State v. Deitchler

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: October 7, 1982
• Docket: 81-224
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO. 81-224

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A F O T N

STATE O XONTANA, F

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

VS.

WESTLEY F. DEITCHLER,

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l I n a n d f o r t h e County o f Rosebud H o n o r a b l e A l f r e d B. C o a t e , J u d s e p r e s i d i n q .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For A.ppellant:

l i l e s t l e y F. D e i t c h l e r , P r o S e , F o r s y t h , Jqontana

For Respondent :

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana J o h n Maynard a r q u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana J o h n S. F o r s y t h e , County A t t o r n e y , F o r s y t h , Montana S. C h a r l e s S p r i n k l e a r q u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , F o r s y t h , Montana

Submitted.: S e p S e ~ b e r8 I 1982

Decided: October 7 , 1982 Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court. On A u g u s t 4, 1980, the d e f e n d a n t was stopped by a

highway p a t r o l m a n a n d i s s u e d c i t a t i o n s f o r w a s t i n g n a t u r a l resources and for failing to display a Montana driver's l i c e n s e on demand. He was c o n v i c t e d o f t h e two m i s d e m e a n o r s following a jury trial in the Justice Court of Rosebud

County. H e appealed t o t h e District Court and, following a t r i a l witnout a jury, was a g a i n c o n v i c t e d of t h e two o f -

fenses. This appeal follows.

Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l :

1. Whether s e c t i o n 61-5-116, MCA, requiring t h a t a driver's license be carried by the operator of a motor vehicle and that it be e x h i b i t e d on demand, is c o n s t i t u -

t i o n a l ; and,

2. Whether section 61-8-304, MCA, declaring that speed limits should be set by the attorney general in

c o n f o r m a n c e w i t h l i m i t s imposed by f e d e r a l l a w , i s c o n s t i t u -

tional. A p p e l l a n t c h a l l e n g e s b o t h s t a t u t e s on a d u e p r o c e s s basis. H e premises h i s a r g u m e n t upon t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e u s e o f p u b l i c h i g h w a y s by i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r v e h i c l e s and

w i t h t h e i r g a s o l i n e is a r i g h t . H e contends t h a t t h e p o l i c e

power of the s t a t e may not be exercised to regulate an

i n d i v i d u a l ' s u s e and c o n t r o l of h i s p r o p e r t y i n a n a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e g e n e r a l w e l f a r e and s a f e t y o f t h e p e o p l e of the state. R a t h e r , h e a r g u e s t h a t o n l y when a n i n d i v i - d u a l h a s i n f a c t harmed a n o t h e r t h r o u g h i r r e s p o n s i b l e u s e o f h i s p r o p e r t y may t h e s t a t e e x e r c i s e i t s p o l i c e power. Appel- l a n t ' s argument is w i t h o u t m e r i t .

The United States Supreme C o u r t in 1837 r e c o g n i z e d t h a t s t a t e and l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s p o s s e s s a n i n h e r e n t power

to enact reasonable legislation for the health, safety,

welfare, or morals of the public. C h a r l e s R i v e r B r i d g e v.

W a r r e n B r i d g e Co. ( 1 8 3 7 ) , 36 U.S. (11 P e t . ) 420. This Court

has a l s o recognized that such a police power exists even

t h o u g h t h e r e g u l a t i o n may f r e q u e n t l y b e a n i n f r i n g e m e n t o f

individual rights. S t a t e v. R a t h b o n e ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 1 1 0 Mont. 225,

241, 1 0 0 P.2d 86, 92. See a l s o , S t a t e v. Penny ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 42

Mont. 118, 111 P. 727. Regulations that are formulated

w i t h i n t h e s t a t e ' s p o l i c e power w i l l b e p r e s u m e d r e a s o n a b l e

a b s e n t a c l e a r showing t o t h e c o n t r a r y . B e t t e y v. City of

S i d n e y ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 Mont. 3 1 4 , 3 1 9 , 257 P. 1 0 0 7 , 1 0 0 9 . Appel-

l a n t h a s n o t m e t h i s burden of making s u c h a showing.

Whether u s e of p u b l i c highways h a s been h e l d t o be a

right or a privilege, c o u r t s have c o n s i s t e n t l y i m p l i e d l y o r

expressly acknowledged the power of the state to require

licensing procedures to be followed prior to use of the

h i g h w a y s a n d h a v e a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e s t a t e ' s power t o p r o p e r l y

r e g u l a t e t r a f f i c on t h e h i g h w a y s . Mackey v . Montrym ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

443 U.S. 1, 99 S . C t . 2612, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 321; Dixon v . Love

( 1 9 7 7 ) , 431 U.S. 1 0 5 , 97 S . C t . 1 7 2 3 , 5 2 L.Ed.2d 172; B e l l v.

B u r s o n ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 402 U . S . 535, 91 S.Ct. 1 5 8 6 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90;

Popp v . Motor V e h i c l e D e p a r t m e n t ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 2 1 1 Kan. 763, 508

P.2d 991; R o b e r t s o n v. S t a t e ex r e l . Lester (Okla. 1972),

5 0 1 P.2d 1099; Campbell v. S t a t e Dept. of Rev., Div. of

Motor Vehicles (1971), 176 Colo. 202, 4 9 1 P.2d 1385, 60

kLK3d 419; S t a t e v . Shak ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 5 1 Haw. 6 1 2 , 6 8 0 , 466 P.2d

422, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 9 1 S.Ct. 191, 27 L.Ed.2d

1 9 0 ; Adams v . C i t y of Pocatello (1966), 91 Idaho 99, 416

P.2d 46. See a l s o , Annot., 6 ALR3d 506; Annot., 86 ALR3d We nave previously recognized the power of the state to regulate licensing of drivers in the interests of public safety. Sedlacek v. Ahrens (1974), 165 Mont. 479, 483, 530 P.2d 424, 426. We have also recognized that the state's exercise of police power in setting speed limits is in the best interests of the state's economy and is in keeping with the national goals of conservation of gasoline and oil and of improved safety, Lee v. State (1981), Mont . I

635 P.2d 1282, 1287, 39 St.Rep. 1729, cert. denied, U.S.

Appellant's contentions fail. Affirmed.

@&&a R44-4, Chief Justice

We concur: