[223]*223LINDE, J.
Defendant was convicted of a burglary and theft at the home of Mrs. Barth. At trial, Mrs. Barth was unable to identify defendant, but a police officer testified that she had selected defendant’s picture from a set of seven photographs shown to her seven months after the burglary. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court should have suppressed this evidence because the circumstances of the pretrial photographic identification were so suggestive as to destroy its reliability. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument for suppression under Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 (1977), and affirmed the conviction, Schwab, C.J., dissenting. 31 Or App 683, 571 P2d 527 (1977). We allowed review.
I.
Before turning to the evidence, we review the applicable law. As far as the constraints of "due process” imposed by the federal 14th amendment are concerned, the state of the law may be summarized as follows.
In a trilogy of cases decided in 1967, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the process by which a witness is given an opportunity to identify a suspect represents a "critical stage” in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293 (1967).1 While Wade and Gilbert involved the protection of the presence of defense counsel at this "critical stage,” Stovall stated that evidence of a pretrial identification must be excluded if, under "the totality of the circumstances surrounding it,” the identification procedure was "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification” that it fell short of due process of law. 388 US at 302. Consistent with the premise that [224]*224the "process” which must be "due” includes the "critical” pretrial procedures of investigation and prosecution, this formulation focused on the question whether the circumstances of the identification needlessly created a risk of misidentification, not whether a misidentification had occurred.
The following year, the Supreme Court applied the Stovall formulation to a case of pretrial identification by photograph. Simmons v. United States, 390 US 377 (1968). However, after having found the particular procedure justified under the circumstances of the case, the Court added that there was "little chance that the procedure utilized led to misidentification of Simmons,” and that subsequent testimony left "little room for doubt that the identification of Simmons was correct.” 390 US at 385-386. These phrases in Simmons could be read to add a "harmless error” qualification to the assessment of the original identification procedure; even though that procedure fell short of due process, it would not require reversal if the ability of the witnesses to identify defendant on other occasions was plainly independent of the suggestiveness of the challenged procedure. But apart from such independent confirmation, the legitimacy of the initial identification process by Stovall standards would still be judged as of the time when this "critical stage” in the prosecution was conducted.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972), further shifted the focus from the propriety of the initial procedure to the reliability of the identification. The part of the Stovall formulation that called for considering the "totality of the circumstances” in testing the identification procedure was transferred to testing whether the identification was reliable despite the needless use of a suggestive procedure. 409 US at 199. BiggershaA arisen before the decision in Stovall, which the Supreme Court had declined to apply retroactively. But in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 (1977), the Court applied also to post-Stovall prosecutions the [225]*225shift from the premise that the "critical stage” of investigatory identification must comply with due process to the position that due process is satisfied if a court can find that the proffered identification "possesses certain features of reliability.” The stated reason, adopting an explanation offered by Judge Leventhal of the U.S. Court of Appeals, was that the exclusion of an improperly obtained identification is required only to protect the defendant’s "evidentiary interest,” that is to say, his right not to be convicted on unreliable evidence partly created by the prosecution itself, rather than to enforce observance of a legal right standing on its own feet, such as the right against an illegal arrest, search, or seizure.2 The "features of reliability” for federal purposes, in turn, were to be sought in scrutinizing each case "on its own facts,” Simmons v. United States, 390 US at 384, for the relative importance of five "factors” bearing on the probable reliability of the identification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 US at 199; Manson v. Brathwaite;432 US at 114. We consider those factors below.
