[Cite as State v. Clark, 2026-Ohio-447.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : : Case No. 25CA32 Plaintiff-Appellant, : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY DANIEL C. CLARK, : : Defendant-Appellee. : RELEASED: 02/05/2026
APPEARANCES:
Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney and Alisa Turner Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for appellant, the State of Ohio.
James Boulger, Chillicothe, Ohio for appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal by the State of Ohio from a Ross County Court of
Common Pleas judgment entry that granted appellee, Daniel C. Clark’s (“Clark”)
motion to suppress evidence. In its sole assignment of error, the State asserts
that the trial court erred when it granted Clark’s motion to suppress. After
reviewing the parties’ arguments, the law, and the record in this case, we find
that the trial court did not err in granting Clark’s motion to suppress. Therefore,
we affirm the trial court’s decision that granted Clark’s motion to suppress the
evidence.
BACKGROUND Ross App. No. 25CA32 2
{¶2} On June 20, 2025, the State charged Clark with aggravated
possession of methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.11, which is a second-
degree felony.
{¶3} On August 7, 2025, Clark filed a motion to suppress the State’s
evidence. His motion alleged that Ross County Lieutenant McGoye (“McGoye”)
was dispatched to investigate a trespass complaint on a “dead-end portion of
Plano Road” when he encountered Clark and a female companion in a parked
car. The motion asserted there was a small sign indicating camera surveillance,
but no sign prohibiting trespassing.
{¶4} The motion claimed that McGoye approached the vehicle and
informed Clark and his companion that they were trespassing. Clark told
McGoye that there was a pellet gun “in the back.” Clark maintained that McGoye
then ordered him out of the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs, telling him that “
‘it does not mean that you are going to jail.’ ”
{¶5} After McGoye conducted a consensual pat-down search of Clark, he
had the female exit the vehicle and placed her in handcuffs as well. The motion
contended that McGoye began questioning them about why they were on this
property. Clark claimed they had the owner’s permission.
{¶6} The motion claimed that after further discussion, McGoye told Clark
and his companion that they might not be charged with trespassing. He then
requested dispatch to contact the property owner to determine if he wanted to
press charges. The dispatcher informed McGoye that the owner wanted to press
charges. McGoye then began searching Clark’s car and found a baggie Ross App. No. 25CA32 3
containing a crystalline substance. The State charged Clark with trespassing
and aggravated possession of methamphetamine.1
{¶7} Clark’s motion argued that McGoye lacked probable cause to believe
he knowingly trespassed, as there was no posted sign and the property was
frequently used by others. He further argued that even if McGoye had probable
cause to believe Clark was knowingly on the property, no arrest was made
before the vehicle was searched and the baggie with crystalline substance was
discovered. Therefore, Clark claimed that the search leading to the drug
discovery was conducted without a warrant, and, as a result, the court should
suppress the drugs found in his vehicle.
{¶8} In response, the State acknowledged that no one “could point to the
exact moment an arrest was legally effective with certainty.” Yet, the State
argued that the evidence should not be excluded because it would have been
discovered “in the lawful course of action.” The State maintained McGoye was
not attempting to act unlawfully; he had a reasonable good-faith belief that he
was conducting an inventory search of Clark’s vehicle.
{¶9} Absent McGoye’s “oversight” in failing to inform Clark that he was
under arrest, the search would have been a lawful inventory search. Therefore,
the State moved the court to deny Clark’s motion to suppress.
{¶10} On September 12, 2025, the court held a suppression hearing. The
State called a single witness, McGoye. McGoye stated that he was wearing a
1 The trespassing charge, which was a fourth-degree misdemeanor was resolved separately in municipal court and is not part of the State’s appeal. Ross App. No. 25CA32 4
body cam that recorded his encounter with Clark. The video was then played for
the judge.
{¶11} The video shows McGoye exiting his patrol vehicle and walking
down a leaf-covered roadway until he sees Clark’s vehicle. As he approaches
the vehicle, it can be seen that there is a sunshade in its front windshield.
McGoye approaches the partially-open window of the back passenger door on
the driver’s side and asks the occupants to put their hands on the dash. With his
sidearm drawn, McGoye then opened the driver’s door and informed Clark and
his female companion that they were trespassing. McGoye asked if there were
any guns or knives, and Clark advised that there was a ”pellet gun in the back.”
