PER CURIAM.
A jury found defendant John Dees guilty of burglary (§ 569.160)1 and rape (§ 566.-030.1), and he was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment for the rape and 10 years for the burglary, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appeals.
Defendant’s first point is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence for the reason that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. In ruling that contention this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, accept all substantial evidence and all legitimate inferences fairly deducible therefrom tending to support the verdict, and reject contrary and contradictory evidence. State v. Petrechko, 486 S.W.2d 217 (Mo.1972). The defendant offered the testimony of himself and other witnesses and thus the submissibility of the case will be determined upon all of the evidence. State v. Sykes, 372 S.W.2d 24, 25[2] (Mo.1963).
In a circumstantial evidence case, the state is required to prove facts and circumstances consistent with each other and with the guilt of the defendant and inconsistent with any reasonable theory of his innocence, State v. Keller, 471 S.W.2d 196, 197[1] (Mo.1971), but the circumstances need not demonstrate an absolute impossibility of innocence. State v. Phillips, 452 S.W.2d 187, 189[2] (Mo.1970). A defendant is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal because of discrepancies or conflicts in the testimony of the state’s witnesses. State v. Cox, 478 S.W.2d 339, 341[3] (Mo.1972). The fact that the testimony of a witness may to some extent be contradictory does not bar it from being substantial evidence. Inconsistencies in testimony are questions for jury resolution. State v. Hodges, 537 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Mo.App.1976).
Defendant does not challenge the adequacy of the evidence to show that the victim was raped on the occasion in question and that her apartment was burglarized. The defect, so defendant argues, is that the evidence is insufficient to identify defendant as the rapist.
In the early morning hours of Wednesday, November 26, 1980, the victim, Kay Ogborn, a 34-year-old divorcee, was asleep in the bedroom of her apartment located at 415 Sheridan Drive, Apartment G, Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Occupying the same bed was her 12-year-old son Derek. At 3:20 a. m. Mrs. Ogborn awoke and saw a man, holding a flashlight, standing over her. Neither Mrs. Ogborn nor Derek, who was awake but “played possum,” was able to see the man’s face but they did observe his approximate height and weight, and Derek noted the fact that he had a moustache and beard. The man had a dark “sock cap” pulled down close to his eyebrows. The intruder put his hand over Mrs. Ogborn’s mouth and ordered her not to scream or struggle. The man escorted Mrs. Ogborn downstairs to her small bathroom where the rape occurred.
[152] The rapist was in the Ogborn apartment approximately 30 minutes. Immediately after his departure the police were notified and they inspected the apartment and the general area. Mrs. Ogborn was taken to a hospital where she was examined by a physician.
The building located at 415 Sheridan contains a row of ten apartments, Apartment A being located at the north end of the building and Apartment J at the south end. The adjacent apartment building, 421 Sheridan Drive, also has ten apartments, similarly designated A through J, with Apartment A being located at the north end of that building. The two buildings are separated by a drive. 415 Sheridan is north of 421 Sheridan.
The rapist gained forcible entry to the Ogborn apartment through a door leading to the patio on the west side of the building. All of the apartments in each of the two buildings had a west patio. The rapist left tracks of mud and pieces of mud in the Ogborn apartment, and especially in the bathroom where the rape was committed. On the night of the rape Apartment J, located at the south end of 421 Sheridan Drive and rented by Kathryn Dickson, was also burglarized. While officers were investigating the area west of the two buildings, Miss Dickson notified them that her apartment had been entered and mud tracks were “all over the place.”
The defendant was arrested on December 12, 1980, at his apartment which was located a mile or a mile and a half from that of the victim. Found in his apartment was a pair of Trax brand tennis shoes, basically blue in color, with red and light brown trim, which he admittedly owned.
Identification of the defendant as the rapist was based on several factors, including the following: (1) Defendant’s height, weight, beard and moustache closely correspond with the descriptions given by Mrs. Ogborn and Derek; (2) through laboratory analysis of seminal stains on the victim’s panties it was determined that the rapist had Type A blood and that he was a “secreter” of that blood type in his bodily fluids. Forty percent of the population have Type A blood and, of those, 85 percent are secreters. Defendant is a secreter with Type A blood; the victim is a non-secreter with Type 0 blood; (3) a dark blue “sock cap” was discovered in defendant’s automobile at the time of his arrest and it was characterized by the victim as being “like the sock cap” which the rapist wore; (4) evidence concerning a shoe print and pieces of mud, to be discussed later.
