[Cite as State v. Coffman, 2024-Ohio-1182.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-230411 TRIAL NO. 23CRB-7133 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
TIMOTHY COFFMAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 29, 2024
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and Ashton Tucker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
B OCK , Presiding Judge.
{¶1} In this criminal appeal, defendant-appellant Timothy Coffman appeals
his conviction for obstructing official business. Coffman’s sole assignment of error
asserts that his conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we sustain the
assignment of error on sufficiency grounds, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and
discharge Coffman from further prosecution in this matter.
I. Facts and Procedure
{¶2} Cincinnati Police officers investigating a breaking and entering at the
Western Hills Shopping Mall received a description of a person of interest and
information that a person matching that description was squatting with others in a
house on Glenway Avenue. When officers searched the Glenway Avenue house, they
found no one matching the description of the person of interest.
{¶3} As the officers were concluding the investigation at that address, an
officer saw a person, who was later identified as Coffman, walking down the other side
of Glenway Avenue pushing a lawn mower. The officer believed that Coffman matched
the description of the person of interest.
{¶4} The officer’s body-worn camera footage showed the officer crossing the
road to intercept Coffman and Coffman continuing to push the lawnmower around a
corner and down a side street. Once the officer got within earshot of Coffman, he asked
Coffman to “come here for a second.” Coffman turned to face the officer, who repeated
his request. Coffman then left the lawn mower and began to run down the street, away
from the officer. Within a few steps, Coffman dropped a bag he was carrying. The
officer followed Coffman, twice warning him that he would use his taser on Coffman if
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he did not stop, but Coffman continued running. The officer deployed the taser and
Coffman fell onto the pavement. Officers surrounded Coffman and arrested him. The
whole chase lasted approximately 20 seconds.
{¶5} The assembled officers placed Coffman in handcuffs and searched him.
Because an officer deployed his taser, a supervisor had to come to the scene. After
approximately ten to 15 minutes, the assembled officers verified Coffman’s identity
and determined he was not the person of interest. The state charged Coffman with
obstruction of official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A). Coffman was held one
night at the Hamilton County Justice Center.
{¶6} After a bench trial, the trial court found Coffman guilty and sentenced
him to one day of imprisonment, with credit for the one day that he spent in jail. The
trial court did not impose a fine, court costs, or other sanctions.
{¶7} Coffman now appeals.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Coffman did not voluntarily serve his sentence
{¶8} As an initial matter, we address whether Coffman’s appeal is moot
because Coffman completed his sentence before this appeal. Where defendants have
fully served their sentences before their appeals are heard, appellate courts have
jurisdiction over the appeals if the defendants show either (1) they did not voluntarily
serve their sentences; or (2) they will suffer ongoing collateral disabilities or loss of
civil rights. State v. Ekouevi, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220267, 2023-Ohio-703, ¶ 4,
citing In re Chambers, 2019-Ohio-3596, 142 N.E.3d 1243, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.).
{¶9} Coffman did not voluntarily serve his sentence. The trial court
sentenced Coffman to one day of imprisonment and gave him credit for the one day
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that he spent in jail on the date that he was arrested. Coffman had no choice whether
to spend that time in jail—police arrested him, took him to the justice center, and
detained him in jail overnight before he appeared in court the next day for his
arraignment. He had no opportunity to ask the court to stay his sentence or otherwise
object to his sentence before he served it. And Coffman had no need to request a stay
of execution of the sentence before the trial court or this court—by the time the trial
court sentenced him, he had already involuntarily served his entire sentence. Thus,
there was nothing left for him to seek to stay after the trial court imposed its sentence.
{¶10} Because Coffman served his one-day sentence involuntarily, his appeal
is not moot.