The Court of Appeals noted that as a result of this ad hoc approach to the admissibility of identification evidence "every case is now of constitutional significance” and expressed some doubt whether an instruction to consider each case "on its own facts” states much of a constitutional standard. Real as these concerns are, they put the cart before the horse. The Supreme Court of the United States pronounces rules governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal courts as a matter of federal decisional law in the absence of statute, or in applying a statute or rule. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383 (1913) (excluding evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment); Nardone v. United States, 302 US 379 (1937), 308 US 338 (1939) (excluding the fruits of wiretaps under the Federal Communications Act); Mallory v. United States, 354 US 449 (1957) (excluding [226]*226admissions made while in custody in violation of Rule 5 of FRCP). Thus in Simmons itself, the Court necessarily considered the identification procedure under its "supervisory authority” before reaching a constitutional issue. 390 US at 386. In this respect, it occupies the same position as this court. See, e.g., State v. Fairley, 282 Or 689, 580 P2d 179 (1978); State v. Flores, 280 Or 273,570 P2d 965 (1977); State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977); State v. Laundy, 103 Or 443, 204 P 958, 206 P 290 (1922). But the Supreme Court does not purport to make the law of evidence for the states. The Court’s decisions under the 14th amendment only pronounce constitutional tests which a state’s rules of evidence, and their application in a particular case, may not fail; but these decisions assume that there is an applicable state rule in advance of the issue of its constitutionality. The rules governing the admissibility of evidence in state courts are the responsibility of the states before a Supreme Court decision and remain so afterwards, within the constitutional limits laid down in the decision. See Cooper v. California, 386 US 58, 62 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 US 719, 733 (1966).
Evidence law has long provided for excluding certain evidence as a class when its questionable reliability vitiates the value of its possible truthfulness in the particular case, apart from any question of constitutional law.
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[223]*223LINDE, J.
Defendant was convicted of a burglary and theft at the home of Mrs. Barth. At trial, Mrs. Barth was unable to identify defendant, but a police officer testified that she had selected defendant’s picture from a set of seven photographs shown to her seven months after the burglary. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court should have suppressed this evidence because the circumstances of the pretrial photographic identification were so suggestive as to destroy its reliability. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument for suppression under Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 (1977), and affirmed the conviction, Schwab, C.J., dissenting. 31 Or App 683, 571 P2d 527 (1977). We allowed review.
I.
Before turning to the evidence, we review the applicable law. As far as the constraints of "due process” imposed by the federal 14th amendment are concerned, the state of the law may be summarized as follows.
In a trilogy of cases decided in 1967, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the process by which a witness is given an opportunity to identify a suspect represents a "critical stage” in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293 (1967).1 While Wade and Gilbert involved the protection of the presence of defense counsel at this "critical stage,” Stovall stated that evidence of a pretrial identification must be excluded if, under "the totality of the circumstances surrounding it,” the identification procedure was "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification” that it fell short of due process of law. 388 US at 302. Consistent with the premise that [224]*224the "process” which must be "due” includes the "critical” pretrial procedures of investigation and prosecution, this formulation focused on the question whether the circumstances of the identification needlessly created a risk of misidentification, not whether a misidentification had occurred.
The following year, the Supreme Court applied the Stovall formulation to a case of pretrial identification by photograph. Simmons v. United States, 390 US 377 (1968). However, after having found the particular procedure justified under the circumstances of the case, the Court added that there was "little chance that the procedure utilized led to misidentification of Simmons,” and that subsequent testimony left "little room for doubt that the identification of Simmons was correct.” 390 US at 385-386. These phrases in Simmons could be read to add a "harmless error” qualification to the assessment of the original identification procedure; even though that procedure fell short of due process, it would not require reversal if the ability of the witnesses to identify defendant on other occasions was plainly independent of the suggestiveness of the challenged procedure. But apart from such independent confirmation, the legitimacy of the initial identification process by Stovall standards would still be judged as of the time when this "critical stage” in the prosecution was conducted.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972), further shifted the focus from the propriety of the initial procedure to the reliability of the identification. The part of the Stovall formulation that called for considering the "totality of the circumstances” in testing the identification procedure was transferred to testing whether the identification was reliable despite the needless use of a suggestive procedure. 409 US at 199. BiggershaA arisen before the decision in Stovall, which the Supreme Court had declined to apply retroactively. But in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 (1977), the Court applied also to post-Stovall prosecutions the [225]*225shift from the premise that the "critical stage” of investigatory identification must comply with due process to the position that due process is satisfied if a court can find that the proffered identification "possesses certain features of reliability.” The stated reason, adopting an explanation offered by Judge Leventhal of the U.S. Court of Appeals, was that the exclusion of an improperly obtained identification is required only to protect the defendant’s "evidentiary interest,” that is to say, his right not to be convicted on unreliable evidence partly created by the prosecution itself, rather than to enforce observance of a legal right standing on its own feet, such as the right against an illegal arrest, search, or seizure.2 The "features of reliability” for federal purposes, in turn, were to be sought in scrutinizing each case "on its own facts,” Simmons v. United States, 390 US at 384, for the relative importance of five "factors” bearing on the probable reliability of the identification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 US at 199; Manson v. Brathwaite;432 US at 114. We consider those factors below.