{¶12} Pursuant to McGoye’s request, Clark exited his vehicle, and
McGoye handcuffed him, explaining that he was alone, Clark was trespassing,
and he needed to assess the situation. While McGoye was handcuffing Clark, he
informed Clark that this did not mean he was going to jail. After receiving
consent, McGoye conducted a pat-down search of Clark. McGoye then checked
Clark’s license, which confirmed his identity. McGoye had Clark move to the
front of the car, then he had Clark’s companion exit the vehicle and handcuffed
her as well.
{¶13} McGoye again informed Clark and his companion that they were
trespassing, but that did not necessarily mean they would be “charged or
ticketed.” He called dispatch and asked that the property owner be contacted
and asked if they wanted to press charges. Shortly thereafter, dispatch informed Ross App. No. 25CA32 5
McGoye that the property owner wanted to pursue a trespassing charge.
McGoye then asked dispatch to acquire the property owner’s contact information.
{¶14} McGoye informed Clark and his companion that there was a no-
trespassing sign and a camera on the property, which they denied seeing. After
briefly discussing with Clark and his companion why they believed they could be
on the property, McGoye left them handcuffed at the front of Clark’s vehicle and
proceeded to search Clark’s vehicle. McGoye inquired about the pellet gun, and
Clark responded that it was in the back. McGoye unsuccessfully attempted to
open the rear hatch and then proceeded to search the back-passenger seat on
the driver’s-side, examining a small black pouch, a small case, and the pocket on
the back of the driver’s seat. He then looked over the seat into the rear-storage
area and located the pellet gun. McGoye then proceeded to search the driver’s-
seat area and discovered a baggie containing a crystallized substance near a
boot on the floor, which formed the basis of the drug charge in this case.
{¶15} Immediately after discovering what appeared to be contraband in
the baggie, McGoye requested dispatch to send the “next available 31[,]” which
Clark claimed is the code for requesting a tow truck. McGoye then proceeded to
the front of the vehicle and read Clark and his companion their Miranda rights.
He reminded both of them that the property owners wanted to press charges
and, therefore, they would be charged for trespassing. He then stated: “keeping
your rights in mind, there’s a little blue bag with crystal stuff in it[,]” i.e., the baggie
he discovered in Clark’s vehicle. Clark denied knowledge of the baggie. Later
during the detention, McGoye requested dispatch to inform Detective Davidson Ross App. No. 25CA32 6
that Clark’s vehicle would be towed, and Clark and his companion were going to
jail. Although there was additional video that showed McGoye continuing his
search of Clark’s vehicle, the arrival of McGoye’s backup, etc., none of it is
probative in addressing the State’s appeal.
{¶16} On direct examination, McGoye testified that he decided to arrest
Clark instead of issuing a summons after learning the property owner wanted to
press charges. He stated that “when people are caught actively trespassing on
property, I generally take the person to jail.” McGoye explained that he
conducted an inventory search of Clark’s vehicle since it was going to be towed.
McGoye testified that a plea deal was reached on the trespass charge that
resulted in Clark being convicted.
{¶17} McGoye stated that the baggie that contained the crystalline
substance, which he suspected was drugs, was sent to the lab for testing.
{¶18} Defense counsel then cross-examined McGoye. McGoye confirmed
that he told both Clark and his companion that being handcuffed did not mean
they were going to jail. McGoye also confirmed that he never explicitly told either
of them they were under arrest when dispatch informed him that the owner
wanted to press charges, but that it was nevertheless at that moment he decided
he was going to arrest them. Defense counsel asked McGoye: “Now the, uh,
decision to impound the vehicle, that was made after the search, wasn’t it?”
McGoye:
No, the, if they were both being arrested, which is what was my intent, as soon as I heard that the property owners wanted them charged, again, I didn’t vocalize this out loud to myself or anybody else, but when I find people actively trespassing on someone Ross App. No. 25CA32 7
else’s property, I usually take them to jail unless there’s extinu, some kind of extenuating circumstances, but I also realize about that time that hey, I am still by myself, backup still hasn’t arrived and is it’s taking my officer this long to get here, it’s going to take the tow truck longer to find us, so I might as well get ahead of the game and call for a tow truck now, versus wait until everything is done.
