State v. Coleman

2026 Ohio 203

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 30479
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Coleman, 2026-Ohio-203.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30479 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2025-TRC-0007 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) PATRICE COLEMAN : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellant : OPINION :

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on January 23, 2026, the judgment of

the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30479

JENNIFER E. MARIETTA, Attorney for Appellant MARC T. ROSS, Attorney for Appellee

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Patrice Coleman appeals from a judgment entry of conviction of one count of

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (“OVI”), which followed a no contest

plea. Because the arresting officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that a red-light

violation had occurred, the evidence that flowed from the improper traffic stop was fruit of

the poisonous tree, and the trial court erred in overruling Coleman’s motion to suppress. The

judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On January 1, 2025, Coleman was cited for OVI, a seat belt violation, and a red-

light violation, and she pled not guilty. She also received an administrative license

suspension (“ALS”).

{¶ 3} On January 30, 2025, Coleman filed a motion to suppress. She also filed an

appeal of her ALS and a motion for limited driving privileges. An ALS hearing was scheduled

for March 4, 2025. The court subsequently continued the hearing and granted a stay of the

suspension. The court addressed both the ALS appeal and the motion to suppress at

hearing on March 20, 2025, and at the conclusion of the hearing, indicated that it would

issue written decisions on each motion. The court issued a written decision overruling the

motion to suppress on April 23, 2025, but did not issue a decision on the ALS appeal.

{¶ 4} On May 12, 2025, Coleman pleaded no contest to OVI. She was found guilty

and sentenced to one year of non-reporting probation, community control sanctions, and a

2 fine of $375.00. The remaining charges were dismissed. Before addressing Coleman’s

assigned errors, we review the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as the

decision on the motion to suppress.

{¶ 5} Ohio State Highway Patrol Officer Tyler Goubeaux testified that on January 1,

2025, he was on patrol in a marked cruiser around 1:00 a.m. when he observed a gray

Chevy SUV driven by Coleman on Salem Avenue in the left hand turn lane facing north.

According to Goubeaux, the “straight lane turned green but the [turn] arrow stayed red and

she attempted to make a left hand turn on a red arrow.” He stated that after he activated his

lights, Coleman’s vehicle almost struck the curb on Cornell Avenue while turning.

{¶ 6} Goubeaux contacted Coleman, approaching her stopped vehicle from the

driver’s side. She was the sole occupant, and he noticed a very strong odor of an alcoholic

beverage. Coleman provided her driver’s license. She had bloodshot, glassy eyes and

slurred speech, and she did not provide insurance when asked to do so. Coleman told

Goubeaux that she had consumed one alcoholic beverage, and he asked her to exit her

vehicle.

{¶ 7} In accordance with his National Highway Traffic Safety Administration training,

Goubeaux administered three field sobriety tests to Coleman, namely the horizontal and

vertical gaze nystagmus tests and the walk-and-turn test. Goubeaux was still able to smell

alcohol on Coleman’s person while she was outside of her vehicle. On the horizontal gaze

test, he observed three clues of intoxication in each of Coleman’s eyes—a lack of smooth

pursuit, nystagmus at prior to forty-five degrees, and sustained nystagmus at maximum

deviation. Goubeaux also observed nystagmus on the vertical gaze test.

{¶ 8} Coleman performed the walk and turn test after being given the instructions and

a demonstration of the test by Goubeaux, and after acknowledging her understanding.

3 Coleman exhibited six out of eight clues of impairment on the test. Coleman almost fell

during the test, and Goubeaux decided not to administer the one-leg-stand test out of

concern for her safety. Based on his training and experience, Goubeaux concluded that

Coleman was intoxicated due to her “running the red light, almost striking a curb, slurred

speech, blood shot glassy eyes, strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, admission to drinking.

The six clues on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test including two clues on the vertical gaze

and then the six clues on the walk and turn test.”

{¶ 9} After another officer arrived on the scene, Goubeaux read the ALS form to

Coleman in the presence of that officer. Goubeaux’s dashcam and body camera video were

played for the court.

{¶ 10} On cross examination, Goubeaux acknowledged that Coleman was already in

the intersection when he first observed her vehicle and that she had already passed the stop

bar there. When asked if he could state when Coleman crossed the stop bar into the

intersection, Goubeaux replied, “I cannot.” He acknowledged that the intersection is large

and that although Coleman was headed north, there was oncoming traffic from the south,

and she had waited until all of the oncoming cars cleared the intersection before initiating

her left-hand turn. The following exchange occurred at the motion hearing:

Q. All right, but if [Coleman] enters the intersection while she is permitted to

do so and then the light turns red and you come upon her and you can’t tell

the sequence of events that occurred prior to your arrival you don’t know what

that left turn signal showed when she entered into the intersection. Isn’t that a

fair statement?