B. Coffman’s conviction was based on insufficient evidence
{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Coffman argues that his obstruction-
of-official-business conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because we find Coffman’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence dispositive of the appeal, his manifest-weight
challenge is moot and we do not address it. See State v. Parrish, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-190379, 2020-Ohio-4807, ¶ 16, citing App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
{¶12} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction
requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of production at
trial. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (Cook, J.,
concurring). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
two of the syllabus. In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve
evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Thomas, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, ¶ 45. Whether sufficient evidence
supported a conviction is a question of law for the court to determine and a court is
not to weigh the evidence unless, after viewing the evidence, it weighs heavily against
conviction. Id.
{¶13} To support an obstructing-official-business-conviction under
R.C. 2921.31(A), the state must prove the defendant “(1) performed an act; (2) without
privilege; (3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public
official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that
hampered or impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.” In re Payne,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, ¶ 11.
{¶14} Coffman argues his conviction must be reversed for several reasons.
First, Coffman argues that he did not perform an affirmative act, but merely refused
to cooperate with the officer’s demand to halt. Second, Coffman contends that the
court could not infer he acted with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the
officer’s performance of his official duties. Third, Coffman argues that his conduct did
not hamper or impede the officer’s investigation.
1. Affirmative act
{¶15} Coffman contends that rather than performing an affirmative act, he
merely refused to cooperate with the officer’s demand to stop. And an R.C. 2921.31
conviction requires the state to prove the defendant performed an affirmative act.
State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 10
(1st Dist.). A defendant’s refusal to comply with a police officer’s order is not an
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affirmative act and cannot, standing alone, support an obstructing-official-business
conviction. See State v. Buttram, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190034, 2020-Ohio-2709,
¶ 12 (collecting cases).
{¶16} But this court has long held that a person performs an affirmative act
within the meaning of R.C. 2921.31 by fleeing from a police officer when the person
has some knowledge that the police officer intends to lawfully detain that person. See,
e.g., State v. Lohaus, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020444, 2003-Ohio-777, ¶ 11 (fleeing
from an officer conducting a lawful Terry stop); State v. Harris, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-230074, 2023-Ohio-4387, ¶ 24 (walking away from an officer while the officer
was issuing a ticket); State v. Davis, 140 Ohio App.3d 751, 753, 749 N.E.2d 322
(1st Dist.2000) (walking away from officers attempting to detain defendant).
{¶17} Coffman was walking down the street pushing a lawn mower and
carrying a bag. When the officer stated, “Come here for a second, I want to ask you
something,” Coffman ran away from the officer, leaving his lawn mower behind and
dropping his bag. This constitutes an “act” under R.C. 2921.31(A) because the
circumstances show Coffman knew that the police officer intended to detain him. After
the officer issued his command, Coffman changed his actions from walking to running
and left his lawn mower and bag behind. He did not merely refuse to answer questions
or fail to stop walking. Rather, Coffman made a conscious decision to flee from the
officer in response to the officer’s request for him to stop. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence that Coffman
performed an affirmative act.
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2. Purposeful mental state
{¶18} Coffman asserts that the court could not infer he acted with purpose
to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officer’s performance of his official duties. A person
acts “purposely” when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result. R.C.
2901.22(A). “The purpose with which a person does an act is determined from the
manner in which it is done, the means used, and all the other facts and circumstances
in evidence.” In re Payne, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 15.
{¶19} Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, a rational trier
of fact could have found that Coffman knew the officer was conducting an investigative
stop and intended to delay the officer’s investigation by his choice to run from the
officer. The officer asked Coffman to stop and submit to questioning. Coffman turned,
saw the uniformed officer, and ran. Coffman discarded his lawn mower and bag when
he ran. The officer warned Coffman that if he continued to flee, he would be subdued
with a taser. Yet, he continued to refuse to comply. See Buttram, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-190034, 2020-Ohio-2709, at ¶ 17-18 (inference of purpose from the defendant’s
conscious decision to act contrary to the officer’s instructions). Viewing this evidence
in a light most favorable to the state, sufficient evidence supported that Coffman’s
fleeing from a uniformed officer showed his purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the
investigation.
