State v. Ruhenkamp

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-20
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Ruhenkamp, 2026-Ohio-1791.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DARKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-20 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 25-TRC-001-0964 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) BENJAMIN J. RUHENKAMP : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & Appellant : OPINION :

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 15, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur. OPINION DARKE C.A. No. 2025-CA-20

ALEXANDER S. PENDL, Attorney for Appellant MATTHEW J. PIERRON, Attorney for Appellee

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Benjamin J. Ruhenkamp appeals from a judgment entry of conviction for

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (“OVI”) and a red-light violation. Because

the arresting officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that a red-light violation had

occurred, the evidence that flowed from the improper traffic stop was fruit of the poisonous

tree, and the trial court erred in overruling Ruhenkamp’s motion to suppress. The judgment

of the Darke County Municipal Court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further

proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On June 17, 2025, Ruhenkamp was cited for two OVI offenses and a red-light

violation, and he pleaded not guilty. On June 21, 2025, Ruhenkamp filed a motion to

suppress. After hearings on August 18 and September 30, 2025, the court denied the

motion, finding in relevant part—without any analysis or citation to authority—that the stop

for the red-light violation was conducted with reasonable suspicion and lawful. On October

10, 2025, Ruhenkamp pleaded no contest to OVI, with a positive breathalyzer test, and to

the red-light violation. The court sentenced him to a 30-day jail term, with 27 days suspended

and 3 days to serve, with the option to attend a three-day driver intervention program. The

court imposed a $650 fine, assessed six points on Ruhenkamp’s driver’s license, and

sentenced him to a year of probation with driving privileges for limited purposes. The court

dismissed the violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) as an allied offense of

2 R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), and it did not impose an additional fine or points for the red-light

violation. Ruhenkamp timely appealed.

Assignment of Error and Analysis

{¶ 3} In his sole assignment of error, Ruhenkamp asserts five separate grounds on

which the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress—namely that the stop of his

vehicle and his removal therefrom to administer field sobriety tests were unlawful; the

horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test was not administered in substantial compliance

with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration guidelines; his arrest was unlawful; and

the subsequent chemical test was not administered in compliance with Ohio Department of

Health standards. Based on our review of the record, the stop of Ruhenkamp’s vehicle for

the red-light violation was unlawful and accordingly dispositive of this matter.

{¶ 4} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and

fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact

and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility

of witnesses.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8, citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d

357, 366 (1992). “An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 16.

“Accepting those facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, as a

matter of law and without deference to the trial court’s legal conclusion, whether the

applicable legal standard is satisfied.” State v. Isaac, 2005-Ohio-3733, ¶ 8, (2d Dist.), citing

State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586 (2d Dist. 1994). “The application of the law to the

trial court’s findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review.” State v. Turner, 2015-

Ohio-4612, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).

3 {¶ 5} As noted by the Sixth District:

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406,

2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7, citing State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389,

391, 745 N.E.2d 1036 (2001). “A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is

a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in

accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v. North Carolina,

574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). This type of seizure

is justified if an officer has a “reasonable suspicion”—i.e., “a particularized and

objective basis” to suspect—that the person stopped has broken the law. Id.

at 60. In other words, a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed a traffic

violation. Mays at ¶ 7-8.

State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-2071, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.).

{¶ 6} One “type of lawful traffic stop is an investigative stop, also known as a Terry

stop, in which the officer has reasonable suspicion based upon specific or articulable facts

that criminal behavior is imminent or has occurred.” State v. Bullock, 2017-Ohio-497, ¶ 7

(12th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968). “The determination whether an officer

had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of

circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the

scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶ 10,

quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991). “An assessment of the totality of the

circumstances ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.’” Id., quoting United

4 States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). When reviewing an officer’s actions, the court

“must give due weight to his experience and training and view the evidence as it would be

understood by those in law enforcement.” Andrews at 88, citing Cortez.

{¶ 7} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for

making a stop—that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Jones,

70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557 (2d Dist. 1990). “Reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop ‘is

dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of

reliability.’” State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 20, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,

330 (1990). “‘Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the

circumstances—the whole picture” . . . that must be taken into account when evaluating

whether there is reasonable suspicion.’” Id., quoting White at 330, quoting Cortez at 417.

{¶ 8} “The derivative-evidence rule, or fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine as it is

widely known, requires suppression of evidence that was seized in a seemingly lawful

manner but about which police learned because of a prior constitutional violation such as an

illegal search or seizure.” State v. McLemore, 2012-Ohio-521, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing Nardone

v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). “The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary

evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that is

subsequently discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.” Id.

{¶ 9} Ruhenkamp was charged with violating R.C. 4511.12, which governs obedience

to traffic control devices, and states: “No . . . driver of a vehicle . . . shall disobey the

instructions of any traffic control device . . .” R.C. 4511.13(C)(1)(a) states: “Vehicular traffic

. . . facing a steady circular red signal . . . shall stop at a clearly marked stop line.” However,

the statutory provision governing obedience to a red traffic signal must be interpreted in

5 conjunction with the provision that applies to a steady yellow signal indication,

R.C. 4511.13(B)(1), which states:

Vehicular traffic . . . facing a steady circular yellow signal indication are thereby

warned that the related green movement or the related flashing arrow

movement is being terminated or that a steady red signal indication will be

exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic . . . shall not enter the

intersection. The provisions governing vehicular operation under the

movement being terminated shall continue to apply while the steady circular

yellow signal indication is displayed.