The Court of Appeals noted that as a result of this ad hoc approach to the admissibility of identification evidence "every case is now of constitutional significance” and expressed some doubt whether an instruction to consider each case "on its own facts” states much of a constitutional standard. Real as these concerns are, they put the cart before the horse. The Supreme Court of the United States pronounces rules governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal courts as a matter of federal decisional law in the absence of statute, or in applying a statute or rule. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383 (1913) (excluding evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment); Nardone v. United States, 302 US 379 (1937), 308 US 338 (1939) (excluding the fruits of wiretaps under the Federal Communications Act); Mallory v. United States, 354 US 449 (1957) (excluding [226]*226admissions made while in custody in violation of Rule 5 of FRCP). Thus in Simmons itself, the Court necessarily considered the identification procedure under its "supervisory authority” before reaching a constitutional issue. 390 US at 386. In this respect, it occupies the same position as this court. See, e.g., State v. Fairley, 282 Or 689, 580 P2d 179 (1978); State v. Flores, 280 Or 273,570 P2d 965 (1977); State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977); State v. Laundy, 103 Or 443, 204 P 958, 206 P 290 (1922). But the Supreme Court does not purport to make the law of evidence for the states. The Court’s decisions under the 14th amendment only pronounce constitutional tests which a state’s rules of evidence, and their application in a particular case, may not fail; but these decisions assume that there is an applicable state rule in advance of the issue of its constitutionality. The rules governing the admissibility of evidence in state courts are the responsibility of the states before a Supreme Court decision and remain so afterwards, within the constitutional limits laid down in the decision. See Cooper v. California, 386 US 58, 62 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 US 719, 733 (1966).
Evidence law has long provided for excluding certain evidence as a class when its questionable reliability vitiates the value of its possible truthfulness in the particular case, apart from any question of constitutional law. One familiar example is the exclusion of coerced confessions; others are the exclusion of evidence obtained by polygraph tests, hypnosis, or "truth drugs.” See State v. Wintzingerode, 9 Or 153 (1881) (confessions obtained by promises or by threats); State v. Green, 271 Or 153, 164-171, 531 P2d 245 (1975) (polygraph evidence); People v. Harper, 111 111 App 2d 204, 250 NE2d 5 (1969) (sodium amobarbital); Jones v. State, 542 P2d 1316 (Okla Crim App 1975) (hypnosis). These rules of evidence are not dependent on federal law. It is necessary, therefore, to consider application of their principle to the use of the challenged identification evidence.
