[Cite as State v. Dees, 2025-Ohio-294.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. Nos. 30106; 30107; 30108; 30128 : v. : Trial Court Case Nos. 2024 CR 00181; : 2024 CR 00038; 2023 CR 03533; 2024 NATHAN DEES : CR 398 : Appellant : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court)
...........
OPINION
Rendered on January 31, 2025
GARY C. SCHAENGOLD, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee
.............
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Nathan Dees appeals from his convictions in four
separate cases. In each case, his sentence included the imposition of a $30 financial
sanction under R.C. 2743.70. Dees contends that the trial court erred in imposing the -2-
financial sanctions because he was indigent. Because the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that Dees could pay these costs, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Between November 2023 and February 2024, Dees was arrested four times
and was charged with several felonies in four separate cases. He was appointed counsel
in each case after the trial court determined that he was indigent and unable to afford
counsel. In March 2024, Dees entered guilty pleas to the following charges: breaking and
entering; receiving stolen property (motor vehicle); receiving stolen property (motor
vehicle); and grand theft (motor vehicle).
{¶ 3} The trial court sentenced Dees to 12-month prison terms in each of his four
cases, to be served consecutively. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it
had considered Dees’s presentence investigation report (PSI), without further
elaboration. The court waived other fines and costs to assist Dees with making a
restitution payment to the victim, but it ordered him to pay $30 as a financial sanction in
each case under R.C. 2743.70 (to be transmitted to the Ohio Treasurer for deposit into
the Reparations Fund), finding that the sanction was non-waivable. Dees did not object
to the trial court’s imposition of the financial sanctions (totaling $120) but now appeals.
The four cases have been consolidated.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} Dees asserts the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS IMPOSITION OF A $30 -3-
FINANCIAL SANCTION UNDER §2743.70 OF THE OHIO REVISED
CODE.
{¶ 5} Dees contends that the trial court should have waived the $30 sanctions set
out in R.C. 2743.70(A)(1)(a) because the court had already determined that Dees was
indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel. Dees argues that, because he was
indigent, the trial court erred by ordering him to pay $30 in each case and in finding that
each $30 sanction was a non-waivable cost. We disagree.
{¶ 6} At the outset, we note that Dees did not object at sentencing and seek a
waiver of the financial sanctions imposed by the trial court. “In criminal cases where an
objection is not raised at the trial court level, ‘plain error’ is governed by Crim. R. 52(B),
which states, ‘Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.’ ” State v. Wertman, 2019-Ohio-4940,
¶ 16 (5th Dist.). An error does not constitute “plain error” unless “but for the error, the
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” Id., quoting State v. Long, 53
Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 7} An appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised in the trial
court only where the appellant demonstrates that “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is
clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome
of the . . . court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
Id. at ¶ 17, quoting United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010). “Notice of plain error -4-
is taken ‘only to “prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Citations omitted.) State
v. Brill, 2023-Ohio-404, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).
{¶ 8} Because Dees did not raise any objections before the trial court, he waived
all but plain error on appeal, and we will apply plain error analysis to his assignment of
error. Dees, as the appellant, bears the burden of demonstrating that plain error by the
trial court affected his substantial rights. Id. at ¶ 18, citing United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 734 (1993); State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 (2004).
{¶ 9} R.C. 2743.70 sets forth additional costs to be imposed in criminal cases to
fund reparations payments. Under R.C. 2743.70(A)(1), any person who is convicted of or
pleads guilty to any offense (other than a traffic offense that is not a moving violation) is
required to pay $30 if the offense is a felony or $9 if the offense is a misdemeanor. “The
court shall not waive the payment of this court cost; “[a]ll such moneys shall be transmitted
on the first business day of each month by the clerk of the court to the treasurer of state
and deposited by the treasurer in the reparations fund.” R.C. 2743.70(A)(1).
{¶ 10} Although R.C. 2743.70 makes no exception for indigency, R.C. 2949.092
provides for waiver of additional costs, including those under R.C. 2743.70, stating “the
court shall not waive the payment of the specified additional court costs that the section
of the Revised Code specifically requires the court to impose unless the court determines
that the offender is indigent and the court waives the payment of all court costs imposed
upon the offender.”
