OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Steve C. Cabagbag, Jr. (Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari (Application) on October 11, 2011 in this court, seeking review of the July 13, 2011 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), filed pursuant to its June 27, 2011 Summary Disposition Order,1 State v. Cabagbag, No. 30682, 2011 WL 2547987 (App. June 27, 2011) (SDO), affirming the Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence filed by the circuit court of the first circuit (the court).2
PART I: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIREMENT
(By: ACOBA, J., with whom all justices concur)
It is concluded unanimously that (1) in criminal cases, the circuit courts must give the jury a specific eyewitness identification instruction whenever identification evidence is a central issue in the case, and it is requested by the defendant,3 (2) a circuit court may, in the exercise of its discretion, give the instruction if it believes the instruction is otherwise warranted in a particular case; and (3) the instruction set forth in this opinion is adopted as a model charge.
A.
Petitioner allegedly stole a truck from a storage facility on February 3, 2010, as well as several tools from a construction site on February 18, 2010. On February 22, 2010, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaii (Respondent) charged Petitioner by felony information with two counts: (1) Unauthorized Control of a Propelled Vehicle, HRS § 708-836 (Supp.2010)4; and (2) Theft in the Second Degree, HRS § 708-831 (Supp. 2010)5. The court held a two-day jury trial that began on May 18, 2010.
1.
In its opening statement, Respondent stated, in relevant part, that the evidence would [305]*305show that Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Eutiquito Tomimbang (Officer Tomimbang) identified Petitioner as the man he saw driving a stolen truck that was discovered with stolen tools. The defense maintained that Officer Tomimbang’s identification was unreliable, and claimed that Officer Tomimbang would only testify that “he s[aw] a male in there, a local male, short dark hair. That’s the description. That’s what he sees. It’s dark, clearly at 1:07 in the morning.”
2.
During trial, the jury heard the pertinent evidence that follows. Leak Master Roofing and Waterproofing (“Leak Master”) owned a white Ford truck with the license plate number 221-TRD. Around 3:30 p.m. on January 29, 2010, Matthew Kotar (Kotar), Leak Master’s general manager, parked the truck for the weekend in the company’s storage “cave” at Waikele Self-Storage (“Waikele”) in Honolulu.6 Kotar and his foreman were the only persons who had access to the truck’s keys, and only Kotar was authorized to drive the vehicle.
On February 3, 2010, Kotar received a phone call from Waikele. Kotar was told that the truck ran through the front entrance of the facility. Normally, Waikele requires all persons driving vehicles out of the facility to stop and provide identification. When Waikele’s security guards asked the person driving Leak Master’s truck to stop, the driver sped off.
After receiving the phone call, Kotar went to Waikele to verify that his truck was no longer in its “cave.” Kotar determined that the truck was missing. After contacting all of Leak Master’s employees to ensure that none had taken the truck without his knowledge, Kotar filed a police report stating that the truck had been stolen. Kotar heard nothing from the police regarding the truck until February 18, 2010.
Around 1:00 a.m. on February 18, 2010, Officer Tomimbang was on patrol in the Pearl City Highlands area. At 1:12 a.m. he learned that a caller had reported that the “cattle gate” (gate) at Newtown Recreation Center (recreation center), which is usually kept closed, was open. Another officer, Officer Enrico Domingo (Officer Domingo), was the first to arrive at the scene. Officer Tom-imbang arrived shortly after. He noticed that the gate was completely open and that there was only one lock on the padlock even though the gate is usually secured with two locks.
Having verified that the recreation center, which is located approximately 50 yards from the gate, was secured, Officer Tomimbang and Officer Domingo proceeded to the construction area, approximately 20 yards from the gate. At the time, the construction area was occupied by the Frank Coluccio Construction Company (Frank Coluccio Construction). Officer Tomimbang noticed that two of the containers used to store equipment in the construction area were open. Officer Tomimbang asked dispatch to contact a representative from the company to let them know that there was a possible break-in.
Around 1:40 a.m., Officer Tomimbang was standing near the office trailer at the construction site when he heard the sound of a large truck coming up Ka'ahele Street, which is adjacent to the gate. Officer Tomimbang assumed the truck had been sent by Frank Coluccio Construction, so he walked toward the fence near Ka’ahele Street. From his location near the fence, Officer Tomimbang could observe Ka'ahele Street. A street light lamp was located on the side of the street where Officer Tomimbang was standing. Another street lamp was located on the opposite side of the street.
Officer Tomimbang saw the truck driving slowly up Ka'ahele Street. He testified that, although his flashlight was off, he got a good look at the truck driver’s face because the street was well-lit and the driver stuck his face out the window and looked in the officer’s direction. Officer Tomimbang watched as the truck continued to drive up Ka'ahele Street and turned right on Lulu Street. The [306]*306truck then stopped and parked on Lulu Street, approximately 30 feet from Ka'ahele Street. During trial, Respondent introduced several photographs that purportedly depicted the way Ka'ahele Street would have appeared to Officer Tomimbang on February 18, 2010. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the photos were misleading because they were taken with a camera that had its flash setting “on,” and therefore may have depicted more light than was available to Officer Tomimbang on the night in question. The court admitted the photographs.