A. For the most part.

Q. Well, what’s wrong with it?

4 A. Well, the light is completely red including the turn arrow on my approach.

So it’s –

Q. I understand that but you don’t know when she actually got into the center

of the intersection do you?

A. I do not.

Q. All right, and if someone actually enters the intersection and waits until

traffic clears, they are still permitted to turn left are they not? If they are already

in the intersection?

A. Correct.

Q. You did not see her go past the stop bar while the light was red. Is that a

A. It’s a fair statement.

{¶ 11} In overruling the motion to suppress, the court found that the “basis for the

arrest was a combination of observations made by Trp. Goubeaux including running the red

light, nearly striking a curb, the odor of alcohol, [Coleman’s] slurred speech and glassy eyes,

and [her] poor performance on the [field sobriety tests].” The court found “probable cause

was present for Tpr. Goubeaux to arrest [Coleman] based upon the totality of the

circumstances.” The court further found:

Tpr. Goubeaux observed: 1) [Coleman] operating a vehicle 2.) [Coleman]

execute a left turn while the respective traffic control light was illuminated red

3.) an odor of alcohol emanating from [Coleman’s] vehicle 4.) [Coleman’s]

slurred speech and glassy eyes 5.) [Coleman] exhibiting multiple clues

indicating impairment during the [horizontal gaze nystagmus] test 6.)

[Coleman] exhibiting multiple clues indicating impairment during the walk and

5 turn test. As such the facts and circumstances known to Trp. Goubeaux were

sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that [Coleman] had

committed an operating a vehicle under the influence offense. The traffic stop

of [Coleman] was lawful. Further, the Court finds Tpr. Goubeaux administered

the [field sobriety tests] in substantial compliance with applicable [] standards.

{¶ 12} Coleman asserts two assignments of error. In her first assignment of error, she

argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

{¶ 13} According to Coleman, there “was no reasonable basis for the traffic stop.”

She argues that the arresting officer did not observe her enter the intersection and that had

she “entered the intersection on a green arrow, then her left turn on the red [arrow] is not a

traffic violation.” She argues that any alleged odor of alcohol or field sobriety test results are

fruit of the poisonous tree after the improper traffic stop, and the court “erred in considering

evidence obtained after the traffic stop to bolster the reason for the original traffic stop.”

{¶ 14} The State responds that there “is no testimony or evidence in the record that

[Coleman] entered the intersection on a green arrow.” The State directs our attention to

Goubeaux’s dash camera video “corroborating the Trooper’s observations of the violation.”

In reply, Coleman asserts that Goubeaux’s “speculation is not reasonable suspicion.” She

argues that she had “no obligation to testify or put forth a single iota of evidence,” and “the

uncontroverted testimony of Trooper Goubeaux is that he did not observe any traffic violation

by her.”

Standard of Review and Analysis

{¶ 15} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of

fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the

6 credibility of witnesses.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8, citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio

St.3d 357, 366 (1992). “An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they

are supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 16.

“Accepting those facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, as a

matter of law and without deference to the trial court’s legal conclusion, whether the

applicable legal standard is satisfied.” State v. Isaac, 2005-Ohio-3733, ¶ 8, (2d Dist.), citing

State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586 (2d Dist. 1994). “The application of the law to the

trial court’s findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review.” State v. Turner, 2015-

Ohio-4612, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 16} As noted by the Sixth District:

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406,

2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7, citing State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389,

391, 745 N.E.2d 1036 (2001). “A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is

a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in

accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S.

54, 60, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). This type of seizure is justified

if an officer has a “reasonable suspicion”—i.e., “a particularized and objective

basis” to suspect—that the person stopped has broken the law. Id. at 60. In

other words, a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed a traffic violation. Mays

at ¶ 7-8.

State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-2071, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.).

7 {¶ 17} One “type of lawful traffic stop is an investigative stop, also known as a Terry

stop, in which the officer has reasonable suspicion based upon specific or articulable facts

that criminal behavior is imminent or has occurred.” State v. Bullock, 2017-Ohio-497, ¶ 7

(12th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968). “The determination whether an officer

had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of

circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the

scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10,

quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991). “An assessment of the totality of the

circumstances ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.’” Id., quoting United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). When reviewing an officer’s actions, the court

“must give due weight to his experience and training and view the evidence as it would be

understood by those in law enforcement.” Andrews at 88, citing Cortez.