[227]*227The rule must take into account, on the one hand, the importance of eyewitness testimony in identifying (or exculpating) a suspected offender and, on the other hand, the widely recognized risk that such identification may often be unreliable at best and at worst may be the psychological product of the identification procedure itself. The extensive research and commentary by psychologists and jurists on the dangers of misidentification and ways to minimize them stretches back at least half a century. Courts as well as commentators have been concerned that the risk of mistake is greater when a witness identifies a suspect from a photograph than in person. Some years before the federal cases, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court noted that "identification from a still photograph is substantially less reliable than identification of an individual seen in person.” People v. Gould, 54 Cal2d 621, 354 P2d 865 (1960), citing 3 Wigmore, Evidence §786a (3d ed 1940) 164-166. In People v. Anderson, 389 Mich 155,186, 205 NW2d 461 (1973), the Supreme Court of Michigan, upon a review of the experience of Michigan courts as well as the research literature, concluded that "eyewitness identification through photographs is at least as hazardous as corporeal identification and probably is more hazardous to the securing of correct identifications,” and that identification by photograph should normally not be used when the suspect is in custody and available for personal identification procedures. The opinion appends extensive quotations from legal and psychological sources that we shall not reproduce here. See 205 NW2d at 479-494. The Supreme Court of Louisiana similarly held that in view of the greater reliability of a legally conducted lineup, "after a suspect is in police custody, there is seldom any justification for employing photo-identification.” State v. Wallace, 285 S2d 796, 801 (La 1973).
At the same time, as noted by the Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, when standards for pre-arraignment practices in the [228]*228investigation of crime and the identification of suspects must be sought in the "piecemeal decisions” of appellate courts in an intermittent series of unique factual disputes, they provide neither clear nor effective guidance to the law enforcement officials responsible for the investigatory processes.3 In its decisions on lineup procedure, the Supreme Court stressed the [229]*229advantages of "[^legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestions” and disclaimed any intention to place the details of identification procedure in a "constitutional strait jacket.” United States v. Wade, 388 US at 239. 4 As Justice Stevens wrote in Manson,
the arguments in favor of fashioning new rules to minimize the danger of convicting the innocent on the basis of unreliable eyewitness testimony carry substantial force. Nevertheless, . . . this rulemaking function can be performed "more effectively by the legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy judicial fiat,” . . . and . . . the Federal Constitution does not foreclose experimentation by the States in the development of such rules.
432 US at 117-118 (concurring opinion). Lineup procedure is in fact often prescribed in police regulations, at least in large cities. See Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance?, 17 UCLA L Rev 339 (1969); Note, Protection of the Accused at Police Lineups, 6 Colum J L Soc Prob 345, 360-373 (1970) (citing many sources). A recent set of model rules published by the Police Foundation covers [230]*230both confrontation and photographic procedures. The model rules provide that photographic identification "is permissible only when a live identification procedure is impractical,” rarely after the suspect’s arrest, and describes how it should be conducted.5 Another systematic effort to state procedures designed to facilitate the important role of eye-witness identification while minimizing the risks of suggestiveness and mistake is the American Law Institute’s Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.6 The commentary to the ALI code states:
[231]*231The Code does not include provisions dealing with pre-trial identification simply as a response to the Supreme Court’s past and present decisions in this area. Whatever the present state of the law in the Court, the fact remains that a wide variety of experienced persons consider and have considered the pre-trial identification as a crucial factor in the fair and accurate determination of guilt or innocence, and a factor as to which certain kinds of error, once committed, are particularly hard to remedy and peculiarly likely to lead to unjust results.
The premise of the code is that
where policies exist in respect to the conduct of law enforcement agencies at the pre-arraignment stage, and guidance — in the form of statutes and regulations — can be given to law enforcement, then such policies should be formulated and guidance given in an explicit form. Plainly many of the due process questions relating to pre-trial identifications that might arise in a criminal prosecution could be avoided or at least mitigated if the police in the conduct of their investigations had a clear mandate regarding [232]*232how they are required to proceed, preferably a mandate which they had some part in formulating. . . .
Id. at 422, 423.
