[Cite as State v. Chambers, 2025-Ohio-1320.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2024-06-034
: OPINION - vs - 4/14/2025 :
NATHANIEL JAMES WILSON : CHAMBERS, : Appellant.
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 2024CRB000196
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Craig Newburger, for appellant.
BYRNE, J.
{¶ 1} Nathaniel Chambers appeals from his conviction for domestic violence.
Specifically, he challenges the condition of community control prohibiting him from having
contact with his children for a period of five years. For the reasons that follow, we reverse
the sentence and remand for further proceedings. Warren CA2024-06-034
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} The facts giving rise to this appeal are uncomplicated. Chambers and
Alyssa Krebs are unmarried and share two children, B.C., age five, and A.C., age three
(at the time of these events). On April 13, 2024, while the children were in Chambers's
care, he left them with a friend's parents to socialize elsewhere. Later that evening, B.C.
awakened, became frightened, and called his mother. After an unsuccessful attempt by
Krebs to retrieve her children, Chambers and his girlfriend subsequently retrieved the
children from where they were sleeping, placed them in a vehicle, and drove to Krebs's
location. The girlfriend then assaulted Krebs while Chambers watched. When Krebs
attempted to reach her children, Chambers pushed her with such force that she fell face-
first onto concrete, knocking her unconscious. The children witnessed these events from
the vehicle.
{¶ 3} Following a bench trial, Chambers was convicted of domestic violence, a
first-degree misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days in jail, with 90 days
suspended, and imposed five years of community control. The court ordered that
Chambers have no contact with Krebs or his children for the duration of his community
control.
{¶ 4} Chambers appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 5} Chambers presents a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO APPELLANT'S PREJUDICE BY IMPOSING A FIVE YEAR NO CONTACT ORDER BETWEEN APPELLANT AND HIS CHILDREN.
{¶ 6} Chambers challenges the trial court's imposition of a five-year no-contact
order with his minor children as a condition of community control, arguing this restriction
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
-2- Warren CA2024-06-034
{¶ 7} Ohio law authorizes courts to impose "appropriate" conditions under a
community-control sanction for misdemeanor offenses. R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a). While trial
courts possess substantial discretion in fashioning these conditions, such discretion is not
boundless. State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52 (1990). We review these determinations
for abuse of that discretion. State v. Ellis, 2022-Ohio-2330, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.), citing State
v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 10.
{¶ 8} The framework established in Jones provides the standard for challenges
to community-control conditions. See State v. Hause, 2009-Ohio-548, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). A
valid condition must advance the tripartite aims of community control: rehabilitation, the
administration of justice, and ensuring good behavior. Id.; R.C. 2929.25(C)(2) ("In the
interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the offender's good
behavior, the court may impose additional requirements on the offender."). This requires
courts to "'consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the
offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and
(3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and
serves the statutory ends of probation.'" Ellis at ¶ 25, quoting Jones at 53. All three prongs
must be satisfied for a reviewing court to uphold a trial court's community-control
condition. Id. Also, the condition "'cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge
upon the [offender's] liberty.'" Talty at ¶ 13, quoting Jones at 52.
{¶ 9} Chambers does not contest the court's authority to prohibit him from contact
with Krebs, the domestic-violence victim in this case. Rather, he challenges the extension
of that prohibition to his children, noting they were not victims, no finding of abuse or
neglect was made, and the victim herself characterized him as "a wonderful dad." The
State counters that Chambers deliberately entangled his children in the offense by
removing them from their beds and transporting them to a location where he anticipated
-3- Warren CA2024-06-034
a confrontation.
{¶ 10} We and other Ohio appellate courts have upheld restrictions on parental
rights when they satisfy the Jones criteria. See, e.g., State v. Emery, 2015-Ohio-1487, ¶
30 (12th Dist.) (two-year no-contact condition imposed on mother upheld where the child
was the victim, as it related to the crime and served the purpose of protecting the child
from future abuse while mother underwent counseling); State v. Sommerfeld, 2004-Ohio-
6101, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.) (sustaining a prohibition on custodial parenthood where the offense
was child endangering); State v. McClure, 2005-Ohio-777, ¶ 12-13 (1st Dist.) (affirming a
no-contact condition where a guardian attempted to kill a child, as it related to the crime
and served the purpose of protecting the child from future domestic violence incidents
while guardian was being rehabilitated).
{¶ 11} Conversely, courts have found abuses of discretion when no-contact
conditions fail the Jones test. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Cornely, 2021-Ohio-689, ¶ 26-27
(8th Dist.) (no-contact condition with defendant's children who observed incident of
domestic violence against the mother, as the condition was not related to that offense,
and the no-contact order was of an indefinite duration); State v. Marcum, 2012-Ohio-572
(4th Dist.) (striking down a no-contact condition between spouses for misuse of 911, as it
was not related to rehabilitating the wife because the condition failed to ensure that she
only use 911 for legitimate purposes); Univ. Hts. v. Roders, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3862
(8th Dist. Aug. 19, 1999) (invalidating a no-contact condition with wife and children for
telephone harassment of police, as it was not related to the crime because wife and
children were not victims and prohibiting appellant from contacting them would not
prevent future harassing phone calls); State v. Brillhart, 129 Ohio App.3d 180 (9th Dist.