{¶ 18} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for

making a stop—that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones,

70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557 (2d Dist. 1990). “Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop ‘is

dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of

reliability.’” State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 20, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,

330 (1990). “‘Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the

circumstances—the whole picture,” . . . , that must be taken into account when evaluating

whether there is reasonable suspicion.’” Id., quoting White at 330, quoting Cortez at 417.

“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not

on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204,

¶ 19. The “Supreme Court has held that, while a series of events appear innocent when

8 viewed separately, taken together, they can warrant further investigation.” State v. White,

2002 WL 63294, *2 (2d Dist. Jan. 18, 2002), citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-

10 (1989).

{¶ 19} “The derivative-evidence rule, or fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine as it is

widely known, requires suppression of evidence that was seized in a seemingly lawful

manner but about which police learned because of a prior constitutional violation such as an

illegal search or seizure.” State v. McLemore, 2012-Ohio-521, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing

Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). “The exclusionary rule reaches not only

primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence

that is subsequently discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.” Id.

{¶ 20} R.C. 4511.13(C)(2)(a), the basis of Goubeaux’s traffic stop for the red-light

violation, states, in relevant part, that vehicular traffic “facing a steady red arrow signal

indication shall not enter the intersection to make the movement indicated by the arrow and

. . . shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; . . . and shall remain stopped until a signal

indication or other traffic control device permitting the movement indicated by such red arrow

is displayed.”

{¶ 21} On the other hand, R.C. 4511.13(A)(2) states that vehicles “facing a green

arrow signal indication, displayed alone or in combination with another signal indication, are

permitted to cautiously enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by such

arrow, or such other movement as is permitted by other indications displayed at the same

time.” Such vehicles, “including vehicles turning right or left or making a u-turn movement,

shall yield the right-of-way” to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.

R.C. 4511.13(A)(2)(b).

9 {¶ 22} Goubeaux acknowledged that Coleman was already in the intersection and

past the stop line when he first observed her vehicle. He specifically testified that he did not

see her cross the stop line while the light was red, and he recognized that she waited for

oncoming traffic to clear the intersection before executing her left turn. Goubeaux further

conceded that if Coleman had entered the intersection lawfully, a fact of which he was

admittedly unaware, she was legally permitted to turn once the traffic cleared. The video

upon which the State relies is grainy, unclear, and cannot overcome Goubeaux’s explicit

concessions regarding his observations of Coleman. Based upon the totality of the

circumstances, Goubeaux lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop

of Coleman’s vehicle. Put differently, he acted upon an inchoate hunch that she had

committed a red-light violation based on seeing her execute the left turn from the

intersection. Evidence of the OVI offense that flowed from the improper traffic stop was fruit

of the poisonous tree and subject to suppression. Coleman’s first assignment of error is

accordingly sustained.

{¶ 23} Coleman’s second assignment of error challenges the trial court’s denial of her

appeal of the administrative license suspension. She argues that if the court had granted

her motion to suppress, she could have established on appeal of the ALS that Goubeaux

lacked reasonable cause to believe that she had violated R.C. 4511.19. The State responds

that because the ALS terminated by operation of law upon Coleman’s conviction, “her appeal

of the ALS is moot” because there is no relief this Court can grant.

{¶ 24} An ALS “is an automatic consequence of a refusal to take a chemical test.”

State v. Hoover, 2009-Ohio-4993, ¶ 25, citing R.C. 4511.191(B)(1). A person placed under

an ALS may appeal the suspension at either the initial appearance on the charge resulting

from the arrest or within thirty days after the person’s initial appearance on that charge.

10 R.C. 4511.197(A). R.C. 4511.197(C) allows an ALS appeal, but this appeal is limited and

will only be allowed if one or more of four conditions have been met, including whether the

arresting officer “had reasonable ground to believe” that the operator violated

R.C. 4511.19(A) or (B). It is true that the “registrar shall terminate a suspension of the driver’s

. . . license . . . imposed pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section upon receipt of notice . . .

that the person has been convicted after entering a plea of no contest to, operating a vehicle

in violation of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code . . . if the offense for which the conviction

is had or the plea is entered arose from the same incident that led to the suspension or

denial.” R.C. 4511.191(B)(2).

{¶ 25} Consideration of this assigned error, however, is rendered moot by our

resolution of Coleman’s first assignment of error. Put differently, because the trial court erred

in denying Coleman’s motion to suppress, this matter is reversed and remanded for further

proceedings, thereby restoring the case to its pre-plea status. If Coleman wishes to pursue

an appeal of the ALS, its validity must be determined by the trial court.

Conclusion

{¶ 26} Having sustained Coleman’s first assignment of error, her conviction for OVI

is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

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LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.