The defendant testified that he spent the night of the rape with Regina Schiwitz in the latter’s apartment located at 124 South Lorimer, Cape Girardeau. He said he arrived there at approximately 10:30 p. m. on Tuesday and remained there until 8 a. m. Wednesday. Miss Schiwitz testified to the same effect.
In rebuttal of the defendant’s alibi evidence, state’s witness William Wilson, a police lieutenant, testified that at 2:30 or 3:00 p. m. on Wednesday, November 26, several hours after the rape had been committed, the defendant came to the Cape Girardeau police station and wanted to sign a complaint against defendant’s brother Paul Dees. According to Wilson, “[defendant] said that his brother had got so wild that morning about 2:15 that he had to leave his apartment.”
State’s witness Robert LeFebvre testified that at 3:00 p. m. on the same Wednesday the defendant came to his office at 1032 Broadway, Cape Girardeau. Defendant told the witness that he was concerned because his brother was behaving irrationally and that he, the brother, needed to be returned to the hospital. Defendant stated that his brother threatened defendant with his life when he attempted to get the brother to leave his apartment earlier that day “in the early morning hours.” During this conversation LeFebvre observed that the defendant was wearing blue “tennis shoes” or what appeared to be “a running type of shoe.” He identified state’s Exhibit 14, the shoes found in defendant’s apartment, as being similar to those he was wearing. The witness said the shoes looked “battered or weathered, wet, somewhat dirty.”
[153] The testimony of Wilson and LeFebvre was to the effect that defendant told them that during the early morning hours of Wednesday, November 26, he, the defendant, was at his apartment which was located at 216 Williams, Cape Girardeau, and that he engaged in an argument with his brother Paul Dees. This directly contradicted the trial testimony of defendant and Regina Schiwitz as to defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the rape. Paul Dees is substantially larger than the defendant and the description of the rapist does not fit Paul Dees.
Police investigators, examining the vicinity of the rape within hours after it happened, obtained mud samples from Kay Og-born’s apartment, including pieces of mud from the bathroom. A fresh piece of mud was found at the edge of the patio of Apartment C of 415 Sheridan, approximately 50 feet from the door through which the rapist gained entry to Kay Ogborn’s Apartment G. Impressed in this piece of mud was the word “TRAX.” A shoe print was found in the mud near the northwest corner of 421 Sheridan, just west of Apartment A in that building, and approximately 134 feet from the victim’s apartment. A plaster cast impression of this shoe print was made and photographs were taken of it.
The photograph of the shoe print, the plaster cast impression, the various pieces of mud, mud samples from Kathryn Dickson’s apartment, and defendant’s shoes were turned over to Robert Briner, Director of Southeast Missouri Regional Crime Laboratory, for analysis.
Dr. Briner, an expert witness for the state, testified that he examined the various items using a technique called “comparison microscopy,” which involves the examination of physical items under a microscope and “looking for details, both of individual and class characteristics.” Individual characteristics, said the witness, are those which appear on the item and will distinguish that item from similar items within a class. Class characteristics are general charaeter-istics which place an item only within a class but do not give it individual identity.
Dr. Briner stated that there were five points of “individual comparison” between the photograph of the shoe print behind Apartment A and the right shoe of the tennis shoes taken from defendant’s apartment. With regard to the piece of mud with the word “TRAX,” Dr. Briner stated that there were eight points of “individual comparison” when it was placed alongside defendant’s right shoe. In Dr. Briner’s opinion the shoe print behind Apartment A and the impression in the piece of mud were both made by defendant’s right shoe.2
The most incriminating evidence from Dr. Briner dealt with Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 22. Exhibit 7 was a “jigsaw” piece of mud found in Miss Ogborn’s bathroom shortly after the departure of the rapist. Exhibit 22 is a color photograph of the sole of defendant’s right tennis shoe “with the piece of mud [Exhibit 7] laid in there.” Both Exhibit 7 and the sole of the right shoe contain green paint. The shoe sole contains “suction cups.”