When Officer Tomimbang saw the truck continue on to Lulu Street, he walked toward a location behind the fence from which he could get a better view of the truck. Standing just behind the fence, about 60 to 70 yards from where the truck was parked, Officer Tomimbang saw a man exit the truck’s driver’s side door and head toward the construction site. The man approached the gate, closed it, and continued walking toward Officer Tomimbang. Once the man was within 20 feet, Officer Tomimbang shone his flashlight toward the man. According to Officer Tomimbang, the man froze for a few seconds, looked straight at him, and then took off running. Officer Tomimbang testified that although it was dark because there was “no lighting” where he was standing, he saw the man’s face clearly and noticed that it was the same man who had driven by earlier on the truck. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Tomimbang about the lighting conditions in the area. Specifically, defense counsel asked Officer Tomimbang about the sources of lighting, the strength of lighting, and whether the lights were functioning. Officer Tomimbang testified that although he was unsure as to the specific sources of lighting, “the street was pretty bright from the street lighting.” Officer Domingo, who was near Officer Tomim-bang, testified that he did not get a good look at the man.
As soon as the man sped off, Officer Tom-imbang said, “Hey, police. Stop.” Officer Tomimbang jumped over the fence and followed the man down Lulu Street. The man then dove into some hedges that led into a residential neighborhood. Officer Tomim-bang decided not to follow and instead asked several other officers who had since arrived at the scene to form a perimeter to search the neighborhood. Officer Tomimbang believed that the man would not be able to escape because the neighborhood was surrounded by steep embankments. Officer Tomimbang then went over to the truck and asked dispatch to run its license plates. Dispatch indicated that the truck had been stolen.
Several other officers arrived within a few minutes. Approximately eleven officers canvassed the neighborhood. Officer Tomim-bang described the suspect to them as a “local male, dark clothing,” or possibly “local male, maybe short dark hair, dark clothing.”
Sergeant Michael Kahikina was one of the officers who participated in the search. As he was walking along the back of a residence in the neighborhood, he flashed his light on a drainage ditch and observed that a man was lying sideways on the ditch. Sergeant Ka-hikina said, “Hey, police. Let me see your hands. Don’t move.”
There was conflicting testimony during trial regarding exactly what happened next. Sergeant Kahikina first testified that the man in the ditch tried to run and had to be tackled. According to Sergeant Kahikina, the man then stated, “I never do nothin’,” and became compliant. On cross-examination, however, Sergeant Kahikina acknowledged that the man had not attempted to run but rather had tried to get up. Sergeant Kahikina put his hand on the suspect and held him down. Sergeant Kahikina then began calling out that he had apprehended a suspect. The suspect was wearing a brown shirt, dark blue jeans, and “possibly a hood.”
Officer Tomimbang identified the suspect as the man whom he had seen driving the truck earlier and who had walked toward the construction area at the recreation center. In court, Officer Tomimbang identified the man as Petitioner. During cross-examination, Officer Tomimbang testified that his initial identification of the man in the ditch had taken place approximately thirteen minutes from the time he saw the man walking toward the construction area. Sergeant Ka-[307]*307hikina also identified Petitioner in court as the man who was lying on the ditch.
After the suspect was arrested, the officers investigated the scene further. Officer Tom-imbang dusted the lids of the open containers at the construction site, but found no fingerprints. Officers Tomimbang and Domingo also examined the white truck. The truck’s license plate number was 221-TRD, the same as the truck reported stolen from Waikele by Kotar on February 3, 2010. No fingerprints were found on the truck.
In the truck, the police found a duffel bag containing a combination lock that had been cut and some bolt-cutters. Richard Shiroma, an employee of the recreation center, identified the lock as the combination lock that was used to secure the gate. The police also found a number of construction tools that were later identified by Grant Kaulbaek, an employee of Frank Coluccio Construction, as belonging either to himself or to Frank Co-luccio Construction. Respondent introduced evidence that the value of the items, together, exceeded $300.00.
The police, having determined that the truck matched the description of the truck reported stolen by Kotar, called Kotar and asked him to identify the vehicle. Kotar identified the truck as belonging to Leak Master. Kotar testified at trial that the truck was “pretty beat up,” but was still operable.
3.