{¶19} McGoye testified that he did not expect to find any evidence to
support a trespassing charge in Clark’s vehicle. He stated that the search was to
inventory property since Clark was going to jail and his vehicle was going to be
towed.
{¶20} After the hearing, the court announced its decision in open court
and issued a one-page entry reflecting that decision. The court granted Clark’s
motion to suppress adopting the reasoning from Clark’s “post hearing
memorandum.” Clark’s post-hearing memorandum maintained that two minutes
prior to learning that the property owner would press trespassing charges,
McGoye had suggested to Clark and his companion that they might not be
charged or go to jail. Yet, two minutes later, when McGoye and Clark overheard
the dispatcher indicate that the property owner wanted to press changes, the
deputy did nothing “to divest [them] of that notion[.]” Further, despite testifying
that he wanted to “get ahead of the game and call for the tow truck now[,]”
McGoye did not call for a tow truck until immediately after he discovered the
baggie of drugs in Clark’s vehicle. It was then that he also approached Clark and
his companion and read them their Miranda rights.
{¶21} From these facts, consistent with Clark’s memorandum, the court
inferred that McGoye did not arrest Clark until after he discovered the baggie of Ross App. No. 25CA32 8
drugs in Clark’s vehicle. Consequently, because the baggie was seized without
a warrant and no exception applied, the court found that the seizure of the baggie
was unreasonable and excluded it from evidence. It is this judgment that the
State appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
{¶22} The State argues that the trial court’s determination that Clark was
not under arrest at the time that the inventory search began is not supported by
competent credible evidence. The State acknowledges that McGoye never
explicitly told Clark that he was under arrest prior to searching Clark’s vehicle,
but claims that such words are not required to constitute an arrest. The State
posits that any confinement beyond that permitted for an investigative detention
permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) is integral in determining what
constitutes an arrest. Citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, and State v. Mauer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, the State claims
that “if one is deprived of his movement by the State, he is in custody and
considered under arrest.”
{¶23} The State asserts that when dispatch informed McGoye that the
property owner wanted to press charges, it was also heard by Clark. The State
claims that Clark “visibly reacted and appeared upset.” The State maintains that
Clark was clearly aware that he was going to be charged at that point in time.
The State claims that being handcuffed and now being aware that he was facing Ross App. No. 25CA32 9
criminal trespass charges was sufficient to put Clark on notice that he was under
arrest.
{¶24} The State also argues that Clark’s vehicle could not remain on
private property following his arrest. An inventory search is routine practice when
vehicles are impounded. Thus, the State contends that McGoye conducted an
inventory search to document any of Clark’s belongings in the vehicle, which did
not require probable cause. In the course of that search, McGoye discovered a
baggie containing a crystalline substance on the driver’s side floor. The State
maintains that this discovery was lawful under the inventory search exception,
one of the few exceptions where a warrant is not needed to search private
property.
{¶25} Even if there was a technical violation, the State argues that the
exclusionary rule should not be applied because the evidence discovered during
the inventory search of Clark’s vehicle would have been inevitably discovered
through lawful means—specifically, when the vehicle was towed and inventoried
after the occupants were arrested and transported to jail, as required by
departmental policy for all towed vehicles. The State further contends that
McGoye acted with an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that his actions
were lawful because he was alone in a remote location, the suspects were
inevitably going to jail after the property owner pressed charges, and the
administrative inventory search was undertaken in accordance with established
practice rather than as a pretext for investigation. Additionally, the State asserts
that suppression would not achieve any appreciable deterrent effect because Ross App. No. 25CA32 10
there was no unlawful intent or attempt to circumvent constitutional protections,
and, therefore, applying the exclusionary rule would place the State in a worse
position than if the evidence had never been discovered, contrary to its intended
purpose.
{¶26} In response, Clark maintains that the State’s assertion that the trial
court erred in granting his motion to suppress is predicated upon an invited error.
Clark claims that the State’s post-suppression hearing brief conceded that he
was not under arrest prior to the initial search. Thus, the State cannot now be
permitted to argue that Clark was lawfully arrested prior to the initial search.
{¶27} Clark further argues that there was no lawful impoundment of
Clark’s vehicle. McGoye’s discovery of drugs in Clark’s vehicle prior to his arrest
cannot provide the basis for a lawful impoundment of Clark’s vehicle. Clark
maintains that an inventory search must follow a lawful impoundment, by conduct
that complies with a standard practice or policy, and cannot be a pretext for a
search for evidence.