Referring to Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 22, Dr. Briner told the jury, “This is a color photograph, as I indicated to you, of this particular portion of the shoe with the piece of mud in this exhibit laid in there; it, it not only fits, but, if you take it end-sideways, end-on, and look end-on, and, and do some, again some other microscopy work, which I could not photograph successfully to, to demonstrate very well, but, the, the lines, there are lines around these particular suction cups and those lines are reproduced in that particular piece of mud, and — Q. Is that on the side of the piece of mud? A. Yes, it’s on the side of the piece of mud, and, I think when they look at the mud they’ll be able to see those lines.” (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Briner then took the piece of mud, Exhibit 7, out of a jar and placed it on the sole of defendant’s shoe, as depicted in Exhibit 22. Dr. Briner testified “that that [154] shoe [defendant’s right shoe] produced those, the marks we have demonstrated to the jury.” Dr. Briner also testified that the green paint on Exhibit 7 and the green paint on defendant’s right shoe “were of the same elemental composition” based on his examination of them by electron microscope. Defendant is a sign painter.
The excellent brief of defendant challenges Dr. Briner’s testimony and labels it “at best inconclusive, speculative and misleading.” In support of that assertion able counsel for defendant make their own extensive analysis of the plaster cast of the shoe print, and photographs of the mud pieces and the shoe print. For example counsel argue that there is a one-inch discrepancy between defendant’s right shoe and the plaster cast of the shoe print. Dr. Briner testified that the plaster cast did not figure significantly in his findings. This court has examined the cast and the shoe and is not convinced that the discrepancy exists.
This court has examined the numerous exhibits and the trial testimony in light of the lengthy and painstaking attack made upon Dr. Briner’s testimony by defendant’s brief. The factors which defendant’s counsel emphasize may have been proper topics for cross-examination (and possible explanation by the witness) or for jury argument, but they do not strip Dr. Briner’s testimony of its substantiality.
The foregoing evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant was the man who raped Kay Ogborn. Defendant’s first point has no merit.
Defendant’s second point is that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress state’s Exhibit 14, defendant’s shoes, and in admitting the exhibit into evidence over defendant’s objection, for the reason that the shoes were seized from defendant’s apartment in violation of defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and Art. I, Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution for the reason that “the initial search of defendant’s apartment was unreasonable in that it was conducted by a police officer who had no right to be in the apartment, without a search warrant and in the absence of any exigent circumstances necessitating such a search.” This court’s review of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress “is limited to a determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain its finding.” State v. Baskerville, 616 S.W.2d 839, 843[2] (Mo.1981).
At approximately 10:00 p. m. on December 12, 1980, Officer William McHughs, of the Cape Girardeau police department, and three other officers, all armed and in plain clothes, went to defendant’s apartment. The officers had a warrant for the arrest of defendant. The warrant had been issued in connection with the rape of another victim.3
The officers entered the hallway of the apartment house in which defendant’s apartment was located and knocked on defendant’s door. Defendant opened the door and stepped into the hallway, closing the door behind him. Defendant was placed under arrest. Defendant was barefooted and asked the officers if he could get his boots. One of the officers said defendant “could get his boots.” Defendant knocked on the door of his apartment and it was opened by his girl friend, Tammy Creg. Defendant told Officer McHughs that “it was all right to go in and get his boots.” McHughs entered the apartment, obtained the boots, and handed them to defendant who was still standing in the hallway near the door which remained open.
It was the testimony of Tammy Creg that while defendant was standing outside the open door defendant said, “You are going to have to find a way home or a ride or you are going to have to walk.” Tammy asked defendant if she could use the telephone. Tammy asked Officer McHughs “if they could stay with me, wait with me while my [155] roommate came to pick me up or until I had a way home.” Pursuant to that request Officer McHughs re-entered the apartment. At no time did defendant object to McHughs’ re-entry.
Defendant’s apartment door opened into the living room and it was in that room that Officer McHughs stayed with Tammy Creg for approximately 15 minutes until her roommate arrived. Officer McHughs did not enter any other room nor did he seize anything. While standing in the living room Officer McHughs observed in plain sight a tennis shoe on the floor of the bedroom and noticed that the tread pattern on the sole of that shoe resembled the shoe print found near the apartment of Kay Ogbom. After McHughs had re-entered the apartment defendant was handcuffed and taken to the police station.
