his information in a reliable way and that probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant existed.
Cf. Draper
v.
United States
(1959), 358 U. S. 307; and
United States
v.
Ventresca
(1965), 380 U. S. 102.
In the present case, the allegations in the affidavit concerning continued surveillance of the premises by the police verifies criminal narcotics activity and is corroborative of criminal activity. On the other hand, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s surveillance of the defendant’s premises contained no suggestion of criminal conduct in
Spinelli
v.
United States, supra
at 418.
The affidavit for a search warrant should be analyzed from a common sense point of view and in its entirety in determining its sufficiency, and there should be no requirement that it be an exercise in an essay writing contest.
United States
v.
Ventresca, supra
at 108, and
McCray
v.
Illinois
(1967), 386 U. S. 300, at 311;
United States
v.
Harris,
403 U. S. 573, decided by U. S. Supreme Court June 28, 1971.
Thus, we conclude that the affidavit for a search warrant was sufficient to support the issuance upon probable cause of a search warrant by the magistrate.
The defendant next complains that the search warrant was invalid because it was issued by a judge precluded by law from doing so and was not issued by a detached magistrate. The judge in this case serves as a prosecuting attorney in a municipality where that municipal court’s jurisdiction is territorially distinct from the territorial jurisdiction where the judge who issued the search warrant presides. This judge also is a substantial part-owner in the premises for which the warrant was issued.
The argument that the judge issuing a search warrant is not authorized by law to issue it because he is not
a detached magistrate is without merit. The argument is based on an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and on Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The rule deduced therefrom is that a search warrant must be issued upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, that is, a person exercising judicial power, and may not be issued by a law enforcement officer having no judicial power.
Johnson
v.
United States
(1948), 333 U. S. 10.
The defendants argue that the narcotics statutes under which they were convicted were arbitrary and unconstitutional. This contention is untenable. From the time the Harrison Act of 1914 was held constitutional in
United States
v.
Doremus,
249 U. S. 86, until the present day the Uniform Narcotic Act of Ohio (R. C. Chapter 3719), has been held valid and constitutional and is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in the furtherance of the public safety, health, morals and general welfare of the body politic.
Spence
v.
Sacks
(1962), 173 Ohio St. 419;
Miller
v.
State
(1920), 13 Ohio App. 171;
Curtiss
v.
Cleveland
(1955), 74 Ohio Law Abs. 499.
The fifth assignment of error is without merit and does not warrant discussion.
The trial court, upon remand, should order all evidence seized as a result of the execution of the search warrant or resulting from the illegal search and seizure suppressed.
The judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Wood County is reversed as to the convictions on all counts of both defendants, and both causes are remanded to that court for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.
Potter, P. J., and Wiley, J., concur.