{¶28} Clark also notes that the State presented no evidence of any policy
from the Ross County Sheriff’s Office regarding searches of impounded vehicles.
Therefore, the trial court could not determine if such a policy could have lawfully
justified McGoye's impoundment of Clark’s vehicle.
{¶29} Finally, Clark contends that the search resulting in the discovery of
drugs was not conducted in good faith. He asserts that determining whether an
item is seized in good faith requires the decision to be “objectively reasonable
under the circumstances.” Without a guiding policy from the Ross County Ross App. No. 25CA32 11
Sheriff’s Office regarding inventory searches, it is impossible to determine
whether McGoye’s actions in searching Clark’s vehicle were in good faith.
A. Law
1. Standard of Review
{¶30} “Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-
2072, ¶ 18, citing State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “An appellate court
must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). “The
appellate court must decide questions of law de novo, without deference to the
lower court's legal conclusions.” Id., citing Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶31} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right of the people to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Johnson, 2014-
Ohio-5400, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391 (2001).
“These two provisions contain nearly identical language, and the Supreme Court
of Ohio has interpreted them as affording the same level of protection.” Id., citing
Orr at 391. “ ‘[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’ ” (Bracket original.) Id., quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967). “Once the defendant demonstrates that he was subjected to a
warrantless search or seizure, the burden shifts to the state to establish that the Ross App. No. 25CA32 12
warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally permissible.” Id., citing State
v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 98.
{¶32} If a search is found to be unreasonable, “[t]he exclusionary rule
operates to exclude, or suppress, evidence that is derived from police conduct
that violated constitutional protections.” State v. Hobbs, 2012-Ohio-3886, ¶ 21,
citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). “The rule is a judicially created
sanction intended to safeguard constitutional rights by deterring Fourth
Amendment violations.” Id., citing State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,
75 Ohio St.3d 82, 88 (1996). It is intended to deter “willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct [by law enforcement] which has deprived the defendant of
some right.’ ” U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984), quoting U.S. v. Peltier,
422 U.S., 531, 539 (1975). Therefore, the rule is not to be applied to exclude
evidence that was ‘ “obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or
seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” ’ Leon, at 909, quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
2. Investigatory Detention and Arrest
{¶33} “An investigative stop, or Terry stop, under the Fourth Amendment
allows an officer to briefly stop and temporarily detain individuals in order to
investigate possible criminal activity.” State v. Collins, 2019-Ohio-1724, ¶ 20-22,
(4th Dist.), citing State v. Staten, 2003-Ohio-4592, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). During an investigatory stop the individual being
investigated is not “free to go.” See State v. Heinhold, 1988 WL 45553 (1st Dist.
May 11, 1988). Yet, “a person detained as a result of a[n] [investigative stop] is Ross App. No. 25CA32 13
not in Miranda custody because such detention does not ‘sufficiently impair [the
detained person's] free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.’ ” (Third brackets original)
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 510 (2012), quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 437 (1984). Thus, “the ‘temporary and relatively nonthreatening
detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda
custody[.]’ ” Id., quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113.
{¶34} “Generally, handcuffing and detaining an individual without probable
cause constitutes an illegal arrest pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” Vaughters v. Scioto Cnty., Ohio, Sheriff's Dep't,
1997 WL 596298, *2 (4th Dist. Sept. 23, 1997), citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
94 (1964). “However, an officer may briefly detain a suspicious individual in
order to determine his or her identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining
more information if specific facts known to the officer indicate that a crime is
occurring or is about to occur.” Id., citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d 58, 60
(1990), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968). “Officers may [hand]cuff
persons stopped pursuant to Terry for purposes of officer safety, without
converting the encounter into an arrest.” State v. Drumm, 2015-Ohio-2176, ¶ 16
(2d Dist.), citing State v. White, 2002 WL 63294, fn. 1 (2d Dist. Jan. 18, 2002),
citing State v. Bradley, 1993 WL 69474, *2 (10th Dist. March 11, 1993).