The foregoing record would justify a finding that the second entry of Officer McHughs into defendant’s living room was made with the implied permission of defendant. Defendant had informed Tammy Creg that she was going to have to find a way home and Tammy, in defendant’s presence, asked Officer McHughs to remain until her roommate came to pick her up. When McHughs re-entered the living room to comply with the girl’s request, defendant made no objection. Defendant had requested Tammy Creg to make arrangements for getting a ride home and the second entry of McHughs at the request of Miss Creg was a part of those arrangements.4
The police officer was not a trespasser in the living room and while he was there, with defendant’s acquiescence and implied permission, he observed the tennis shoes in plain view and recognized that they were evidence material to the investigation of the Kay Ogbom case. It was an inadvertent discovery.
Although McHughs testified at the suppression hearing that he did not have defendant’s permission to go back into the apartment, the trial court was justified in finding that his testimony, read in context, referred to the lack of express, as distinguished from implied, permission to re-enter.
An officer is lawfully present on the premises of defendant when he is there with the consent of defendant. Underhill, Criminal Evidence, Fifth Edition, Vol. II, § 417, note 54. See also United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Leal, 460 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1972); Alberti v. State, 495 S.W.2d 236, 237[1 — 3] (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
The shoes were not found as a result of a search. “They were on the floor, not hidden or concealed in any way. They were in plain view of the officers and were observed by them as they rightfully entered the room.... The mere observation of what is in plain view does not constitute a search.” State v. Collett, 542 S.W.2d 783, 786[5] (Mo. banc 1976). See also State v. Williams, 554 S.W.2d 524, 531[9] (Mo.App.1977). In Collett the officers were lawfully present in the room because they were there for the purpose of executing the arrest warrant for defendant. In the instant case Officer McHughs was lawfully present in the room because he was there with defendant’s implied consent.
It is unnecessary to determine whether McHughs would have been justified, under the plain view doctrine,5 in seizing the shoes [156] when he first saw them. He did not do so. After seeing the shoes Officer McHughs telephoned his supervisor and suggested that a search warrant be procured.
Officer McHughs then returned to the police station where he talked with defendant and gave him the Miranda warnings. Defendant, who is a college graduate with a “BS in art and a minor in business,” signed an acknowledgment that he had received the Miranda warnings which were contained in the acknowledgment. The document recited, “I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions and I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.”
Thereafter McHughs informed defendant that he had the right to refuse to consent to the search of his apartment. McHughs asked defendant if he had any objection and defendant told McHughs “that he had nothing to hide, that we could look.” Defendant signed a written “consent to search and seize,” the premises covered by the consent being defendant’s apartment and his automobile. That document recited that defendant had been informed of his right to refuse to consent to the search and that his permission “to search and seize” was given voluntarily and “without threats or promises of any kind being made to me.” After obtaining the consent to search, McHughs and other officers named in the written consent returned to the apartment where several items, including the tennis shoes, were seized. Defendant accompanied McHughs to the apartment, was present during the search, and entertained the officers by playing a guitar while the search was conducted. The sock cap was seized after a search of defendant’s car.
[157] “In general, an entry and search without a warrant are deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States unless the action falls within certain carefully delineated exceptions. ... The burden is on the state to show an exception exists.... Among the exceptions are ... searches with consent.” State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260, 263[1—3] (Mo. banc 1978).
The fact that defendant was under arrest at the time he gave his consent to search is not “enough in itself” to establish that such consent was involuntary. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). The additional factors of incarceration and handcuffing do not necessarily make the consent involuntary. United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 1976). See generally 9 A.L.R.3d 858 (Validity of consent to search given by one in custody of officers).
Here there was no evidence that the consent to search was extracted by coercion. The contents of the document signed by defendant and his subsequent conduct in connection with the search itself, together with the other facts previously recited, justified a finding by the trial court that the consent to search was voluntarily given. Defendant’s second point has no merit.
