In re D.L.M.

2025 Ohio 988

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: 30291
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re D.L.M., 2025-Ohio-988.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

IN RE: D.L.M. : : : C.A. No. 30291 : : Trial Court Case No. A-2024-001997-0A : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Juvenile Division) : :

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OPINION

Rendered on March 21, 2025

ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by TRISTAN D. DIEGEL, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} D.L.M. appeals from his adjudication of delinquency in the Montgomery

County juvenile court on one count of obstructing official business. The court imposed a

mandatory but waivable $9.00 fine pursuant to Marsy’s Law.1 Because the trial court

1 Marsy’s Law is codified in Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution, enumerating

several rights for crime victims. -2-

failed to exercise its discretion to consider D.L.M.’s request to waive the cost due to his

indigency, the judgment is reversed as to the imposition of costs, and that issue is

remanded for further consideration. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

Procedural History

{¶ 2} D.L.M. was charged by way of complaint on April 27, 2024, with one count of

obstructing official business and one count of a curfew violation. He was placed on

electronic home monitoring, and a guardian ad litem was appointed for him. On April 30,

2024, the magistrate determined that D.L.M. was indigent and appointed counsel to

represent him.

{¶ 3} An adjudicatory hearing occurred on May 20, 2024, at which D.L.M. made an

admission to the charge of obstructing official business; in exchange, the curfew violation

was dismissed. Electronic home monitoring was terminated, and the magistrate ordered

D.L.M. to complete eight hours of community service. D.L.M. was also ordered to “pay

mandatory court costs in the amount of $9.00 per O.R.C. 2743.70”; the magistrate waived

all other fines and court costs. The judge adopted the magistrate’s decision.

{¶ 4} On May 24, 2024, D.L.M. filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions

of law, specifically addressed to the mandatory $9.00 in costs that had been imposed.2

D.L.M. asserted that “R.C. 2151.54 on its face, and in past practice with this court, allows

2 For purposes of context, we note that Ohio’s minimum wage as of Jan. 1, 2025, is $10.70 per hour for employers with annual receipts of $394,000 or more. U.S. Department of Labor, State Minimum Wage Laws, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum- wage/state (accessed March 5, 2025). -3-

the court, upon the finding the juvenile is indigent, [to] dispense with all fines and cost[s],

including those ‘mandatory costs’ pursuant to R.C. 2743.70(A)(2).” On May 29, 2024,

the magistrate ordered the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law on the issue.

{¶ 5} D.L.M.’s attorney filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on

June 17, 2024; the State did not respond or submit a proposal. On July 10, 2024, the

magistrate filed an order finding:

● O.R.C. 2743.70 requires a Court to order a $9.00 fine against a juvenile

who is adjudicated a delinquent child on a misdemeanor act.

● Counsel for the Juvenile objected to any fines/costs being imposed for the

juvenile because he was found indigent in an April 30, 2024 entry appointing

the Public Defender, due to his age, and because he could not work this

summer due to his schooling.

● All prior findings related to the May 20, 2024 Magistrate’s Decision and

Judge’s Order remain in full force and effect.

{¶ 6} On July 18, 2024, D.L.M. objected to the magistrate’s decision. No

response was filed.

{¶ 7} The judge filed a final appealable order on August 21, 2024, and an amended

order on October 8, 2024. After reviewing R.C. 2151.54 and R.C. 2743.70, the court

overruled D.L.M.’s objection, finding:

In the instant case, the use of the word “shall” in both R.C. 2151.54 and

R.C.2743.70 creates a mandatory imposition of a specified court cost. The -4-

record indicates that the Magistrate understood that Marsy’s Law imposed

a mandatory fine that could not be waived. Accordingly, the Magistrate

imposed the $9.00 required court cost as the juvenile was adjudicated

delinquent for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a

misdemeanor.

{¶ 8} D.L.M. appeals.

Assignment of Error and Analysis

{¶ 9} D.L.M. argues that the trial court erred in concluding that R.C. 2151.54 does

not give the court discretion to waive the “required” costs specified in R.C. 2743.70 and

R.C. 2949.09, even when it has found the juvenile to be indigent and waived all other

costs.

{¶ 10} Pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d), if timely objections to a magistrate's

decision are filed, the juvenile court must “undertake an independent review as to the

objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual

issues and appropriately applied the law.” A trial court's decision to adopt a magistrate's

decision is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. In re S.E., 2011-Ohio-

2042, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community

Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). “It is to be expected that

most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable,

rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” Id. “A decision is

unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support” it. Id. -5-

{¶ 11} The transcript of the adjudicatory hearing reflects the following exchange:

THE COURT: . . . And [Counsel for D.L.M.], I will allow you to be heard. I

am going to order a $9.00 Marsy’s law fine.

[COUNSEL FOR D.L.M.]: Your Honor, may I ask the Court if the Court

would consider waiving that, as . . . he was 14 years old at the time of the

incident. He just turned 15 a few weeks ago. He’s not employed, has no

other source of income. He is currently in school this summer and won’t

be able to even get odd jobs through the summer. He qualified for a public

defender, Your Honor, and he’s presumed indigent by virtue of his age; and

therefore, we would ask that those be waived, and if the Court is not inclined

to waive those, we would ask for some reason why the Court’s not going to

waive those.