{¶35} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that “[a]n arrest, in the
technical, as well as common sense, signifies the apprehension of an individual
or the restraint of a person's freedom in contemplation of the formal charging with Ross App. No. 25CA32 14
a crime.” State v. Darrah, 64 Ohio St.2d 22, 26, citing United States v. Bonanno,
180 F.Supp. 71, (S.D.N.Y.1960). The Court has recognized that “ [a]n arrest
occurs when the following four requisite elements are involved: (1) an intent to
arrest, (2) under real or pretended authority, (3) accompanied by an actual or
constructive seizure or detention of the person, and (4) which is so understood
by the person arrested.’ ” State v. Barker, 53 Ohio St.2d 135, 139 (1978).
“Because this is a conjunctive test, all four of its factors must be satisfied to
determine that [an arrest has occurred].” Phillips v. Regina Heath Care, 2024-
Ohio-6012, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.).
{¶36} “ ‘In determining ‘when’ an investigatory stop ripens into an arrest,
no bright line exists. Instead, in determining whether an investigative detention is
unreasonable, “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria.” ’ ” (Emphasis added.) State v. Ronald Stringer, 1999 WL
105095, *8 (4th Dist. Feb. 24, 1999), quoting United States v. Espinosa-Guerra,
805 F.2d 1502, 1509 (11th Cir. 1986), quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 685 (1985). “ ‘In determining “when” a person is arrested, [a reviewing court
should] ask at what point, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed he [she] was not free to
leave.” ’ ” (Brackets original) Id. at *8, quoting United States v. Hastamorir, 881
F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989), quoting United States v. Hammock, 860 F.2d
390, 393 (11th Cir.1988).
Furthermore, in determining when an arrest occurred, courts may consider the law enforcement officers' behavior. Courts may examine: (1) whether the officers touched the individual; (2) whether the officers displayed a weapon; (3) whether the officers handcuffed Ross App. No. 25CA32 15
the individual; and (4) the type of words spoken by the police officer. Id. at 110, Section 6.2. Whether the officers' conduct contributes to a finding that the officers arrested the individual “turns upon the degree of physical force and show of authority communicated by the police.” Id. at 110, Section 6.2.
Id. at *10
{¶37} Additionally, “[i]t is well-settled that an officer's subjective view of
whether probable cause existed to arrest the suspect is not dispositive of the
issue.” Id., citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). “Rather, the
reviewing court should examine the objective facts and circumstances when
determining whether the defendant was under arrest.” Id., citing Katz and
Gianelli, Criminal Law, 107, Section 6.2 (1996). “ ‘[C]ourts have disregarded
officers' rationale for a search as inconclusive, finding that “it is of no importance
that the police may have thought [regarding their authority to conduct a search];
the test is what could lawfully be done, not what the policemen thought the
source of their power to be.” ’ ” (Initial brackets original) Id., at *9, quoting State
v. DiNickle, 1993 WL 545142, *7 (11th Dist. Dec. 3, 1993) (Christely J.
concurring), quoting United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1256 (2d Cir. 1979).
{¶38} “The benefit of the objective custody analysis is that it is ‘designed
to give clear guidance to the police.’ ” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261,
270 (2011), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S., 652, 668 (2004). A court
should examine the totality of the circumstances in determining when an
investigative detention ripens into an arrest. United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d
524, 529 (6th Cir. 2003)
3. Inventory Search Ross App. No. 25CA32 16
{¶39} “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment —subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” (Footnotes omitted). Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “An inventory
search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is a well-defined exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State
v. Goodin, 2000 WL 134733, *3 (4th Dist. Jan. 28, 2000), citing Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). “The purpose of an inventory search is
‘aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents.’ ” State v. Williams, 54
Ohio App.3d 117, 119, (4th Dist. November 3, 1988), quoting South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976). However, “[a] search which is conducted
with an investigatory intent, and which is not conducted in the manner of an
inventory search, does not constitute an ‘inventory search’ and may not be used
as a pretext to conduct a warrantless evidentiary search.” Id., citing State v.
Caponi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 302, 303 (1984).