Defendant contends in his third point that the trial court erred in granting on the morning of trial the state’s motion to endorse Kathryn Dickson as an additional witness. Her testimony is discussed under defendant’s next point. More than five months before trial, defendant’s counsel were provided with a report of the burglary at her apartment and were given an opportunity to talk to her the day of the trial. The trial court has broad discretion to permit late endorsements, and we do not reverse a conviction unless that endorsement created prejudice to the defendant. State v. Cameron, 604 S.W.2d 653, 658[13] (Mo.App.1980). Counsel for defendant had sought to suppress evidence of the burglary at her apartment and could have reasonably anticipated that she might be called to testify by the state. See State v. Strawther, 476 S.W.2d 576, 580[3-4] (Mo.1972). Defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced due to the late endorsement; therefore, this point is denied.
Defendant’s fourth point is that the trial court erred in receiving into evidence, over defendant’s objection, testimony from Kathryn Dickson and physical evidence regarding a burglary of her apartment on the morning of November 26, 1980, for the reason that defendant was not on trial for the Dickson burglary and evidence of that crime had no relevance or materiality to the offenses for which defendant was being tried, the rape of Kay Ogborn and the burglary of her apartment. The Dickson apartment was located at the south end of 421 Sheridan. The Ogborn apartment was located in the middle of the adjacent building, 415 Sheridan. The two apartments were separated by twelve other apartments and a driveway.
Over defendant’s objection Kathryn Dickson was permitted to testify that her apartment was burglarized on the same night that Kay Ogborn was raped. Forcible entry had been gained to her apartment through a bathroom window. Miss Dickson’s fiancé was present at the apartment when the burglary occurred. Neither he nor Miss Dickson saw the burglar. The next morning Miss Dickson found that $20 was missing from her purse. She testified that there were mud prints “all over the place.” Mud chips collected from the Dickson apartment were, over defendant’s objection, admitted into evidence. The evidence showed that they could have come from the same shoe that left the mud in the Ogborn apartment.
“The general rule is that on a prosecution for the commission of a crime, evidence of other offenses is not admissible.” State v. Hancock, 451 S.W.2d 6, 8[1] (Mo.1970). Such evidence, however, is admissible if it has some legitimate tendency to establish directly the accused’s guilt of the crime with which he is charged. State v. Hicks, 591 S.W.2d 184, 192[6] (Mo.App.1979). Evidence of other crimes is admissi[158] ble to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related that proof of one tends to establish the other, or identity of the person charged with the crime on trial. State v. Wing, 455 S.W.2d 457, 464[10] (Mo.1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 1009, 91 S.Ct. 566, 27 L.Ed.2d 621 (1971).
The state argues that evidence of the Dickson burglary was admissible to prove defendant’s identity. We agree. There was no question that the crime of burglary and rape occurred here; the only question was whether defendant was the perpetrator. It is a reasonable inference under the circumstances that the same person broke into both the Dickson and Ogborn apartments. The time, the manner of entry, the mud and the theft of money were all similar. Two forced entries in such close proximity, both involving essentially the same manner of gaining entry and the fact that each apartment had similar muddy shoeprints would indicate that it is at least probable that the same person committed both. See State v. Williams, 602 S.W.2d 209, 212[4] (Mo.App.1980).
However, whether or not it was established that the same person broke into both apartments, this was certainly a possibility, and as such, was a fact for the jury to consider. Without it, they would not be fully advised of the circumstances occurring in the immediate vicinity of the rape that night. When a fact is to be established by circumstantial evidence, all surrounding circumstances are properly considered by the jury if they have any bearing on the ultimate fact sought to be established. State v. Stout, 198 S.W.2d 364, 367[3] (Mo.App.1946). See also State v. Cox, 527 S.W.2d 448, 454 (Mo.App.1975); 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 411, p. 479 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
“In cases wholly or largely depending on circumstantial evidence, the trial court has a broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and greater latitude is allowed in the admission of evidence than otherwise. In such cases every circumstance affording the basis of a logical inference relative to the issue, or reasonably tending to shed any light on the issue, is admissible”. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 604, pp. 411-412 (1961). See also State v. Atkinson, 293 S.W.2d 941, 943[3] (Mo.1956). When evidence is circumstantial, the state is permitted to show facts which, when standing alone, may be without probative force, but when connected by evidence with other facts are admissible as material, even when they tend only remotely to establish the ultimate fact. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 637, p. 499 (1961).
