State v. Clark

2024 Ohio 4976, 256 N.E.3d 239
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in State v. Clark. Read the opinion of the Court — 2022 Ohio 2801
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided October 15, 2024·No. 2024-T-0030·Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Clark, 2024-Ohio-4976.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-T-0030

Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas

NICHOLAS ALEXANDER CLARK, Trial Court No. 2023 CR 00730 Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

Decided: October 15, 2024 Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Eric D. Hall, P.O. Box 232, Medina, OH 44258 (For Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, Nicholas Alexander Clark, appeals the judgment of conviction on

multiple charges of rape and one charge of gross sexual imposition. We affirm.

{¶2} In 2022, Clark’s minor nephews disclosed to their parents that Clark had

acted inappropriately toward them. In 2023, Clark was indicted on charges based upon

the nephews’ allegations. With respect to the younger nephew, born in 2009, Clark was

charged in counts one, two, and three with first-degree felony rape of a child less than 13

years of age, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B), with factual findings that Clark

purposely compelled the victim to comply through force or the threat of force pursuant to 2971.03(B)(1)(c), and with a factual finding attendant to the third count that the victim was

less than ten years of age pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b). Also, with respect to the

younger nephew, Clark was charged in count four with third-degree felony gross sexual

imposition of a child less than thirteen years of age, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and

(C). With respect to the older nephew, born in 2008, Clark was charged in counts five and

six with first-degree felony rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and (B). Also, with

respect to the older nephew, in counts seven and eight, Clark was charged with first-

degree felony rape of a child less than thirteen years of age, in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B), with factual findings that the victim was less than ten years of

age pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b) and that Clark purposely compelled the victim to

comply through force or the threat of force pursuant to 2971.03(B)(1)(c).

{¶3} Clark pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the case proceeded to jury trial.

The jury found Clark guilty on all charges and found that he did commit the offenses in

accordance with the factual findings identified in the indictment. Thereafter, the court

imposed concurrent prison sentences of 25 years to life on count one, 25 years to life on

count two, life without parole on count three, 48 months on count four, 10 to 15 years on

count five, 10 years on count six, life without parole on count seven, and life without parole

on count eight, for a total prison sentence of life without parole.

{¶4} In his first and second assigned errors, Clark contends:

[1.] The evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts of “guilty” with respect to the charged offenses of Rape in Counts I-III and V-VIII, and with respect to the charged offense of Gross Sexual Imposition in Count IV.

[2.] Defendant-Appellant’s convictions as to all counts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Case No. 2024-T-0030 {¶5} The question of whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction “is a test

of adequacy,” which we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, 386. “In a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when

viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact

to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Dent,

2020-Ohio-6670, ¶ 15, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of

the syllabus.

{¶6} Unlike a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, our review of the “[w]eight

of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence . . .

to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis in original.) Thompkins

at 387, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). When considering challenges to

the weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews “‘the entire record, weighs the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and

a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175

(1st Dist. 1983). “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a

‘“‘thirteenth juror’”’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting

testimony.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). “The

discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case

in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting

Martin at 175.

Case No. 2024-T-0030 {¶7} Here, the jury found Clark guilty of four counts of rape pertaining to Clark’s

older nephew and three counts of rape pertaining to Clark’s younger nephew, and one

count of gross sexual imposition pertaining to Clark’s younger nephew. Two of the rape

counts as to the older nephew and all of the rape counts as to the younger nephew were

charged under former R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), which provides that “[n]o person shall

engage in sexual conduct with another who is not the spouse of the offender or who is

the spouse of the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, when . . .

[t]he other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows

the age of the other person . . . .”1 The remaining two rape counts as to the older nephew

were charged under former R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), which provides that “[n]o person shall

engage in sexual conduct with another who is not the spouse of the offender or who is

the spouse of the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, when the

offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.”2

“Sexual conduct” includes anal intercourse. R.C. 2907.01(A). “Penetration, however

slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.” Id.

{¶8} With respect to “force” as an element of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and as a factual

finding pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b), R.C. 2901.01(A)(1) defines “force” as any

“violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a

person or thing.” In State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56 (1988), paragraph one of the

syllabus, which involved the rape of a child by a parent, the Ohio Supreme Court held:

1. R.C. 2907.02(A) was recently amended affective August 9, 2024 to remove the following language “who is not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender[.]"

2. See footnote one. 4

Case No. 2024-T-0030 The force and violence necessary to commit the crime of rape depends upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other.

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State v. Clark, 2024 Ohio 4976, 256 N.E.3d 239 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).

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