{¶40} Further, “an inventory search is unlawful if it is not conducted in
accordance with standardized procedures or policies.” State v. Catrell, 1997 WL
414974, * 5 (4th Dist. July 21, 1997), citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
370-71 (1987). Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that:
the government's failure to submit a copy of written inventory- search procedures into evidence in support of a warrantless inventory search does not render the search per se unreasonable. We further hold that a law-enforcement officer's testimony that attributes an inventory-search policy to the law-enforcement agency that conducted the inventory search, explains when the policy must be followed, and explains whether the policy was followed, combined with body-camera footage documenting the Ross App. No. 25CA32 17
inventory search, is sufficient evidence to establish the existence of such procedures, that the officer who conducted the search acted in accordance with the policy, and that the search was reasonable, and therefore lawful, under the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Toran, 2023-Ohio-3564, ¶4.
4. Criminal Trespass
{¶41} Finally, we note that criminal trespass is a fourth-degree
misdemeanor offense. See State v. Wright, 2021-Ohio-2692 (4th Dist.), ¶16. “In
misdemeanor cases where a law enforcement officer is empowered to arrest
without a warrant, the officer may issue a summons in lieu of making an arrest,
when issuance of a summons appears reasonably calculated to ensure the
defendant's appearance.” Crim.R. 4(A)(3). Therefore, when dealing with a
person who has arguably committed a misdemeanor, the law enforcement officer
has discretion whether to issue the defendant a summons or to arrest him or her.
See City of Marysville v. Rausch, 1979 WL 207871, *2 (3rd Dist. June 6, 1979).
B. Analysis
{¶42} When announcing its decision to the parties, the court stated: “I
don’t know that the facts are really in dispute, and I think this is literally, more a
question of law that applies to it.” We agree, so our review is de novo. Virtually
the entire stop was recorded by the deputy’s body cam. Thus, it essentially
comes to whether the search that resulted in the discovery of the
methamphetamine was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, i.e., it was
supported by probable cause or whether there is some exception that otherwise Ross App. No. 25CA32 18
permitted the search. One critical question that is pertinent in making this
determination is when did McGoye arrest Clark.
{¶43} After having Clark exit his vehicle, McGoye handcuffed Clark and
told him “I got to detain you for right now because I’m by myself, you guys are
trespassing, I gotta figure out what’s goin on here. It doesn’t mean you gotta go
to jail.” McGoye never mentions Clark might be arrested. As he is patting down
Clark for any weapons he might possess, McGoye again tells Clark he is
“investigating a trespass.” McGoye then ordered Clark’s female companion to
exit the vehicle and handcuffed her as well.
{¶44} McGoye again told Clark and his companion that they were “actively
trespassing and committing a violation that doesn’t necessarily mean you gotta
get charged or ticketed, we don’t know.” Based on McGoye’s comments, we find
that McGoye’s handcuffing of Clark and his companion was to permit McGoye to
conduct his investigation safely, considering he was the only law enforcement
officer on the scene at that time. Under these facts, we find that Clark was under
an investigative detention. Thus, he was not free to leave, but he was also not
under arrest.
{¶45} Approximately 12 minutes into the detention, McGoye requested the
dispatcher to contact the property owner to see if he wanted to press trespass
charges. Shortly thereafter, the dispatcher informed McGoye that the property
owner wanted to press charges. At the suppression hearing, McGoye testified
that this is when he decided to arrest Clark and his companion. However, putting
McGoye’s testimony aside, none of the factors of an arrest as outlined in Stringer Ross App. No. 25CA32 19
were present. For example, McGoye maintained a relaxed demeanor, and
although Clark was handcuffed, it had been previously determined that this was
for McGoye’s protection during the investigation, and not an indication of Clark
being under arrest. See Stringer, 1999 WL 105095, *8 (4th Dist. Feb. 24, 1999).
Further, while McGoye initially drew his firearm when approaching the idling car,
he holstered it after opening the driver’s door and speaking with Clark and his
companion, and did not draw it again during the remainder of the detention.
Additionally, McGoye informed Clark on two separate occasions that he was
trespassing, but also stated that this did not mean that Clark would be jailed,
charged, or ticketed.
{¶46} Further complicating the analysis in this particular case is the fact
that charging Clark with trespass did not automatically mean he was under
arrest. Because criminal trespass is a fourth-degree misdemeanor, McGoye
could have merely issued a summons for Clark to appear in court instead of
arresting him. Although not legally required, McGoye could have, and perhaps
should have, informed Clark and his companion that they were under arrest once
he learned that the property owner wanted to press charges, which might have
prevented this appeal. Instead, McGoye briefly chatted with Clark and his
companion about who allegedly allowed them on the property.
