State v. Protich

2025 Ohio 2981

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 20, 2025
• Docket: C-240507
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Protich, 2025-Ohio-2981.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240507 TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/7287/A/B/C Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY ALEXANDER PROTICH, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 8/20/2025 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Protich, 2025-Ohio-2981.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240507 TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/7287/A/B/C Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : OPINION ALEXANDER PROTICH, :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgments Appealed From are: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 20, 2025

Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jon Vogt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Schuh & Goldberg, LLP, and Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} One day in July 2024, patrons visiting Third Eye Brewing Company got

more than just food and beverages. Defendant-appellant Alexander Protich loudly

accosted multiple patrons, causing a Third Eye employee, T.H., to demand Protich

leave the premises. Protich eventually left, but only after T.H. told Protech the police

were coming—and after Protich bothered yet another patron.

{¶2} When police officers caught up to Protich, he refused to provide his

identification, walked away, and “slung” his arm toward officers to avoid being

grabbed. After a brief struggle, officers arrested Protich. Following a bench trial, the

trial court convicted Protich of obstructing official business, criminal trespass, and

resisting arrest. On appeal, Protich asserts that his convictions were supported by

insufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence.

{¶3} We affirm Protich’s convictions. First, the State’s evidence involving the

police officers’ encounter with Protich was sufficient to support Protich’s obstructing-

official-business conviction. His conduct caused a substantial stoppage that hampered

the performance of the officers’ duties. Second, because Protich refused to leave Third

Eye’s premises after its employee told him to leave, his criminal-trespass conviction

was supported by sufficient evidence. Finally, we reject Protich’s argument that he was

not guilty of resisting arrest based on the police’s alleged lack of a lawful basis for

arresting him. Police officers had a reasonable basis to believe that Protich had

criminally trespassed and obstructed official business. We accordingly overrule the

assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

I. Factual and Procedural History

a. Procedural history

{¶4} In May 2024, the State charged Protich with failing to comply with a

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lawful order in violation of R.C. 2921.331, resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33,

criminal trespass in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), and disorderly conduct in violation

of R.C. 2917.11(A)(1). The failing-to-comply charge was later amended to obstructing

official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31.

{¶5} Following a bench trial, the trial court found Protich guilty of

obstructing official business, resisting arrest, and criminal trespass but not guilty of

disorderly conduct. The trial court sentenced Protich to 90 days on the obstructing

and resisting-arrest charges and two days on the trespass charge, and credited him for

two days of time-served. Protich appealed.

b. Facts

{¶6} In May 2024, T.H., a Third Eye employee, observed Protich verbally

accosting customers and raising his voice. T.H. testified that when Protich continued

to berate other customers, he directed Protich to wait at the bar to be served. Protich

asked T.H. “if we were going to have a problem.” T.H. replied, “All right, man, now I’m

going to have to ask you to leave.” When Protich remained, T.H. repeated, “Will you

please leave?” and Protich responded, “No. Fuck you.” T.H. warned Protich that if he

did not leave, T.H. would call the police. Protich invited T.H. to “[g]o ahead.” T.H.

called the police and informed the dispatcher that a belligerent customer was on Third

Eye’s premises and refused to leave. T.H. testified that, after he called the police, he

was told by another customer that there was a man “out front bothering them.”

{¶7} Officers Brian Limke and Robert Otte of the Sharonville Police

Department arrived at the brewery and spoke with T.H., who explained the situation.

T.H. identified Protich as the person across the street walking towards a hotel. Limke

asked T.H. what he wanted done and T.H. responded that he did not want Protich to

return to the brewery.

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{¶8} Otte testified that he and Limke went to the hotel to “investigate the

disorderly conduct and the criminal trespass” at Third Eye. Limke spoke with Protich

“to get his side of what occurred.” Otte testified that Protich began to walk away from

the officers. Otte stated that “it was my impression that we did have crimes that had

been committed,” so he told Protich to stop and grabbed Protich’s arm. Protich “slung”

his arm back and told Otte not to touch him. Otte instructed Protich to put his hands

behind his back. Protich did not comply, so the officers “took him to the ground.” Otte

stated that during the struggle Protich tucked his arms underneath him to prevent the

officers from grabbing him and placing him in handcuffs. Otte testified that it took him

and Limke “maybe a minute, two minutes” to handcuff Protich. Limke testified that

Protich’s resistance hampered the officers’ ability to effectuate the arrest.

II. Analysis

{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Protich asserts that his convictions are

based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.

a. Standard of review

{¶10} In reviewing a conviction under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard,

an appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and

asks whether a reasonable finder of fact “could have determined that the state proved

each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Henderson, 2024-

Ohio-2312, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.).