See Columbus v. Sharaf, 2002-Ohio-4502, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.) (“Ohio courts have construed

both local and state traffic code provisions . . . to mean that a motorist who enters an

intersection on a yellow signal is lawfully within the intersection and, having the right-of-way,

may continue with caution through the intersection.”); State v. Coleman, 2026-Ohio-203,

¶ 22 (2d Dist.) (officer acted on inchoate hunch and lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion

that traffic violation occurred when defendant was already in the intersection and past the

stop line when the officer first observed her vehicle and did not see her cross the stop line

while the light was red).

{¶ 10} As this Court has noted:

Distinctions have been made between cases where a stop is based on a

mistake of fact and cases where the justification for the stop is based on a

mistake of law. See, e.g., State v. Reedy, 5th Dist. Perry No. 12-CA-1, 2012-

Ohio-4899, ¶ 19, citing State v. Greer, 114 Ohio App.3d 299, 683 N.E.2d 82

(2d Dist. 1996) (officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable). Compare

State v. Babcock, 2013-Ohio-2366, 992 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.) (officer’s

6 mistake of law would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule). See also

State v. Fears, 8th Dist. No. 94997, 2011-Ohio-930, ¶ 12; State v. Drushal,

9th Dist. Wayne No. 13CA0028, 2014-Ohio-3088, ¶ 13; State v. Stadelman,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–130138, 2013-Ohio-5035, ¶ 4.

(Footnote omitted.) State v. Dowty, 2016-Ohio-4719, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.) (because traffic stop

was predicated on mistake of law, trial court did not err in sustaining motion to suppress).

See United States v. Lopez–Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[I]f officers are

allowed to stop vehicles based on their subjective belief that traffic laws have been violated

even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic stops

as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive”).

{¶ 11} At the suppression hearing, Officer Aaron Gilbert of the Versailles Police

Department, who stopped Ruhenkamp, testified that he had been a police officer for a little

over 18 months. He acknowledged that he was a fairly new police officer. Gilbert stated that

on June 13, 2025, at 11:11 p.m., while on routine patrol on Main Street, he was stopped at

the light controlling the intersection of Main Street and West Street. West Street runs north-

south and is perpendicular to Main Street. While waiting at the stop light, Gilbert observed a

black Chevy truck traveling north on West Street run a red light. Gilbert testified repeatedly

that he was very familiar with the intersection and its layout, having driven through it many

times from all four directions. Based on the alleged red-light violation, Gilbert turned right to

proceed behind Ruhenkamp and stopped Ruhenkamp’s vehicle on West Street.

{¶ 12} Gilbert stated that West Street is a truck route, and on the south side of the

intersection, the stop line before the traffic signal is set back from Main Street at a distance

from the crosswalk to allow trucks to negotiate turns in the intersection. The trial court took

judicial notice of the measurements reflected in an aerial photo from Google Maps. The

7 photo showed a distance of over 36 feet between the stop line on the northbound side of

West Street and the crosswalk along the south side of the intersection.

{¶ 13} Gilbert’s cruiser camera video was played for the court, and he testified that it

fairly and accurately depicted the events that led to the traffic stop. He stated that at the time

of the alleged red-light violation, Ruhenkamp was past the stop line but “clearly” not past the

crosswalk. Gilbert said that the crosswalk was located where “a normal stop bar would be.”

When asked if Ruhenkamp had “entered the intersection” at the time of the alleged violation,

Gilbert responded, “I guess, yes, if it’s based off that stop bar.” He conceded that

screenshots from his cruiser camera video showed that Ruhenkamp had passed the stop

line when the light turned yellow and was even further beyond it when the light turned red,

such that he did not commit a red-light violation. Finally, Gilbert acknowledged that it is not

a traffic offense to drive through a yellow light. On the second day of the hearing, Gilbert

testified that he believed entering the intersection meant “breaking the plane [of the

crosswalk] and taking over the intersection.”

{¶ 14} We have viewed Gilbert’s cruiser camera video. While Gilbert’s cruiser is

stopped at the red light, Ruhenkamp’s vehicle crosses the intersection in front of Gilbert from

the left side of Gilbert’s perspective. The light facing Ruhenkamp can be seen changing from

green, to yellow, to red as he approaches. Consistent with the screenshot from Gilbert’s

cruiser camera, the moment the light facing Ruhenkamp changes to red, his vehicle is

beyond the stop line, and he almost completely clears the intersection before Gilbert’s light

turns green. Accordingly, a red-light violation did not occur, because Ruhenkamp crossed

the stop line on a yellow light (as Gilbert conceded), and the stop was predicated on a

mistake of law by Gilbert. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including Gilbert’s

limited experience of only 18 months in law enforcement, he lacked reasonable, articulable

8 suspicion to initiate the traffic stop of Ruhenkamp’s vehicle. Rather, Gilbert acted on an

inchoate hunch that Ruhenkamp committed a red-light violation when he crossed the

crosswalk on a red light. The exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained as

a result of a traffic stop based on conduct that a police officer mistakenly believed is a

violation of the law. The facts here are not in dispute, and Gilbert’s testimony alone

established the lack of a violation when he conceded that Ruhenkamp was past the stop

line when the light turned red. Evidence of the OVI offense that flowed from the improper

traffic stop was fruit of the poisonous tree and thus subject to suppression. Given our

analysis of Ruhenkamp’s arguments related to the basis of the traffic stop, we need not

evaluate the other bases for suppression articulated in his assignment of error. Accordingly,

Ruhenkamp’s assignment of error is sustained.

Conclusion

{¶ 15} The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur.