State v. Chilton

736 P.2d 1277, 112 Idaho 823, 1987 Ida. LEXIS 271

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: February 5, 1987
• Docket: 16220
• Status: Published

Opinions

HUNTLEY, Justice.

Robert Chilton appeals the trial court’s order denying him a discharge or conditional release from a mental hospital. Chilton alleges the trial court applied an improper legal standard by placing the burden of proof on him to prove: (1) he could be released without danger to himself or others, and (2) that he was no longer mentally ill. Chilton also argues the trial court improperly concentrated on Chilton’s alleged past criminal record, alleged refusal to accept that he was mentally ill, and alleged refusal to accept treatment in reaching its decision.

At a trial in September 1981, Chilton was found not guilty by reason of mental disease and defect of forcible rape, two counts of the infamous crime against nature, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and first degree kidnapping. Upon his acquittal, Chilton was committed to State Hospital South in Blackfoot, Idaho, and assigned to “Hoover Four,” the intermediate security facility which provides the maximum security available at the hospital. For a number of years, Chilton refused to acknowledge his mental illness and actively refused anti-psychotic medication. Around the beginning of 1984, Chilton agreed to start taking anti-psychotic medication and was moved off “Hoover Four” to a minimum security section of State Hospital South. Chilton has apparently made steady progress as a result of the medication, and most of the psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and others working with Chilton now advocate his conditional release to a less structured environment, such as a shelter home, provided he remains on medication.

Despite those recommendations, the trial court ruled that Chilton had failed to show that he could be released under either of two statutory standards: first, it could not be shown that Chilton could be released without danger to himself or others (the standard required under I.C. § 18-214(2) (repealed), which statute Chilton was committed under) and second, Chilton did not show that he was no longer mentally ill nor likely to injure himself or others (a standard required under I.C. § 66-337(b), enacted after the repeal of I.C. § 18-214). The trial court based its decision, in large part, upon reports it ordered pursuant to I.C. §§ 66-337 and 18-214 (repealed), by doctors Lamarr Heyrend and Michael Estess. Dr. Heyrend expressly stated that, in his opinion, Chilton is not ready for conditional release as he persists in stating that he is not mentally ill and remains unwilling to recognize the necessity for treatment. Additionally, that report mentioned the uncooperative attitude with which Chilton currently receives his medication. While Dr. Estess is of the opinion that Chilton might succeed in a less structured environment, he emphasized that any success would depend entirely upon Chilton’s continued receipt of medication and treatment and cooperation with an out-patient treatment program. All experts who testified at the hearing stated that Chilton still refuses to acknowledge the reason for his commitment, refuses to accept the diagnosis of his illness and continues to object to the necessity of taking medication. The court also emphasized its own observations of Chilton’s demeanor and attitude during the hearing, stating:

“The hearing was relatively brief. The defendant [Chilton] appeared indifferent at first, but quickly became impatient as the hearing continued. He became quite agitated at the slightest negative testimony, interrupting several times with outbursts of disagreement with statements offered. Finally, in a bizarre incident, he waved a white handkerchief as though in surrender, during the prosecutor’s closing. The court is satisfied that the clearly expressed reservation of Dr. Heyrend and the implied reservation of Dr . Estess are well founded. The defendant demonstrated no appreciation for the necessity of his treatment, the existence of his medical condition, nor a willingness to abide by any terms of a conditional release. It appears to the court that the defendant might view a relaxation of the conditions of his commitment as a license to abandon further treatment, including the necessary medication. Since, without medication, it has been demonstrated that the defendant’s mental disease quickly reverts to a psychotic condition, and since in that condition the defendant poses a significant danger to himself and others, the court is not satisfied that the defendant is eligible for conditional release at this time.” (Emphasis added).

The trial court concluded that Chilton had failed to meet his burden of proof of showing he could be released without danger to himself or others, the standard required by I.C. § 18-214 (repealed), and had also failed to show he was no longer mentally ill nor likely to injure himself or others, the standard required by I.C. § 66-337, and therefore should not be conditionally released. Chilton was involuntarily committed pursuant to I.C. § 18-214 (repealed), which in addition to providing for the commitment of criminal defendants acquitted on the ground of mental illness also specified hearing procedures for the conditional release of those so committed.

“18-214. Commitment of acquitted defendant-conditional release — revocation of release within five years.—

(1) When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, the court shall order him to be committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Health and Welfare to be placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment.

(3) If the court is satisfied by the report filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of this section and such testimony of the reporting psychiatrist as the court deems necessary that the committed person may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or others, the court shall order his discharge or his release on such conditions as the court determines to be necessary. If the court is not so satisfied, it shall promptly order a hearing to determine whether such person may safely be discharged or released. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding and the burden shall be upon the committed person to prove that he may safely be discharged or released. ...” (Emphasis added) (repealed).

By contrast, I.C. § 66-337, although it expressly pertains to patients admitted under § 18-214 (as well as other involuntary patients) does not specify on whom the burden of proof of showing fitness to release lies. The trial court’s apparent confusion as to which code section to apply, and its resultant application of both legal standards for release found in the sections stems, no doubt, from the paucity of instruction regarding conditional release hearings found in I.C. § 66-337.

Chilton raises several contentions on appeal. First, that the trial court incorrectly relied on the report of Dr. Heyrend since it had not been formally admitted into evidence, thereby precluding Chilton's right to cross-examine. Second, that the trial court incorrectly placed on Chilton the burden of proving both that he could be released without danger to himself and to others, and that he was no longer mentally ill nor likely to injure himself or others. We address each issue in turn.

THE HEYREND REPORT

The reports of Dr. Lamarr Heyrend and Dr. Michael Estess were ordered pursuant to I.C. § 66-337(c) which provides in relevant part:

“[Ujpon motion of an interested party or the court on its own motion, the court shall determine whether the conditions justifying such release exist. In making such determination, the court may order an independent examination of the patient____”

At the onset, it is simply inconsistent for Chilton to urge that it was improper for the trial court to consider the Heyrend report while at the same time moving this Court to consider the Estess report, which also was not formally introduced into evidence during the open hearing. Regardless, we hold that I.C. § 66-337 contemplates just such use of independent examination reports by the court as was done in this instance.

Neither report was formally admitted into evidence at the conditional release hearing. Chilton did not object before the trial court to the use of the reports, but now contends that the trial court’s utilization of the Heyrend report violates his right to cross-examine Dr. Heyrend as guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST. 6th Amend.) and the Idaho Constitution (ID. CONST, art. 1, §§ 1, 13, 18). While ordinarily Chilton’s position would be well taken, conditional release hearings pursuant to I.C. § 66-337 are unique. As mentioned, that statute specifically provides that the court may order an independent examination of the patient. The statute, therefore, clearly contemplates the judicial utilization of reports received as a result of such “independent examination.”

Chilton also alleges that he was never aware that the trial court would consider the Heyrend report until after the hearing concluded. However, I.C. § 66-337(c) specifically allows that the court may release a patient, without a hearing, on the basis of such reports.

66-337. Review, termination of commitment and discharge of patients.—

(c) Upon notification of intention to release from an inpatient facility either a patient admitted under section 18-214, Idaho Code, acquitted of criminal charges filed prior to July 1, 1982, on grounds of mental disease or defect, or committed pursuant to sections 18-212(3) and 66-329, Idaho Code, as unfit to proceed, and upon motion of an interested party or the court on its own motion, the court shall determine whether the conditions justifying such release exist. In making such determination, the court may order an independent examination of the patient. The cost of such independent examination must be borne by the party making the motion or, if indigent, the county having jurisdiction of the case. If no motion is made, the patient may be released according to the notice. (Emphasis added).

Given this clear legislative intent allowing the trial court to make full use of reports in releasing a patient without hearing, we cannot hold that the trial court is precluded from even considering such reports as a supplement to a formal hearing. The legislative intent seems to be to provide the trial court with meaningful, expert guidance — with or without the hearing process. We hold the trial judge is entitled to use reports ordered pursuant to I.C. § 66-337, regardless of whether the reports have been formally admitted into evidence; however, such entitlement is subject to the right of the committed to subpoena the doctors providing reports for cross-examination, should the committed acquittee so move.

Therefore, Chilton’s argument that the trial court incorrectly relied on Dr. Hey-rend’s report in denying Chilton’s conditional release fails.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CONDITIONAL RELEASE HEARINGS FOR INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED PATIENTS

As we have already mentioned, the enactment of I.C. § 66-337 at the time of the repeal of I.C. § 18-214 has left numerous questions regarding the current status of hearing procedures applicable in conditional release hearings for involuntarily committed patients. I.C. § 66-337 simply does not provide the guidance § 18-214 did. Specifically, it articulates no standards as to burden of proof. Accordingly, the state urges that I.C. § 18-214, despite its repeal, continues to provide the burden of proof, it being upon the committed person. However, the plain meaning derived from a reading of the current statutes pertaining to both involuntary civil and criminal commitment indicate a legislative intent to treat both such patients (i.e. those civilly and criminally involuntarily committed) alike. I.C. § 66-317(c) provides in relevant part:

66-317. Definitions.

(c) “Involuntary patient” shall mean an individual committed pursuant to sections 18-212, 18-214, 66-329 or 66-1201, Idaho Code, or committed pursuant to section 16-1610 or 16-1814, Idaho Code, and admitted to a facility for the treatment of minors.

It is noteworthy that that section treats those committed under I.C. § 18-214 and I.C. § 66-329 (the section pertaining to the involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill persons) identically. I.C. § 66-329 provides that the involuntary civil commitment of mental patients occurs by way of civil proceeding and requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others, or is gravely disabled due to mental illness. As already noted, I.C. § 66-337 specifies no burden of proof, nor does it state whether civil or criminal procedures are to be followed during the hearing process. (As noted, I.C. § 18-214 did specify that the committed patient carry the burden of proving that he may safely be discharged or released pursuant to a civil hearing procedure). The state argues that this lapse of statutory instruction mandates the continued application of I.C. § 18-214 to those admitted pursuant to it. However, such argument ignores the legislature’s express mention of those committed pursuant to I.C. § 18-214 in the text of I.C. § 66-337. That section provides in pertinent part:

66-337. Review, termination of commitment and discharge of patients.

(b) The commitment of an involuntary patient shall be terminated if the patient is no longer mentally ill or is no longer likely to injure himself or others or is no longer gravely disabled; provided, that patients admitted under section 18-214, Idaho Code, acquitted of criminal charges filed prior to July 1, 1982, on grounds of mental disease or defect, or committed pursuant to sections 18-212(3) and 66-329, Idaho Code, as unfit to proceed, may not be released from an in-patient facility unless thirty (30) days before such release, the department director or his designee shall notify the committing court and prosecuting attorney of the contemplated release.

(c) Upon notification of intention to release from an in-patient facility either a patient admitted under section 18-214, Idaho Code, acquitted of criminal charges filed prior to July 1, 1982, on grounds of mental disease or defect, or committed pursuant to sections 18-212(3) and 66-329, Idaho Code, as unfit to proceed, and upon motion of an interested party or the court on its own motion, the court shall determine whether the conditions justifying such release exist. In making such determination, the court may order an independent examination of the patient. The cost of such independent examination must be borne by the party making the motion or, if indigent, the county having jurisdiction of the case. If no motion is made, the patient may be released according to the notice.

In short, the plain language of I.C. § 66-337 bonds those committed under § 18-214 and § 66-329, and fails to distinguish altogether a separate procedure or burden of proof as between those involuntarily committed by a process civilly and those automatically committed as a result of criminal acquittal. It is important to note that confinement to a mental institution against one’s will is a deprivation of liberty. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); Application of True, 103 Idaho 151, 154, 645 P.2d 891, 894 (1982). Such liberty interest is entitled to due process of law. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Application of True, 103 Idaho at 154, 645 P.2d 891.

An involuntary commitment cannot constitutionally continue after the basis for it no longer exists. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2493, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975). In analyzing both the individual’s and the state’s interests during a release hearing, it is important to note that the confinement of an individual to a psychiatric hospital is a uniquely strong deprivation of liberty. (See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1971). The import of this liberty interest cannot be underemphasized. Dissenting in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), Justice Brennan referred to “the massive intrusion on individual liberty that involuntary psychiatric hospitalization entails.” Jones, 363 U.S. at 372, 103 S.Ct. at 3053-54.

The enormity of the liberty interest involved, coupled with the fact that this state’s legislature has revealed that it has little or no interest in delineating upon whom the initial burden of proof lies during a conditional release hearing for those involuntarily committed under I.C. § 18-214 and has, in essence, abdicated its authority in this regard, makes us reluctant to read into the statutory scheme a further deprivation of a patient’s liberty interest when we are not required to do so. Simply put, restrictions of liberty interests should intrude on such interest to the least extent necessary for the purposes of the restriction. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). In this instance, the plain language of the statutes involved do not compel a further deprivation of Chilton’s liberty interest by way of requiring that he bear the initial burden of proof at his conditional release hearing. In reaching this holding, we note that Application of Downing, 103 Idaho 689, 652 P.2d 193 (1982), is inapplicable to the situation before us. In Downing, we upheld as constitutionally permissible distinctions in the rights to hearing and judicial determination on the question of fitness for release for those committed pursuant to I.C. § 18-214 as opposed to I.C. § 66-329. We held that “once it has ... been established that the acquittee was dangerously mentally ill, a presumption arises that the defendant continues to suffer from that condition until he is able to prove otherwise.” [Citations omitted]. Downing, 103 Idaho at 696, 652 P.2d 193.

However, Downing was decided at a time when I.C. § 18-214 provided expressly that the burden of proof be upon the committed acquittee and specifically addressed the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-214:

We ... hold that an accused who asserts the defense of mental disease or defect, and is acquitted on that basis, may be automatically committed to a mental institution without further hearing; that such automatic commitment does not violate the acquittee’s rights to due process or equal protection because his dangerous mental condition has been established by his own admission; and that the committed acquittee thereafter bears the burden of establishing his right to release by showing, pursuant to authorized procedures, that he is no longer dangerously insane. (Emphasis added) (Downing, 103 Idaho at 697).

I.C. § 18-214 is no longer effective. If it were, Downing would be the controlling case law. As it is, we do not have to address the constitutionality of any particular statute. Rather, we have only to recognize that we should not impinge on a committed acquittee’s liberty interest when the state’s sound interests (as exemplified by statute) do not require any impingement. Shelton, supra.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in stating that “the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that society will not be jeopardized by his release____” However, while the trial court applied what we now hold to be an incorrect burden of proof, we do not, on that basis, reverse its finding. The record is replete with evidence justifying the trial court’s conclusion that “the defendant poses a significant danger to himself and others” if he goes without medication. The record further indicates that the defendant “demonstrated no appreciation for the necessity of his treatment ... nor willingness to abide by any terms of the conditional release.” As the evidence relied upon by the trial court was competent and sufficiently weighty to sustain the state’s initial burden of proof in any event, we hold that the trial court’s failure to apply the proper burden of proof was harmless error. I.R.C.P. 61. Affirmed.

DONALDSON, C.J., concurs. BAKES, J., concurs in the result.