{¶11} Under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, we ask whether the

State failed to meet its burden of persuasion at trial. State v. Hurt, 2024-Ohio-3115,

¶ 95 (1st Dist.). An appellate court “must ‘independently “review the entire record,

weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether

the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” Id.,

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quoting State v. Kizilkaya, 2023-Ohio-3989, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Powell,

2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.).

{¶12} The “[w]eight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater

amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather

than the other.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting Black’s

Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). Moreover, “a prerequisite for any reversal on

manifest-weight grounds is conflicting evidence.” State v. Tate, 2014-Ohio-3667, ¶ 20.

{¶13} Although Protich’s assignment of error challenges his convictions on

both sufficiency and manifest-weight grounds, Protich’s appellate brief offers no

argument that any conflicting evidence weighed in his favor. Accordingly, we review

only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.

b. Obstructing official business

{¶14} Protich first argues that his obstructing-official-business conviction

should be reversed because he did not hamper or impede the officers in the

performance of any official duty.

{¶15} To establish that a defendant is guilty of obstructing official business,

the State must prove “that the defendant ‘(1) performed an act; (2) without privilege;

(3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public official of

any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that hampered

or impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.’” State v. Thompson, 2024-

Ohio-3165, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.), quoting In re Payne, 2005-Ohio-4849, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.); R.C.

2921.31(A). A person acts purposely if the person intends to cause a specific result.

R.C. 2901.22(A).

{¶16} The obstructing-official-business statute prohibits affirmative acts “that

create a ‘substantial stoppage’ of a police officer’s official business.” Thompson at ¶ 24,

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quoting State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-4387, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.). “There is no particular

period of time that constitutes a ‘substantial stoppage.’” State v. Coffman, 2024-Ohio-

1182, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Wellman, 2007-Ohio-2953, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). “So

long as the record demonstrates that the defendant’s act hampered or impeded the

officer in the performance of his duties, the evidence supports the conviction.” Id.

{¶17} The trial court found that Protich was guilty of obstructing official

business when Protich walked away from the officers after being asked to provide

identification.

{¶18} R.C. 2921.29(A)(1) provides, “No person who is in a public place shall

refuse to disclose the person’s name, address, or date of birth, when requested by a

law enforcement officer who reasonably suspects . . .: (1) The person is committing,

has committed, or is about to commit a criminal offense.” Because the officers had

information that Protich had criminally trespassed, they could validly require Protich

to identify himself.

{¶19} Protich is correct that the failure to produce identification when

requested by a police officer does not, in itself, constitute obstructing official business.

See State v. Brickner-Latham, 2006-Ohio-609, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.). But courts have held

that defendants may be convicted of obstructing official business if they take

additional affirmative acts to hamper or impede the officer from learning their

identities. Id. at ¶ 27.

{¶20} Protich relies on this court’s decision in Coffman, which held that flight

from officers resulting in a 20-second chase was “a de minimis interference, rather

than conduct that hampered or impeded the officer.” Coffman, 2024-Ohio-1182, at ¶

29 (1st Dist.).

{¶21} In Coffman, an officer approached the defendant and asked him to

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“come here for a second,” and the defendant fled. Id. at ¶ 4. Officers caught the

defendant after a 20-second chase. Id. Reversing the obstructing-official-business

conviction, this court explained that “Coffman’s flight did not create a substantial

stoppage to the officers’ investigation. The chase, from beginning to end, lasted

approximately 20 seconds. The state did not establish that Coffman’s brief flight was

anything more than a de minimis interference, rather than conduct that hampered or

impeded the officer.” Id. at ¶ 29.

{¶22} The State asserts Coffman is distinguishable, and argues that “Protich’s

drunken intransigence combined with his affirmative acts of walking away from the

police after being told to stop and swatting away Officer Otte’s hand demonstrated an

overall pattern of resistance that rises to the level of obstruction pursuant to this

Court’s holding in In re M.H.”

{¶23} In In re M.H., we explained, “‘Where the overall pattern of behavior is

one of resistance, * * * officers may consider the totality of the events and need not

point to a single act that rises to the level of obstruction.’” In re M.H., 2021-Ohio-1041,

¶ 18 (1st Dist.), quoting Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 2005). This

court also observed that Ohio courts have “held that moving away from and physically

resisting officers is sufficient to support a conviction for obstructing official business.”

Id. at ¶ 21 (collecting cases). We concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove

that a juvenile had obstructed official business where she “exhibited ‘hostility and

unwillingness to cooperate in physical and verbal ways,’” was “twice ordered” to “come

here” before she stopped, pulled away from an officer who grabbed her arm, and

resisted officers’ subsequent attempts to restrain her. Id. at ¶ 22. We also observed

that the juvenile’s conduct “entirely stalled the officers’ investigation into the original

complaint.” Id.

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{¶24} Under Coffman, Protich’s act of walking away from officers, alone, may

have been insufficient to sustain his obstructing-official-business conviction. But the

evidence reflecting the totality of his interactions with officers, viewed in the light most

favorable to the State, is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Protich’s conduct was

more than just briefly fleeing, like the defendant in Coffman. Protich argued with

officers, refused to provide identification, attempted to walk away from officers after

lawfully being ordered to provide identification, and “slung” his arm back when an

officer grabbed his arm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, these actions

constitute a substantial stoppage.

{¶25} We hold that Protich’s conviction for obstructing official business was

supported by sufficient evidence.

c. Criminal trespass

{¶26} R.C. 2911.21(A)(1) provides, “No person, without privilege to do so, shall

. . . [k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another.”

{¶27} Even if a person initially possesses a privilege to be present on the land

of another, the owner of the land or an agent of the owner may revoke that privilege.

State v. Staley, 2021-Ohio-3086, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). While the language of the trespass

statute does not provide a “time limit for leaving the premises once privilege is

revoked, . . . several courts have held that a guest must immediately leave once the

privilege to remain on the premise is withdrawn.” Id. at ¶ 21 (collecting cases).

{¶28} Here, T.H., as an agent of Third Eye, revoked Protich’s privilege when

he told Protich, “I’m going to have to ask you to leave.” At this point, Protich lacked

consent to remain on the premises and was required to “immediately leave.” See id.

But Protich did not leave. When T.H. asked, “Will you please leave,” Protich

responded, “No. Fuck you.” T.H. then warned that if Protich did not leave, T.H. would

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call the police and Protich invited T.H. to “[g]o ahead.”

{¶29} Protich does not deny that he refused to leave the brewery when asked;

instead, he suggests that he left “shortly after being asked to leave.” Protich argues that

his conduct did not constitute criminal trespass based on him leaving Third Eye

“shortly after” T.H. told him to leave and his having exited from the brewery by the

time T.H. had finished calling the police.

{¶30} The State argues that Protich remained on the premises well past the

time that T.H. requested he leave, in part based on T.H.’s testimony that other patrons

complained about Protich’s actions outside in front of the brewery. The record is

unclear as to whether Protich’s outdoor belligerence occurred on or off of Third Eye’s

property. But in a sufficiency review, we construe the facts most strongly in the State’s

favor, so we must construe T.H.’s testimony as demonstrating that Protich remained

on Third Eye’s property even after T.H. had called the police.

{¶31} Even if Protich had bothered these patrons off of Third Eye’s property,

he exited from the property only after multiple requests for him to leave. Protich had

already violated the criminal-trespass statute when he failed to leave the first time T.H.

asked him to leave, thus revoking his privilege to be on Third Eye’s property.

{¶32} We hold that Protich’s criminal-trespass conviction was supported by

sufficient evidence.

d. Resisting arrest

{¶33} Finally, Protich argues that his resisting-arrest conviction should be

vacated because there was no lawful basis to arrest him.

{¶34} R.C. 2921.33(A) provides, “No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist

or interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” By its terms, R.C. 2921.33(A)

requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resisted a

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“lawful arrest.” While the State need not prove that the defendant was guilty of the

offense for which the arrest was made, it must prove that the arresting officer had

probable cause or a “reasonable basis to believe that the offense for which the

defendant has been arrested did, in fact, occur.” State v. Glenn, 2004-Ohio-1489, ¶ 23.

Additionally, the criminal offense must be one for which the defendant can be

arrested. State v. Tsibouris, 2014-Ohio-2612, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.).

{¶35} Protich argues that because he did not obstruct official business or

criminally trespass, there was no lawful basis to arrest him. He argues that at the time

police arrested him, the only information the officers had was that Protich was being

disorderly and Third Eye did not want Protich to return.

{¶36} But as explained above, Protich’s obstructing-official-business

conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. And Officer Otte testified he and

Officer Limke went to Third Eye because they “were dispatched for trouble with an

employee, a male subject who was . . . refusing to leave.” The officers possessed

probable cause to believe that Protich had committed criminal trespass.

{¶37} We overrule the assignment of error and affirm Protich’s convictions.

III. Conclusion

{¶38} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Protich’s assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Judgments affirmed.

NESTOR and MOORE, JJ., concur.