[781]*781THORNTON, J.
This appeal involves the construction of our statutes dealing with the forfeiture of a motor vehicle allegedly used in committing a narcotics offense. The single issue presented is whether a defendant whose vehicle was seized by police following his arrest for an alleged narcotics offense may thereafter give a lien on the vehicle in favor of another, which lien takes precedence over the state’s forfeiture proceedings under ORS 167.247.1
The state appeals from that portion of an order of the trial court holding that defendant could encumber his seized motor vehicle by giving the challenged lien.
The vehicle in issue was seized and impounded by sheriff’s officers on December 12, 1975, incident to defendant’s arrest. The officers were not, however, acting pursuant to any writ issued by a court.
The trial court found the essential facts to be as follows:
"4. From the first contacts defendant had with the attorney-claimant on or about December 13 or 14,1975, both defendant and claimant were actually aware of the fact that the vehicle had been seized by narcotics officers as a consequence of an alleged criminal drug offense by [782]*782the defendant for which he had been arrested and charged.
"5. By mutual consent of defendant and the attorney-claimant, defendant agreed to transfer a lien interest in the vehicle to the attorney-claimant, which interest was to be for the amount of legal expenses defendant incurred to the attorney-claimant for services rendered in the defense of defendant’s said pending criminal drug case.
“6. Defendant took the title to the attorney-claimant’s office, and on December 30, 1975, attorney-claimant’s name was inscribed on the title as a lien-holder, and an amended Certificate of Title was later issued by the Oregon Motor Vehicles Division showing the attorney-claimant as a lienholder.
"7. On December 30, 1975, the District Attorney for Multnomah County served and filed a Motion for Order to Retain Vehicle Pending Litigation (ORS 167.247) (later corrected in one respect by a 'Corrected’ motion signed January 22, 1976). Attorney-claimant acknowledged certified mail service of the first motion on December 31, 1975.
"8. During the period between attorney-claimant’s first meeting with defendant on or about December 13-14, 1975, and the amendment of defendant’s vehicle title to reflect attorney-claimant’s claimed hen interest on December 30, 1975, attorney-claimant had at least two telephone conversations concerning the status of the vehicle with Sgt. Charles Fessler, of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office, whom attorney-claimant knew to be the sheriff’s officer in administrative charge of vehicle forfeitures arising from ORS 167.247, in both of which communications Sgt. Fessler advised attorney-claimant that the car would not be released because it was requested to be forfeited under the narcotics vehicle forfeiture laws.”
The trial court concluded:
"9. Prior to the filing of plaintiffs first Motion to Retain Vehicle Pending Litigation and actual notice thereof to attorney-claimant, defendant was free to dispose of or encumber his vehicle free of any interest by plaintiff State of Oregon; consequently, defendant’s [783]*783transfer of a lien interest to attorney-claimant on December 30, 1975, was valid.
"10. Neither the actual knowledge of the seizure of the vehicle under the narcotics laws nor the actual knowledge by attorney-claimant that the seizing law enforcement agency was requesting its forfeiture prior to December 30, 1975, affects the attorney-claimant’s lien interest, since he had no actual knowledge of any formal forfeiture action by the District Attorney at the time his lien was created.”,
and ruled that the attorney-claimant’s lien was valid.
The court ordered the vehicle forfeited and also ruled that defendant’s motion for return of the vehicle on the grounds of alleged violation of constitutional rights respecting cruel and unusual punishment or denial of equal protection of the law was not well founded.
Defendant cross-appeals from that portion of the trial judge’s order forfeiting the vehicle and denying defendant’s motion for return of the vehicle.
The state argues that the subject vehicle from the moment of police seizure was in the custody of the law ("in custodia legis”), that a lien cannot be created in property in custody of the law and that the trial court erred in ruling otherwise.
Defendant answers by asserting that the doctrine of "custodia legis” does not apply under the facts because the vehicle was not in the " ' * * * official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ * * citing inter alia Bank v. Livingood, 83 Kan 118, 121, 109 P 987, 988 (1910).
The state relies on the early case of Dahms v. Sears, 13 Or 47, 11 P 891 (1885). In Sears one Kittener was
"* * * confined in the county jail of Multnomah County upon civil process; that he had in his possession the currency mentioned in the complaint, and that the jailer and Witherell, who was deputy sheriff, conceiving or pretending to think that his actions were peculiar, and that he might have something on his person that would [784]*784enable him to make his escape, searched him, and found upon his person the said currency, and took it from him, and delivered it over to Sheriff Sears. * * *” 13 Or at 51.
The money was taken from Kittener’s possession on October 23, 1883. On February 8, 1884, Kittener assigned to his attorney, the plaintiff, his interest in the money. The court stated:
"* * * I am of the opinion that property taken from a prisoner under such circumstances is not the subject of attachment or levy, by virtue of an execution. The security of the public may justify the searching of a prisoner confined in prison upon criminal or even civil process, and the taking from him of any property in his possession that would aid him to make an escape. * * *” 13 Or at 56.
The court held that the execution of the judgments upon the sums held by the sheriff was improper in Sears.
The state argues that property held by the state is not subject to the creation of a lien upon that property during the period of the state’s possession anymore than it is subject to attachment or execution, citing Sears and Saper v. West, 263 F2d 422, 427 (2d Cir 1959).
We do not regard Sears as directly in point.
For reasons which follow we conclude that the trial court was correct in all respects except in ruling that the attorney-claimant’s lien was valid.
It is not disputed that the vehicle properly came into the possession of the state pursuant to the provisions of ORS 167.247
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[781]*781THORNTON, J.
This appeal involves the construction of our statutes dealing with the forfeiture of a motor vehicle allegedly used in committing a narcotics offense. The single issue presented is whether a defendant whose vehicle was seized by police following his arrest for an alleged narcotics offense may thereafter give a lien on the vehicle in favor of another, which lien takes precedence over the state’s forfeiture proceedings under ORS 167.247.1
The state appeals from that portion of an order of the trial court holding that defendant could encumber his seized motor vehicle by giving the challenged lien.
The vehicle in issue was seized and impounded by sheriff’s officers on December 12, 1975, incident to defendant’s arrest. The officers were not, however, acting pursuant to any writ issued by a court.
The trial court found the essential facts to be as follows:
"4. From the first contacts defendant had with the attorney-claimant on or about December 13 or 14,1975, both defendant and claimant were actually aware of the fact that the vehicle had been seized by narcotics officers as a consequence of an alleged criminal drug offense by [782]*782the defendant for which he had been arrested and charged.
"5. By mutual consent of defendant and the attorney-claimant, defendant agreed to transfer a lien interest in the vehicle to the attorney-claimant, which interest was to be for the amount of legal expenses defendant incurred to the attorney-claimant for services rendered in the defense of defendant’s said pending criminal drug case.
“6. Defendant took the title to the attorney-claimant’s office, and on December 30, 1975, attorney-claimant’s name was inscribed on the title as a lien-holder, and an amended Certificate of Title was later issued by the Oregon Motor Vehicles Division showing the attorney-claimant as a lienholder.
"7. On December 30, 1975, the District Attorney for Multnomah County served and filed a Motion for Order to Retain Vehicle Pending Litigation (ORS 167.247) (later corrected in one respect by a 'Corrected’ motion signed January 22, 1976). Attorney-claimant acknowledged certified mail service of the first motion on December 31, 1975.
"8. During the period between attorney-claimant’s first meeting with defendant on or about December 13-14, 1975, and the amendment of defendant’s vehicle title to reflect attorney-claimant’s claimed hen interest on December 30, 1975, attorney-claimant had at least two telephone conversations concerning the status of the vehicle with Sgt. Charles Fessler, of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office, whom attorney-claimant knew to be the sheriff’s officer in administrative charge of vehicle forfeitures arising from ORS 167.247, in both of which communications Sgt. Fessler advised attorney-claimant that the car would not be released because it was requested to be forfeited under the narcotics vehicle forfeiture laws.”
The trial court concluded:
"9. Prior to the filing of plaintiffs first Motion to Retain Vehicle Pending Litigation and actual notice thereof to attorney-claimant, defendant was free to dispose of or encumber his vehicle free of any interest by plaintiff State of Oregon; consequently, defendant’s [783]*783transfer of a lien interest to attorney-claimant on December 30, 1975, was valid.
"10. Neither the actual knowledge of the seizure of the vehicle under the narcotics laws nor the actual knowledge by attorney-claimant that the seizing law enforcement agency was requesting its forfeiture prior to December 30, 1975, affects the attorney-claimant’s lien interest, since he had no actual knowledge of any formal forfeiture action by the District Attorney at the time his lien was created.”,
and ruled that the attorney-claimant’s lien was valid.
The court ordered the vehicle forfeited and also ruled that defendant’s motion for return of the vehicle on the grounds of alleged violation of constitutional rights respecting cruel and unusual punishment or denial of equal protection of the law was not well founded.
Defendant cross-appeals from that portion of the trial judge’s order forfeiting the vehicle and denying defendant’s motion for return of the vehicle.
The state argues that the subject vehicle from the moment of police seizure was in the custody of the law ("in custodia legis”), that a lien cannot be created in property in custody of the law and that the trial court erred in ruling otherwise.
Defendant answers by asserting that the doctrine of "custodia legis” does not apply under the facts because the vehicle was not in the " ' * * * official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ * * citing inter alia Bank v. Livingood, 83 Kan 118, 121, 109 P 987, 988 (1910).
The state relies on the early case of Dahms v. Sears, 13 Or 47, 11 P 891 (1885). In Sears one Kittener was
"* * * confined in the county jail of Multnomah County upon civil process; that he had in his possession the currency mentioned in the complaint, and that the jailer and Witherell, who was deputy sheriff, conceiving or pretending to think that his actions were peculiar, and that he might have something on his person that would [784]*784enable him to make his escape, searched him, and found upon his person the said currency, and took it from him, and delivered it over to Sheriff Sears. * * *” 13 Or at 51.
The money was taken from Kittener’s possession on October 23, 1883. On February 8, 1884, Kittener assigned to his attorney, the plaintiff, his interest in the money. The court stated:
"* * * I am of the opinion that property taken from a prisoner under such circumstances is not the subject of attachment or levy, by virtue of an execution. The security of the public may justify the searching of a prisoner confined in prison upon criminal or even civil process, and the taking from him of any property in his possession that would aid him to make an escape. * * *” 13 Or at 56.
The court held that the execution of the judgments upon the sums held by the sheriff was improper in Sears.
The state argues that property held by the state is not subject to the creation of a lien upon that property during the period of the state’s possession anymore than it is subject to attachment or execution, citing Sears and Saper v. West, 263 F2d 422, 427 (2d Cir 1959).
We do not regard Sears as directly in point.
For reasons which follow we conclude that the trial court was correct in all respects except in ruling that the attorney-claimant’s lien was valid.
It is not disputed that the vehicle properly came into the possession of the state pursuant to the provisions of ORS 167.247, and that the attorney-claimant was aware that the vehicle had been seized by narcotics officers as a consequence of defendant’s arrest for an alleged narcotics offense.
As already noted the state relies upon the doctrine of "in custodia legis.” It is true as defendant argues that there is a line of cases holding that the doctrine of "in custodia legis” does not apply until the subject [785]*785money or property is in the " ' * * * official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ * * *’,” Bank v. Livingood, supra, and that the officers were not acting pursuant to any writ. However, no case has been cited to us giving such a narrow interpretation where, as here, the property has been seized by the police under the provisions of a seizure and forfeiture statute, such as ORS 167.247 and 471.660 et seq.
While we have found no Oregon cases in point, the authorities in other jurisdictions uniformly hold that whenever a statute enacts that upon the commission of a certain illegal act specific property used in or connected with the act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the right to the property then vests in the state, although its title is not perfected until judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the state at the time the offense is committed and the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith. United States v. Stowell, 133 US 1, 10 S Ct 244, 33 L Ed 555 (1890). Accord: Simons v. United States, 541 F2d 1351 (9th Cir 1976); United States v. One 6.5 mm. Mannlicher-Carcano Military R., 250 F Supp 410 (ND Tex 1966); United States v. One 1957 Model Tudor Ford, 167 F Supp 864 (ED So Car 1958); Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 NJ 546, 109 A2d 623 (1954); People v. Grant, 52 Cal App2d 794, 127 P2d 19 (1942).2
Accordingly we conclude that no post-seizure lien can be created where the subject property has been thus seized, and that the attorney-claimant’s lien at bar cannot prevail.
When property becomes liable to forfeiture under the positive provisions of our forfeiture statute, the [786]*786only lienors protected from the forfeiture are those whose liens attached prior to the illegal act or acts. See, ORS 471.665.
As to defendant’s cross-appeal, defendant argues that the forfeiture constitutes part of the fine and thus exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, and further that the state’s policy of seeking forfeiture only in certain cases depending on the encumbrance thereon and the needs of the police for an undercover vehicle is unconstitutional. Neither contention can be sustained. See, Commonwealth v. Certain Motor Vehicle, 261 Mass 504, 159 NE 613, 61 ALR 548 (1928); 36 Am Jur2d 611 et seq, Forfeitures and Penalties § 1 et seq (1968) , as to the first point. On defendant’s second point see, State v. Bailleaux, 218 Or 356, 343 P2d 1108 (1959), cert denied 362 US 923, 80 S Ct 677, 4 L Ed 2d 742 (1960); Delaney v. Gladden, 397 F2d 17 (1968), cert denied 393 US 1040, 89 S Ct 660, 21 L Ed 2d 585 (1969) .
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.