After Respondent presented its evidence, Petitioner asked the court to enter a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the request. The court then instructed the jury. Relevant here, the court discussed the prosecution’s burden of proof, explaining that the jury had to presume that Petitioner was innocent “unless and until the prosecution proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court also instructed the jury as follows:
It is your exclusive right to determine whether and to what extent a witness should be believed and to give weight to his or her testimony accordingly. In evaluating the weight and credibility of a witness’s testimony, you may consider the witness’s appearance and demeanor; the witness’s manner of testifying; the witness’s intelligence; the witness’s candor or frankness or lack thereof; the witness’s interest, if any, in the result of this case; the witness’s relation, if any, to a party; the witness’s temper, feeling, or bias if any has been shown; the witness’s means and opportunity of acquiring information; the probability or improbability of the witness’s testimony; the extent to which the witness is supported or contradicted by other evidence; the extent to which the witness has made contradictory statements whether in trial or at other times; and all other circumstances surrounding the witness and bearing upon his or her credibility. Now inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness or between the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause you to discredit such testimony. In weighing the effect of inconsistencies or discrepancies, whether they occur within one witness’s testimony or as between different witnesses, consider whether they concern matters of importance or only matters of unimportant detail and whether they result from innocent error or deliberate falsehood. If you find that a witness has deliberately testified falsely to any important fact or deliberately exaggerated or suppressed any important fact, then you may reject the testimony of that witness except for those parts which you nevertheless believe to be true. You are not bound to decide a fact one way or another just because more witnesses testify on one side than the other. It is testimony that has a convincing force upon you that counts, and the testimony of even a single witness, if believed, can be sufficient to prove a fact.
Subsequently, the parties delivered their closing arguments. During its closing argument, Respondent stressed that “Officer Tomimbang saw [Petitioner] with his own eyes as he was driving the vehicle,” and that Officer Tomimbang “observed [Petitioner] walk up to him after [Petitioner] ... walked towards the Newtown area which is where Officer Tomimbang flashed his flashlight to his face seeing it’s the same person.” Re[308]*308spondent also stated that each “witness testified credibly to what he saw on the date of the incident.”
During its closing argument, the defense challenged Officer Tomimbang’s eyewitness identification testimony as follows:
[Officer Tomimbang’s] observation was actually not very good. Let’s look at the lighting here. The testimony is that there’s a light. And there’s pictures where you can see this light post on the street. The testimony is also that his vantage point was behind this post in a very dark courtyard—uh, construction yard-No matter all the testimony about where the light was, it’s clear throughout his testimony in the courtyard behind this light he indicated several times that it was really dark.
And let’s look at the time he had to observe what he observed. He was up on this courtyard on a hill investigating.... [A]nd they hear a truck coming up. When the truck comes up, both Officers Tomim-bang and Domingo indicated there was nothing really unusual. Officer Tomim-bang said, well, I thought it was maybe one of the trucks with the employees coming. So them focus was not on this truck.
Did Officer Tomimbang see this truck and perhaps sees this driver? I think he did.... Did he get a good look? No. Look at the distance. Officer Tomimbang laid out the scene for you. Two lanes, median lane, turning lane, and two more lanes, sidewalk, hill, fence, grass area. This is all distance. This is at night. This is one, two o’clock in the morning....
Now from an angle [Officer Tomimbang] says he saw the person coming out [of the truck]. I don’t think so. There’s hedges in that corner, and the hill. That Lulu Street, it goes down. And he—this truck was parked 30 feet into the street. Any other lighting? Not in the area....
Now you got some pictures ... it looks pretty lit. But it’s not lit. That’s not how it looked like that night. It looked like that because they’re using flash on the camera. That is not how it looked when the officers were there investigating....
Other reasons to question the clarity of Officer Tomimbang. When he says he observed this male walk towards him and he put his flashlight to this person and he said he got a good look, no, he didn’t. He got a look but not a good look. His description, what he gave to dispatch.... He got a local male, dark hair, short hair. That’s it.
This is an officer with a lot of training.... They know what to put in there.... They know to put as much detail as they can. And not even to dispatch. Somewhere in their report. And it was not there because there’s nothing to add. They didn’t get a good look.
Officer Domingo added maybe about 5'8. But he says he didn’t get a good look either. He didn’t get to see the face. There’s testimony that says that Officer Domingo recovered a hat. Sergeant Ka-hikina said this guy was wearing a jacket. There’s a lot more stuff that could have been mentioned if they saw it.
If this Officer Tomimbang saw this guy and he was that close, he would have had that information. He didn’t because he didn’t get a good look. I call it the “Aha factor.” You got this very broad description that fits. You’re in Hawai‘% in Aiea, this area. It fits a lot of people.
(Emphases added.) Neither the court’s oral instructions nor its written instructions included a specific instruction concerning eyewitness identification, and neither party requested one.
On May 19, 2010, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the two charged offenses. On July 19, 2010, the court sentenced Petitioner to two concurrent five-year terms of probation.
B.
Before the ICA, Petitioner argued that the court committed plain error by failing to provide a cautionary instruction stating the factors to be considered by the jury in assessing eyewitness identification evidence. In a summary disposition order, the ICA held that whether to give a cautionary instruction was within the court’s discretion and that, in this case, defense counsel’s opening and closing statements, her cross-examination of Officer Tomimbang, and the court’s [309]*309general instructions adequately directed the attention of the jury to the identification evidence. The ICA therefore affirmed Petitioner’s conviction.
C.
Petitioner presents the following question in his Application to this court:
Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the circuit court did not commit plain error by failing to provide a jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification because the opening statement by defense counsel, the cross-examination of Officer Eutiquito Tomimbang Jr. of the Honolulu Police Department (“HPD”), defense counsel’s closing argument, and the general jury instructions adequately directed the attention of the jury to the identification evidence.
Respondent did not file a Response to the Application.
D.
Petitioner argues that a cautionary jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification should be required in any ease in which eyewitness identification is a “critical” or “central” issue.7 Petitioner recognizes that this court has repeatedly held that the giving of special instructions regarding eyewitness identification is within the discretion of the trial court. (Citing State v. Padilla, 57 Haw. 150, 162, 552 P.2d 357, 365 (1976); State v. Pahio, 58 Haw. 323, 331-32, 568 P.2d 1200, 1206 (1977); State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 383, 404-05, 894 P.2d 80, 101-02 (1995); State v. Vinge, 81 Hawai'i 309, 316-17, 916 P.2d 1210, 1217-18 (1996)). However, Petitioner urges this court to reconsider those decisions in light of the widely-recognized perils of eyewitness identification testimony. Petitioner cites to several other states that have abandoned the discretionary approach and adopted the position that a cautionary instruction must be given whenever an eyewitness’s identification is the central issue in the case. (Citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979)).
In the alternative, Petitioner argues that if this court does not adopt a rule requiring circuit courts to give a specific instruction whenever eyewitness identification is the central issue in the case, we should hold that the ICA nevertheless gravely erred in concluding that the court had not committed plain error in not exercising its discretion to provide such an instruction.
E.
In 1976, this court for the first time considered a due process challenge to eyewitness identification testimony in Padilla, 57 Haw. at 153-55, 552 P.2d at 360-61. Following the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), Padilla held that the use of unreliable eyewitness identification testimony could violate a defendant’s due process rights, but that whether constitutional rights were affected depended on the “totality of the circumstances.” Padilla, 57 Haw. at 153-55, 552 P.2d at 360-61. The reliability of eyewitness testimony was said to depend upon:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness during the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the eonfrontation[.]
See id. (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375).
Simmons and Biggers, on which Padilla relied, were the Supreme Court’s responses to the risk that unreliable eyewitness testimony might result in misidentifieation, undermining the fairness of trial. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113, 97 S.Ct. [310]*3102243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). The Court was unwilling, however, to go so far as to adopt a blanket rule barring eyewitness testimony, even in cases where the police employed unduly suggestive identification procedures. Id. at 112, 97 S.Ct. 2243. The Court expressed concern that the exclusion of “reliable” eyewitness testimony might result in the “guilty going free.” Id. Padilla, following the Court’s lead, also left to the circuit court’s discretion the decision of whether to give a specific jury instruction in eases where eyewitness testimony is “a key issue” in the case. Id. at 161-62, 552 P.2d at 364-65. In exercising that discretion, Padilla stated that circuit courts had to consider whether cross-examination, the arguments made to the jury, and the rest of the jury instructions adequately directed the jury’s attention to the identification testimony, rendering the more specific instruction unnecessary. Id.
More recently, in Perry v. New Hampshire, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 716, 720-21, 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012), the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification that was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement. Justice Sotomayor dissented and would have held that it is not necessary for law enforcement to create the suggestive circumstances in order for a preliminary judicial inquiry to be warranted. Id. at 733-34, 132 S.Ct. 716 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Since the first eases addressing the reliability of eyewitness testimony were decided in the 1970s, a robust body of research in the area of eyewitness identification has emerged. Many studies now confirm that false identifications are more common than was previously believed. For example, Professor Brandon L. Garrett concluded in a study involving 250 exonerated defendants that “[ejyewitnesses misidentified 76% of the exonerees (190 of 250 cases).” Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, 48 (2011). Professor Garrett’s original study of 200 such cases in 2008 concluded that eyewitness identification testimony was the leading contributing factor to wrongful convictions and was four times more likely to contribute to a wrongful conviction than a false confession. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 76 (2008). Other studies have reached similar results. See, e.g., Edward Connors, et. al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence after Trial, 15, 96 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf (reviewing 28 sexual assault cases in which defendants were later exonerated and concluding that all eases, except those involving homicide, “involved victim eyewitness identification both prior to and at trial,” and that in those eases “eyewitness testimony was the most compelling evidence”); Gary L. Wells, et. al, Recommendations for Properly Conducted Lineup Identification Tasks, in Adult Eyewitness Testimony: current Trends and Developments 223-24 (1994) (studying over I,000 wrongful convictions and concluding that recall errors by witnesses were the leading cause of such convictions).