3. Hamper or impede
{¶20} To support Coffman’s conviction, the state must also prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Coffman’s conduct in fact hampered or impeded the officers’
investigation. Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953,
879 N.E.2d 215, at ¶ 17.
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{¶21} Not every act that “can conceivably be said to hinder a police officer
rises to the level of criminal conduct.” Harris, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230074,
2023-Ohio-4387, at ¶ 22, quoting In re Payne, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705,
2005-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 16. R.C. 2921.31(A) does not criminalize every “minor ‘delay,
annoyance, irritation, or inconvenience’ ” put on a police officer. Id., quoting State v.
Harris, 2018-Ohio-4316, 121 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Vitantonio,
2013-Ohio-4100, 995 N.E.2d 1291, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.), quoting Lakewood v. Simpson,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80383, 2002-Ohio-4086, ¶ 16.
{¶22} Rather, the statute criminalizes conduct where the defendant commits
an affirmative act, and that affirmative act creates a “substantial stoppage” in the
police officer’s official business. Id., quoting State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700,
2009-Ohio-372, 906 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), citing Wellman at ¶ 17. There is no
particular period of time that constitutes a “substantial stoppage.” Wellman at ¶ 18,
citing State v. Dunn, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-790319, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 11877
(Mar. 26, 1980). So long as the record demonstrates that the defendant’s act hampered
or impeded the officer in the performance of his duties, the evidence supports the
conviction. Id., citing State v. Stayton, 126 Ohio App.3d 158, 163, 709 N.E.2d 1224
(1st Dist.1998).
{¶23} “When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must ‘defer
to the trier of fact on questions of credibility and the weight assigned to the evidence.’ ”
State v. Wing, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2023-03-022, 2023-Ohio-4171, ¶ 17, quoting
State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 132.
8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶24} After the close of evidence, the trial court stated, “Here I find that there
is no substantial stoppage and find him guilty of the affirmative act of running and
then the time it took to call the supervisor or superior. So that’s guilty.”
{¶25} The video showed that the time between the officer calling for Coffman
to stop and handcuffing Coffman was approximately 20 seconds. And the officer
testified that it took ten to 15 minutes to summon his supervisor and rule Coffman out
as the perpetrator of the breaking-and-entering crime. He testified that had Coffman
not run, he would have been able to ask Coffman questions and could have ruled him
out as a suspect.
{¶26} First, any delay caused by Coffman’s passive act—failing to answer
questions or otherwise assist the officers in clearing him as the suspect in the breaking
and entering—cannot support an obstruction conviction. See Wellman,
173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, at ¶ 10.
{¶27} Second, any delay caused by the officer summoning his supervisor
cannot be attributed to Coffman. There must be a nexus between the defendant’s
affirmative act and the alleged substantial stoppage of the official’s business. See
Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700, 2009-Ohio-372, 906 N.E.2d 1203, at ¶ 16. The officer
testified, “Every time we have a tasing on scene [the supervisor] shows up.” But the
officer needing to summon a supervisor was dictated by internal police policy on the
use of tasers, not Coffman’s decision to flee. See id. at ¶ 3, 16 (finding no nexus between
defendant’s false statement to police officers and the two hours to fingerprint and
identify the defendant at the Hamilton County Justice Center); see also In re Payne,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, at ¶ 13 (focusing on the actor’s
conduct and the effect that conduct has on the public official).
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{¶28} The nexus between Coffman’s flight and the alleged substantial
stoppage of the police officer’s investigation ended after approximately 20 seconds—
the time it took for the officer to spot, intercept, stop, and handcuff Coffman. While no
set amount of time is necessary to constitute substantial stoppage, the amount of time
is a relevant factor for this court to consider. See Grice at ¶ 12.
{¶29} We agree with the trial court that Coffman’s flight did not create a
substantial stoppage to the officers’ investigation. The chase, from beginning to end,
lasted approximately 20 seconds. The state did not establish that Coffman’s brief flight
was anything more than a de minimis interference, rather than conduct that hampered
or impeded the officer. See In re R.B., 2021-Ohio-3749, 179 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 24-25
(1st Dist.) (de minimis interference where the defendant briefly hid from police
officers conducting a search of a residence for trespassers). And without evidence of
“hampering” or “impeding” beyond that 20-second delay in apprehending Coffman,
the state failed to show that Coffman hampered or impeded the officers’ breaking-and-
entering investigation.
