SUMMERS, Justice.
On October 5, 1966 Claude Comeaux was charged by bill of information with aggravated burglary of the dwelling of Mr. and Mrs. David Arceneaux on June 26, 1965. La.R.S. 14:60. He was convicted and sentenced to serve thirty years at hard labor. Six bills of exceptions are relied upon in this appeal for reversal of the conviction and sentence.
Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved when the trial judge denied a motion to quash the bill of information. The motion to quash alleged that the general venire from which the petit jury was drawn was illegally constituted in that the Jury Commission purposely excluded “potential jurors” who were unable to read and write the English language, notwithstanding that the potential jurors may have been capable of'understanding and speaking the language and were citizens and qualified electors of the United States and State of Louisiana. The motion further alleged that, in like manner, the Commission selected no women for jury service.
Article 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1928) requires that a petit juror in any of the courts of this State shall be “able to read and write the English language.” Article 172.1 provides that “No woman shall be drawn for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of the district court a written, declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service.” The testimony of a member of the Jury Commission reflects that the Commission makes an effort to exclude persons who are illiterate and that no women had filed a declaration of their desire to serve as jurors for the current term of court and, therefore, none were called.
Appellant contends that the statutes in question and the actions of the Commission pursuant thereto are discriminatory and prejudicial to the accused in violation of Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article IV, Sections 1 and 2, of the Constitution of the United States and the-Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in that he is deprived of a jury which represents a fair cross section of the local population.
The requirement that a person be able to read and write the English language to be qualified for jury service is a reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation by the state which operates equally against all persons tried by juries; it affords no advantage to the state which it does not offer to the accused. Literacy is .a requirement, moreover, • which, if not essential to that purpose,, is more apt to assure an understanding of the evidence and the law and bring about a fair verdict [487]*487for both the accused and the State. We are of the opinion that this qualification is just as essential to the State’s obligation to assure a fair trial to the accused as it is to assure a fair trial for the State. No authority has been cited which refutes these propositions, and we have been referred to no decisions which hold that the literacy qualification for jurors violates constitutional rights.
Nor can we conclude that the statute exempting women from jury service on the basis of their sex is not based upon a reasonable classification. Women by nature are the center of home and family life. Louisiana, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, may conclude that women may be relieved from the civic duty of jury service. Hoyt v. State of Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118 (1961). See also State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967).
Bill of Exceptions No. 3: Prior to trial, counsel for appellant was advised by the District Attorney that he intended to inform the jury in his opening statement that he would introduce evidence at the trial of certain purported confessions, incriminatory statements or admissions made by the accused as required by Article 333 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure1 and by decisions of this court. See State v. Davis, 241 La. 974, 132 So.2d 866 (1941); State v. Augustine, 241 La. 761, 131 So.2d 56 (1941). When the case was fixed for trial on December 14, 1966, counsel filed a motion to set aside the fixing and continue the trial to a date subsequent to January 1, 1967.
The motion for continuance is based upon the argument that the Legislature, at its regular session in 1966, enacted a new code of criminal procedure which was to become effective on January 1, 1967, and Article 767 of the new code2 repealed Article 333 of the 1928 Code. Since the new provision would not permit the State, in its opening statement, to advert in any way to a confession or inculpatory statement made by the defendant, the Legislature had effectively abolished the concept of Article 333 as explained by the jurisprudence. Therefore, it would offend any acceptable concept of basic justice to try the accused at a time so near the effective date of the new code.
[489]*489The contention which this bill raises is without merit. If, as counsel contends, the enactment of Article 767 of the new code denounces Article 333 of the old, the denunciation is only effective on January 1, 1967. There was no intimation in the new code that all prosecutions should await its effective date. Hence the new law has no effect on this prosecution. Nor are we prepared to agree that the new enactment is more nearly attuned to concepts of fair play than the old.
Bill of Exceptions No. 13 was reserved during the empaneling of the jury. When ten jurors had been selected the regular venire was exhausted; whereupon the trial judge ordered the clerk to draw the names of fifteen tales jurors from the tales jury hox. The sheriff, having received the names at 12:15 p. m., proceeded forthwith to summon the tales jurors to report. About two o’clock that same afternoon seven of the fifteen tales-men were present in court. At that time defense counsel objected to proceeding with the selection of the jury until all fifteen of the tales jurors had been summoned and were present in court. The objection was overruled and the remaining two jurors were selected from the seven tales jurors present.
The testimony attached to the bill of exceptions shows that the sheriff and his deputies made reasonable efforts to summon all fifteen of the tales jurors. Telephone calls were made, either to the residences or places of business or employment of each tales juror. It was ascertained from these calls, and in some instances from other sources, that the tales jurors were either out of town and unavailable, or that they would not be available for several hours. The per curiam of the trial judge discloses that appellant was deprived of no peremptory challenges by the proceedings.
Article 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that,
“If on the trial of any criminal case, the regular venire is exhausted, or it appears that it will he exhausted, before the selection of the jury therein, the court at its discretion may instruct the clerk to open the tales jury box and draw therefrom such number of tales jurors as in its judgment may be necessary to serve on said case * * *»
There is no statutory requirement, and none in reason, which compels us to conclude that the trial may not proceed unless the total number of tales jurors selected are present in court. It would be impracticable, and in some instances impossible, to comply with such a requirement. It does appear, however, that the court should be satisfied that a reasonable effort was made to summon [491]
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SUMMERS, Justice.
On October 5, 1966 Claude Comeaux was charged by bill of information with aggravated burglary of the dwelling of Mr. and Mrs. David Arceneaux on June 26, 1965. La.R.S. 14:60. He was convicted and sentenced to serve thirty years at hard labor. Six bills of exceptions are relied upon in this appeal for reversal of the conviction and sentence.
Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved when the trial judge denied a motion to quash the bill of information. The motion to quash alleged that the general venire from which the petit jury was drawn was illegally constituted in that the Jury Commission purposely excluded “potential jurors” who were unable to read and write the English language, notwithstanding that the potential jurors may have been capable of'understanding and speaking the language and were citizens and qualified electors of the United States and State of Louisiana. The motion further alleged that, in like manner, the Commission selected no women for jury service.
Article 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1928) requires that a petit juror in any of the courts of this State shall be “able to read and write the English language.” Article 172.1 provides that “No woman shall be drawn for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of the district court a written, declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service.” The testimony of a member of the Jury Commission reflects that the Commission makes an effort to exclude persons who are illiterate and that no women had filed a declaration of their desire to serve as jurors for the current term of court and, therefore, none were called.
Appellant contends that the statutes in question and the actions of the Commission pursuant thereto are discriminatory and prejudicial to the accused in violation of Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article IV, Sections 1 and 2, of the Constitution of the United States and the-Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in that he is deprived of a jury which represents a fair cross section of the local population.
The requirement that a person be able to read and write the English language to be qualified for jury service is a reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation by the state which operates equally against all persons tried by juries; it affords no advantage to the state which it does not offer to the accused. Literacy is .a requirement, moreover, • which, if not essential to that purpose,, is more apt to assure an understanding of the evidence and the law and bring about a fair verdict [487]*487for both the accused and the State. We are of the opinion that this qualification is just as essential to the State’s obligation to assure a fair trial to the accused as it is to assure a fair trial for the State. No authority has been cited which refutes these propositions, and we have been referred to no decisions which hold that the literacy qualification for jurors violates constitutional rights.
Nor can we conclude that the statute exempting women from jury service on the basis of their sex is not based upon a reasonable classification. Women by nature are the center of home and family life. Louisiana, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, may conclude that women may be relieved from the civic duty of jury service. Hoyt v. State of Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118 (1961). See also State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967).