Researchers have found that several variables tend to affect the reliability of an eyewitness’s identification. These include the passage of time,8 witness stress,9 duration of exposure,10 distance,11 “weapon focus”12 (vi[311]*311sual attention eyewitnesses give to a perpetrator’s weapon during crime), and cross-race bias13 (eyewitnesses are more accurate at identifying persons of their own race). Juries, however, may not be aware of the extent to which these factors affect an individual’s ability to make an accurate identification, and thus tend to “over believe” witness identification testimony. In a 1983 study, for example, researchers presented individuals with crime scenarios derived from previous empirical studies. See Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 19, 22-24 (1983). Researchers found that the study’s respondents estimated an average accuracy rate of 71 percent for a highly unreliable scenario in which only 12.5 percent of eyewitnesses had in fact made a correct identification. See id.
Empirical research has also undermined the common sense notion that the confidence of the witness is a valid indicator of the accuracy of the identification. See Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (explaining that the accuracy of an identification is only poorly associated with witness confidence and is sometimes inversely associated with witness confidence) (citing K. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 Law & Hum. Behav. 243 (1980); Lindsay, et. al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 J. Applied Psych. 79, 80-82 (1981)). However, courts and juries continue to place great weight on the confidence expressed by the witness in assessing reliability. See Cutler & Penrod, Jury Sensitivity to Witness Identification Testimony, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 185, 185 (1990) (finding that what most affects jurors’ assessment of witness identificátion testimony is the confidence expressed by the witness).
One of the justifications often advanced for the continued use of eyewitness testimony despite its well-documented weaknesses is the proposition that any danger that a jury might give undue weight to an unreliable identification can be mitigated by the use of “appropriate jury instructions,” along with the “strong presumption” that juries will follow such instructions.14 See, e.g., United States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1972); see also State v. Klinge, 92 Hawai'i 577, 592, 994 P.2d 509, 524 (2000) (“[JJuries are presumed to follow all of the trial court’s instructions.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In Perry, the Court grounded its holding that due process does not require a preliminary inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification not arranged by law enforcement, in part, on the fact that there are “safeguards built into [the] adversary system that caution juries against placing undue weight on eyewitness testimony of questionable reliability.” Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 728. According to the Court, one of these safeguards is the use of “[e]yewitness-specifie jury instructions, which many federal and state courts have adopted, [which] likewise warn the jury to take care in appraising identification evidence.” Id. at 728-89.
In this regard, several other jurisdictions have decided to abandon the discretionary approach to jury instructions and now require trial courts to give a specific instruction whenever eyewitness identification is central to the case and the defendant requests the instruction.15 For example, in Warren, the [312]*312Supreme Court of Kansas held that “in any criminal action in which eyewitness identification testimony is a critical part of the prosecution’s case and there is a serious question about the reliability of the identification, a cautionary instruction should be given[.]”16 635 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added). That court emphasized the need to recognize the “serious nature” of the “problems inherent” in eyewitness identification testimony, noting the “great volumes of articles on the subjeet[,]” and the “potential for injustice.” Id. at 1239-42.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Utah, concluding that there is “no significant division of opinion on the issue” and that “[t]he studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion that human perception is inexaet[,]” decided to adopt “a more rigorous approach to cautionary instructions[.]”17 See Long, 721 P.2d at 488. That court explained that although research has convincingly demonstrated the dangers of eyewitness identification testimony, “[pjeople simply do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness.” Id. at 490. The Utah court therefore held that a cautionary jury instruction was required whenever eyewitness identification testimony is a central issue in the ease and the defendant requests the instruction. Id. at 492.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also held that “[wjhen identification is a ‘key issue,’ the trial court must instruct the jury on identification, even if a defendant does not make that request.” State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 865 A.2d 660, 665 (2005). In State v. Cromedy, that court more specifically held that when cross-racial identification testimony is critical to the case and the identification is not corroborated, trial courts must give a cautionary instruction. See 158 N.J. 112, 727 A.2d 457, 467-68 (1999). More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court reconsidered its position in light of additional research on cross-race bias and decided to impose a more stringent standard.18 State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d 872, 926 (2011).
New Jersey trial courts are now required to give a cautionary instruction “whenever cross-racial identification is in issue at trialt,]” regardless of whether it is a “critical” issue. Id. In fact, Henderson more broadly held that “enhanced instructions [must] be given to guide juries about the various factors that may affect the reliability of an identification in a particular ease.” Id. at 924. The instructions “are to be included in the court’s comprehensive jury charge at the close of evidence”—regardless of whether the defendant requests them. See id. Accord Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 457 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (1983) (when the facts permit it and the defendant requests it, “[f]airness to a defendant compels the trial judge to give an instruction on the possibility of an honest but mistaken identification”).
F.
This court has repeatedly reaffirmed Padilla’s holding that the decision to give a [313]*313cautionary instruction is for the trial court to make in the exercise of its discretion. See Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206; Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 404-05, 894 P.2d at 101-02; Vinge, 81 Hawai'i at 316-17, 916 P.2d at 1217-18. But none of those cases have considered whether Padilla’s holding should be re-examined in light of what is now known about the weaknesses of eyewitness identification testimony.