Dr. Briner said that both the full imprint and the trax imprint were made by the defendant’s tennis shoe. Defendant seriously questions his testimony. The break-in at the Dickson apartment is relevant as tending to show that the “full” shoe imprint was made by the same person who broke into the Ogborn apartment, leaving mud chips, and four apartments down left the “trax” imprint. Starting from the south going north, one first passed the Dickson apartment, then the place where the full imprint appeared. One hundred thirty-four feet further north was the Ogborn apartment. Approximately fifty feet north of it the trax imprint was found. If the Dickson break-in and the rape were committed by the same person, that break-in shows that he was on the south side of defendant’s apartment where the full imprint of the foot was found.
As authority on this point defendant primarily relies on State v. Mathis, 375 S.W.2d 196 (Mo.1964) and State v. Strickland, 530 S.W.2d 736 (Mo.App.1975). Neither are controlling here. In Mathis evidence of another burglary was not considered relevant because it did not show that defendant committed the crime charged. Here the overall picture and the path of the perpetrator could be important to the jury in determining if the mud samples found in the Ogborn apartment and the imprints found outside the apartments all came from the same shoe. In Strickland the evidence of another crime was “not connected” with the defendant. See 530 S.W.2d at 737. Here we [159] believe that the break-in was sufficiently connected to other relevant evidence for the jury to be advised of it.
If the jury believed that the Dickson break-in and the burglary and rape at the Ogbom apartment were committed by the same person, that would not by itself tend to make them believe that defendant was that person. We believe that showing the known details of the Dickson burglary would not create any improper prejudice to defendant and that the value of the jury being fully advised of the facts would outweigh any prejudice that might arise from the fact that the perpetrator of the crimes defendant was charged with may have broken into another apartment on the night of those crimes.
We hold that evidence of the burglary at the Dickson apartment was admissible to provide the jury with all the circumstances surrounding the crimes charged and specifically as to the circumstances which might be relevant to their consideration of the origin of the mud samples and shoe imprints in evidence. Point four is denied.
Defendant’s fifth point is that he was denied a fair trial because he did not have effective assistance of counsel. He points to several things that he says counsel should have done. Whether those would have been helpful, or whether counsel declined to do so as trial strategy, we cannot say on the record before us. Our review of the entire record convinces us that defendant’s trial counsel vigorously and competently defended him. This point is denied.
Defendant’s sixth point is that the trial court erred in denying his request to strike for cause a venireman who was a drivers’ license examiner employed by the Missouri Highway Patrol. It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine when a challenge for cause should be sustained, and his decision should not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Stewart, 596 S.W.2d 758, 760[8] (Mo.App.1980). Friendship or relationship with a police officer is not alone sufficient to disqualify a venireman. State v. Dodson, 551 S.W.2d 932, 934[4] (Mo.App.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1071, 98 S.Ct. 1255, 55 L.Ed.2d 774 (1978). The venireman indicated that he could fairly hear the evidence and we find no abuse of discretion here. This point is denied.
Defendant’s seventh point is that the trial court erred in failing to give MAI— CR2d 2.70. A similar point was denied in State v. Bellah, 603 S.W.2d 707, 710-711[6] (Mo.App.1980), and our discussion of it is applicable here. Point seven is denied.
In defendant’s eighth and ninth points he contends that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial because of portions of the prosecuting attorney’s closing argument. The drastic nature of a mistrial requires that it be granted only in extraordinary circumstances where the prejudicial effect cannot be removed in any other way, and such a determination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Reynolds, 608 S.W.2d 422, 427[5-6] (Mo.1980). We find no abuse of discretion in not granting a mistrial in either of the respects claimed here. Points eight and nine are denied.
Defendant’s tenth and final point is that the trial court erred in denying his motion requesting a reduction of the jury’s assessment of 35 years imprisonment on the rape conviction. Defendant argues that this punishment is too severe for the crime, and necessarily has to result from bias, passion and prejudice. Under the circumstances shown here, we are not convinced that this term of imprisonment was based on bias, passion or prejudice. This point is denied.
The judgment is affirmed.
BILLINGS, P. J., and TITUS and PREWITT, JJ., concur.
MAUS, C. J., concurs and files concurring opinion.
FLANIGAN, J., dissents and files dissenting opinion.