{¶47} Additionally, what is further notable and objectively quantifiable is
when McGoye called for a tow truck. McGoye testified that because his backup
was taking so long to get to the scene, it would likely take the tow truck a long
time to find the property as well. Therefore, he testified that he decided to get Ross App. No. 25CA32 20
“ahead of the game[,]” and would “call for the tow truck now, versus wait until
everything is done.” Yet, at no time prior to his search of Clark’s vehicle,
including after the dispatcher informed him that the property owner wanted to
bring trespass charges, can McGoye be heard calling a tow truck. It was only
after discovering contraband in Clark’s vehicle that McGoye requested the “next
available 31[,]” a tow truck. Objectively, this timing suggests that McGoye
intended to arrest Clark only after finding the drugs.
{¶48} Also persuasive to our analysis is the timing of when McGoye read
Clark and his companion their Miranda rights. Immediately after discovering the
contraband and calling for the tow truck, McGoye returned to Clark and his
companion and read them their Miranda rights. He further stated that “if [the
owners] wanted to press charges, charges will be pressed, for trespass.”
McGoye continued: “Keeping your rights in mind, there’s a little blue bag with
crystal stuff in it[.]” Thus, McGoye’s reading of Clark’s and his companion’s
Miranda rights for both criminal trespass and the drugs occurred after discovery
of the baggie. Again, objectively, we find that these actions support the
conclusion that McGoye did not intend to arrest Clark for trespass until after
findings the drugs in Clark’s car.
{¶49} Viewing the totality of these circumstances using an objective
standard, we reluctantly conclude that McGoye’s investigative detention of Clark
and his companion did not ripen into a custodial arrest until after he searched
Clark’s vehicle and discovered the contraband. This means that the contraband Ross App. No. 25CA32 21
was discovered during a warrantless search, and without an applicable exception
to justify the search, it was unreasonable.
{¶50} The State argues that this court should determine McGoye was
performing an inventory search of Clark’s vehicle when he found the
methamphetamine, which falls under an exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The State maintains that McGoye, knowing that he was arresting Clark,
conducted an inventory search because the vehicle would need towing.
However, we have determined that McGoye did not arrest Clark until after finding
the contraband, suggesting that the search may have been a pretext for a
warrantless investigatory search. Notably, during the initial search that
uncovered the contraband, McGoye was not wearing gloves or taking
photographs. It was only after arresting Clark, following the discovery, that
McGoye used gloves and took photographs when he resumed the search. This
indicates that McGoye’s search was investigatory, not for inventory purposes.
Therefore, McGoye did not conduct a valid inventory search.
{¶51} Finally, the State argues that even if McGoye found the
methamphetamine before he arrested Clark, McGoye had legal authority to
arrest Clark and impound the vehicle, leading to its inevitable discovery. The
State maintains that McGoye had no motive or intent to find evidence of a crime.
Therefore, the State urges that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to
exclude the evidence.
{¶52} Even if we were to assume McGoye acted improperly but in good
faith in conducting an inventory search of Clark’s vehicle, we cannot assess the Ross App. No. 25CA32 22
reasonableness of that search because the State did not provide sufficient
evidence of any inventory search policy from the Ross County Sheriff’s Office.
No written policy was admitted, and McGoye’s testimony and body cam footage
were insufficient to determine if his search qualified as a valid inventory search.
Aside from stating that a car is impounded when a person is arrested and
searched, McGoye failed to explain when the policy must be followed or provide
details on its implementation. Without the policy or a detailed explanation from
McGoye, we cannot assess whether his search of Clark’s vehicle was a
reasonable inventory search.
{¶53} Therefore, we reject the State’s assertion that the exclusion rule
should not apply here.
CONCLUSION
{¶54} We must uphold constitutional protections, even when unpopular, as
neglecting this duty erodes the foundational principles of our country. The
evidence when viewed through an objective lens showed that McGoye did not
arrest Clark until after discovering contraband in his vehicle, making the search
warrantless and lacking a valid exception. Consequently, the search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, we find that Clark’s motion to
suppress should be granted, excluding the contraband from evidence, and we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Ross App. No. 25CA32 23
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and the appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.