Although we agree with the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Wade, supra, about the value of clear procedural rules, of course we do not hold that any version of the foregoing specific procedures is mandated in the absence of statute. We cite these sources to show that the unreliability of eyewitness identification under suggestive circumstances is widely recognized, and that the procedures used to minimize this unreliability bear on the admissibility of evidence of such identification. As a practical matter, in the context of a motion by a defendant to suppress identification evidence on the ground that it is the product of a suggestive procedure, the decision on its admissibility involves two steps. First, the court must determine whether the process leading to the offered identification was suggestive or needlessly7 departed from procedures prescribed to avoid such suggestiveness. If so, then the prosecution must satisfy the court that "the proffered identification has a source independent of the suggestive confrontation” or photographic display, see Commonwealth v. Botelho, 343 NE2d 876, 881 (Mass 1976) (citing cases), or that other aspects of the identification at the time it was made substantially exclude the risk that it resulted from the suggestive procedure.
It is in making this second determination that facts of the kind mentioned by the Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite are relevant. These include the opportunity that the witness had at the time to get a clear view of the persons involved in the crime and the attention he or she gave to their identifying features, the timing and completeness of the description given [233]*233by the witness after the event, the certainty expressed by the witness in that description and in making the subsequent identification, and, of course, the lapse of time between the original observation and the subsequent identification. These are not to be taken as a mechanical checklist of "constitutional” facts. Obviously other facts may also be important, such as the age and sensory acuity of the witness, see State v. Bush, 29 Or App 315, 563 P2d 747 (1977), or a special occupational concern with people’s appearance or physical features, or the frequency of his or her contacts with individuals sharing the general characteristics of the person identified, see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US at 115. Listing these and other relevant inquiries must not distract attention from the ultimate issue whether an identification made in a suggestive procedure has nevertheless been demonstrated to be reliable despite that suggestiveness.8 Of course, when the evidence survives this judicial scrutiny, its reliability and probative force under the circumstances of the identification remain questions for the jury-
II
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the crime as follows:
On May 15, 1975, the complaining witness hired two men, one black and one white, who had come to her home soliciting yard work. After the two men had worked for a few minutes while their employer remained with them working and answering questions, the black man asked to use the toilet. He went into the house, and the complainant remained outside with the other man. After several minutes she became suspicious and went into the house to find out why the black man had not returned. He was gone. She quickly discovered that several valuable items were missing. She then rushed back outside and found that the white man had also disappeared. [234]*234Shortly after the incident, complainant gave descriptions of the two men to a police officer. . . .
In his written report of the interview on May 15, the officer, Deputy Sheriff Detloff of Clackamas County, wrote that Mrs. Barth described the white man as being five feet four inches tall, slender, weighing 150 pounds, with short light brown hair and a Vandyke beard. The photographic identification at issue here took place on a visit to Mrs. Barth’s home by another officer, Detective Christensen of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s office, some seven months later, on or about December 18, 1975. A hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of this photographic identification was held on June 21, 1976, six months after the challenged identification and 13 months after the crime and Officer Detloffs initial interview with Mrs. Barth. At this hearing the following evidence was taken relevant to the asserted suggestiveness of the identification procedure and to the reliability of the identification despite any such suggestiveness.
Detective Christensen testified that he first heard of the May 15 episode from Mrs. Barth in August, 1975, when he visited her in connection with a different burglary. Mrs. Barth’s description led him to suspect that the black man involved might be one Richard Fuller. Either on that occasion or in December Christensen showed Mrs. Barth one or two pictures of Fuller. She positively identified him as the black participant in the May 15 crime. In December, Christensen showed Mrs. Barth seven "mug shots” of white men. All had mustaches. One had additional facial hair along the jaw from temples to chin which in Christensen’s view was something less than a "beard.” Christensen had not read the earlier report of the Clackamas County deputy concerning Mrs. Barth’s description of the two men involved. He did not himself ask Mrs. Barth to describe them nor describe to her the height or weight of the men whose faces appeared in the pictures.