{¶30} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, the state
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Coffman’s running from police
hampered or impeded the officers’ performance of their duties. Therefore, Coffman’s
conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and we sustain Coffman’s
assignment of error.
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III. Conclusion
{¶31} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Coffman’s assignment of error on
sufficiency grounds, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and discharge Coffman from
further prosecution in this matter.
Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.
K INSLEY , J., concurs. W INKLER , J., dissents.
W INKLER , J., dissenting.
{¶32} I respectfully dissent because in my view this appeal is moot.
Consequently, I would dismiss the appeal.
{¶33} The general rule on the mootness of criminal appeals provides that
“[w]here a defendant, convicted of a criminal offense, has voluntarily paid the fine or
completed the sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered
from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral
disability or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction.” In re Chambers,
2019-Ohio-3596, 142 N.E.3d 1243, at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236,
325 N.E.2d 236 (1975), syllabus. Here, the trial court sentenced Coffman to one day
of imprisonment with credit for one day served and did not impose a fine, court costs,
or other financial sanction. Thus, Coffman had fully served his sentence before he filed
his appeal. For an appellate court to have jurisdiction over an appeal in which the
defendant has fully served the sentence before the appeal is heard, the defendant must
show either that the sentence was not served voluntarily or that she or he will suffer
ongoing collateral disabilities or loss of civil rights. Ekouevi, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-220267, 2023-Ohio-703, at ¶ 4, citing In re Chambers at ¶ 9; Wilson at
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Farris, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150567,
2016-Ohio-5527, ¶ 4.
{¶34} With regard to whether a sentence was served voluntarily, this court
has most recently stated:
[t]he completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an
appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the
appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right
to appellate review, that the appellant has a substantial stake in the
judgment of conviction, and that there is subject matter for the appellate
court to decide.
Ekouevi at ¶ 5, quoting City of Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389,
2011-Ohio-2673, 953 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 26. Coffman was appointed counsel, contested the
charge at trial, accepted the sentence, and filed a notice of appeal. But Coffman did
not seek a stay of execution of the sentence in the trial court and did not seek a stay in
this court. See App.R. 8(B). Had he done so, Coffman’s appeal would not be moot,
regardless of whether either stay was denied. See Lewis at ¶ 23. Without any
indication on the record that Coffman did not abandon his right to appeal when he
accepted the court’s sentence, Coffman’s appeal is moot.
{¶35} Nor is there any basis to infer that Coffman suffered ongoing collateral
disabilities or loss of civil rights from his misdemeanor conviction for obstructing
official business. The collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction can be
significant. See Lewis at ¶ 28-34 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring). But Coffman
already has multiple misdemeanor convictions, including a conviction for obstructing
official business. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Coffman, Hamilton M.C. No. 23CRB-1044
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
(Feb. 14, 2023) (conviction for obstruction of official business).1 Thus, Coffman
already suffers any potential ongoing collateral disabilities from that conviction. His
appeal in this case cannot change the outcome in those other cases.
{¶36} Because Coffman does not demonstrate anything to indicate he served
the sentence involuntarily and Coffman already suffers the collateral disabilities of a
misdemeanor conviction for obstructing official business, I would dismiss the appeal
as moot. See Andrew v. Dennis, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210638, 2022-Ohio-2567,
¶ 6 (appellate courts may sua sponte dismiss an appeal as moot), citing Hammond v.
Hammond, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190376, 2020-Ohio-3443, ¶ 9.
Please note: The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
1 A reviewing court may consider an event that renders an appeal moot that is outside the record.
See Pewitt v. Superintendent, Lorain Corr. Inst., 64 Ohio St.3d 470, 472, 597 N.E.2d 92 (1992).