The reason stated in our ease law in support of the existing rule is, in essence, that a specific eyewitness identification instruction would be superfluous in light of the defendant’s opening statement, cross-examination of the witness, and closing argument. See Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 80. But if the instruction is merely superfluous, then there is no harm in giving the instruction when identification is a critical issue. At most, giving the instruction would take a few minutes of the court’s time. Warren, 635 P.2d at 1244.
Moreover, requiring trial courts to give cautionary instructions rather than relying on defense counsel to point out flaws in the witness’s testimony during opening statements, cross-examination, or closing arguments has merit. Cross-examination may not adequately apprise the jury of the factors it should consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony or of the deficiencies of eyewitness identification testimony. Additionally, court instructions are more authoritative than lawyers’ opening statements and closing arguments. Jurors may very well ignore counsel’s admonitions about the factors that affect reliability, but the law generally presumes that juries follow court instructions. See Klinge, 92 Hawai'i at 592, 994 P.2d at 524.
Without appropriate instructions from the court, the jury may be left without sufficient guidance on how to assess critical testimony, sometimes the only testimony, that ties a defendant to an offense. Although a jury may intuit some of the factors that affect the reliability of such testimony, this court does not “rely on jurors to divine rules themselves from cross-examination or summation.” Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896. “Even with matters that may be considered intuitive [such as the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony], courts [should] provide focused jury instructions.” Id.
Most significantly, the impetus for a change in our approach lies in the empirical research that reveals that people generally do not understand all of the factors that affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification. In her dissent in Perry, Justice Soto-mayor cited a great deal of the empirical evidence that has called into question the reliability of eyewitness identifications. 132 S.Ct. at 731-40. Justice Sotomayor recounted how the Court’s precedents had “pointed to the ‘formidable’ number of ‘miscarriage[s] of justice from mistaken identification’ in the annals of criminal law.” Id. at 731 (brackets in original) (citation omitted). Justice Soto-mayor then reasoned:
The empirical evidence demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is “ ‘the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.’” Researchers have found that a staggering 76% of the first 250 convictions overturned due to DNA evidence since 1989 involved eyewitness mis-identifieation. Study after study demonstrates that eyewitness recollections are highly susceptible to distortion by poste-vent information or social cues; that jurors routinely overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications; that jurors place the greatest weight on eyewitness confidence in assessing' identifications even though confidence is a poor gauge of accuracy; and that suggestiveness can stem from sources beyond police-orchestrated procedures.
Id. at 738-39 (footnotes omitted).
It is apparent from both the majority’s opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Perry that, based on the empirical studies, it cannot be assumed that juries will necessarily know how to assess the trustworthiness of eyewitness identification evidence. See id. Under these circumstances, we hold that when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury’s attention on the [314]*314trustworthiness of the identification.19 A circuit court may also give a specific eyewitness instruction, in the exercise of its discretion, if it believes the instruction is otherwise warranted in a particular case.
G.
The following instruction, the earlier requested version of which was cited in State v. Vinge, 81 Hawai'i 309, 314, 916 P.2d 1210, 1215 (1996), would appropriately address the general concerns described above. The instruction cited in Vinge is an older California model instruction, California Jury Instructions Criminal (CALJIC) 2.29 (1988).20 Vinge does not contain the entire instruction, but quotes only the factors the jury should consider. See Vinge, 81 Hawai'i at 314-15, 916 P.2d at 1215-16. The first paragraph of the instruction reproduced below is part of an additional instruction given in Vinge, which is necessary to alert the jury that the prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant’s identity beyond a reasonable doubt. The next two paragraphs, adopted with slight modifications from the current California model instruction, are quoted for the sake of completeness, and are followed by the factors mentioned in Vinge.
[T]he burden of proof is on the prosecution with reference to every element of a crime charged, and this burden includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the person responsible for the crime charged.
You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. As with any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave accurate testimony.
In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following factors:
The opportunity of the witness to observe the alleged criminal act and the perpetrator of the act;
The stress, if any, to which the witness was subject at the time of the observation;
The witness’ ability, following the observation, to provide a description of the perpetrator of the act;
The extent to which the defendant fits or does not fit the description of the perpetrator previously given by the witness;
The cross-racial or ethnic nature of the identification;
The witness’ capacity to make an identification;
[Evidence relating to the witness’ ability to identify other alleged perpetrators of the criminal act;]21
[Whether the witness was able to identify the alleged perpetrator in a photographic or physical lineup;]
The period of time between the alleged criminal act and the witness’ identification; Whether the witness had prior contacts with the alleged perpetrator;
The extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the identification; Whether the witness identification is in fact the product of his own recollection; Any other evidence relating to the witness’ ability to make an identification.