1998) (overturning a two-year prohibition on contact with children where the offense was
domestic violence against the mother, as the condition was unrelated to the crime, even
-4- Warren CA2024-06-034
though one of the children witnessed the act of domestic violence).
{¶ 12} We acknowledge that the present case is distinguishable from Cornely, as
the State contends, in that the no-contact condition here has a definite duration. Also,
Chambers's conduct—deliberately transporting his drowsy children to what he likely knew
would be a volatile confrontation—was undoubtedly more egregious than the scenario in
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[Cite as State v. Chambers, 2025-Ohio-1320.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2024-06-034
: OPINION - vs - 4/14/2025 :
NATHANIEL JAMES WILSON : CHAMBERS, : Appellant.
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 2024CRB000196
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Craig Newburger, for appellant.
BYRNE, J.
{¶ 1} Nathaniel Chambers appeals from his conviction for domestic violence.
Specifically, he challenges the condition of community control prohibiting him from having
contact with his children for a period of five years. For the reasons that follow, we reverse
the sentence and remand for further proceedings. Warren CA2024-06-034
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} The facts giving rise to this appeal are uncomplicated. Chambers and
Alyssa Krebs are unmarried and share two children, B.C., age five, and A.C., age three
(at the time of these events). On April 13, 2024, while the children were in Chambers's
care, he left them with a friend's parents to socialize elsewhere. Later that evening, B.C.
awakened, became frightened, and called his mother. After an unsuccessful attempt by
Krebs to retrieve her children, Chambers and his girlfriend subsequently retrieved the
children from where they were sleeping, placed them in a vehicle, and drove to Krebs's
location. The girlfriend then assaulted Krebs while Chambers watched. When Krebs
attempted to reach her children, Chambers pushed her with such force that she fell face-
first onto concrete, knocking her unconscious. The children witnessed these events from
the vehicle.
{¶ 3} Following a bench trial, Chambers was convicted of domestic violence, a
first-degree misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days in jail, with 90 days
suspended, and imposed five years of community control. The court ordered that
Chambers have no contact with Krebs or his children for the duration of his community
control.
{¶ 4} Chambers appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 5} Chambers presents a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO APPELLANT'S PREJUDICE BY IMPOSING A FIVE YEAR NO CONTACT ORDER BETWEEN APPELLANT AND HIS CHILDREN.
{¶ 6} Chambers challenges the trial court's imposition of a five-year no-contact
order with his minor children as a condition of community control, arguing this restriction
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
-2- Warren CA2024-06-034
{¶ 7} Ohio law authorizes courts to impose "appropriate" conditions under a
community-control sanction for misdemeanor offenses. R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a). While trial
courts possess substantial discretion in fashioning these conditions, such discretion is not
boundless. State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52 (1990). We review these determinations
for abuse of that discretion. State v. Ellis, 2022-Ohio-2330, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.), citing State
v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 10.
{¶ 8} The framework established in Jones provides the standard for challenges
to community-control conditions. See State v. Hause, 2009-Ohio-548, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). A
valid condition must advance the tripartite aims of community control: rehabilitation, the
administration of justice, and ensuring good behavior. Id.; R.C. 2929.25(C)(2) ("In the
interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the offender's good
behavior, the court may impose additional requirements on the offender."). This requires
courts to "'consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the
offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and
(3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and
serves the statutory ends of probation.'" Ellis at ¶ 25, quoting Jones at 53. All three prongs
must be satisfied for a reviewing court to uphold a trial court's community-control
condition. Id. Also, the condition "'cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge
upon the [offender's] liberty.'" Talty at ¶ 13, quoting Jones at 52.
{¶ 9} Chambers does not contest the court's authority to prohibit him from contact
with Krebs, the domestic-violence victim in this case. Rather, he challenges the extension
of that prohibition to his children, noting they were not victims, no finding of abuse or
neglect was made, and the victim herself characterized him as "a wonderful dad." The
State counters that Chambers deliberately entangled his children in the offense by
removing them from their beds and transporting them to a location where he anticipated
-3- Warren CA2024-06-034
a confrontation.
{¶ 10} We and other Ohio appellate courts have upheld restrictions on parental
rights when they satisfy the Jones criteria. See, e.g., State v. Emery, 2015-Ohio-1487, ¶
30 (12th Dist.) (two-year no-contact condition imposed on mother upheld where the child
was the victim, as it related to the crime and served the purpose of protecting the child
from future abuse while mother underwent counseling); State v. Sommerfeld, 2004-Ohio-
6101, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.) (sustaining a prohibition on custodial parenthood where the offense
was child endangering); State v. McClure, 2005-Ohio-777, ¶ 12-13 (1st Dist.) (affirming a
no-contact condition where a guardian attempted to kill a child, as it related to the crime
and served the purpose of protecting the child from future domestic violence incidents
while guardian was being rehabilitated).