{¶ 11} Dees contends that the trial court considered him to be indigent when it
appointed counsel for him and thus erred by imposing the financial sanctions under R.C. -5-
2743.70 after finding them “non-waivable.” However, “[a] finding that a defendant is
indigent for purposes of appointed counsel does not shield the defendant from paying
court costs or a financial sanction.” State v. Swartz, 2020-Ohio-5037, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.),
quoting State v. Felder, 2006-Ohio-2330, ¶ 64 (2d Dist.); see State v. Thomas, 2021-
Ohio-1746, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.) (a determination of indigency for purposes of appointment of
counsel is qualitatively different than a finding that a person does not have the present or
future ability to pay a fine or court costs).
{¶ 12} In sentencing Dees, the trial court considered Dees’s PSI. It was not
required to hold a hearing on the issue of financial sanctions or to take express factors
into consideration when imposing such sanctions. See State v. Parks, 2024-Ohio-5026,
¶ 73 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Hull, 2017-Ohio-7934, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Culver,
2005-Ohio-1359, ¶ 57 (2d Dist.). “While it might be preferable, a trial court is not required
to expressly state that it considered [a] [d]efendant’s ability to pay a fine.” Id. at ¶ 73,
quoting State v. Parker, 2004-Ohio-1313, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Slater, 2002-
Ohio-5343 (4th Dist.). “The court’s consideration of that issue may be inferred from the
record under appropriate circumstances.” Id. The trial court may fulfill its obligation “by
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Dees, 2025-Ohio-294.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. Nos. 30106; 30107; 30108; 30128 : v. : Trial Court Case Nos. 2024 CR 00181; : 2024 CR 00038; 2023 CR 03533; 2024 NATHAN DEES : CR 398 : Appellant : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court)
...........
OPINION
Rendered on January 31, 2025
GARY C. SCHAENGOLD, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee
.............
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Nathan Dees appeals from his convictions in four
separate cases. In each case, his sentence included the imposition of a $30 financial
sanction under R.C. 2743.70. Dees contends that the trial court erred in imposing the -2-
financial sanctions because he was indigent. Because the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that Dees could pay these costs, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Between November 2023 and February 2024, Dees was arrested four times
and was charged with several felonies in four separate cases. He was appointed counsel
in each case after the trial court determined that he was indigent and unable to afford
counsel. In March 2024, Dees entered guilty pleas to the following charges: breaking and
entering; receiving stolen property (motor vehicle); receiving stolen property (motor
vehicle); and grand theft (motor vehicle).
{¶ 3} The trial court sentenced Dees to 12-month prison terms in each of his four
cases, to be served consecutively. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it
had considered Dees’s presentence investigation report (PSI), without further
elaboration. The court waived other fines and costs to assist Dees with making a
restitution payment to the victim, but it ordered him to pay $30 as a financial sanction in
each case under R.C. 2743.70 (to be transmitted to the Ohio Treasurer for deposit into
the Reparations Fund), finding that the sanction was non-waivable. Dees did not object
to the trial court’s imposition of the financial sanctions (totaling $120) but now appeals.
The four cases have been consolidated.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} Dees asserts the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS IMPOSITION OF A $30 -3-
FINANCIAL SANCTION UNDER §2743.70 OF THE OHIO REVISED
CODE.
{¶ 5} Dees contends that the trial court should have waived the $30 sanctions set
out in R.C. 2743.70(A)(1)(a) because the court had already determined that Dees was
indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel. Dees argues that, because he was
indigent, the trial court erred by ordering him to pay $30 in each case and in finding that
each $30 sanction was a non-waivable cost. We disagree.
{¶ 6} At the outset, we note that Dees did not object at sentencing and seek a
waiver of the financial sanctions imposed by the trial court. “In criminal cases where an
objection is not raised at the trial court level, ‘plain error’ is governed by Crim. R. 52(B),
which states, ‘Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.’ ” State v. Wertman, 2019-Ohio-4940,
¶ 16 (5th Dist.). An error does not constitute “plain error” unless “but for the error, the
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” Id., quoting State v. Long, 53
Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 7} An appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised in the trial
court only where the appellant demonstrates that “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is
clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome
of the . . . court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
Id. at ¶ 17, quoting United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010). “Notice of plain error -4-
is taken ‘only to “prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Citations omitted.) State
v. Brill, 2023-Ohio-404, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).