Id.; see also CALCRIM No. 315. By identifying this instruction as sufficient to address the general concerns identified above, we do not intend to preclude modification of this instruction or the development of other related instructions. Accordingly, we refer this instruction to the Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for future comments, suggestions, and any recommended modifications.
/s/ Mark E. Reektenwald
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
/s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr.
/s/ James E. Duffy, Jr.
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
[315]*315
PART II: LIMITATION ON JURY INSTRUCTION RULE AND APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
(By: RECKTENWALD, C.J., with whom NAKAYAMA, DUFFY and McKENNA, JJ., concur)
A. The new rule is applied prospectively and the instruction is given at the request of the defendant
This court’s holding that “in criminal eases, the circuit courts must give the jury a specific eyewitness identification instruction whenever identification evidence is a central issue in the case, and it is requested by the defendant,” marks a departure from the pri- or approach in this jurisdiction.
Previously, the decision to give a special instruction on eyewitness identification rested within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Padilla, 57 Haw. at 162, 552 P.2d at 365; Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206; Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 404-05, 894 P.2d at 101-02; Vinge, 81 Hawai'i at 316, 916 P.2d at 1217. However, as noted in Part I, there is substantial scholarship and empirical research indicating that there are a number of factors that can affect the reliability of eyewitness identification. Moreover, mis-identification is one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions. Accordingly, we are exercising our supervisory powers in order to ensure that, upon request of the defendant when identification is a central issue, the jury will be specifically instructed as to the potential factors which can affect the reliability of eyewitness testimony. See HRS § 602-4.22 This court has previously invoked its supervisory powers to adopt new procedural requirements to prevent error in the trial courts, see, e.g., Shak v. Doi, 49 Haw. 404, 406-07, 420 P.2d 100, 102 (1966) (“[T]he court, in the exercise of its supervisory power, here states that if a defendant requests a copy of the charge he should be furnished it, whether the charge be in the form of a written complaint or an oral charge. This will better assure fulfillment of the requirement that the court be satisfied defendant understands the charge against him.”), and we do so here as well.
Our holding does not require a trial court to give the instruction unless the defendant requests it.23 This recognizes that a defendant may legitimately conclude, as a matter of trial strategy, that the instruction is not necessary or appropriate in a given case. The truth-seeking function is furthered by giving the defendant the option of not requesting the instruction, and accordingly we respectfully disagree with the dissent’s position that the instruction must be given whether requested or not.24 See Dissenting [316]*316Opinion at 319-20, 277 P.3d at 1044-45. For example, where the circumstances of the identification lend weight to its reliability, the defendant may wish to focus the jury’s attention on other issues in the ease.25
Other appellate courts have expressly relied on their supervisory powers when departing from a discretionary approach in the giving of a special instruction on eyewitness identification and have prospectively applied the new rule. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 881 A.2d 290, 318 (2005), exercised its supervisory powers to fashion a new jury instruction requirement concerning eyewitness identification. The Connecticut court recognized that it “[had] invoked [its] supervisory authority to provide guidance concerning jury instructions in the past.” Id. The Connecticut court stated, “In light of the importance of eyewitness identification evidence and the conclusions to be drawn from the scientific research discussed [supra ], we conclude that it is appropriate to invoke that authority again to mitigate the potential risk of mistaken identification.” Id. Accordingly, the Connecticut court “direet[ed] the trial courts of [its] state to incorporate an instruction in the charge to the jury” “for use by [its] trial courts in such eases in the future[.]” Id.
The Supreme Court of Utah also exercised its supervisory authority in Long when it abandoned the discretionary approach. 721 P.2d at 492. The Utah court held, “We therefore today abandon our discretionary approach to cautionary jury instructions and direct that in cases tried from this date forward, trial courts shall give such an instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense.” Id. (emphasis added). The Utah court further stated:
Given the great weight jurors are likely to give eyewitness testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived flaws in it, to convict a defendant on such evidence without advising the jury of the factors that should be considered in evaluating it could well deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Id.
In a subsequent case, State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court of Utah clarified that the rule it adopted in Long arose under its supervisory powers rather than federal or state constitutional principles. In Stilling, the defendant argued before the Utah court that it should “retroactively apply” Long’s holding that “cautionary eyewitness identification instructions must be given ‘whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense.’ ” Id. (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 492). The defendant “eite[d] dicta in Long where [the court] wrote that failure to provide eyewitness identification instructions ‘could very well deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.’” Id. The Utah court rejected the defendant’s equal protection and due process arguments by explaining that the court “decided Long on neither federal nor state constitutional principles, but rather as a result of our supervisory capacity over the lower [317]*317courts.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Utah court in Stilling explained that “[s]inee defendant’s case was tried before Long became law, we evaluate defendant’s claim under the pre-Long standard which left the giving of a cautionary instruction to the discretion of the trial judge under the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987)).