{¶ 11} Conversely, courts have found abuses of discretion when no-contact
conditions fail the Jones test. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Cornely, 2021-Ohio-689, ¶ 26-27
(8th Dist.) (no-contact condition with defendant's children who observed incident of
domestic violence against the mother, as the condition was not related to that offense,
and the no-contact order was of an indefinite duration); State v. Marcum, 2012-Ohio-572
(4th Dist.) (striking down a no-contact condition between spouses for misuse of 911, as it
was not related to rehabilitating the wife because the condition failed to ensure that she
only use 911 for legitimate purposes); Univ. Hts. v. Roders, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3862
(8th Dist. Aug. 19, 1999) (invalidating a no-contact condition with wife and children for
telephone harassment of police, as it was not related to the crime because wife and
children were not victims and prohibiting appellant from contacting them would not
prevent future harassing phone calls); State v. Brillhart, 129 Ohio App.3d 180 (9th Dist.
1998) (overturning a two-year prohibition on contact with children where the offense was
domestic violence against the mother, as the condition was unrelated to the crime, even
-4- Warren CA2024-06-034
though one of the children witnessed the act of domestic violence).
{¶ 12} We acknowledge that the present case is distinguishable from Cornely, as
the State contends, in that the no-contact condition here has a definite duration. Also,
Chambers's conduct—deliberately transporting his drowsy children to what he likely knew
would be a volatile confrontation—was undoubtedly more egregious than the scenario in
Cornely, where children merely happened to be present during an incident of domestic
violence. Yet certain similarities to Cornely remain. The children were not victims of the
offense. No evidence suggests Chambers has ever abused his children or poses a threat
to them. Indeed, the victim herself—uniquely positioned to assess his parental fitness—
described him as "a wonderful dad." And as the Eighth District has noted, "a general,
unsupported concern for the 'safety of the people involved' is an insufficient basis to justify
the imposition of a community control condition that would completely separate a father
and his three young children for five years." City of Lakewood v. Radostitz, 2018-Ohio-
1971, ¶ 21 (invalidating a five-year no-contact condition after defendant was convicted of
assault on the mother, as the condition was not reasonably related to the assault, the
children had no involvement in the incident, nor were they present during the altercation).
{¶ 13} The trial court's no-contact condition here falters most significantly by failing
to satisfy the first Jones factor: It is not reasonably related to rehabilitating Chambers.1 A
categorical five-year prohibition on parent-child contact, devoid of mechanisms for
modification upon completion of therapeutic or rehabilitative measures, serves
punishment rather than rehabilitation. In fact, when Chambers's counsel sought guidance
on lifting or modifying the no-contact order, the trial court stated, "I have no idea what
that's going to entail at this point in time. I guess we have five years to figure it out." This
1. Chambers's conduct in bringing the children to what he likely knew would be a volatile confrontation could perhaps satisfy the second and third Jones factors, but we do not reach or decide that issue. -5- Warren CA2024-06-034
statement demonstrates the absence of a rehabilitative rationale. While protecting
children's welfare is unquestionably important, and we understand the trial court's
concern for the safety of Chambers's children, a community control condition that
effectively terminates a parent-child relationship for five years, particularly with such
young children, demands more precise tailoring. To paraphrase Cornely, under these
circumstances, fashioning a condition that resulted in the five-year complete separation
of a father from his young children was not reasonable or appropriate. See Cornely at ¶
22.
{¶ 14} This is not to suggest that all potential contact restrictions would be
inappropriate. Given Chambers's demonstrated lapses in judgment regarding his
children's welfare, carefully tailored restrictions may well be necessary to protect both the
children and their mother. See Emery, 2015-Ohio-1487, at ¶ 5, 30 (no contact with
children unless invited by child protective services or the juvenile court). If such
restrictions are appropriate, they must be tethered to rehabilitation, not punishment, and
must also satisfy the other Jones elements.
{¶ 15} The constitutional dimensions of this case, though not explicitly raised by
Chambers, merit acknowledgment. A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of
his children represents "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by" the U.S. Supreme Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Government
intrusion on this right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See
id. at 65-66. While no-contact conditions implicating parent-child separation may
withstand constitutional scrutiny when designed to protect children from harm, the trial
court's five-year condition with no explicit modification mechanism strains the boundaries
of constitutional tailoring. See State v. Brillhart, 129 Ohio App.3d 180, 186 (9th Dist.
1998). It risks severing Chambers's relationship with his children during their formative
-6- Warren CA2024-06-034
years—potentially harming the very individuals the court aims to protect.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 16} We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the five-
year blanket no-contact-with-the-children condition of community control. Therefore,
Chambers's assignment of error is sustained. Because the condition is invalid, we vacate
that portion of the trial court's sentencing order. See Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, at ¶ 25. The
trial court's judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for resentencing.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and POWELL, J., concur.
-7-