{¶ 8} Because Dees did not raise any objections before the trial court, he waived
all but plain error on appeal, and we will apply plain error analysis to his assignment of
error. Dees, as the appellant, bears the burden of demonstrating that plain error by the
trial court affected his substantial rights. Id. at ¶ 18, citing United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 734 (1993); State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 (2004).
{¶ 9} R.C. 2743.70 sets forth additional costs to be imposed in criminal cases to
fund reparations payments. Under R.C. 2743.70(A)(1), any person who is convicted of or
pleads guilty to any offense (other than a traffic offense that is not a moving violation) is
required to pay $30 if the offense is a felony or $9 if the offense is a misdemeanor. “The
court shall not waive the payment of this court cost; “[a]ll such moneys shall be transmitted
on the first business day of each month by the clerk of the court to the treasurer of state
and deposited by the treasurer in the reparations fund.” R.C. 2743.70(A)(1).
{¶ 10} Although R.C. 2743.70 makes no exception for indigency, R.C. 2949.092
provides for waiver of additional costs, including those under R.C. 2743.70, stating “the
court shall not waive the payment of the specified additional court costs that the section
of the Revised Code specifically requires the court to impose unless the court determines
that the offender is indigent and the court waives the payment of all court costs imposed
upon the offender.”
{¶ 11} Dees contends that the trial court considered him to be indigent when it
appointed counsel for him and thus erred by imposing the financial sanctions under R.C. -5-
2743.70 after finding them “non-waivable.” However, “[a] finding that a defendant is
indigent for purposes of appointed counsel does not shield the defendant from paying
court costs or a financial sanction.” State v. Swartz, 2020-Ohio-5037, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.),
quoting State v. Felder, 2006-Ohio-2330, ¶ 64 (2d Dist.); see State v. Thomas, 2021-
Ohio-1746, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.) (a determination of indigency for purposes of appointment of
counsel is qualitatively different than a finding that a person does not have the present or
future ability to pay a fine or court costs).
{¶ 12} In sentencing Dees, the trial court considered Dees’s PSI. It was not
required to hold a hearing on the issue of financial sanctions or to take express factors
into consideration when imposing such sanctions. See State v. Parks, 2024-Ohio-5026,
¶ 73 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Hull, 2017-Ohio-7934, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Culver,
2005-Ohio-1359, ¶ 57 (2d Dist.). “While it might be preferable, a trial court is not required
to expressly state that it considered [a] [d]efendant’s ability to pay a fine.” Id. at ¶ 73,
quoting State v. Parker, 2004-Ohio-1313, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Slater, 2002-
Ohio-5343 (4th Dist.). “The court’s consideration of that issue may be inferred from the
record under appropriate circumstances.” Id. The trial court may fulfill its obligation “by
considering a presentence investigation report . . . which includes information about the
defendant’s age, health, education, and work history.” (Citation omitted.) Id., quoting
State v. Willis, 2012-Ohio-294, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.); accord State v. Kirchgessner, 2022-Ohio-
3944, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.); State v. Moore, 2019-Ohio-4806, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 13} In this case, the fact that Dees qualified for appointed counsel was
insufficient to demonstrate that Dees, who was only 35 years old at the time of sentencing, -6-
would be unable to pay financial sanctions totaling $120 in the future. See State v. Lewis,
2012-Ohio-4858, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.) (regarding future ability to pay fines). Based on Dees’s
age, overall good health, GED achievement, and previous employment, as indicated in
his PSI, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that he would be able to pay
these costs. The record does not otherwise demonstrate that Dees would not be able to
pay the R.C. 2743.70 sanctions.
{¶ 14} Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred by
finding the sanctions to be non-waivable. The question of ability to pay financial sanctions
is different from indigence for purpose of appointed counsel, and Dees has not
demonstrated that the trial court committed “plain error” affecting his substantial rights by
imposing costs as it did. Dees has not demonstrated that the trial court’s imposition of
$120 in financial sanctions affected his substantial rights or the fairness and integrity of
the proceedings or resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Dee’s
assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.