[235]*235The officer testified that he told Mrs. Barth that "I suspected that the white subject with the Negro subject from May 15 was in this group.” Mrs. Barth first segregated two of the seven pictures and, after further study, selected the picture with the additional facial hair.9
Mrs. Barth’s recollections at the suppression hearing diverged somewhat from Christensen’s. She testified that she was shown more than seven pictures, including several of Negroes, and that the photographs presented at the hearing were not those shown her at her home six months earlier. She recalled narrowing the choice to two of the white men before selecting one. Mrs. Barth also recalled having been told that the pictures included the men who had come to her home the previous May.
We conclude that two elements of the process that led to her selection of defendant’s photograph must be characterized as suggestive. One is the statement to the witness that the suspect is one of the persons among whose pictures the witness is to choose. As the Supreme Court of Indiana has stated:
A witness may thus be lead to feel that he has an obligation to choose one of the participants in the display since the police evidently are satisfied that they have apprehended the criminal. The result may be that the witness strains to pick someone with familiar characteristics or someone who most resembles the actual criminal or the result may be that the witness will choose the one least dissimilar by the process of elimination. . . .
[236]*236Sawyer v. State, 260 Ind 597, 602, 298 NE2d 440, 443 (1973). This has been held to make admission of the identification evidence reversible error in some cases. See State v. Wallace, supra. The second suggestive element is the fact that only one of the pictures showed a man with facial hair beyond a mustache. In her report of the incident, Mrs. Barth had made a particular point of the white man’s "Vandyke” beard, and without getting into speculation whether the picture Mrs. Barth chose showed a "beard” or "four or five days’ growth,” as Mr. Christensen thought, an examination of the photographs shows that it alone displayed this feature that was important to her recollection of a man seen seven months earlier.
As stated above, these suggestive aspects would not require the court to suppress the evidence that Mrs. Barth had identified defendant’s photograph if the prosecution was able to negate any substantial risk that this identification was stimulated by the suggestive procedure. The prosecution did not do so at the suppression hearing. Mrs. Barth’s testimony at the hearing was brief and was not directed to the kind of showing of reliability in the face of a suggestive procedure discussed above. On the record made at the suppression hearing, it was error not to suppress the evidence of the photographic identification.
However, although the evidence should have been suppressed, the question remains whether its use at trial was reversible error. In concluding that it was not, the Court of Appeals took into account testimony at the trial itself as bearing on the question whether Mrs. Barth had reliably identified defendant’s photograph independently of the suggestive manner in which it was shown to her.10 The court stressed Mrs. [237]*237Barth’s extended opportunity to observe the two men when they came to work for her, in daylight, under conditions when she would give her attention to them, and without distracting elements of fear or stress.11 We agree that her opportunity to form an impression of the men was better than in most reported cases in which a subsequent identification is challenged, and it would lend reliability to any otherwise positive identification she might have made shortly after the events, either by confrontation or, if the suspect was not in custody, by recognizing a photograph. However, the difficulty arises because Mrs. Barth did not see the photographs until seven months after the only time she had seen the suspects. On her own testimony, her identification of defendant’s photograph at that time cannot be described as very positive. She had already been told that the officer believed the white suspect to be one of the group of pictures he showed her. She expressed doubts because she remembered the "Vandyke beard,” and only one of the pictures had facial hair beyond a mustache. As Chief Judge Schwab wrote in dissent below, under these circumstances it is not surprising that Mrs. Barth selected defendant’s picture.
[238]*238Actually, Mrs. Barth testified that she selected two pictures and said "it’s got to be one of these two.” When asked whether her memory was better at the time she saw the photographs than it was six months later at the hearing, Mrs. Barth answered: "Not about most things, but at the time I just didn’t pay that much attention. I didn’t even think of it coming to trial. I didn’t pay that much attention.”
On this record, we cannot conclude that Mrs. Barth would have identified one of the photographs out of seven if several of them had shown men with similar beards and if she had been told that the police did not know whether the man she had seen was among those in the set of photographs, that is to say, in the absence of the suggestive procedure. The state has not carried that burden. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.