Similar to the Utah court, the shift in this jurisdiction’s approach to the giving of a special jury instruction on eyewitness identification is rooted in our supervisory powers. Accordingly, we hold that this rule should be given prospective effect. See id. (clarifying the prospective effect of the rule in Long); see also State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607, 612-13 (Tenn.1995) (holding that the adopted instruction “must be given when identification is a material issue and it is requested by defendant’s eounsel[,]” but noting that “[w]e do not apply this new rule to the case under submission” because “the instruction given at trial was correct under the law then in effect”); Ledbetter, 881 A.2d at 318-19 (stating that the specific jury instruction the court had adopted was “for use by [its] trial courts in such cases in the future” and upholding the conviction in the ease before it despite the absence of such an instruction in the underlying trial). Thus, as to the instant case and other eases that are currently pending on direct appeal, this court will apply the rule then in effect when the cases were tried.26
B. Cabagbag’s conviction is affirmed under the rule then in effect when he was tried
In analyzing Cabagbag’s case, “we must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.” Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102; see also Padilla, 57 Haw. at 161-62, 552 P.2d at 364-65 (stating that the cross-examination, the arguments made to the jury, and the rest of the jury instructions adequately directed the jury’s attention to the identification evidence, rendering a more specific instruction unnecessary).
Cabagbag argues that under this rule, the circuit court “commit[ted] plain error for failing to provide such an instruction because the jury’s attention was not adequately drawn to the identification issue.” The record, however, indicates that the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the eyewitness identification issue at trial by the opening statements and closing arguments of counsel, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, and the general instructions given by the court.27 Identification was a primary issue in the case, and both the DPA and defense counsel focused the jury’s attention on this issue from the start of trial. During [318]*318her opening statement, the DPA noted that after Officer Tomimbang “shines his light in [defendant’s] face” and asks, “ ‘What are you doing here?,’ ” “[t]he defendant freezes for a second then takes off, flees across the street towards the truck where he had parked[.]” Later, defense counsel pointed out during her opening statement, “Now the officer will say that he sees a male in there, a local male, short dark hair. That’s the description. That’s what he sees. It’s dark, clearly at 1:07 in the morning.” Defense counsel concluded her opening statement by saying, “There were no other witnesses other than Officer Tomimbang who saw the truck drive up. The evidence will be simply that.” These statements, among others, alerted the jury that there were potential issues with Officer Tomimbang’s identification of Cabag-bag from the start of trial.
This focus on the identification issue continued throughout the examination of witnesses by both the DPA and defense counsel. During cross-examination of Officer Tomim-bang, defense counsel directed the jury’s attention to the circumstances surrounding the officer’s viewing of the truck driver. Defense counsel asked Officer Tomimbang about, inter alia, the lighting conditions, the angle from which he made his observation, and his degree of attention. In response to these questions, Officer Tomimbang testified about the sources of lighting and the strength of lighting. Officer Tomimbang also testified that it was “probably ten minutes” between the time he saw the driver dive into the hedges until he heard Sergeant Kahikina call out that he had a possible suspect. Sergeant Kahikina, who discovered Cabagbag “lying down in the drainage” after the search commenced, testified that “[a]s soon as Officer Tomimbang came, he identified the person that [Sergeant Kahikina] had detained as the suspect that he was running after.”
During closing arguments, defense counsel again highlighted for the jury the conditions in which Officer Tomimbang made his observations, as well as perceived weaknesses in Officer Tomimbang’s testimony. Defense counsel directed the jury to consider, inter alia, the “lighting” conditions, the amount of “time” Officer Tomimbang spent viewing the driver, and the “distance” between Officer Tomimbang and the driver. Defense counsel specifically asked the jury, “Did he get a good look? No.” Defense counsel then gave other reasons to question Officer Tomim-bang’s identification, including the general description he gave of the driver. Thus, the factors that could have affected the reliability of the identification were pointed out by defense counsel.
Moreover, we are satisfied that in this particular case, the court’s general instructions drew adequate attention to the factors that defense counsel put at issue and Officer Tomimbang testified about. Specifically, the court explained that the jury could consider a number of factors in deciding on the weight and credibility of a witness’s testimony, including the witness’s “means and opportunity of acquiring information” and “the probability or improbability of the witness’s testimony.” These instructions, taken together with the other aspects of the trial discussed supra, sufficiently guided the jury; they apprised the jury that it could consider factors such as lighting, distance, and timing, in assessing the weight and credibility of Officer Tomimbang’s testimony. Accordingly, Ca-bagbag’s argument that the jury’s attention was not adequately focused on the identification issue lacks merit, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sua sponte give an instruction in this particular case.
Thus, we affirm Cabagbag’s Judgment of Conviction and Probation and Sentence filed on July 19, 2010. Because Cabagbag’s judgment of conviction is affirmed, we affirm the ICA’s judgment on appeal for the reasons set forth in this opinion.
PART III: DISSENT TO (1) REQUIRING THAT DEFENDANTS REQUEST EYEWITNESS INSTRUCTION AND (2) PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF INSTRUCTION REQUIREMENT