Bill of Exceptions No. 3: Prior to trial, counsel for appellant was advised by the District Attorney that he intended to inform the jury in his opening statement that he would introduce evidence at the trial of certain purported confessions, incriminatory statements or admissions made by the accused as required by Article 333 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure1 and by decisions of this court. See State v. Davis, 241 La. 974, 132 So.2d 866 (1941); State v. Augustine, 241 La. 761, 131 So.2d 56 (1941). When the case was fixed for trial on December 14, 1966, counsel filed a motion to set aside the fixing and continue the trial to a date subsequent to January 1, 1967.
The motion for continuance is based upon the argument that the Legislature, at its regular session in 1966, enacted a new code of criminal procedure which was to become effective on January 1, 1967, and Article 767 of the new code2 repealed Article 333 of the 1928 Code. Since the new provision would not permit the State, in its opening statement, to advert in any way to a confession or inculpatory statement made by the defendant, the Legislature had effectively abolished the concept of Article 333 as explained by the jurisprudence. Therefore, it would offend any acceptable concept of basic justice to try the accused at a time so near the effective date of the new code.
[489]*489The contention which this bill raises is without merit. If, as counsel contends, the enactment of Article 767 of the new code denounces Article 333 of the old, the denunciation is only effective on January 1, 1967. There was no intimation in the new code that all prosecutions should await its effective date. Hence the new law has no effect on this prosecution. Nor are we prepared to agree that the new enactment is more nearly attuned to concepts of fair play than the old.
Bill of Exceptions No. 13 was reserved during the empaneling of the jury. When ten jurors had been selected the regular venire was exhausted; whereupon the trial judge ordered the clerk to draw the names of fifteen tales jurors from the tales jury hox. The sheriff, having received the names at 12:15 p. m., proceeded forthwith to summon the tales jurors to report. About two o’clock that same afternoon seven of the fifteen tales-men were present in court. At that time defense counsel objected to proceeding with the selection of the jury until all fifteen of the tales jurors had been summoned and were present in court. The objection was overruled and the remaining two jurors were selected from the seven tales jurors present.
The testimony attached to the bill of exceptions shows that the sheriff and his deputies made reasonable efforts to summon all fifteen of the tales jurors. Telephone calls were made, either to the residences or places of business or employment of each tales juror. It was ascertained from these calls, and in some instances from other sources, that the tales jurors were either out of town and unavailable, or that they would not be available for several hours. The per curiam of the trial judge discloses that appellant was deprived of no peremptory challenges by the proceedings.
Article 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that,
“If on the trial of any criminal case, the regular venire is exhausted, or it appears that it will he exhausted, before the selection of the jury therein, the court at its discretion may instruct the clerk to open the tales jury box and draw therefrom such number of tales jurors as in its judgment may be necessary to serve on said case * * *»
There is no statutory requirement, and none in reason, which compels us to conclude that the trial may not proceed unless the total number of tales jurors selected are present in court. It would be impracticable, and in some instances impossible, to comply with such a requirement. It does appear, however, that the court should be satisfied that a reasonable effort was made to summon [491]*491all of the tales jurors and that they could not be produced in court for several hours, and to await their response to the summons would unduly retard the progress of the trial. This requirement was met in the instant case. Moreover, there was no showing that the sheriff intentionally selected certain talesmen for appearance in court to the exclusion of others, or otherwise practiced any fraud to the prejudice of the accused. La.Code Crim.P. art. 557 (1928). Under these circumstances, it was not necessary to delay the proceeding. State v. Lebleu, 137 La. 1007, 69 So. 808 (1915).
Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved to the overruling of a motion to suppress as evidence a piece of cloth and pinking shears found by Dr. Ray Herd, State Criminologist, in the dwelling house of appellant. Bill No. 14 was reserved at the trial when the court overruled defendant’s objection to the introduction of the cloth and pinking shears into evidence.
The facts which form the background of these bills of exceptions may be briefly stated. On June 26, 1965 Mr. and .Mrs. David Arceneaux resided in a rural dwelling west of Scott and north of Highway 90 in Lafayette Parish. About 5:15 that morning the dwelling was burglarized. One of the three actors in the crime, Bobby Elias, was shot and killed instantly by Mr. Arceneaux. Another, Douglas Simmons, was injured as he fled the scene and was apprehended nearby.