THE COURT: Okay. So the Court will waive all other fines and court

costs, including any attorney fees related to the appointment of the guardian

ad litem or the public defender. However, the Court will order the $9.00

Marsy’s Law fine in this case. Anything else . . . ?

[COUNSEL FOR D.L.M.]: Your Honor, is that because the Court considers

that a mandatory cost?

THE COURT: Yes. And I believe that will be placed into our entry.

{¶ 12} R.C. 2743.70 sets forth additional costs to be imposed in criminal and

juvenile cases to fund reparations payments. Section (A)(1) applies to adults, and

Section (A)(2) applies to juveniles. Section (A)(2) states: -6-

(2) The juvenile court in which a child is found to be a delinquent child or a

juvenile traffic offender for an act which, if committed by an adult, would be

an offense other than a traffic offense that is not a moving violation, shall

impose the following sum as costs in the case in addition to any other court

costs that the court is required or permitted by law to impose upon the

delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender:

(a) Thirty dollars, if the act, if committed by an adult, would be a felony;

(b) Nine dollars, if the act, if committed by an adult, would be a

The thirty- or nine-dollar court cost shall be collected in all cases. . . .

{¶ 13} R.C. 2151.54 governs the waiver of fees and costs. It states:

If a child is adjudicated to be a delinquent child or a juvenile traffic offender

and the juvenile court specifically is required, by section 2743.70 or

2949.091 of the Revised Code or any other section of the Revised Code, to

impose a specified sum of money as court costs in addition to any other

court costs that the court is required or permitted by law to impose, the court

shall not waive the payment of the specified additional court costs that the

section of the Revised Code specifically requires the court to impose unless

the court determines that the child is indigent and the court either waives

the payment of all court costs or enters an order in its journal stating that no

court costs are to be taxed in the case.

{¶ 14} While D.L.M.’s appeal was pending, appellate counsel filed a notice of -7-

supplemental authority, citing State v. Dees, 2025-Ohio-294 (2d Dist.), which involved the

imposition of costs pursuant to R.C. 2743.70(A)(1). Dees did not object to the imposition

of costs or request a waiver and, under plain error analysis, we found that R.C. 2949.092

permitted the waiver of such costs. Id. at ¶ 10. That statute states that if a court is

required to impose a sum of money as costs pursuant to R.C. 2743.70, “the court shall

not waive the payment of the specified additional court costs that [R.C. 2743.70]

specifically requires the court to impose unless the court determines that the offender is

indigent and the court waives the payment of all court costs imposed upon the offender.”

R.C. 2949.092.

{¶ 15} The italicized language in R.C. 2151.54, above, compels the conclusion that

the trial court had the authority to waive the court cost that was imposed on D.L.M. While

R.C. 2743.70(A)(2) mandates that the $9 cost shall be collected in all cases involving

juvenile offenders and makes no exception for indigency, R.C. 2151.54 provides for a

waiver of costs, including those under R.C. 2743.70, by its plain language.

{¶ 16} We recognize that appointment of counsel based on indigency does not

compel a finding of inability to pay court costs.

“[A] finding that a defendant is indigent for purposes of appointed counsel

does not shield the defendant from paying court costs or a financial

sanction.” State v. Swartz, 2020-Ohio-5037, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.), quoting State

v. Felder, 2006-Ohio-2330, ¶ 64 (2d Dist.); see State v. Thomas, 2021-

Ohio-1746, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.) (a determination of indigency for purposes of

appointment of counsel is qualitatively different than a finding that a person -8-

does not have the present or future ability to pay a fine or court costs).

Dees at ¶ 11. We held in Dees that “the fact that Dees qualified for appointed counsel

was insufficient to demonstrate that Dees, who was only 35 years old at the time of

sentencing, would be unable to pay financial sanctions totaling $120 in the future.” Id.

at ¶ 13. Further, “[b]ased on Dees's age, overall good health, GED achievement, and

previous employment, as indicated in his PSI, the trial court could have reasonably

concluded that he would be able to pay these costs.” Id. The record did not otherwise

demonstrate that Dees would not be able to pay the R.C. 2743.70 sanctions. Id. Dees

concluded, “[u]nder these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred by

finding the sanctions to be non-waivable.” Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶ 17} While this matter presents similar arguments to those made in Dees, an

important distinction exists in that Dees failed to object in the trial court to the imposition

of the court costs, and thus the matter was reviewed only for plain error. Here, though,

D.L.M. did object, and thus we review for abuse of discretion. Although D.L.M. was found

to be indigent for purposes of obtaining representation, that determination had no bearing

on the imposition of the $9 fine. D.L.M. requested a waiver of the costs, but the trial court

determined that the costs were mandatory and did not exercise its discretion to consider

whether waiver was appropriate under the circumstances. In other words, the court

failed to exercise its discretion and evaluate D.L.M.’s indigency with respect to payment

of costs. Accordingly, an abuse of discretion is demonstrated, and D.L.M.’s assignment

of error is sustained.

{¶ 18} The judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the imposition of $9 in costs, -9-

and the matter is remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion in determining

whether D.L.M. is indigent with respect to payment of the minimal mandatory court cost.

In all other respects, the judgment will be affirmed.

EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.