The third party to the crime fled the scene. At approximately 10:00 or 10:30 that morning appellant was found concealed in a shallow trench in an isolated section of a cotton field about seven-tenths of a mile from the Arceneaux dwelling.
A burlap bag containing burglary tools was found on the Arceneaux premises. Among other items contained in the bag were white rags used to wrap the burglary tools. The rags had been cut with pinking shears.
The sheriff’s officers knew from prior investigations that Comeaux had connections with Douglas Simmons, who had been arrested in connection with other investigations. Comeaux and Simmons had been seen together.
When the sheriff received notice of Comeaux’s arrest by his officers, he applied for and received a warrant to search the house where Comeaux lived with his. wife and Pat Robinson in Lafayette about seven miles from the scene of the .crime. The warrant was issued to search for narcotics, money, a revolver and other items not connected with the Arceneaux burglary. Based upon the warrant, theComeaux dwelling was searched and drugs and other items, connected with other' offenses, were taken by the officers’[493]*493This search ended about three o’clock. Later that afternoon Dr. Herd, with Deputy Leonard Broussard and Officer Fruge of the State Police, contacted Mrs. Lillian Comeaux, appellant’s wife, and obtained her permission to search the dwelling again. Mrs. Comeaux accompanied the officers to her dwelling and remained there while the search was conducted. At approximately five that afternoon the officers found pinking shears and cloth which were later identified as being the same cloth from which the rags found with the burglary tools were cut.
Appellant’s contention is that the first search was unconstitutional and that the officers discovered the cloth in that search which induced them to seek and obtain permission for the second search, which yielded the cloth and pinking shears later introduced in evidence to appellant’s prejudice. Hence, the cloth and pinking shears seized in the second search were the fruit of the first unlawful search and the evidence could not, therefore, under the exclusionary rule, be used against appellant. This is appellant’s contention that the search warrant was merely a ruse to obtain entry into appellant’s house to search for objects connected with the Arceneaux burglary. It presents factual issues which the trial judge resolved adversely to appellant. On the basis of the record before us, and the facts recited herein, we cannot say that the finding is erroneous. There is, we would agree, ample evidence to support the finding.
The State’s attorney asserts that the cloth and pinking shears were admissible because they were obtained as a result of a lawful arrest. The decision in James v. State of Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 86 S.Ct. 151, 15 L.Ed.2d 30 (1965) makes this position untenable. But we agree with the State’s other contention that the search made with the consent of the wife was lawful and the evidence obtained as a result thereof was properly admitted. The question of consent is purely a factual one which the evidence amply supports in this instance. Not only was the consent to enter and search manifested by the wife’s verbal acquiescence, but she accompanied the officers to her house and consented to the removal of the objects discovered there. See Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert, denied 380 U.S. 980, 85 S.Ct. 1344, 14 L.Ed.2d 274; Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948); State v. Gregoire, 249 La. 890, 192 So.2d 114 (1966).
The final bill, No. 15, was reserved during the hearing on the motion to suppress. Deputy Sheriff Harson was called as a witness by appellant and, while he was being examined by defense counsel, he was asked when the drugs referred to in the application for the search warrant [495]*495were stolen. The State’s attorney objected to the question as immaterial and irrelevant, and the objection was sustained. In argument, defense counsel asserted that the question was relevant and material to establish that the representations made in the application for the search warrant were made simply as a ruse and subterfuge to gain access to appellant’s home and, furthermore, to show that none of the items mentioned in the search warrant had any connection with the Arceneaux burglary.
We have noted fi'om the record that the items mentioned in the warrant were not related to the Arceneaux burglary, and since this fact was established, no prejudice occurred to appellant by this ruling.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
McCALEB, J., dissents from the ruling on Bills Nos. 4 and 14.
BARHAM, J., dissents with written reasons.